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ABSTRACT
BEYOND BIOLOGY: BASES FOR A CHILD-CENTERED AND FUNCTIONAL
ACCOUNT OF PARENTHOOD

By
Jacob M Kohlhaas
December 2015

Dissertation supervised by Darlene Fozard Weaver
This dissertation argues that the presently influential Catholic theological account
of parenthood is indebted to an essentialist theory of gender and the system of sexual
ethical reasoning it produces. In consideration of the family, Catholicism tends to favor
the differentiated gender roles of the father as the primary financial provider and the
mother as the primary caregiver. Though such thinking is often justified as natural or
traditional, it relies heavily upon a post-Victorian social context. This gender
complementarity is often accompanied by an idealization of the autonomous biologicalnuclear family. This family is autonomous in granting parents alone direct responsibility
for the household and certain rights to privacy; biological in assuming continuity among
genetic, gestational, and social parenthood; and nuclear in centering on a married couple
without essential bonds beyond the parent-parent and parent-child relationships.

iv

Importantly, this theory of gender and human sexuality appears not only to reject
voluntary participation in placing children with same-sex partners, but so privileges the
biological family that it may undermine Catholic participation in, and theological
reflection on, adoption more generally. This approach produces a constricted theology of
parenthood which governs thought on childrearing, yet does not meaningfully engage the
Catholic Church’s long and diverse history of orphan care and does little to integrate
contemporary social scientific studies of child wellbeing.
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Case Study: Catholic Charities v The State of Illinois et al.
On June 7, 2011, Catholic Charities of the Illinois dioceses of Springfield, Peoria
and Joliet filed suit against the state Attorney General and Department of Child and
Family Services (DCFS). Their lawsuit sought to establish the agencies’ good standing
under the Illinois Human Rights Act despite their practice of refusing children placements
with cohabitating and unmarried heterosexual or homosexual couples.1 The suit came in
response to both a March, 2011 complaint to the Attorney General’s office alleging
discriminatory practices as well as the state’s interpretation of the Illinois Religious
Freedom Protection and Civil Unions Act, which had taken effect on June 1, 2011.2 This
act created a state-recognized civil institution for same-sex or different-sex partners very
similar to marriage; though it avoided certain terms (spouse, marriage, etc.3) which had
been defined by the federal Defense of Marriage Act of 1996.4 Under the DCFS’s
interpretation, these civil unions, though not considered marriages, could not be subject
to discrimination in preference for marriage. Catholic Charities’ distinguished between
civil unions and marriage in its placements by refusing placements for partners in civil
unions.

1

Cf. “Catholic Charities v State of Illinois et al,” The Thomas More Society, (June 7 – November
14, 2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/cases/closed-cases/catholic-charities-v-state-of-illinois-etal/press-releases/ This site contains chronological documentation of the developments of this lawsuit
through press releases and relevant materials.
2
“Illinois Religious Freedom Protection and Civil Unions Act,” Illinois General Assembly, (Jun.
1, 2011) http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=3294&ChapterID=59.
3

Richard A. Wilson. “Family Law: A Guide to the New Illinois Civil Union Law,” Illinois State
Bar Association, 99 no. 5 (May 2011), 232.
4

“Defense of Marriage Act,” U.S. Government Printing Office, (Sept. 12, 1996)
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-104hr3396enr/pdf/BILLS-104hr3396enr.pdf.
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In letters to Catholic Charities on July 8, the Illinois Attorney General stated that,
because these agencies had made clear their intention not to comply with the Civil Union
Act, their state contracts would not be renewed and existing DCFS cases would be
transitioned to other agencies.5 On July 12, a judge granted a preliminary injunction to
allow a continuation of existing relations between the state and these agencies, including
the referral of new cases. Shortly thereafter, Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois,
associated with the Diocese of Bellevue joined the lawsuit.6
On August 18, 2011 the court ruled that the state of Illinois was not obligated to
renew its contracts with these agencies. Representatives of the agencies argued the case
on the grounds of religious freedom and the Attorney General’s faulty interpretation of
the Civil Unions Act in light of the Illinois Human Rights Act. However, the court did not
consider the state’s motivation for withholding contracts to be centrally significant.
Instead it focused on the obligations that might bind the state to contract with a specific
party. Despite the DCFS’ own high rating of these agencies and more than forty years of
partnership with the state,7 the court found that the plaintiffs could not claim the right to a
government contract in the absence of a legally recognized property right.8 In response to

5
Erwin McEwen, “FY12 Foster Care and Adoption Contracts,” scribd.com
http://www.scribd.com/doc/59782549/Catholic-Charities-Foster-Care-and-Adoption-Contracts-IllinoisDepartment-of-Children-Family-Services-Letter.
6

“Highly Ranked Catholic Adoption/Foster Care Agency Serving Southern Illinois Joins Catholic
Charities Lawsuit to Continue to Serve Children’s Best Interests,” The Thomas More Society, (June 26,
2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/2011/07/26/highly-ranked-catholic-adoptionfoster-care-agencyserving-southern-illinois-joins-catholic-charities-lawsuit-to-continue-to-serve-childrens-best-interests/.
7
Maryann Medlin, “Illinois Bishops Announce Shutdown of Adoption Services,” Catholic News
Agency. (15 Nov. 2011).
8

In effect, because no formal agreement bound the state to future contracts, the relationship was
on a year-to-year basis, though this was clearly not the informal understanding. To allow an informal
understanding the standing to obligate future contracts would have set a potentially dangerous precedent for
the state. John Schmidt, “Summary Court Order,” scribd.com (August 18, 2011)
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this ruling, Bishop Jenky of Peoria lamented that a compromise was not reached,
especially as it was the state’s interpretation of the Civil Unions Act, not the wording of
the act itself, which had forced the partnership to end.9 The plaintiffs sought to appeal the
decision and stall the state’s reassignment of children to other providers. By November,
after substantial transitions of cases away from the agencies had taken place, the outcome
was inevitable. The Thomas More Society, representing the agencies, filed motion to
dismiss the case.10
Catholic adoption agencies responded differently in the aftermath. In the dioceses
Springfield and Joliet, adoption services by Catholic Charities ended, though other family
services continued.11 By discontinuing adoption services the agencies avoided having to
either operate without public contracts or comply with the new legislation. Adoption
services in the dioceses of Peoria and Bellevue chose to disaffiliate with the Catholic
Church in order to comply with the DCFS’s interpretation of state law. In the Diocese of
Bellevue, Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois became Christian Social Services

http://www.scribd.com/doc/62597962/Illinois-Circuit-Court-Summary-Judgment-Order-in-CatholicCharities-Foster-Care-Adoption-Services-Case.
9

Daniel Jenky, “Statement by the Most Reverend Jenky, Bishop of the Diocese of Peoria,
Regarding the Court Decision Made by Judge John Schmidt in Sangamon County,” The Thomas More
Society , (August 18, 2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/2011/08/22/statement-by-the-mostreverend-jenky-bishop-of-the-diocese-of-peoria-regarding-the-court-decision-made-by-judge-johnschmidt-in-sangamon-county/.
10

“After 90 Years, Catholic Charities Foster Care Will Cease in Illinois,” The Thomas More
Society, (November 14, 2011) https://www.thomasmoresociety.org/2011/11/14/after-90-years-catholiccharities-foster-care-will-cease-in-illinois-states-action-to-remove-children-from-charities-care-forcescessation-of-lawsuit/.
11

Cf. “Catholic Charities Programs.” Catholic Charities Diocese of Springfield
http://www.cc.dio.org/programs.htm and “Programs and Services.” Catholic Charities Diocese of Joliet
http://www.cc-doj.org/programs.htm.
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of Illinois.12 In the Diocese of Peoria, the adoption arm of Catholic Charities separated
from the larger organization and became the Center for Youth and Family Solutions.13
Both of these new agencies operate under the state’s new guidelines and ceased ranking
placements by marital and civil union status. Finally, the diocese of Rockford and
Archdiocese of Chicago, which had ended adoption services prior to the Civil Unions Act
in 201114 and 200715 respectively, both restarted adoption services.16 These agencies are
inspected and licensed by the state of Illinois, but are not reliant upon state funding.
Independence of state contracts allows these agencies to restrict placement applicants to
heterosexual married couples alone; going beyond the previously accepted practice of
admitting single applicants. Thus, three resolutions emerged; ending adoption services,
disaffiliation from the Catholic Church, and financial independence from the state.
Other faith-based adoption services were also affected by the state’s application
of the Civil Unions Act. Evangelical Child and Family Agency (ECFA) did not have its
state contracts renewed, but continued independently. This new status allows ECFA to

12

Unlike in the other Illinois dioceses, Adoption was not run through Catholic Charities in
Southern Illinois. Cf. “Adoption,” Christian Social Services of Illinois,
http://www.cssil.org/programs/adoption.aspx.
13

“Adoption Services,” Center for Youth and Family Solutions,
http://cyfsolutions.org/services/adoption-services.
14

The Diocese of Rockford had announced its discontinuation of adoption services prior to the
Civil Unions Act taking effect. Manya A. Brachear, “Catholic Charities of Rockford Ends Foster Care,
Adoption Services,” Chicago Tribune (May 26. 2011) http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-0526/news/ct-met-rockford-catholic-charities-st20110526_1_catholic-charities-adoption-services-care-andadoption.
15

Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Chicago ended its services in 2007 for financial

reasons.
16

Cf. “Adoption Services Available,” Diocese of Rockford Catholic Charities,
http://catholiccharities.rockforddiocese.org/adoptionservices and “Adoption,” The Catholic Charities of the
Archdiocese of Chicago, http://www.catholiccharities.net/services/adoption/.

xiv

restrict applicants to active members in Evangelical congregations alone (it allows single
applicants).17 Lutheran Family and Child Services (LFCS), which is recognized by the
Lutheran Church Missouri Synod, formerly restricted applicants to married couples but
chose to adjust its practice to retain state contracts.18

Raising Questions
Numerous observations can be made from this case study, which suggest much
larger questions about the family, the needs of children, and the role of parents are
understood in Catholic tradition and American culture. In an ironic twist, the state of
Illinois’ attempt to require broader placements led to an increased number of independent
agencies with more restricted standards than before. Catholic agencies began to require
marriage while the ECFA began to require a religious affiliation. Interestingly, the
counter-arguments of the religious organizations appealed to faith commitments not only
to reject the states’ new requirements but implicated practices in which they themselves
had earlier participated.

Relationship of Church and State
In 2012, a nationwide debate about religious freedom arose in response to the
department of Health and Human Services’ decision to require health insurance coverage
of contraceptives for most religiously affiliated employers under the Patient Protection

17

Cf. “Adoption Program Information, Policies and Fees,” Evangelical Child and Family Agency,
http://www.evancfa.org/Adoption/adoprograminfo.htm#Basic_Eligibility_Criteria.
18

Cf. “Adoption,” Lutheran Child and Family Services, http://www.lcfs.org/page.aspx?pid=186.
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and Affordable Care Act of 2010. The debate was championed by the United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) and the fate of adoption services in Illinois
became an important reference point for perceived state intervention and compulsion in
religious matters.19 Documents from the USCCB suggest that the discontinuation of
adoption services was the direct result of laws that forcefully intruded upon the
conscience-bound beliefs of religious organizations.20 However, these documents do not
mention Catholic Charities’ limited, but voluntary participation in same-sex adoptive
placements throughout the preceding decades, as well as the very recent developments in
Catholic teaching which had ended these practices.
In recent years, Catholic Charities of Boston and of San Francisco ended adoption
services in response to legislation similar to that in Illinois. However, prior to 2006,
Catholic Charities in both cities voluntarily placed a limited number of particularly
challenging children with same-sex partners. In all, Catholic Charities of Boston placed
thirteen children in the care of same-sex couples over a twenty year period.21 Catholic
Charities of San Francisco placed five children with same-sex couples between 2000 and
2006.22 Cardinal William Levada, former archbishop of San Francisco and former Prefect

19

United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Ad Hoc Committee for Religious Liberty, “Our
First, Most Cherished Liberty: A Statement on Religious Liberty,” USCCB, (March, 2012)
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Our-First-Most-Cherished-Liberty-Apr126-12-12.pdf.
20

Ibid., Cf. United States Catholic Bishops, “Discrimination against Catholic Adoption Services,”
USCCB, (Summer 2012) http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/fortnight-for-freedom/
upload/Catholic-Adoption-Services.pdf.
21
Jerry Filteau, “Catholic Charities in Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services,” Catholic
News Service, (March 13, 2006) http://www.catholicnews.com/data/stories/cns/0601456.htm.
22

Wyatt Buchanan, “Catholic Charity Might Stop Adoptions / Vatican Prohibits Placement with
Same-Sex Couples” SFGate, (March 11, 2006) http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/SAN-FRANCISCOCatholic-charity-might-stop-2539650.php.

xvi

of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF), had been aware of three of these
placements. Describing these decisions, he explained that, at the time, these were
considered exceptional circumstances in which prudential considerations of the children’s
needs warranted such actions.23
That Catholic adoption agencies had earlier voluntarily placed children with
same-sex partners suggests that new legislation was not the only cause for ending this
public-private partnership; religious developments occurred as well. New legislation in
Massachusetts, San Francisco, Illinois and Washington D.C. compelled Catholic agencies
desiring state contracts to cease prioritizing married applicants over those in civil unions,
including same-sex couples. Prior to this, Catholic agencies consistently held suitable
married heterosexual couples as ideal candidates, but allowed for same-sex partners and
single candidates as less preferable placement options. These lesser candidates were
turned to, on occasion, with particularly hard to place children. This hierarchy reflected
religious convictions about familial ideals and had been legally acceptable.24 Even after
new legislation passed, Catholic adoption agencies’ religious affiliation could have
provided grounds for exemption if this was not seen to conflict with other goods. In
Illinois, it was the Attorney General’s interpretation of the law, not the law itself, which
judged equal treatment of citizens as an overriding concern against religious exemptions.

23

Filteau, “Catholic Charities in Boston Archdiocese to End Adoption Services.”

24

In 1992, the CDF expressed concern over legislative protections for non-discrimination of
homosexual persons and raised concerns about the possible implications for adoption and foster care. Still
the document did not directly prohibit Catholic participation in same-sex adoption placements. Cf.
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative
Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 24, 1992)
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_19920724_homose
xual-persons_en.html.
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Religiously, Catholic involvement in adoptions by same-sex couples became
more restricted after 2003 with the CDF’s, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give
Legal Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons.” This document coupled its
concern with legalization of same-sex marriage with unease that such couples would then
be allowed to adopt children. The document asserts that placing children in the care of
same-sex partners “creates obstacles in the normal development of children” and as such
“would actually mean doing violence to these children.”25 This judgment did not
explicitly prohibit all Catholic participation in same-sex adoption. It did, however,
describe the action as “gravely immoral.”26 This indicates that it is a mortal sin, but does
not clarify whether circumstances might ever permit the act either as a lesser evil or as an
‘indirect’ consequence of attaining an immediate good. In some situations, prolonged
foster care may leave children without many of the essential aspects of a stable family
that have also been enumerated by Catholic leaders as lacking in same-sex relationships.
Could this, under certain circumstances, warrant placements with same-sex couples?
Such was the prudential judgment made by Archbishop William Levada in San
Francisco. In a 2006 letter to the Archdiocese of San Francisco, the CDF clarified that the
earlier statement did in fact prohibit all direct participation in same-sex adoption
placements. Remarkably, this judgment was written by the newly appointed Prefect of the
CDF and Cardinal-elect, William Levada.27

25

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal
Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 31, 2003)
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html, 7.3.
26

Ibid.

27

Cardinal Levada sent a letter to his former diocese on March 11, 2006 stating that Catholic
Charities of San Francisco should discontinue placing children with same-sex partners. Three such
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Developments in Catholic Teaching
The case study above raises questions concerning the role of gender in a Catholic
theology of parenthood, especially in terms of the importance of sexual complementary
among caregivers for healthy child development,28 the relative scope of who can be
properly considered a parent in Catholic thought, and what principle lies behind the
current practice of accepting single-parent applicants but not same-sex partners. Related
to this last point, it might also be asked what role the presumption of a sexual relationship
has in evaluating fitness for parenthood. Questions could also be raised concerning how
such developments have transformed Catholic conceptions of the family. Might
opposition to same-sex adoption implicate other forms of non-biological parenthood?

placements had taken place with his knowledge while he was archbishop, but in light of the CDF’s teaching
of 2003, he stated that all bishops were to follow this standard. Recently elected Archbishop George
Niederauer confirmed this new approach a few days later. In August, 2006, Catholic Charities decided to
continue adoption services by providing employees to staff California Kids Connection, a website that
provided a database for matching children and adults in California’s adoption system. This allowed
Catholic Charities to continue involvement in adoption placements, without undertaking placements itself.
Interestingly this greatly expanded the number of adoption cases Catholic Charities was involved in, as
well as the percentage involving same-sex couples. On October 12, 2008 the partnership was unexpectedly
dissolved, following a budget shortfall in the San Francisco diocese and a campaign by Family Builders by
Adoption, the owner of California Kids Connection, to increase adoptions by same-sex couples; which had
recently hit 88%. Cf. “Catholic Charities in San Francisco Severs Links to Homosexual Adoptions,”
Catholic News Agency, (October 5, 2008)
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholic_charities_in_san_francisco_severs_links_to_homosexu
al_adoptions/ and Valerie Schmalz, “SF Catholic Charities Cuts Ties to Homosexual Adoptions,” Our
Sunday Visitor, (October 12, 2008) http://www.osv.com/tabid/7621/itemid/4093/Catholic-Charities-cutshomosexual-adoptionties.aspxhttp://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/catholic_charities_in_san_francisco_severs_links_to_h
omosexual_adoptions/.
28

Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, “Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal
Recognition to Unions between Homosexual Persons,” Vatican, (July 31, 2003)
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html, 7.3.
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And does a presumption of biological normativity restrict potential caregivers for
children in need?

The Best Interest of Children and Adult Capabilities
A final point to consider in relation to this case is the way in which it portrays
both children’s needs and adult capabilities to provide care for children. Both sides
represented in the case study above asserted that their position worked in the best
interests of children. For example, from the state of Illinois’ perspective, implementing
the law in the manner it did assured the maximum number of suitable placement families.
From the Catholic perspective, refusal to abide by the new laws was founded on a
commitment to privilege the family form most conducive to healthy child development.
Still, neither side convincingly promoted children’s needs as their primary consideration.
Proponents of Illinois’ legislation were clearly concerned with non-discrimination of
adults29 while the Catholic agencies were concerned for religious freedom vis-à-vis
developments in magisterial teaching.30
Closer consideration of the Catholic theological argument yields a number of
concerns related to its method. For example, the CDF claims that “experience” attests to
the deleterious effects of childrearing without parental complementarity, yet neither
supports this claim further nor convincingly demonstrates interest in engaging scholarly
research on the experience of parents and children in same-sex households. In addition,
the magisterial position tends towards making categorical objections which can create

29

Cf. Brachear, “Catholic Charities of Rockford Ends Foster Care, Adoption Services.”

30

Medlin, “Illinois Bishops Announce Shutdown of Adoption Services.”

xx

challenges for application. For example, Adoption placements in the US have layers of
processes and documentation designed to match children with specific needs to families
with specific capabilities. Categorical dismissal of certain family forms appears to run
contrary to a system that relies on references, home studies, and other case-by-case
evaluations to determine fitness for placement. Interestingly, this case-by-case approach
was also the method that characterized limited participation in adoption placements with
same-sex couples by Catholic agencies prior to 2006. Moreover, further concerns
include: what concepts of the child and children’s needs are being assumed by the
magisterium? How does categorical denial of certain family forms affect adoption
processes? What conception of parenthood is being assumed? What specific capabilities
are required to parent? And are any individuals categorically unable to fulfill these?

Introduction to the Research
While speedy placement in permanent homes is a demonstrated benefit to the
wellbeing of adoptees,31 placing children in the care of same-sex couples violates
Catholic teaching, which asserts that every child has a right to a family that is founded on
marriage.32 Recent developments have left Catholic agencies in between a legal
understanding of family that supports equal protection for same-sex spouses on one hand

31

David M. Brodzinsky, Expanding Resources for Children III: Research-Based Best Practices In
Adoption By Gays and Lesbians, (New York: Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, 2011), 5., Cf. Kristin
Anderson Moore, et al., “Research Brief: What is ‘Healthy Marriage’? Defining the Concept,” Child
Trends (September 2004),1., and David M. Rubin, et al. “The Impact of Placement Stability on Behavioral
Well-being for Children in Foster Care” Pediatrics Vol. 119 No. 2 (February 1, 2007).
32

Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. “Instruction for Respect of Human Life in Its
Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day.” (Donum vitae) Vatican.
(February 22, 1987), II.A.1.

xxi

and a theological understanding that contends that same-sex partnerships cannot form
families on the other hand. Confronted with these opposing views, many agencies chose
to uphold Catholic teaching and lost the substantial government funding needed to
continue their adoption services.33 The end of the long-standing and biblically mandated
practice of Catholic orphan care in these localities is a cause for concern and raises
serious theological questions.
These decisions to end Catholic adoption services in response to nondiscrimination legislation reflect deeper developments in the Catholic conception of
parenthood. This dissertation will argue that the presently influential Catholic theological
account of parenthood is indebted to an essentialist theory of gender and the system of
sexual ethical reasoning it produces. This essentialist theory conceptualizes maleness and
femaleness as discrete and complementary categories. In consideration of the family,
Catholicism tends to favor the differentiated gender roles of the father as the primary
financial provider and the mother as the primary caregiver.34 Though such thinking is
often justified as natural or traditional, it relies heavily upon a post-Victorian social
context.35 This gender complementarity is often accompanied by an idealization of the

33
Catholic Social Services of Southern Illinois chose to disaffiliate from the Catholic Church and
continues under the name Christian Social Services of Illinois. Adoption agencies of the Missouri Synod
Lutheran Church have continued in compliance with the legislation despite theological disagreements akin
to those of Catholic agencies. All agencies had the option of continuing without state funding, however,
subsisting on private donations was not a realistic alternative for most. “In Illinois, Catholic Charities in
five of the six state dioceses had grown dependent on foster care contracts, receiving 60% to 92% of their
revenues from the state, according to affidavits by the charities’ directors.” Medlin, Par. 15.
34

Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Notes on Moral Theology: 1989; Feminist Ethics,” Theological Studies 51

(1990), 58.
35
Rosemary Radford Reuther, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family, (Boston:
Beacon Press, 2000), 10. Cf. Frances Goldscheider, “Rescuing the Family from the Homophobes and
Antifeminists: Analyzing the Recently Developed and Already Eroding “Traditional” Notions of Family
and Gender,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 64 no. 3 (2014), 1029 – 1044. The article argues that the
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autonomous biological-nuclear family. This family is autonomous in granting parents
alone direct responsibility for the household and certain rights to privacy; biological in
assuming continuity among genetic, gestational, and social parenthood; and nuclear in
centering on a married couple without essential bonds beyond the parent-parent and
parent-child relationships.
Importantly, this theory of gender and human sexuality appears not only to reject
voluntary participation in placing children with same-sex partners, but so privileges the
biological family that it may undermine Catholic participation in, and theological
reflection on, adoption more generally. This approach produces a constricted theology of
parenthood which governs thought on childrearing, yet does not meaningfully engage the
Catholic Church’s long and diverse history of orphan care and does little to integrate
contemporary social scientific studies of child wellbeing. These underlying realities
profoundly influenced the disagreements that arose as a result of non-discrimination
legislation in adoption.
This dissertation will critique magisterial teaching and revisionist theology in
response to a common linear progression from human sexuality, to sexual ethics, to
theology of marriage, to theology of parenthood, in light of the biases and limitations it
presents. Like modern magisterial documents, revisionist Catholic theologians
consistently access theology of parenthood through sexual ethics and, in doing so, tend to
replicate the biological bias of magisterial thought. Treatment of adoption as a peripheral,

specifically the roughly century long interval between the majority of men shifting from agricultural to
non-agricultural employment in the mid to late nineteenth century and the majority of women shifting from
agricultural then domestic work to the pubic labor force in the mid to late twentieth century.
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rather than integral, consideration of the meaning of Christian childrearing is
symptomatic of this approach.
This dissertation contends that the approach common to the magisterium and
revisionist theologians is neither sufficient to respond adequately to contemporary
questions related to non-biological kinship, nor adequately representative of historical
diversities in Christian childrearing. Further, this project will assess resources from
multiple fields of study that intentionally account for non-biological familial
relationships. These will be critically integrated into a more expansive theological
framework from which a broader account of parenthood may be constructed. Such
resources include social scientific studies of child wellbeing, historic resources that
demonstrate contingency and social construction in family and caregiving, and secular
sources that challenge the normativity of biological kinship. In concluding, this project
will assess the extent to which these expanded resources for a theology of parenthood
warrant prudential tolerance of non-discrimination legislation among Catholic adoption
agencies.
The case study above signals the intended scope of the project at hand which is
concerned primarily with the theological nature of parenthood as presented by
contemporary Catholic teaching and theology as well as by the historical evidence of the
Christian tradition. It raises this concern directly in response to questions raised within
the American social context regarding the nature of marriage, the family, and children’s
needs. The reality of same-sex partnerships, marriages, and parenting, are the entry
through which these questions are raised, but not the direct object of inquiry. For this
reason, the research directly considers only those same-sex couples who have children or
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desire to adopt children while many additional concerns found in queer literature and
beyond related to same-sex couples and family formation will not addressed. In addition,
the moral questions concerning the use of assisted reproductive technologies and
surrogacy by same-sex couples, different-sex couples, and single individuals lie beyond
the scope of this project’s concern. Finally, international adoption raises a host of moral
concerns given its history and contemporary economic realities but will not be addressed
in light of the project’s focus on the Western cultural tradition and present American
context. In sum, the project centers on theological consideration of the nature of
parenthood itself as it relates to parental function and children’s needs. For this reason, it
cannot address a number of questions related to means of reproduction and family
formation that are nonetheless important.

Methodology, Extent and Limitations of Research
The methodology of this dissertation will be characterized by a cross-disciplinary
and dialogical approach that critically engages a variety of fields in order to draw upon
expansive and diverse sources of contemporary research on the complex subjects of
gender, family, and parenthood. Evaluations of each field will include both a critical
deconstructive aspect as well as an integrative constructive aspect. The latter will be
characterized by a historically-conscious, personalist, revisionist methodology which
will rest on a conviction that a contemporary theology of parenthood must carefully
consider both the needs and wellbeing of children as well as the potentials and
capabilities of adult caregivers.
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This dialogical methodology will be employed with each of the fields noted above
so as to facilitate a cross-disciplinary critical evaluation of the possibilities, limitations,
strengths, and weaknesses presented by these resources. Historic and empirical research
will be engaged as sources of descriptive information, yet acknowledged as requiring
interpretation to serve a theological argument. Secular research will serve as a valuable
resource for criticisms of biological bias and contemporary reconstructions of family and
parenthood, but particular attention will be paid to ideological and anthropological
foundations. Additionally, in recognition of human flourishing as the central concern of
the Catholic moral tradition, this research proceeds from the conviction that God
proscribes only what is truly not good for humans. This obliges establishing a mutually
critical dialogue between the theological and non-theological sources in order to clarify
and assess the claims of each as complementary contributions towards a suitable
understanding of the human person fully alive.
The critical deconstructive aspect of this research rests on the observation that
both magisterial and revisionist theological accounts of parenthood tend to be drawn out
of sexual-ethical convictions, focused on biological kinship, and lacking sufficient
integration of adoption. It will evaluate assumptions and methodologies in light of these
limitations and will articulate both the problematic and the potentially beneficial aspects
of various theological resources.
The integrative, constructive aspect of this research will place insights from
various fields into conversation so as to suggest broader resources for constructing a
theological account of parenthood. It will take historical variation, development and
contingency as significant for theological reflection, will suggest expanded bases for an
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account of parenthood through an broadened theological anthropology related to both the
adult and child subjects, and will not take the authoritative judgment that homogenital
acts are “objectively evil” as sufficient to end consideration of same-sex caregiving.
Although a consistent methodology will be attempted, this project cannot be
divorced from the specific this project will nonetheless reflect the concerns and context
of its author. As a married, white, Catholic, heterosexual father and educator, my
academic concern for a more adequate contemporary theological account of parenthood
is not without personal interest. During much of the time in which this project was
conceived and written, my wife and I more than once exchanged periods of being
primary caregiver, primary income earner, and both working full-time. My personal
experiences in these negotiated parental roles are not without consequence for the present
study. This research will be presented with a level of academic objectivity and
disinterestedness as well as a willingness to pursue the questions where they lead.
However, much of the motivation behind completing this project stems from personal
recognition of dissonance between Catholic teaching and theological literature and my
own lived experience. As such, my intent is to write a theological exploration of the
subject matter that is reasoned, thorough, and accurate, even as this work cannot be
alienated from who I am as its author.
This project intends to maintain a moderate and pragmatic approach to
contemporary questions concerning diversity in childrearing. It attempts to respect the
convictions of the magisterium in expressing strong concern for recent social
developments, while also articulating resources for a more expansive and nuanced
theology of parenthood that may challenge the bases of these beliefs. This approach is

xxvii

informed largely by my own experiences in the classroom where students generally range
from steadfast religious conservatives, to social progressives, to those who are
disinterested or hostile towards organized religion. In my estimation, these young people,
and broader trends within scholarship and American culture, are raising significant and
challenging questions regarding the meaning of parenthood to which Catholic responses
have often been inadequate. In large part, this is because the religious imagination and
theological framework utilized to respond are too restricted and thereby inform responses
that fail to adequately acknowledge the depth and significance of the questions. When
research for this project first began, I asked a room full of peers why it was that gender
complementarity now functions as a sin qua non for a healthy childrearing in arguments
against same-sex parenthood despite the Catholic Church having maintained a long
tradition of orphan care by women religious that does not arouse similar concern for
sexually complementary. The passionate but disconnected responses I received were
more than enough to convince me that at some point or points important shifts had taken
place in modern Catholic conceptions of parenthood which were worthy of further study.
From this insight this dissertation was born.

Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1: Magisterial Teaching
The first chapter reviews modern magisterial teaching on the family and argues
that the conceptions of parenthood offered are informed by an underlying theory of
gender and human sexuality that promotes a biological bias and produces a constricted
theology of parenthood. Evidence of this includes a tendency in considerations of
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“responsible parenthood” to emphasize sexual ethical standards while directing little
attention the task of childrearing beyond procreation. Moreover, the chapter contends that
modern magisterial teaching is limited by a narrow vision of human adaptability in
caregiving (e.g. no consideration of males as primary caregivers), an inattention to
scientific evidence (e.g. the absence of reference to studies on child wellbeing), a limited
attention to adoption, and a moral evaluation of same-sex parenting that does not
integrate an thorough evaluation of caregiving potential.
On the other hand, the first chapter also contends that many aspects of magisterial
teaching are central for constructing a reappraised theological account of parenthood. For
example, despite being the subject of criticism for his gender theory John Paul II also
surmised that the true meaning of parenthood goes beyond biological kinship, a
commitment that resonates throughout the tradition. Moreover, John Paul II’s
understanding of the social vocation of the family is an important corrective to overly
privatized conceptions. On the whole, the chapter argues that magisterial teaching itself
contains numerous internal sources of correction for the criticisms being leveled, though
these are often underemphasized. For example, conceptions of the family as a learning
and evangelizing community suggest that families might also be evaluated by how they
function over time, despite frequent magisterial emphases on family structure and sexual
ethical norms.

Chapter 2: Revisionist Resources
The second chapter considers contemporary revisionist theological approaches to
family and parenthood. It argues that revisionist theologians provide important
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methodological guides for incorporating secular and empirical perspectives into
theological arguments. However, these sources appear to share in the biological bias of
magisterial teaching despite having more thoroughly incorporated experience as a
resource in producing revised accounts of theological anthropology and sexual ethics. In
this light, the chapter critiques a preoccupation with sexual morality among Catholic
moral theologians. Even as revisionist arguments have challenged magisterial teaching an
underlying approach shapes both which is manifest in a similar inattention to adoption.
The revisionist authors considered tend to criticize magisterial teaching on the family for
its idealism and narrow linking of the nuclear family to gendered parental roles. But
revisionist responses are limited by the tendency to replicate certain lines of thought in
the writings they criticize as well as to assert social scientific data without integrating this
sufficiently into a theological account of parenthood as such. Despite certain limitations,
several revisionist authors provide valuable insights for a theological reconsideration of
parenthood. Drawing from these, the chapter will suggest a constructive understanding of
the family and parenthood that is less attached to sexual ethics and can more adequately
account for adoption, family function, and parental capabilities.

Chapter 3: Historical Resources
This chapter argues that numerous historical resources exist for expanding a
theological conception of parenthood and childrearing. It will argue that the history of
childrearing in the Christian tradition is diverse, complex, and has undergone significant
development. Moreover, it has not always shared the biological bias prevalent in
contemporary thought. This chapter will argue that historically, practices of childrearing
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have often diverged from the complementary two-parent norm based on biological
kinship. It pays particular attention to accepted forms of childrearing, such as orphan care
by vowed religious, that have been viewed as a function of Christian virtue and yet have
lacked parental sexual complementarity. Throughout Christian history, spiritual
understandings of kinship have often served as a powerful resource to support practices
of care, especially in the absence of biological ties. Consequently, the chapter argues that
biological relatedness and the willingness to construct kinship based on other’s needs are
both important to historical Christian conceptions of kinship. While admitting that many
historical experiences in caregiving have been negative, this chapter problematizes overly
simplistic ideals of family and parenthood.

Chapter 4: Social Scientific Resources
While acknowledging the limitations of present research, the fourth chapter will
demonstrate how recent findings of social scientific research support, challenge, and
expand various aspects of Catholic teaching on family function, parenthood and
children’s wellbeing. It observes that, on factors that benefit child wellbeing, Catholic
teaching and contemporary research find significant agreement and children raised by
their biological married parents fair best on average. Likewise, the detriments to child
wellbeing most cited in Catholic teaching largely agree with contemporary research.
Poverty, racial discrimination (present and historical), gender discrimination, divorce and
single-parent families are interconnected realities which have profound negative
consequences for children. Viewing the family from a social perspective, magisterial
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thought appears well supported by observation, yet this general consistency masks
differences in nuance and interpretation.
This chapter contends that, in the realm of moral theology, Catholic teaching is
challenged by empirical research, especially as its underlying theory of essentialist
gender complementarity is confronted with increasing knowledge of human adaptability.
Moreover, its idealization of the nuclear family creates problems in adequately assessing
how social and economic pressures influence family formation, fragmentation, and
function. It is also significant that the only major risk factor for children in Catholic
teaching that is not supported by present research is same-sex parenthood. Using these
observations, the chapter argues that research on the needs and wellbeing of children as
well as on the abilities of adults is a valuable resource for a constructive theological
account of parenthood.

Chapter 5: Resources from the Humanities
The fifth chapter argues that significant resources for theological reflection on
children and parenthood exist within the writings of feminist, philosophical and legal
scholars and that these help address limitations in present theological discourse. The
chapter considers the philosophical foundation for parental responsibilities and argues for
a mixed approach which values both causation as well as voluntary choice. It then
explores both the contributions and limitations of theories of human rights when applied
directly the children and childhood. Further, the chapter considers the contributions
writing on adoptive parenthood make in expanding the notion of parenthood more
generally while also acknowledging significant disagreements within this literature.
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Finally, the chapter considers Capabilities Theory as a means of understanding human
potential and adaptability as related to the function of parenting.
By bringing these sources into conversation with theological commitments, the
chapter argues that parenthood is largely a voluntary as well as a dynamic reality that
changes throughout the course of the parent-child relationship. Nonetheless, it contends
that parenthood relies on both internal individual capabilities as well as external realities.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
The final chapter reviews the arguments made and suggests the bases these may
provide for a contemporary Catholic theological account of parenthood. It then returns to
questions raised by the case study in this Introduction and considers how these bases for a
conception of parenthood might help address present social realities. Here it contends that
rigorous concern for the best interests of children in need of stable, permanent families is
essential and that the importance of the Catholic Church’s involvement in adoption
services for its own identity should not be ignored. Concerns regarding Catholic
responses to mandated non-discrimination legislation for same-sex adopters are offered
which attempt to be both mindful of children’s rights and needs, as well as the
magisterium’s present objections and concerns. This reconsideration is based upon
evaluation of the caregiving potential of same-sex partnerships in distinction from the
moral evaluation of potential sexual acts within such partnerships. The final section of
this chapter outlines potential trajectories for future research that would continue this
project’s line of inquiry. Here it suggests further investigation into the relationship
between conceptions of parenthood and gender, the relationship between sacramental
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marriage and other intimate human partnerships, and the development of moral
theologies that take children seriously as subjects of moral reflection.
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Introduction
This chapter surveys teachings of the Roman Catholic Magisterium on subjects
pertaining to children, parenthood and the family. These documents span from Leo XIII’s
first encyclical on marriage, Arcanum, to the papacy of Benedict XVI and are presented
in three eras. This chapter seeks to demonstrate both consistent themes within this corpus,
as well as developments through time. In particular, it will identify and assess the
influence of an underlying theory of gender and human sexuality within the documents
which promotes a bias towards biological kinship. This bias, in turn, produces a
constricted theology of parenthood that may be insufficient to ground responses to
contemporary challenges. This chapter will also suggest that magisterial teaching holds
many answers to these very limitations, such that underemphasized resources could
inform a more expansive and adequate Catholic theology of parenthood.

Part I: The Modern Magisterium before Vatican II, 1880 – 1958
Historical Overview
Pope Leo XIII’s 1880 encyclical, Arcanum divinae sapientiae, marked the first
papal encyclical devoted entirely to the subject of marriage and family.1 It recounts a
Christian narrative about marriage that will be continually retold in successive teaching.
Namely, the original form of marriage was good in accordance with the divine plan, but
through human sin, suffered corruption; yet marriage was restored by Christ who raised

1

Pius XI, Casti connubii, Vatican. (December 31, 1930) http://www.vatican.va/
holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html, #4.
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the institution to a sacrament.2 Arcanum’s major concerns include the divinely
established hierarchical structure of the family, the church’s role as proclaimer and
protector of divine truths, the benefits of love for marriage and spouses, the proper roles
of church and state in regulating marriage, the contemporary corruption of morals, and
the spread of divorce.3
Half a decade later, Pope Pius XI’s encyclical Casti connubii built upon Arcanum
and established Catholic teaching on marriage and family in a way that, with few
exceptions, was not substantially altered until Vatican II.4 Casti connubii should not be
considered apart from Pius XI’s earlier encyclical on education, Divini illius magistri, of
1929.5 The latter encyclical presupposes and references the former while each relies
heavily upon the same sources; scripture, St Augustine,6 the 1917 Code of Canon Law,

2
Leo XIII. Arcanum divinae sapientiae. Vatican. (February 10, 1880)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_lxiii_enc_10021880_arcanum_en.html, #5 – 8. This corruption is observed most clearly in polygamy and
divorce.
3

See Arcanum, #1 – 2, 11 – 15, and 18 – 34. Two silences are notable. First, Arcanum does not
view female subordination as a result of the fall; instead it is part of the divine plan. Second, Arcanum is
silent about love expressed through sexual intercourse. On the latter, see Robert Obach, The Catholic
Church on Marital Intercourse. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 119.
4
The delay was not least due to World War I, reactions to which occupied much of Benedict XV’s
papacy (1914 – 1922), as well as the relative newness of the subject for papal teaching.
5

Pius XI’s first encyclical Ubi arcano (1922) also lamented the harm the social ills of World War
I had done to Christian families. Quadragesimo anno (1931) and Caritate Christi (1932) consider the
family in relation to social life. The constitution Deus scientiarum Dominus (1931) and the encyclical Ad
catholici sacerdotii (1935) consider the priesthood in relation to the family. Finally, Lux veritatis (1931)
considers the Holy Family as a model for Christian families while the Apostolic Letter Con singular
complacencia (1939) argues for the restoration of the family in light of Christ’s headship and the model
provided by the Holy Family.
6
Direct quotations of Augustine include Casti connubii #6, 17, 53, and 101 and Divini illius
magistri #10, 11, 17, 23, 26, 33, 36, 41, 55, and 98. By comparison, Aquinas appears infrequently (Casti
connubii #6, 70 and 94 and Divini illius magistri #33 and 31). The 15th centenary of Augustine’s death
between the publications of these encyclicals, in 1930, appears to have encouraged this attention to his
thought.
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and the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII.7 Of these, the Code of Canon Law supplies a
juridical understanding of marriage and the obligations of parenthood, clarifies the rights
and duties of the church, and supports existing ecclesial practices.8 Leo XIII’s Rerum
novarum provides limits to the power of the state and helps define state obligations.9
The earlier encyclical, Divini illius magistri, opens with the assertion that the
Church has a special affection for children.10 It then devotes much consideration to the
proper relations of the family, the church and civil society; the three “societies” with
interests in children’s education.11 The encyclical also responds to a number of
contemporary concerns, including the dangers of sex education in schools, co-education,
and Catholic children in non-Catholic schools.12

7

The encyclicals of Leo XIII that are referenced include Arcanum divinae sapientiae (1880),
Nobilissima gallorum gens (1884), Immortale Dei (1885), Libertas (1888), Sapientiae Christianae (1890),
Rerum novarum (1891), and Militantis ecclesiae (1897). Casti connubii also makes frequent reference to
teachings of the Council of Trent. These function similarly to its use of the Code of Canon Law.
8

Pius XI, Divini illius magistri, Vatican. (December 31, 1939)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/ encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121929_divini-illiusmagistri_en.html, #21, 23, 34, 36, 39, and 79. Casti connubii, #6, 17, 39, 82, and 89. Salzman and Lawler
contend that the three descriptions of marriage codified in 1917; marriage as contract, marriage granting
rights to bodies for procreative sexual intercourse, and the primacy of procreation for marriage, are not
drawn explicitly from tradition, but from an influential contemporary book on the subject. “When Piero
Cardinal Gasparri codified Catholic law in the 1917 Code of Canon Law, book 3, title VII, on marriage was
heavily inspired by his influential book on marriage, Tractatus canonicus de matrimonio, published in
1892.” Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, The Sexual Person, Toward a Renewed Catholic
Anthropology. (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 38.
9

Divini illius magistri, #35. Casti connubii, #8, 117, and 118.

10
Divini illius magistri, #1 and 9. After this, the encyclical contains few direct references to
children. When it does (#57ff) it describes children in terms of their limitations, particularly as prone to
vice and in need of discipline.
11

Divini illius magistri, #11.

12

Divini illius magistri, #65, 68, and 79 respectively.
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The first part of the companion encyclical, Casti connubii, is structured according
to Augustine’s goods of marriage: procreation, fidelity and sacrament.13 The second part
responds to challenges facing marriage, including the mass media’s spread of moral
distortion and the growing belief that marriage is not a divinely established institution,
but a human convention with mutable forms and purposes.14 Additionally, the moral
problems of contraception, abortion, and state or personal intervention in the body’s
procreative capabilities are condemned; as are ideologies favoring women’s
emancipation from the domestic sphere and equal social rights with men.15 The
encyclical concludes with a call to return to the divine intention for marriage as
articulated by the Catholic Church. This includes accepting teaching on marriage in its
fullness, improved marriage preparation, supporting family wages for fathers, and
improved church-state cooperation; always in accord with their respective purposes.16
Pope Pius XII assumed the papacy in 1939 and, although he never devoted an
encyclical to marriage and family, his many allocutions to newlyweds and other
occasional speeches demonstrated his great concern for the subject. In these, Pius XII

13

Casti connubii, #11 – 18, 19 – 30, and 31 – 43 respectively.

14
Casti connubii, #47 and 49 respectively. Puis XI was cautious towards then-present
developments in marriage and argues that marriage’s form and purpose are fixed. Individual choice is free
to determine whether and whom a person will marry; but “the nature of matrimony is entirely independent
of the free will of man, so that if one has once contracted matrimony he is thereby subject to its divinely
made laws and its essential properties.” Casti connubii, #6. In this light and reiterating concerns of
Arcanum, marriage’s indissolubility is defended. Casti connubii, #78 – 92.
15

Casti connubii, #53 – 62, 63 – 67, 68 – 71, and 74 – 77 respectively. #59 – 62 contains a
defense of the Catholic Church’s right and ability to define intrinsically evil acts.
16
Casti connubii, #94 – 111, 112 – 115, 117, and 116 – 129 respectively. The topic of family
wages for fathers was reasserted in greater detail the following year in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno
along with the importance of private property. See, Pius XI, Quadragesimo anno, Vatican, (May 15, 1931)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimoanno_en.html, #59 – 76.
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often reiterated the themes of preceding pontiffs. He affirmed the family as the basis for
society with primary rights that oblige social respect and protection.17 Along with the
nascent social encyclical tradition, Pius XII urged familial stability through secure
housing and private property.18 And, like his predecessors, he disdained the increase and
social acceptance of divorce and was critical of mass media’s moral influence. 19
Yet, the frequency and style of Pius XII’s occasional addresses also facilitated
expansions. For example, informed by the new field of genetics, Pius XII regarded the
decision to refrain from biological parenthood due to the probability of passing hereditary
disease as potentially licit, while reminding doctors not to infringe upon the individual
right of procreation.20

Sexual Ethics and Marriage
Casti connubii presumes a sexual ethic but does not develop a methodology in
this regard; though its reliance upon Augustine’s conviction that procreation is the
primary end of sexual intercourse is evident. Rather, Casti connubii is primarily
concerned with correcting particular errors. The encyclical reminds that contraception is

17

Pius XII, “Allocution to Parish Priests and Lenten Preachers of Rome,” February 17, 1945, in
Matrimony, trans. Michael J. Byrnes (Boston: Saint Paul Editions, 1963), 360. And Pius XII, “Radio
Message to the World,” in Matrimony, 353.
18

Pius XII, “Radio Message to the World,” in Matrimony, 330. And “Letter Testes obsequii,” in
Matrimony, 385.
19
Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 346ff. and Pius XII, “Radio Message to
French Families,” in Matrimony, 363.
20

Pius XII, “Allocution to the International Congress of Catholic Doctors,” in Matrimony, 383.
Pius XII also condemned artificial insemination regardless of donor, but with varying reasons. See, Pius
XII “Allocution to the Members of the II World Congress of Fertility and Sterility,” in Matrimony, 482.
And Pius II “Allocution to the Members of the Seventh Congress on Hematology,” in Matrimony, 513.
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regarded by God as a “horrible crime and at times [God] has punished it with death.”21
This condemnation of contraception further appropriates the “uninterrupted Christian
tradition” to declare such acts an offenses against both divine and nature law.22
Further reflecting its Augustinian foundations, Casti connubii presents sexual
intercourse as the means of transmission for original sin with potential moral goodness
only within marriage when directed towards the procreation and education of children.23
The encyclical is wary of sexual pleasure; spiritualizing its description of spousal love
and warning spouses against loving “as adulterers love.”24
Pius XII did not substantially depart from his processor’s understanding of sexual
intercourse, save for his historically significant judgment that periodic abstinence could
be a licit means of regulating childbirth under strictly limited conditions.25 The relation of
this judgment to Casti connubii is not entirely settled. Many view Casti connubii’s moral
acceptance of spouses who “use their right in the proper manner although on account of
natural reasons either of time or of certain defects, new life cannot be brought forth” as

21

Casti connubii, #55. This is in reference to “Onanism.” In subsequent decades the consensus
among biblical scholars developed towards regarding Onan’s crime as his disobedience of his father and
failure to honor his brother through his obligation to produce children as heirs. “Onanism” is now generally
understood as the means by which Onan made himself the object of harsh divine judgment, but not the full
moral content of his sin; although in moral methodologies that closely link act and intention, Onan’s
contraceptive act remains sinful in itself even as it carries further moral implications given his obligations.
22

Casti connubii, #56. Historically, contraception was viewed as a crime against marriage,
whereas abortion was considered a crime against created life and therefore God. This notwithstanding, here
Pius XI asserts contraception as an abrogation of natural law.
23

Casti connubii, #14 and 17.

24
Casti connubii, #23. “When taking into account the whole papal letter, the spiritual dimension of
marital love seems to be placed in a relationship of opposition to the bodily expression of that same love.”
Obach, 135.
25

Pius XII, “Allocution to the Midwives,” in Matrimony, 424. This is reaffirmed in Pius XII,
“Allocution to Associations of the Large Families,” in Matrimony, 440.
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the basis of Pius XII’s development.26 Yet this passage seems evidently directed at the
elderly and infertile who are allowed to contract marriage in the Church, a point of
tradition defended by Augustine. Further Pius XI’s tendency to justify sex through
procreation and Casti connubii’s later assertion, within an extended consideration of
moral marriage preparation, that knowledge of physiology ought not be used for “sinning
in a subtle way” suggest that he may not have been inclined to agree with his successor.27
Pius XI identified procreation as the primary end of sexual intercourse but in
Casti connubii surmised that procreation is the primary end of marriage only from a
certain restricted perspective. From another perspective, the relationship of husband and
wife may be taken as primary.28 While procreation and education remains the primary
end of marriage, the mutual aid of spouses may be considered the “chief reason and

26

Casti connubii, 59.

27
Casti connubii, 108. Obach takes this statement to be an allusion to the rhythm method
consistent with Augustine’s rejection of periodic abstinence in his opposition to the Manichees; although
until the twentieth century this was a theoretical debate only. (See Obach, 149., Cf. Augustine “On the
Morals of the Manichees.” And Peter Hebblethwaite, Paul VI: The First Modern Pope (New York: Paulist
Press) 298.) The clear majority both within the Magisterium and among theologians has been to posit
continuity between Pius XI’s and Pius XII’s teachings and posit Casti connubii #59 as setting the
foundation for Pius XII’s judgment. (Ramón García de Haro, Marriage and the Family in the Documents of
the Magisterium, 2nd ed. trans. William E. May (San Francisco, Ignatius Press, 1993), 134. Margaret A.
Farley, Just Love; A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics. (New York: Continuum, 2010), 47.) This
view is historically confirmed by moral approval of periodic abstinence as a method of birth control in
seminary moral manuals such as Theologiae Moralis Summa of 1958 and popular marriage handbooks such
as The Rhythm of Sterility and Fertility in Women, by Leo J. Latz, M.D. of 1932. Moreover, the Sacred
Penitentiary approved of periodic abstinence in responses to confessors in both 1860 and 1932. The reason
for Casti connubii’s avoidance of clear judgment on this topic is usually attributed to limited information,
however, as the dates above make clear it was clearly a topic of discussion in the early 1930’s. I am
grateful for the insight and patience of Bernard G. Prusak, Ph.D. in helping to clarify this history for me.
28
Casti connubii, #24. This reflects the thought of Leo XIII in Arcanum “Not only, in strict truth,
was marriage instituted for the propagation of the human race, but also that the lives of husbands and wives
might be made better and happier.” Arcanum, #26. This non-hierarchical perspective follows from Aquinas
who argues that love is the form of marriage while procreation is marriage’s end. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, 3, q. 29, a. 2. Cf. de Haro, 116 – 117. Here the differentiation is described in terms of form and
principle.
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purpose of matrimony.”29 This coincides with Leo XIII’s perspective but stands in some
tension with the 1917 Code of Canon Law where these goods are presented in a
hierarchy.30 Later, in 1944, the Holy Office judged that all other ends are “essentially
subordinate”31 to procreation and education; a judgment confirmed by Pius XII.32 The
tension between these teachings appears largely indebted to differences in Augustine’s
and Aquinas’ frameworks for marriage, even as it is also influenced by the legalism of
Pre-Vatican II Catholic moral theology.33

Gender and Family Structure
Throughout this period, an essentialist theory of gender, accompanied by a
presumption of male normativity, underlies all teachings on marriage and family. 34 All

29

Casti connubii, 24. Further relativizing the primacy of procreation for marriage is the
encyclical’s reaffirmation that sterility cannot be the grounds for a divorce due to the indissolubility of
marriage in accord with its sacramental nature. Casti connubii, #36.
30

Canon 1013 states “The primary end of marriage is the procreation and nurture of children; its
secondary end is mutual help and the remedying of concupiscence.” Obach, 119.
31

The Rota asserted that marriage has both a primary and secondary end and this ordering is
attested to by numerous popes, theologians, canonists and moralists as well as recorded in Canon Law. The
primary end of marriage is the procreation and education of children, the secondary is mutual aid and a
remedy for concupiscence. The Rota contends that, because the rights of mutual aid and common living are
“intrinsically dependent” on the right to “acts of generation,” the ordering of the ends of marriage is certain
in as much as the secondary is clearly dependent upon the primary. Holy Roman Rota, “The Order of the
Purposes of Matrimony,” in Matrimony, 553.
32

“Now, the truth is that matrimony… has not as a primary and intimate end the personal
perfection of the married couple but the procreation and upbringing of a new life… This is true of every
marriage, even if no offspring result.” Pius XII, “Allocution to Midwives,” in Matrimony, 424.
33

Much of the debate surrounds the use of terms and the significance of what is and is not made
explicit. Suffice to say, in the early to mid-twentieth century it was possible to describe the value of
marriage both in terms of a hierarchy of ends and in terms of goods which allowed for different orderings
in response to different ways of inquiring into marriage’s values and purposes. The legalist responses of
Vatican officials were in no small part reactionary to perceived innovations in moral theology by authors
such as Doms and Von Hildebrand. See Salzman and Lawler, 40.
34

Bernard Cooke explains “The encyclical was promulgated at a time when the long-standing
belief in the dominant role of the husband was generally taken for granted… With few exceptions, the
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popes presented above were explicitly opposed to women’s social equality and
participation in the public sphere. Casti connubii describes these movements as
“unnatural,” in support of a “false liberty,” and failing to recognize the natural
distinctions and complementarity of the sexes. Further, they are claimed to lead to
women’s own harm, ultimately making them slaves and mere instruments of men.
Instead, the domestic sphere is women’s proper place where, Casti connubii explains, she
has been raised by the Gospel to a “truly regal throne” even as she still owes man
“honorable and trusting obedience.”35 Casti connubii devotes a great deal of attention to
the domestic realm of women in comparison to men’s public realm, which is only
explicitly attended to in calling for a family wage.36
Strong opposition to coeducation further demonstrates the era’s concern for
distinct gendered spheres. Divini illius magistri argues that “there is not in nature itself…
in temperament, in abilities, anything to suggest that there can be or ought to be
promiscuity, and much less equality, in the training of the two sexes.” As each is destined
for dichotomous vocations, coeducation is not only senseless, but potentially harmful in
as much as the “perfect union of the sexes” rightly occurs only in matrimony. Special
attention is given to the dangers coeducation poses for female modesty. 37

patriarchal structures and presuppositions of society in general and of the church in particular remained
unrecognized and unchallenged.” Bernard Cooke, “Casti connubii to Gaudium et spes” in, Marriage in the
Catholic Tradition, eds. Todd A. Salzman, Thomas M. Kelly and John J. O’Keefe (New York: Crossroad
Publishing, 2004), 110.
35

Casti connubii, #74 and 75.

36

Ibid., #117.

37

Divini illius magistri, #68.
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Within the home, a divinely established hierarchy is consistently defended.38 In
Casti connubii, the analogous bond between Christ and the Church, which is presented so
as to directly associate husbands with Christ and wives with the Church, serves as a basis
for the husband’s primacy in authority.39 However, no wife is compelled to comply with
her husband’s demands if they are not in accord with reason or her own dignity. Further,
Casti connubii offers a complementarity of primacies; “For if the man is the head, the
woman is the heart, and as he occupies the chief place in ruling, so she may and ought to
claim for herself the chief place in love.”40
A presumption of the private, biological-nuclear family as normative also
underlies teachings of the era.41 With the sole exception of Casti connubii’s affirmation
of a woman’s right to head the family if a husband is lax or absent, neither of Pius XI’s
encyclicals consider the family beyond this norm.42
The ideal family is also large. Pius XII is most explicit on this and connected
large families to the virtues of faith and generosity.43 Yet, Pius XII also relativized the

38

Pius XII, “Allocution to Fathers of Families,” in Matrimony, 397.

39

Casti connubii, #23 and 26.

40

Ibid., #27.

41

By defending the family as an institution founded upon the partnership of a man and women,
naturally directed towards procreation and education, and spiritually directed to the mutual benefit of
spouses, Divini illius magistri gives grounds for this claim. The prevailing assumptions of the time likely
provided no need to define of the family, although World War I certainly left many families without fathers
throughout Europe. If Pius XI had any intent of including extended kinship or non-biological kinship
within his conception of the family, he left little evidence.
42

Despite the divinely ordained headship of the male in the family, this position may be forfeited
through his actions. Thus there exists some flexibility in family structure relative to function, but only in
restricted circumstances.
43

Pius XII, “Allocution to the Associations of the Large Families,” in Matrimony, 440.
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importance of biological kinship much more than his predecessors. For Pius XII, the
primary bond between children and parents was the passing on of faith which “is a
thousand times more precious” than biological parenthood.44 Further, he urged infertile
couples, or those fearful of transmitting hereditary disease, to consider adoption. He
described adoption as “usually crowned with happy results” and free of moral objections,
while qualifying that “the children of Catholic parents be committed to Catholic foster
parents.”45 Yet, Pius XII’s consideration of adoption is neither thorough nor entirely
optimistic. Adding further ambiguity, Pius XII taught that “sterility is very often the
punishment for the sinner.”46

Children, Family and Parenthood
Children, as such, are rarely an explicit consideration during this era.47 Children
are positively described as gifts from God, who are entrusted to their parent’s care and

44

“Above all, remember that when you call your children heirs of your blood, you must refer to
something which is much greater than corporal generation only. You are, and your children ought to be, the
source of a race of saints… men sanctified and raised up to participate in the divine nature by means of
supernatural grace… As a consequence, in baptized people, when one speaks of transmitting inherited
blood to descendants… there is no need to limit the sense of those words to a purely biological and
material element, but it may be extended to that which is, as it were, the nutriative liquid of the intellectual
and spiritual life: the patrimony of faith, virtue, and honor transmitted by parents to their posterity is a
thousand times more precious than the blood-be it ever so rich-infused into their veins.” Pius XII,
“Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 312 – 313. (Italics added)
45

Pius XII, “Allocution to the Members of the Seventh Congress on Hematology,” in Matrimony,

520.
46

Pius XII, “Allocution to Midwives,” in Matrimony, 408. This is likely an allusion to sexually
transmitted disease.
47
A significant exception is the concern shown for children as victims of war; particularly by
Benedict XV during World War I. Outspoken concern to protect children in civil unrest is a continuing
concern that has persisted into the present. See, Charles J. Reid jr, “The Right to Life and Its Application to
the Welfare of Children in Canon Law and the Magisterium of the Catholic Church: 1878 to the Present,”
In The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right. Ed.
Timothy P. Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 142 – 178.
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who must never be considered burdens.48 Additionally, children require both spiritual and
social education.49 More frequently, however, children serve an important conceptual
function, especially in consideration of marital and sexual morality. Sexuality is directed
towards procreation and marriage is largely defined as an institution for raising children;
particularly in reference to children’s need for love and stability.50
Attention to children also frequently assumes a negative tone. In Divini illius
magistri education is connected to gaining control over “evil impulses” which highlights
attention to original sin.51 The same encyclical also recounts the proverb, “Folly is bound
up in the heart of a child and the rod of correction shall drive it away.” Later the
encyclical characterizes children as adults in training who must be directed towards
proper vocations.52 Pius XII paid more attention to the physical, emotional and
intellectual needs of children, than did Pius XI, yet he generally made similar use of his
observations.53

48

Casti connubii, #15 and 53. García de Haro positively summarizes the encyclical’s positions as
follows: “These teachings are inspired by an attitude of concern: children are a gift of God and a precious
good for the family; they strengthen the love and unity between the spouses and are for them a source of
indissoluble joy and at the same time a marvelous way for them to make a generous gift of themselves.
When children are refused because of egoism, the family destroys itself; we ought not forget that the divine
laws regarding marriage are a protection and guide for attaining the goods God wills for the spouses.”
García de Haro, 135.
49

Divini illius magistri, #8.

50

Casti connubii, #16 and 37.

51

Divini illius magistri, #59.

52

Ibid., #68.

53
“[Children] need a happy atmosphere for their healthy development; and it is certain a serene
youth, a harmonious formation and education, are inconceivable without the undoubted fidelity of the
parents. Do not children nourish the bond of this married love?” Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in
Matrimony, 351. Cf. Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, Vatican. (October 20, 1939)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_20101939_summipontificatus_en.html, #90.
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Throughout this era, the family is described as the basis of society and an
“imperfect society” in itself.54 Thus, the family has certain rights in respect to its natural
priority, yet is dependent and directed outward to participation in the ecclesial and civil
societies.
Parents are defined by marriage and the sexually differentiated roles therein.
Parenting itself is at least partially an act of caretaking,55 supervision56 and educating,57
though the details of these functions are generally undeveloped. Pius XII offered high
praise for the task of parenting, calling parenthood a “ministry of Christ” and speaking of
parents as “priests” of their households.58
Pius XII showed particular concern for instructing fathers. He asserted that the
entire health and wellbeing of the family, not only physically, but intellectually and
spiritually, rested upon the virtue and hard work of the father.59 He further likened
fatherhood to God’s original act of creation and added that fatherhood communicates “the
superior life of intelligence and love.”60 Moreover, he suggested that fathers not only

54

Divini illius magistri, #12.

55

Ibid., #32.

56

Casti connubii, #15.

57

Divini illius magistri, #34.

58
“You are, always under the guidance of the priest, the first and closest educators and teachers of
the children of God entrusted and given to you… You are as it were the spiritual precursors, priests
yourselves of the cradle, infancy and childhood, for you must point out to the children the way to heaven.”
Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 318.
59

Pius XII, “Allocution to Fathers of Families,” in Matrimony, 398.

60

Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in Matrimony, 325.
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fulfilled the “priestly” role of parenting, but an “episcopal” role within the home.61
Clearly Pius XII’s concern for fatherhood has implications for motherhood. As he exults
fatherhood and calls men to greater commitment and involvement within their families,
he simultaneously affirms familial hierarchy and female subservience.
Both mothers and fathers are described as holding certain rights and duties in
respect to their children; particularly as regards education, an aspect of marriage’s
primary end.62 Divini illius magistri, upholds Aquinas’ view that a father’s rights over his
children, including the duty to educate, are natural extensions from biological paternity.63
Casti connubii clarifies that God “would have failed to make sufficient provision for
children that had been born… if He had not given to those to whom He had entrusted the
power and right to beget them, the power also and the right to educate them.”64 Thus, by
God’s providence, the biological procreative capacity is said to assure both the right and
capacity of parents to educate their children. Pius XII does not directly reject this notion,

61

Pius XII, Summi Pontificatus, #89.

62

“The principle end of matrimony is not only to procreate children, but also to educate them, and
have them grow in the fear of the Lord and in faith…” Pius XII, “Allocution to Newlyweds,” in
Matrimony, 340. This concern to defend the primacy of parental rights does not extend to considerations of
methods of domestic education. Divini illius magistri, simply refers readers instead to a classic book on the
subject, Silvio Antoniano’s On the Christian Education of Youth of 1583. Divini illius magistri, #72.
63

Divini illius magistri, #33. The document quotes from Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, 2-2, Q. CII,
a. I which reads in part, “Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular
way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises
providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the
principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life:
while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things:
for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a
professor in matters of learning, and so forth.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoligica, First American
Edition. trans. Fathers of the Dominican English Provence (Cincinnati: Benziger,1947).
64

Casti connubii, 16.
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yet his support for adoption implicitly undermines the argument by suggesting that the
capability to parent does not arise through biological procreation alone.

Conclusions
Leo XII’s Arcanum inaugurated a new genre of papal moral teaching focused
specifically on marriage and the family. This occurred within an era, extending from the
implementation of the Council of Trent through Vatican II, in which the Roman
magisterium itself became ever more defensive, authoritarian, and centralized.
Simultaneously, papal engagement in moral teaching significantly increased in scope,
frequency, and detail.65 Each of the Pontiffs considered above presented the propositions
of the magisterium as authoritative and authentic interpretations of God’s will for
humanity with concomitant irreformability.66 Likewise, each claims their universal
applicability; though circumstantial exceptions are occasionally acknowledged.67
Yet the era is not entirely consistent in its developments of these themes.
Certainly, an essentialist understanding of gender with its attendant differentiations in
vocations underlies this teaching, as does a propensity for hierarchical ordering and

65

James F. Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century; From
Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences, (New York: Continuum, 2010), 30. Cf. Charles E. Curran, The
Development of Catholic Moral Theology; Five Strands, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
2013), 176.
66

Casti connubii, #1. Divini illius magistri, #2. Divini illius magistri is more reserved as it seeks
to establish the legitimate cooperation of church, family and society. In contrast, Casti connubii is not
concerned with cooperation but with asserting the divine vision for marriage and family against erroneous
opinions.
67

For example, Divini illius magistri states that, although baptism provides the entry into the
church and salvation, children of non-Christians are not to be baptized, save for rare circumstances. Thus,
despite baptism being a universal good, it is also occasionally withheld in light of the natural rights of
parents. Divini illius magistri, #39.
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assumptions of male normativity. Yet the different methods of articulating marriage’s
values and Pius XII’s acceptance of birth-regulation through periodic abstinence and
relativizing of biological kinship do not fit seamlessly within the tradition.

Part II: Vatican II, 1958 – 1978
Historical Overview
Vatican II’s teaching on marriage and family is largely continuous with earlier
documents and frequently references Pius XI and Pius XII. Several earlier themes are
consistently upheld throughout the period. These include the family as the foundation of
society, the duties required of society by that fact, the primary rights of parents in their
children’s education, and the importance of familial stability.68 The most pronounced
exception to this continuity is a greater appreciation of gender equality within markedly
widened spheres, though this remains framed and conditioned by persistent gender
essentialism.
Pope John XXIII’s most significant contributions were his calling of the council
and significant divergence from his predecessors on the topic of women’s social rights.
Pope Paul VI oversaw the majority of the council as well as the papal birth control

68

John XXIII, Pacem in terris, Vatican, (April 11, 1963)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/ encyclicals/documents/hf_jxxiii_enc_11041963_pacem_en.html, 16, 17. John XXIII, Mater et magistra, Vatican, (May 15, 1961)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jxxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html, 195. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, Vatican, (December 7, 1965)
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html, #52. The importance of private property is also consistently
upheld in this regard, yet Gaudium et spes adds goods and “immaterial things such as professional
capacities.” Gaudium et spes, 13. Repeated threats include polygamy, divorce and non-exclusive sexual
partnerships. See Casti connubii, 73, 78 – 92. and Arcanum, 27 – 34.
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commission in 1963.69 After the council he invested heavily in implementing and guiding
Vatican II’s reforms.

Sexual Ethics and Marriage
The 1960s witnessed growing anxieties over human population growth. Pope
John XXIII responded to these with concern as well as insistence that acceptable
solutions must neither do “violence to man’s essential dignity” nor depend upon “an
utterly materialistic conception of man himself and his life.” Further, he affirmed that
divine laws govern the transmission of human life and must be respected.70 This pattern
of concern for the growing importance of birth regulation balanced against the dictates of
divine law persisted throughout the era and became increasingly linked to the
magisterium’s authority in articulating specific moral norms.71

69

In his oversight of the council, Paul VI habitually intervened in support of the conservative
minority and provided their concerns with additional chances at incorporation into the documents. Yet he
ultimately left the manner of incorporation open to the judgments of the drafting commission. In the
commissions, these suggestions were reinterpreted in light of the existing documents and substantially
softened. Paul VI’s interventions in the council are well documented, as is the circuitous path Father
Ermenegildo Lio’s De Castitate took from a rejected draft document, through its first return as papal modi
in 1965, to finding its expression in Humanae vitae; a connection Lio would celebrate in articles claiming
he had written the “rough draft” of Humanae vitae. See Hebblethwaite, 298 – 300, 444, 470 – 471, 526.
70

Those who disregard this fact “not only offend the divine majesty and degrade themselves and
humanity, they also sap the vitality of the political community of which they are members.” John XXIII,
Mater et magistra, #191 and 194.
71
Not all at Vatican II shared the view that married couples ought to intentionally regulate
childbirths. Cardinal Ottaviani criticized the 1964 draft of what would become Gaudium et spes for
rejecting Catholic spouses’ subservience to “blind instinct” in reproduction. Some also sought to add an
explicit condemnation of sexual intercourse absent a specifically procreative intent into Gaudium et spes.
See John T. Noonan, The Church and Contraception: The Issues at Stake. (New York: Paulist Press, 1967),
18 and 31.
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Gaudium et spes confirmed the rights of spouses to responsibly plan childbirths in
light of familial, social, and ecclesial considerations.72 But, it added, this decision
requires proper moral training, especially as illicit forms of contraception threaten
marriage.73 Thus couples’ rights were framed by the seriousness of the matter and the
potential harm of its misuse. Nonetheless, the document assures, “a true contradiction
cannot exist between the divine laws pertaining to the transmission of life and those
pertaining to authentic conjugal love.”74 Though some of the council fathers attempted to
insert a general condemnation of contraception into Gaudium et spes, the document
reserves this question for a papal decision.
After the council, and a lengthy delay following the commission’s report, Paul
VI’s Humanae vitae defined Catholic teaching on contraception.75 The task of making a
judgment on the question of artificial birth control was neither one Paul VI desired nor
one to which he was naturally well suited.76 Still, Humanae vitae went beyond its
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Gaudium et spes, #50. Here there is an implicit rejection of the intervention of priests or other
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incorporation into the document. Cf. Hebblethwaite, 299., de Haro, 262. And Noonan, 25.
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Gaudium et spes, 51. Gaudium et spes avoids an explicit affirmation of previous teaching on
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connection to Christian families. The extent to which Humanae vitae led to a polemic that effectively
blocked constructive dialogue concerning marriage and family should not be forgotten. Paul VI had desired
to make family the subject of a synod, but was hesitant for fear of reopening the “old wounds just as they
were beginning to heal.” Hebblethwaite, 597.
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Among the principle influences on Paul VI’s decision, was a concern for the role of science in
ethics and a fear of the dangers of “scientism.” Cf. Hebblethwaite, 453 – 478. This was particularly
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immediate task to judge on contraception and offered a broad vision of marital morality
which was informed by concerns of personalist moral methodology such as spousal love
and the dignity of the human person.77 Paul VI amended the final draft of Humanae vitae
by removing references to “mortal sin” and inserting a passage urging compassion for
sinners.78 Yet, the encyclical retained its central conviction that just as intercourse
without consideration of a partner’s will violates the unitive end of marriage, Humanae
vitae teaches, so too does contraceptive intercourse contradict the will of God.79 In the
latter years of his papacy, Paul VI stood behind the judgment of Humanae vitae while its
method was largely echoed in the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s (CDF)
clarification on human sexuality, Persona humana.
Two observations about Paul VI’s publication of Humanae vitae are pertinent.
First it was an exercise in papal authority that was knowingly at odds with widely held
opinions among the Catholic faithful, and, in fact, at various points in direct opposition to
the opinion of the commission’s majority report. Thus, in as much as the encyclical
became a center of controversy, it welded magisterial authority to a particular aspect of

problematic for contraception because the older argument was based on the idea that people do not have
absolute dominion of their bodies. The discovery of fertility cycles decidedly removed conception from an
act of God’s will, to a physical process that could be understood. Thus the argument against dominion had
to be revised in a way that both acknowledged the achievements of human reason while limiting their licit
applications.
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The question is often regarded as concerning the use of artificial methods of contraception by
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approach carries the assumption that the prohibition of contraception has been historically established as
irreformable but is difficult to sustain against the refusal of the council fathers to incorporate a general
condemnation of contraception into Gaudium et spes.
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Paul VI always refused to qualify the encyclical as infallible. Hebblethwaite, 517.
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Ibid., #13. Notably, Humanae vitae extends the prohibition to include acts intended to impede
procreation “either before, at the moment of, or after sexual intercourse.” The addition of “before” includes
the pill as a contraceptive despite it not directly altering the act of intercourse itself.
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sexual ethics. Second, Paul VI’s decision to go beyond a mere judgment on the matter of
contraception80 united Catholic perspectives on marriage to an idea of ‘responsible
parenthood’ inextricably linked to the morality of contraception. Paul VI’s intentions
notwithstanding, the publication of Humanae vitae marks a watershed moment in
Catholic conceptualizations of the family in which biological reproduction and
magisterial authority provide central planks in the conceptual framework.
Seven years after Humanae vitae, the CDF’s Persona humana reiterated several
traditional prohibitions of Catholic sexual morality. With more clarity than Humanae
vitae, the document asserts that its teachings rely upon immutable and timeless principles
common to all humanity; adding that these “in no way owe their origin to a certain type
of culture, but rather to knowledge of the Divine Law and of human nature.”81 Further, it
reaffirmed the tradition that all moral matters in the realm of sexuality are of objective
seriousness.82
The Vatican II era never repeated Pius XI’s epistemologically brazen assertion
that the Vatican observes the world “as from a watchtower” but nonetheless defends the
certainty and objectivity of magisterial teaching; especially in matters of sexual ethics.
And despite Humanae vitae’s claim that the magisterium has always taught concerning
marriage, it cites only one source prior to Arcanum. Throughout this era, the relatively
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new phenomenon of consistent magisterial teaching on marital morality delved into
increasingly controversial subject matters. Simultaneously, the assertion that magisterial
judgments on such matters are derived with certainty from divine law was firmly upheld.
These repeated affirmations implicated the nature of the magisterium’s teaching authority
with the doubts and rebuttals this genre of teaching generated.

The Vatican II era attests to a number of other significant developments as well.
Sex itself is recognized as good and sexual ethics are increasingly framed by the
personalist goods of love, dignity, and human relationship. Meanwhile, the earlier
tendency to judge spousal virtue by the number of children in their care is reformed, yet
persistent.
Both Gaudium et spes and Humanae vitae assert the essential goodness of sexual
intercourse, particularly as it expresses love and strengthens spousal fidelity.83 Gaudium
et spes turns this towards a recognition of the potential harm done by counseling celibacy
within marriage,84 whereas, Humanae vitae considers the harm of the spread of
contraception. The earlier document urges against fear of sex itself, whereas the latter
concerns its proper use.
Humanae vitae’s presentation of responsible parenthood includes the need to
control one’s “innate drives and emotions” as these relate to the “procreative biological
faculties.”85 It teaches that periodic abstinence may help couples grow in self-discipline,
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personal enrichment, mutual respect, awareness of responsibilities, and spiritual
blessings.86 Persona humana also urges a greater appreciation of chastity, which is said
to have particular benefits for marriage as it “increases the human person’s dignity and
enables him to love truly, disinterestedly, unselfishly and with respect for others.”87
Despite the advent of a greater appreciation for the goodness of sex, with Persona
humana the tradition of linking chastity to generosity and lust to selfishness clearly
reemerges within post-Vatican II sexual ethics.
Gaudium et spes also sparked greater attention to the importance of spousal love
in the emerging personalist approach to sexual morality.88 Building upon this, Humanae
vitae explains, through marital love, spouses “perfect one another” and cooperate with
God in producing and raising children.89 Echoing Gaudium et spes, Humanae vitae
describes this love as fully human, an act of free will aimed at human fulfillment, a total
love directed at the beloved for their own sake as a self-gift, and fecund.90 Nonetheless,
the validity of the marriages of infertile couples is clearly and consistently upheld.91
The importance of fecundity for conjugal love is also a repeated point of
emphasis. Gaudium et spes teaches that true conjugal love and “the whole meaning of the
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family life which results from it” is the willingness of spouses to “cooperate with the love
of the Creator and the Savior.”92 Like earlier teachings, Gaudium et spes links
procreation to generosity and praises those who raise large families “suitably.”93 The
inclusion of the modifier is not inconsequential as it suggests that generosity, and by
implication, the quality of spousal love itself, cannot be directly correlated to the number
of children within a family. In a 1960 address to the Roman Rota, John XXIII had earlier
rejected this view by prioritizing parents’ role of educating as a “more noble office”
which “perfects” their role of procreation. This assertion followed a lavish description of
procreation as cooperation with God in which humans give life “to new beings in whom
the life-giving Spirit infuses the powerful principle of immortal life.” And John XXIII
asserted that it is because of the greater nobility of the task of education that marriage
requires stability.94 These views appear to echo Pius XII, but they were not shared among
all bishops before or at Vatican II. Upholding education alongside, and potentially
against, procreation retrieves a traditional but frequently neglected balance between these
goods.95 Moving further in this direction, the severity of conditions that may warrant the
regulation of conception listed by Gaudium et spes is notably softened compared to Pius
XII’s allocution, and includes broader sources of concern.
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Humanae vitae teaches that spouses must respect a hierarchy of obligations to
“God, themselves, their families and human society” in making decisions of family
planning.96 Of these, the first has a unique place in establishing guides and parameters for
a couple’s options. In Humanae vitae, the decision for procreation is cast more positively
than that to delay or not pursue childbirth while large families function as the ideal.97 In
light of the previous and existing disagreements on whether or not the good of education
could alone relativize the good of procreation, the encyclical served to shift greater
concern towards the procreative aspect of parenthood. At the same time, Humanae vitae’s
personalism holds these goods closely together.98 Thus, the emergence of a prioritization
of procreation over education is largely a matter of nuance. But significant factors in this
regard include the extent to which collaboration with the Creator through procreation
becomes an interpretive lens for responsible parenthood as well as the association of
procreation with generosity.

On the topic of marriage, Gaudium et spes repeats a central theme of Casti
connubii; namely, that the institution of marriage was established by the Creator, is based
upon “irrevocable personal consent,” is “unbreakable,” and has been endowed by God
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“with various benefits and purposes.”99 Likewise, Gaudium et spes praises the shared
love of spouses and describes spouses as mutual helpers who grow in perfection together
and strive for “total fidelity.”100 Marriage is described as a distinct form of friendship,
holy, and a vocation.101 And, diverging from the juridical language of the 1917 Code of
Canon Law, Gaudium et spes describes marriage as ‘covenant’ founded in mutual love.102
Additionally, the document is silent on the hierarchy of the ends of marriage, repeatedly
mentions love before procreation, and asserts that both marriage and conjugal love are
ordered towards procreation. 103
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As in pre-Vatican teaching, marital stability remains centrally important,
particularly as it benefits children.104 Yet the goods offered to spouses themselves receive
greater emphasis. For example, Persona humana teaches that human dignity itself
compels sexual intercourse to be limited to the stability of marriage “which establishes a
state of life of capital importance both for the exclusive union of the man and the woman
and for the good of their family and of the human community.”105 Intercourse outside of
marriage can only offer a false conjugal love that is unable “to develop into paternal and
maternal love.” If pregnancy does result, “it will be detrimental to the children, who will
be deprived of the stable environment in which they ought to develop in order to find in it
the way and the means of their insertion into society as a whole.”106

Gender and Family Structure
John XXIII’s 1961 encyclical, Mater et magistra, did not challenge the
hierarchical ordering of the family posited by earlier pontiffs and assumed an all-male
workforce.107 Yet, just two years later and after the opening of the council, Pacem in
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terris optimistically considers the changes in social and family life brought about by
women’s progress; even judging these to have stemmed from women’s recognition of
their own human dignity.108 This claim is remarkable given that both Leo XIII and Pius
XI had argued against women’s participation in the public sphere precisely as a means of
protecting women’s unique dignity.109 Moreover, John XXIII wrote favorably of
women’s increasing claims to social rights and abandonment of contentment with a
“purely passive role.”110
To be sure, John XXIII still conceived of women primarily as wives and mothers
and did not envision their participation in all types or fields of public employment.111
Nonetheless, Pacem in terris laid the foundation for one of this era’s most significant
developments wherein hierarchical conceptions of female subservience are increasingly
replaced by ideals of both public and private equity.112 Of these, women’s role in the
public sphere shows greater signs of conflict, as new assertions of women’s rights to
public participation are balanced against a continuing insistence on women’s primarily
domestic vocation. For example, while women’s participation in public life is
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encouraged, Gravissimum educationis grants that the universal right to education may be
conditioned by gender.113
Gaudium et spes affirmed women’s right to take a more active role in cultural life,
but cautioned that this must be “in accordance with their own nature.”114 In calling for
reforms in the labor force, it assumes women’s presence yet identifies the “new social
relationships between men and women” as a source of familial conflict.115 Likewise, Paul
VI’s apostolic letter, Octogesima adveniens, also looked favorably upon growing social
recognition of women’s “rights to participate in cultural, economic, social and political
life,” while warning against “that false equality which would deny the distinction with
woman’s proper role, which is of such capital importance, at the heart of the family as
well as within society.”116
Within the home, concern to protect men’s and women’s unique vocations is
comparably muted. Gaudium et spes unseats the analogy between the marital bond and
Christ and the Church by affirming the participation of marriage partners in the very
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unity of Christ and the Church.117 Additionally, the former identification of husbands
with Christ and wives with the Church is absent, as are other means of hierarchically
ordering husband over wife.118 Instead, Gaudium et spes repeatedly affirms spousal
equality, which is extended into a condemnation of all discrimination “with respect to the
fundamental rights of the person.”119 Still, an assumption of dichotomous parental roles
persists. Gaudium et spes encourages fathers to be active in their children’s lives, while
children, especially young children, “need the care of their mother at home.” Motherhood
has a “domestic role” that “must be safely preserved, though the legitimate social
progress of women should not be underrated on that account.”120
Persona humana’s articulation of the importance of sexual difference makes
explicit some of the tensions that underlie the era’s attempt to embrace gender equity.
Here, gender is said to condition an individual’s development in numerous ways. In light
of this, justice is served when men and women are treated with equal dignity but also
with respect to their essential differences.121 The document’s insistence on unchanging
norms, as described above, clearly colors how these differences are articulated.
Children, Family and Parenthood
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Gaudium et spes, describes parenthood as a “dignity” and “office” and asserts that
through the “faithfulness and harmony” of their love, married couples can bring about
renewal in society’s appreciation of marriage as well as instruct their own children on the
“dignity, duty and work of married love.”122 Realizing the full potential of the family is
said to depend upon “kindly communion of minds and the joint deliberation of spouses,
as well as the painstaking cooperation of parents in the education of their children.”123
Gravissimum educationis provides more developed teaching on education and
asserts an inalienable human right to education. Notably, earlier adversity to co-education
is absent and a prudent sexual education is now described as appropriate at a certain
age.124 Additionally, the right to a moral education and growth in conscience is upheld as
well as the right of all the baptized to a Christian education. Though the family has the
primary right to educate, help from the whole of society is required.125 Yet the priority of
the family is so strongly affirmed that schools are described as optional “tools” at the
service of the family.126
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The decree Apostolicum actuositatem further explicates the role of the family and
Christian educators in preparing children for vocations. It describes parents as
“cooperators in grace and witnesses of faith for each other, their children, and all others
in their household.” They are the primary evangelizers and role models for their children
who help children discern their vocation.127 Additionally, parents “have the task of
training their children from childhood on to recognize God’s love for all men.”128 The
family is described as both a source of spiritual growth as well as a means for exercising
the apostolate.129 The family fulfills its God-given purpose when, through love and
prayer, it acts as a domestic church, participates in liturgical worship, promotes
hospitality and justice, and undertakes works of service.130
One of Vatican II’s most notable developments is its application of various terms
to describe the family. In lieu of earlier language of a hierarchy and “imperfect
society,”131 the council describes the family as a “school of deeper humanity,”132 “the
primary mother and nurse of [cultural] education,”133 “the first school of the social virtues
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that every society needs,”134 the “foundation of all society”135 an “apprenticeship for the
apostolate,”136 the “domestic church,”137 an “initial seminary”138 and a proclaimer of
“both the present virtues of the Kingdom of God and the hope of a blessed life to
come.”139
In contrast to the many documents of Vatican II which touch on parental and
familial duties, particularly as related to education, Paul VI rarely engaged the subject.
Populorum progressio, for example, is repeatedly silent on the role of the family where
explicit references might be expected. Its concern centers on the individual who is the
“chief architect of his own success or failure” and who may be “helped, and sometimes
hindered, by his teachers and those around him.”140 In fact, it employs the terms “father”,
“mother” and “family” metaphorically (for God, Mary and the Church or the human
community) more often than literally. A single paragraph titled, “The Role of the
Family”, repeats many traditional concerns.141 Even here, the encyclical objects to
excessive familial influence over individuals. In contrast, Humanae vitae contains a more
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sustained and positive reflection on the family. Most notably, it describes the family
apostolate as allowing married couples to “become apostles to other married couples.”142
Paul VI’s general silence on issues related to the family may have contributed to greater
emphasis on Humanae vitae; the only major document where he gave sustained attention
to the subject.

On a few occasions, the documents of Vatican II consider children directly.
Gaudium et spes describes children as contributors to their parent’s holiness; a sentiment
later repeated by Paul VI in Evangelii nuntiandi.143 Apostolicum actuositatem contends
that children may undertake “their own apostolic work” in accordance with their abilities
as “true living witnesses of Christ among their companions.”144 However, children are
primarily considered in regards to the vocations they will undertake in adulthood with
special concern for nurturing and encouraging those who may be called to ordained or
religious life.145
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A few documents also give brief attention to non-biological kinship, but the
subject is not consistently developed. Gaudium et spes asserts that Christians must be
willing to assist children who have been born outside of marriage and suffer for other’s
sins.146 The same document entrusts society with the care of children “who unhappily
lack the blessing of a family” and who require legal protections necessary to assure their
wellbeing.147 And in Apostolicum actuositatem the first item in a list of possible activities
of the family apostolate is “the adoption of abandoned infants.”148

Conclusions
In its considerations of marriage and family, the Vatican II era shows a great deal
of consistency with earlier magisterial teaching. The most significant contrast is the
development in women’s standing within society and the family. These developments are
initiated by John XXIII’s identification of women’s social progress as stemming from
women’s own recognition of their dignity, which stands in stark relief against earlier
protectionist claims that associated female dignity with home life. This development
informed a more optimistic view of women’s place in the workforce and influenced
greater acceptance of coeducation. Within the family, hierarchical language was replaced
by ideals of spiritually enriching spousal partnerships. Yet, these developments are at
times awkwardly balanced against continuing insistence on women’s primarily domestic
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vocation. In this era of developing teaching on women’s roles, the conditioned term
“legitimate progress” often bears the weight of holding these disparate concerns together.
Humanae vitae’s judgment on artificial contraception is an important component
of this era’s teaching for a number of reasons. With John XXIII and Vatican II a growing
awareness that education of children must be a privileged good in matters of birth
regulation was beginning to displace an emphasis on procreation as primary. While Paul
VI’s personalism closely associated these goods, the encyclical turned attention towards
sexual intercourse and biological procreation and framed procreation unambiguously as
an exercise in the virtue of generosity. The tradition’s appeal to divine providence to
assure a parent’s capability to educate well further supports an emphasis on procreation
without serious moral attention to adult educational capabilities prior to conception.149 An
emphasis on faith in the sufficiency of providence to provide further undermines
considerations which might make procreation less than an unambiguous good. In
addition, as the decision against conceiving a child, or more children, is only cautiously
accepted with repeated warnings about potential sinfulness, the importance of serious
attention to educating children well is only further obstructed. For a brief moment,
recognition that the duty to educate is both a more complex and more important
obligation of the Christian parent began to emerge. Humanae vitae largely ended this
trajectory and complicated matters by associating its moral teaching strongly with
magisterial authority, a theme later repeated by the CDF.
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Finally, the conception of children themselves underwent development. As in
earlier writings, children take on the dual identities of being gifts when considered in
terms of procreation and adults-in-training when considered in terms of education. Yet
the era gave greater credence to the idea that children can fulfill a Christian vocation
within childhood itself. This assertion that children are not only Christians in the making,
but potential exemplars of the faith, is rarely acknowledged previously beyond
hagiographic writings. Still, children are situated within an ideal of the biological nuclear
family. And, although their parents have now become co-equal partners, the familial
hierarchy remained largely unchanged from the child’s perspective, though the potential
aspirations of girls have expanded.

Part III: John Paul II, 1978 – 2012
Historical Overview
Prior to his papacy, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla participated in every session of
Vatican II and was a member of the papal birth control commission.150 Throughout his
papacy, he repeatedly presented Gaudium et spes and Humanae vitae as harmonious
documents and sought to guide the authentic interpretation of Vatican II. Because his
pastoral and academic concerns correlate with emphases of his papacy, particularly
concerning family life, an assessment of his magisterial contributions must also
acknowledge these. The 1960 book Love and Responsibility provides significant
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background to John Paul II’s teaching.151 Here Wojtyla articulates a philosophical-ethical
project defined by the personalist norm; to respect people as subjects in themselves and
never use them as a means to an end.152 This universal is based upon the uniqueness of
human reason and the existence of an “inner self.”153 For Wojtyla, therefore, the task of
ethics, especially sexual ethics, is to carefully differentiate acts of “loving kindness” from
acts which intend to use a person.154
Soon after ascending to the papacy, John Paul II gave a series of addresses which
built upon themes articulated in Love and Responsibility and set the foundations of his
“theology of the body.”155 Here, John Paul II takes Jesus’ response to divorce in Matthew
19, which he regards as normative teaching, as a basis for constructing a theological
anthropology rooted in the creation narrative.156 Genesis’ account of prelapsarion
humanity, including the creation of human sexual differentiation, provides a resource to
which John Paul II applies his phenomenological method to expound the meaning of
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embodied sexuality.157 The addresses culminate with an indication of Christ’s response to
contemporary questions concerning marriage and sexuality and a defense of Humanae
vitae.158 A subsequent series of addresses began with the Beatitudes, particularly Jesus’
teaching on adultery, and moved towards greater considerations of postlapsarian
humanity. Again, Genesis remains a critical point of inquiry and the project leads to a
defense of Humanae vitae; though the second series concludes with considerations of
artistic portrayals of the human body.
Following the 1980 Synod of Bishops, John Paul II wrote the apostolic
exhortation, Familiaris consortio. This he described as “a summa of the teaching of the
Church on the life, the tasks, the responsibilities, and the mission of marriage and of the
family in the world today.”159 Familiaris consortio begins by assessing the state of
marriage and the family globally. Despite occasional pessimism, John Paul presents
contemporary challenges as a mix of positive and negative developments that require
careful discernment.160 The remainder of the comprehensive document clarifies the
Catholic Church’s understanding of marriage and family and their mission in the world.
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Numerous significant writings beyond these include John Paul II’s encyclicals
Evangelium vitae, Centesimus annus, Sollicitudo rei socialis and Laborem exercens; his
apostolic exhortation Christifideles laici; his apostolic letters Mulieris dignitatem and
Dilecti amici; and his letters to women, to children, and to families. In addition, John
Paul II considered marriage and family in numerous audiences, speeches and homilies,
and authored several books.161
Although the expansive writings of John Paul II clearly dominate the post-Vatican
II era, the CDF also produced significant documents which compliment John Paul II’s
papal teaching on marriage and family. Notably, the CDF’s writings often took on the
“dirty work” of clarifying moral prohibitions. Other dicasteries, particularly the Pontifical
Council for the Family, contributed to this growing corpus as well. And the United States
Catholic Bishops have collectively issued a number of documents on marriage and
family. Much of the content repeats or paraphrases teachings already expounded by the
Vatican, but the US Bishops make specific contributions by contextualizing the message
to an American audience. Finally, John Paul II’s successor, Benedict XVI162 emphasized
moral responsibility and the inter-connectivity of society and the human person.163 For
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example, he argued that Humanae vitae “indicates the strong links between life ethics and
social ethics,” and ushered in “a new area of magisterial teaching that has gradually been
articulated in a series of documents, most recently John Paul II's Encyclical Evangelium
vitae.”164

Sexual Ethics and Marriage
Unlike his predecessor, John Paul II was equipped with an academic training in
philosophy and deep interest in sexual ethics, especially in the context of spousal love
and the human person. Love and Responsibility argues that the sexual urge has both the
capacity to develop into love and an orientation towards reproduction. Clashes between
this potential and purpose harm love.165 Instead, morality rests on the “synthesis of
nature’s purpose with the personalistic norm.”166 The body, with its sexual urge, provides
the material for true conjugal love, but also requires respect for the ends to which it is
directed. That is, the person must be respected in his or her fullness while the will must

within his overarching theological project through the phrase “integral human development.” Cf. Benedict
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govern the passions.167 Concupiscence is the propensity for this synthesis to go awry; to
tend towards lesser ends.168
Lust acquires a central importance in Blessed are the Pure of Heart’s account of
the postlapsarian human, who has become “the man of lust.”169 A primary effect of the
fall was that the differentiation between man and woman, particularly in reference to
physicality, became a source of shame which persists through the inability of fallen
humanity to realize authentic communion or satisfy lust.170 Thus, the heart “has become a
battlefield between love and lust.”171 The great harm caused by this condition, is the
capability to objectify and seek possession of other human beings.172 Nuptial love and
lust are incompatible and competing forces.173 Thus, John Paul II asserts that wrongful
desire may lead to adultery even among spouses; the criteria being objectification, not the
marital bond. 174
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Reflecting this earlier thought, Familiaris consortio, argues that conjugal love
requires a total self-giving, both spiritually and physically, as any reservation makes such
giving a lie.175 John Paul II’s successor, Benedict XVI also located the foundations of
marriage in Genesis. But as he was more conversant with Greek philosophy and Patristic
theology, the place of John Paul II’s “sexual urge” is largely assumed by “eros.” Because
the latter is a multivalent term, Benedict’s development added ambiguity to the role of
desire in human sexuality.176
According to John Paul II’s anthropology, the human body has a “nuptial
meaning” which finds it proper expression in marriage where sexual intercourse may
speak to the fullness of the human person as both subject and gift. 177 True conjugal love
requires a conscious decision to “participate in the whole natural order of existence”
through begetting children.178 John Paul II describes procreation as the “greatest possible
gift” and laments that conception is often needlessly thwarted in the contemporary
world.179 Especially in wealthy countries, married couples are deprived of “the generosity
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and courage needed for raising up new human life: thus life is often perceived not as a
blessing, but as a danger from which to defend oneself.”180
Familiaris consortio provides an extensive review and defense of Humanae vitae.
Here John Paul II declares that artificial contraception and Natural Family Planning
(NFP) embody “two irreconcilable concepts of the human person and of human
sexuality.”181 Only NFP encourages actions and dispositions compatible with the
church’s vision of marriage. Therefore, “husbands and wives should first of all recognize
clearly the teaching of Humanae vitae as indicating the norm for the exercise of their
sexuality” then they should seek the means to observe this norm.182
Two decades earlier, Wojtyla had argued that “Sexual relations between a man
and a woman in marriage have their full value as a union of persons only when they go
with conscious acceptance of the possibility of parenthood.”183 If the possibility of
parenthood is rejected, especially by interference with the “naturalness” of the sexual act,
the entire sexual act is reduced to mere pleasure seeking; that is, the greatness of nuptial
love becomes mere lust.184
In spite of Familiaris consortio’s support for NFP, John Paul II was suspicious of
all methods of regulating birth. At least two reasons underlie his apprehension. First, as
had Paul VI, John Paul II viewed birth regulation as serious moral decision fraught with
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potential for error. Had Catholicism remained content with the physicalism of earlier
times, distinctions in method would have retained clear ethical implications. But with the
embrace of personalism, even the best method could be put to sinful use. Second, John
Paul II’s early opposition to contraception did not seamlessly ally with later
developments in NFP. Unlike some bishops of the 1960s, Wojtyla recognized the
legitimacy of the need for family planning and did not believe a specifically procreative
intent was required of licit sexual acts. Yet his rejection of contraception was directed
against acts which make pregnancy impossible or virtually impossible. Thus, he initially
supported NFP specifically for its fallibility.185 Though he would later advocate for
scientific assistance in perfecting the method, this required development in his reasons
for supporting NFP.
Like John Paul II, Benedict XVI, saw artificial contraception as feeding numerous
global social ills and Caritas in veritate specifically implicated artificial contraception
within modern societies’ destructive “anti-birth mentality.”186 In response to the problems
of forced contraception, sterilization and abortion in international aid, as well as the
spread of an “anti-birth” mentality, he wrote, “Openness to life is at the centre of true
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development.”187 Elsewhere Benedict XVI argued that an absolute witness against
artificial birth control is “crucial for humanity's future.”188

Though John Paul II’s approach to sexual ethics is remarkably innovative, it was
nevertheless closely connected with Paul VI’s moral reasoning. John Paul II continued
and in some ways intensified the link between specific negative moral norms and
magisterial authority; a controversy largely centered on Humanae vitae.189 This became
most explicit in John Paul II’s encyclical on fundamental moral theology, Veritatis
splendor, which defended both absolute negative moral norms and the magisterial
authority to clarify these.190 Throughout John Paul II’s lengthy papacy, the CDF
produced documents in support of this trend, while individual bishops and national
bishops’ conferences became increasingly differential to papal prerogatives.191

For John Paul II, ethical sexual expression requires marriage because it is the only
context that allows and safeguards the total offering required.192 Citing Humanae vitae,
Familiaris consortio recalls that marriage is directed towards the total unity of heart and
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soul, demands fidelity and indissolubility, and is open to procreation. Correspondingly, it
identifies selfishness as a primary cause of marital troubles.193 Familiaris consortio also
contrasts support for life against contra-life mentalities; which indicate God’s absence
and are driven by fear and selfishness. This culminates in a reaffirmation of opposition to
contraception, sterilization and abortion; especially when political power is involved.194
Unlike earlier eras, Familiaris consortio’s primary analogue for the love of
spouses is God’s love for humanity. This is expressed first by the Hebrew Scriptures’ use
of nuptial language to describe the covenant, second by the love of Christ for his
followers, and third by the bond of Christ and the Church.195 Familiaris consortio
describes the fundamental task of marriage as communicating love. Four additional tasks
of marriage are related to this; to form a community of persons, serve life, build society,
and share in the Church.196
The fruits of the sacramental grace of marriage ascend to a more prominent place
in John Paul II’s thought than in earlier teachings. In particular, this attention clarifies the
origins of the parental capacity to provide religious education. Through the grace of
sacramental marriage couples become participants in and witnesses to salvation equipped
to mentor and guide others.197 Although the basic capability to educate children remains
rooted in biological procreation, recalling Aquinas, the duty to educate is described as

193

Ibid., #9.

194

Ibid., #30.

195

Although these may simply be presented in historical order, the order is rather striking.
Familiaris consortio, 13.
196

Ibid., 17.

197

Ibid., #5.

47

fortified by matrimony in which it becomes a ‘ministry.’198 For John Paul II, procreation
is conceptually bound to education because the true expression of conjugal love entails
not only openness to procreation, but preparedness to accept a new human life and ensure
the child’s full physical and spiritual development.199
This period again recognizes the primary authority of spouses in planning the
number and spacing of their children, while setting the context for such decisions within
the teaching of Humae vitae.200 As in earlier times, the choice to have more children is
described as generous. A decision not to have a child, or more children, falls under
suspicion of faithless fear and selfishness while the means to achieve that end are morally
precarious. John Paul II made the point quite explicitly; “the church encourages couples
to be generous and hopeful, to realize that parenthood is a privilege in that each child
bears witness to the couple’s own love for each other, to their generosity and to their
openness to God.”201 The US Bishops repeated this association of procreation with the
virtues of gratitude and openness while adding that these both make a marriage fit for
children and allow people to respect life and reach out to the poor.202 In as much as this
makes virtuous generosity a precondition for willful procreation, the link between spousal
virtue and number of children remained strong.
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Throughout this era there was an increasing concern for “false alternatives” to the
“irreplaceable value of the family based on marriage.”203 These primarily included
various forms of cohabitation, same-sex relationships, and civil unions which all lack the
social commitments of marriage. There non-marital sexual partnerships are each
considered harmful in themselves even as they also undermine the true meaning of
marriage. When persons inhabiting these marriage alternatives seek legal protection or
the right to adopt children they become cause for particular alarm.204 Same-sex
relationships, in particular, are a “deplorable distortion of what should be a communion
of love and life between a man and a woman in a reciprocal gift open to life.”205 One
document from the Vatican protests,
It is in no way acceptable for children to be subjected, forced and basically obliged to undergo the
discrimination of being entrusted to such unions made up of their very lives. Impeding them from
being part of a family – in the proper and original sense – involves serious, negative and even
irreparable consequences for [these children]. 206
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John Paul II directed attention to the human meaning of sexual difference in a
manner distinct from his predecessors.207 This was influenced both by the creativity of his
moral theology as well as changing gender roles in Western society. Preceding periods
attest to a rejection, then a progressive albeit cautious, acceptance of women’s place in
the social sphere. This progression was fueled largely by recognition of the importance of
equal social rights and non-hierarchical spousal partnerships. John Paul II, however, is
concerned to articulate why and how sexual differentiation still matters in a world where
the fluidity and cultural construction of gender roles has become widely recognized. Such
theoretical developments are not seen as stemming from basic human dignity, but from
an ideology of “gender” being promoted on a global scale.208 In response, John Paul II
upholds a set of universal and fundamental human attributes, especially related to human
desires and capacities, while arguing strongly for essentialist gender differentiation and
its implications for the individual and social good. 209 These implications are reified by
the essentially exclusive yet complimentarily concepts “masculinity” and “femininity”;
each of which embodies a range of assertions. For John Paul II masculinity and
femininity are “two ways of ‘being a body’” that speak to and complete each other.210
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They are dual incarnations of humanity, both in the image of God, but distinct.211 And
they are complementary such that each, in a sense “finds itself” in the other.212
At the same time, women occupy a unique place of concern in John Paul II’s
thought. He was the first pope to address an apostolic letter directly to women, he
repeatedly affirmed women’s essential dignity and equality with men, he rebuked the
objectification of women, and he was even conversant to some extent with feminist
scholarship.213 Yet, John Paul II also strongly supported distinction in gendered
vocations. Like his predecessors, he contended that authentic respect for equality must
not obscure the basic reality of gendered difference.214 Although John Paul II embraced a
somewhat larger vision of women’s social and economic participation than many of his
forebears, women remained characterized by an essential femininity conceptually bound
to passive receptivity and motherhood.215 The vocation of women to being wives and
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mothers is women’s “main” and “irreplaceable role” which corresponds to “the very
essence of her womanhood.”216 In the social arena, John Paul II argued for the
importance of including women and women’s perspectives as sources of reform.217 Still
the “fundamental contribution” of women to society is conditioned by their experience of
motherhood in which they accept and love life for its own sake.218
In the labor force, Women have a legitimate place but this employment must give
due regard for women’s roles as wives and mothers if social advancement is to be “truly
and fully human.”219 John Paul II consistently repudiated social structures that compel
married women to enter the workforce and viewed occupations that can be undertaken
from the home as particularly appropriate.220 He also urged deeper study of the
relationship between work and family.221 Notably, there is a relative absence of
corresponding calls to study men’s relation to work and home. And John Paul II
suggested that respect for domestic labor, the education of children, may rightly lead to
societies providing “family allowances or the remuneration of the work in the home.”222
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Benedict XVI’s direct attention to women is not comparable to John Paul II’s.
Yet, he also upheld the importance of respect for human dignity and decried the violence
done against women in situations where they are “still firmly subordinated to the
arbitrary decisions of men, with grave consequences for their personal dignity and for the
exercise of their fundamental freedoms.”223 Furthermore, he argued that women’s
employment should be freely chosen and effective in meeting the economic needs of
families.224
Likewise, the US Bishops view unequal pay for women as a major source of
injustice which, along with over-involvement in the workforce by either or both parents,
has negative consequences for children.225 As in Vatican documents, mothers’ inability to
provide fulltime care for young children is seen as particularly problematic.226
Consistent calls for a ‘family wage’ trace back to Leo XIII and appear to function
as the male corollary to concern for women in the workforce. Despite, and perhaps in
opposition to, significant social change, the post-conciliar era has remained largely
committed to an ideal of the male single-earner household. This dichotomy is muted
somewhat in the writings of the US bishops where blame is spread more generally to
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American society’s failure respect the importance of childcare while spouses are forced
to negotiate the difficult balance between work and family.227

For John Paul II, the family is a community founded upon the bond of spouses
which is rooted in their natural complementarity.228 This view of gender’s significance
results in an emphasis on family structure. Familiaris consortio begins with structural
and conceptual aspects of the family and moves to considerations of function. Just as the
physical act and the personalist significance are linked in his sexual ethics, so too are
essential aspects of the family required to fulfill its human purpose. For John Paul II, the
private nuclear family is no historic accident; it is the necessary outcome of theological
reflection on the meaning of the family.229 In this, the Holy Family is paradigmatic,
though he clearly interprets the Holy Family through a post-industrial ideal.230 Although
John Paul II’s basic criterion for the family appears to include only the biological parental
and sibling relationships, John Paul II’s occasional inclusion of grandparents and the
extended family is significant even if relatively undeveloped. Each of these are clearly
presented favorably, especially as aids to the nuclear family, but are also directed to
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respect the privacy of the nuclear family and its members.231 The inclusion of
grandparents is connected to a concerted effort in John Paul II’s papacy to consider the
needs of the elderly in relation to family life. This includes common living, or when not
possible, frequent visitation and contact.232 Unfortunately, Benedict XVI did not employ
his well-developed notion of spiritual kinship to further develop this trajectory.233 The US
Bishops, however, take great account of the extended family and family networks, most
notably as these have beneficial potential for cooperative childrearing.234

Throughout this period, an essentialist theory of gender persists even as social
roles for women are extended in comparison to earlier teaching. At the same time,
hierarchical images of family structure subside in favor or language of mutuality between
spouses. Continuing commitment to gender essentialism becomes most evident in the
rising importance of the idea of complementarity. The magisterial defense of the validity
of marriages of infertile couples and rejection of same-sex partnerships offers a useful
reference point for understanding the importance of complementary in the family.
Magisterial affirmations of the validity of marriages of the infertile are seldom
supported by theological argument and usually arise as tangential topics within larger
arguments. John Paul II teaches that infertility does not devalue marriage; instead, it
affords the opportunity to serve life in other ways, including “adoption, various forms of
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educational work, and assistance to other families and to poor or handicapped
children.”235 And John Paul II presents marriage and family as distinctly different, but
related realities. Marriage is an institution of self-giving between a man and a woman.
Family is a society created by the birth of a child. Both are founded in love and the
former rightfully and naturally leads to the latter. But marriage precedes and is not
absorbed by the formation of a family.236 Therefore, the dignity and value of marriage is
not contingent upon the creation of a family and marital sexual acts remain licit even
apart from the possibility of biological procreation. Infertility becomes the focus of moral
concern primarily as it may dispose couple’s towards unethical forms of reproductive
technologies.237
Unlike biologically childless marriages, homosexual relationships occupy a
central moral concern of three pertinent documents issued by the CDF under John Paul II.
Throughout this period, the moral question took on new dimensions as family formation
by same-sex partners became a growing public phenomenon.
In 1986, “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of
Homosexual Persons” sought to clarify Persona humana’s judgment on homogenital
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acts; particularly in response to perceived laxist pastoral applications.238 Its most
significant claim is that, although the homosexual inclination itself is not a sin, “it is a
more or less strong tendency ordered toward an intrinsic moral evil; and thus the
inclination itself must be seen as an objective disorder.”239 This is supported by the claim
that creation displays a clear, God-given complementarity.240
In 1992, “Some Considerations Concerning the Response to Legislative Proposals
on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons” followed a similar method to assert
that sexual orientation cannot be considered as a form human diversity protected from
discrimination; akin to race or gender. Instead, anyone who has made his or her
homosexuality a matter of public knowledge implies a willingness to engage in
homogenital acts and may rightly be subject to discrimination in areas such as
employment and housing.241
“Considerations Regarding Proposals to give Legal Recognitions to Unions
between Homosexual Persons” of 2003 argues that, because procreation is impossible for
homosexual couples, they cannot contribute in a proper way to the survival of the human
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race. And, because same-sex partnerships lack sexual complementarity, adoption cannot
be allowed as this absence would cause developmental problems for the children.242
Because of this, “Not even in a remote analogous sense do homosexual unions fulfil [sic]
the purpose for which marriage and family deserve specific categorical recognition.”
Instead, legal recognition of same-sex unions poses an inherent threat to heterosexual
marriage, children, and society.243
These differentiated responses to infertility in heterosexual marriages and to
same-sex partnerships reveal a single factor as paramount; via the significance of sexual
complementarity, the former can bear witness to authentic plan for the family while the
latter cannot.
Children, Family and Parenthood
Familiaris consortio describes parents as “heralds of the Gospel” for their
children who fulfill their vocation as both physical and spiritual progenitors.244 Parental
authority is described as both “unrenounceable” and a “true and proper ‘ministry.’”245
Concerning the evangelical tasks of parenthood, John Paul II posits much more common
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ground between male and female experiences than in other tasks.246 Yet, John Paul II also
stresses differences in these vocations; frequently using ‘fatherhood and motherhood’ in
place of general references to ‘parenthood.’247
In his early work, Wojtyla discerned a basic asymmetry in male and female
experiences of parenthood. Women are powerfully and instinctually driven towards
desiring child. Men have to cultivate paternal feelings as they tend to lack this drive and
do not share the physical experience of pregnancy.248 These observations are confirmed
by John Paul II’s preferred theological analogues. He had a strong devotion to Mary, and,
especially in Mulieris dignitatem, presents her as the model for motherhood and
femininity.249 On the other hand, John Paul II’s apostolic exhortation dedicated to St.
Joseph, Redemptoris custos, linked Jesus’ use of ‘Abba’ to the significance of the
vocation of fatherhood.250 God, St. Joseph, priesthood, and fatherhood are all closely
associated in John Paul II’s conception of masculinity. Earthly fatherhood is identified as
an imitation of “the very fatherhood of God.”251 Yet, Familiaris consortio also names the
replication of God’s fatherhood as a function of parenthood generally. As such, John Paul
II’s thought includes some flexibility in gendered motifs, though his insistence on the
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essential differences between the parental roles of motherhood and fatherhood is often
more prevalent.252
In the daily activities of parenthood, John Paul II assumes and supports gendered
differentiations. He argues for the importance of women’s role in nurturing children, and
gives no indication that a father might also fulfill this task.253 The duties of fatherhood
relate to men’s economic contributions, loving one’s wife and children, and involvement
in the life of the family.254 Thus, fathers are more than income earners, but generally play
a secondary role in childrearing. Fatherhood is also frequently associated with education,
though the task is properly shared by both parents.255 And, although hierarchical language
was largely avoided at Vatican II, Laborem exercens once again identifies men as the
“head” of the household.256
Like John Paul II, the US Bishops urge fathers to take a greater role in their
family’s lives, particularly around the task of education. Distinctively, they acknowledge
fathers’ capability to nurture their children and identify growing awareness of this as a
hopeful and beneficial trend.257

252

Familiaris consortio, #41. Cf. “Conclusions of the Congress on ‘Paternity of God and Paternity
in the Family’” in Enchiridion on the Family, 1220ff.
253

Familiaris consortio, #66.

254

John Paul II, “Letter to Families,” #16.

255
Familiaris consortio, #25. Cf. Mulieris dignitatem, The Code of Canon Law gives a broad
articulation of the realms of the education; “Parents have the most grave duty and the primary right to take
care as best they can for the physical, social, cultural, moral and religious education of their offspring.”
Canon 1136.
256

John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, #19.

257

USCCB, “Follow the Way of Love.”

60

Considering the mutual task of education, John Paul II teaches that love
conditions this obligation and perfects parenthood’s “service to life.” The love of parents
is “the animating principle and therefore the norm inspiring and guiding all concrete
educational activity, enriching it with the values of kindness, constancy, goodness,
service, disinterestedness and self-sacrifice that are the most precious fruit of love.”258
Further, Familiaris consortio encourages parents to educate in ways that reduce
materialism and emphasize the goodness of the human person.259 Additionally, parents
are encouraged to acknowledge the educational value of their actions and expressions of
love.260

Consistent with earlier eras, both John Paul II and Benedict XVI link biological
procreation to generosity and favor large families.261 Yet, in Love and Responsibility,
Wojtyla had gone beyond mere preference to suggest that families require a certain
number of children to be true families at all. His rational is based on the idea that the
family is a society wherein peer relationships are essential. Wojtyla is doubtful as to if
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only a single child or two children could truly constitute a family, because the family
must arise “within the framework of a community of children, a collective of siblings.”262
As pope, John Paul II argued that parents ought to remind themselves that it is “certainly
less serious to deny their children certain comforts or material advantages than to deprive
them of the presence of brothers and sisters, who could help them to grow in humanity to
realize the beauty of life and all its ages and all its variety.”263 Relatedly, Benedict XVI
questioned if small families could be beneficial for society. Such families, he wrote, “run
the risk of impoverishing social relations, and failing to ensure effective forms of
solidarity.”264
The admonition to “serve life” is an often repeated mutual task. Procreation and
education are the “most immediate, specific and irreplaceable” meanings of this good. It
is not entirely clear how a true family might be formed aside from biological procreation
as the procreative act is centralized and biological kinship is assumed. John Paul II
acknowledges the superiority of spiritual bonds, yet within the family these deepen and
enrich “the natural bonds of flesh and blood.”265 Still a potential avenue is presented,
though undeveloped, in the assertion that serving life may take forms beyond biological
procreation.266 John Paul II contends that, because all people are children of God, the
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bounds of the family rightfully extend to universal concern for children in need. Families
may serve life by their willingness to “adopt and foster children who have lost their
parents or have been abandoned by them.” This benefits children, who rediscover the
“warmth and affection of a family,” as well as the family, via its expansion.267 Elsewhere,
John Paul II writes, “True parental love is ready to go beyond the bounds of flesh and
blood in order to accept children from other families, offering them whatever is necessary
for their well-being and full development.”268 But these recognitions of a deeper meaning
of serving life are clearly secondary to the repeated emphasis on biological
procreation.269

John Paul II never tired of emphasizing the importance of the family. In the
concluding remarks of Familiaris consortio he writes simply, “The future of humanity
passes by way of the family.”270 Later, he taught that the family is both the source of a
person’s individuality and every individual’s “existential horizon.”271 Considering the
social dimensions of family life, John Paul II upheld the family as a powerful resource for
overcoming social ills and transforming society. This obligation is expressed in raising

267

Ibid. John Paul II also praises adoption in Evangelium vitae, #63 as do the US Bishops in
“Follow the Way of Love”
268

Families with economic advantages are encouraged to “adopt” whole families through
economic support. This alleviates a difficulty John Paul II clearly associates with adoption; family breakup. “Among the various forms of adoption, consideration should be given to adoption-at-a-distance,
preferable in cases where the only reason for giving up the child is the extreme poverty of the child's
family. See, Evangelium vitae, #93.
269

John Paul II, “Letter to Families,” #12.

270

Familiaris consortio, #86.

271

John Paul II, “Letter to Families,” #2.

63

children properly, but also through hospitality and political engagement.272 Moreover,
John Paul II displayed unique concern for children.273 Children are the “crowning” of
marriage and the “living reflection” of their parents’ love. Children are a “permanent sign
of conjugal unity and a living and inseparable synthesis” of their mother and father.274
John Paul frequently emphasized the need to respect the full human dignity of
children.275 He urged parents to see their children as ends in themselves, willed by God
for their own sake. John Paul II also taught that children have a right to be the result of a
sexual act between loving spouses and to be desired and respected from conception.276
And he argued that children are to be respected as individuals and understood as gifts
from God such that no one can claim a positive right to a child.277 Orphans or children
who are deprived of the assistance of their parents or guardians must receive particular
protection on the part of society. The State, with regard to foster-care or adoption, must
provide legislation which assists suitable families to welcome into their homes children
who are in need of permanent or temporary care while also respecting the natural rights
of parents.278
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Within the US context, the bishops encouraged inclusive forms of familial decision
making. Citing St. Benedict, they write, “the abbot is to consult with all members of the
monastery, even the youngest (who often were children), when their lives were likely to
be affected. Rather than undermining authority, this strengthens it in love.”279

Conclusions
Clearly John Paul II’s influence on post-conciliar magisterial teaching on
marriage and the family is monumental. The major marks of his contributions are his
articulations of the meaning and significance of gendered human embodiment, a
personalist ethics that holds spiritual and bodily existence closely together, and a strident
opposition to contraception, abortion, and homosexual partnerships. He also developed
numerous aspects of Catholic teaching which includes a limited recognition of the good
of adoption and the importance of bonds beyond the nuclear family.
Aside from specific teachings, John Paul II’s thought is significant for the original
the manner in which he framed questions of morality. Several oppositional dichotomies
underlie his thought, including nuptial love and lust, respect and objectification, and the
sexual urge and the will. These and other categories give John Paul II’s thought a
propensity for dualism which often reduces the complexity of human experience to stark
contrasts between good and evil.280 For example, if a sex act is not open to the possibility
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of conception, an act that could attest to greatness of nuptial love becomes an act of mere
lust.281 Further the lack of sexual complementarity in homosexual relationships turns
these into the antithesis of marriage; not life giving as well as morally and socially
destructive. At times, the positive halves of these dichotomies drift into romanticized and
unrealistic claims. Thus women have a rightful place in the public sphere but are also
singularly identified with the nurture of children within the home. Similarly, children are
gifts of God with a right to be desired from conception, yet sex does not require an
explicit procreative intent. To what extent can a woman assume an influential social
vocation while also identifying herself as the single nurturer of her children? And how
can sex be excused of an explicit intent to procreate if this would violate the right of any
child conceived in as much as his or her existence would not be known for some time?
These are not insurmountable contradictions so much as examples of the way John Paul
II’s rhetoric could become quite distanced from practical realities.
This propensity also appears to have influenced John Paul II clear and strong
distinctions between good and evil which led to criticisms of legalism in his thought. On
the matter of contraception in particular, John Paul argued that there can be no
“graduality of the law”; truth must be either embraced or denied.282 Thus, sexual acts are
either a pure communication of free self-giving or a form of domination that disrespects
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the body with mere utilitarian intent. No room is allowed for uncertainty in the potential
meaning of each and every sexual act.283
As a result of these tendencies, the ample possibilities for individual moral growth
suggested by John Paul II’s ethical perspective are complimented by only a limited vision
of human adaptability in familial and social relations. That is, women and men actualize
their moral growth in distinct manners that seem restrictively bound to their gendered
identity. To posit that a husband may find authentic fulfillment as his children’s primary
caregiver, or a wife do so as her family’s primary economic earner, pushes human
adaptability further than John Paul II’s gendered framework allows.
By comparison, the contributions of Benedict XVI and the US Bishops are
limited. Most significantly, Benedict reframes some of John Paul II’s teachings with both
more classical theological language and concern for expressing the unity of Catholic
teaching. The US Bishops diverge most significantly in expressions of gender equality
within the family, where they give much greater emphasis to parental cooperation in
discerning how to provide for and nurture their children.

Part IV: Critical Appraisal
The remainder of this chapter offers a brief assessment of magisterial teaching on
sex, marriage and family with specific attention to developments and emphases. This is
not intended to provide a thoroughgoing appraisal, but only to raise concerns about this
body of teaching to guide the considerations of subsequent chapters. These concerns

283

Joseph W. Koterski, “An Introduction to the Thought of John Paul II,” in The Legacy of Pope
John Paul II: His Contribution to Catholic Thought. Ed. Geoffrey Gneuhs (New York: The Crossroad
Publishing Company, 2000), 33.

67

center around the role of normative sexual ethics tied to gender essentialism as these have
developed within modern magisterial teaching and influenced conceptions of parenthood.
In particular, the intimate links between sexual ethics and teaching on marriage and
family appear to have produced a consistent tendency to conceive of parenthood in a
restricted sense, centered on biological kinship. This tendency appears to have been
exacerbated following Humanae vitae. Consequently, recent magisterial teaching retains
the conviction that spiritual education marks Christian parenthood in its fullest. Yet the
magisterium undermines this conviction through repeated emphasis on contraception (to
which the concept of ‘responsible parenthood’ is inseparably tied) and gendered parental
roles. This narrowing of concern it most clearly illustrated in the limited attention
adoptive parenthood receives since the papacy of Pius XII.
This assessment begins by considering the extent to which an underlying theory
of gender and human sexuality influences magisterial teaching on marriage and family. It
then considers the concepts of children and parenthood in magisterial thought. It
concludes with a consideration of magisterial thought on the functional aspects of
parenthood and other resources useful for a fuller account of parenthood.

Gender
The magisterial teaching presented above is consistently supported by a strong
essentialist theory of gender.284 From Leo XIII through Benedict XVI, male and female
have been conceptualized as exclusive and differentiated categories. These teachings
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suggest no acceptance of the common academic distinction between “sex” and
“gender.”285 Rather, concern centers on feminism and other movements that utilize
ideologies of gender which only confuse and complicate differentiated parental roles.286
In this account of gender, embodied human sexuality seamlessly yields the discrete
categories of male and female, each with its own innate characteristics.
At the same time, however, interpretations of appropriate gender roles have
developed. In fact, the changing role of women may be the most significant development
within the era. All the documents are characterized by a post-industrial ideal that
separates the male public sphere from the female domestic sphere.287 But even Arcanum
is aware of shifting gendered barriers, particularly concerning the role of women in
public life. Yet, whereas Pius XI read these developments as unnatural and opposed to
women’s essential character,288 John XXIII interpreted them as signs of women
embracing their own dignity.289 As both centrally claim the dignity of women, a clearer
opposition is hard to imagine. Still, this transition came gradually and the conviction that
women are first and foremost wives and mothers was consistently upheld. Holding these
claims together gives rise to tensions which become particularly evident with John Paul II
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whose support for women’s rights to public participation is framed by his alarm that
women have come to neglect, and even fear, their primary obligations to their family.
Gender essentialism functions within magisterial teaching to support demarcated
gender roles within an overarching framework of the natural complementarity of the
genders.290 This permits universal claims about the propensities of the sexes while
relegating complex cultural considerations to secondary importance. This framework
conforms, to an extent,291 to patterns of gendered behavior in post-industrial Western
society but rests on a relatively weak conceptual foundation.
Discerning essential from socially-constructed gendered attributes is immensely
challenging in real-time anthropological observations because the rate of change in social
constructions can be very slow.292 That is, a socially constructed ideology that influences
gendered behavior may prevail within a culture for centuries. Thus, the differentiation
between essential and socially-constructed differences is of less practical significance
than that between long-held and observably-changing differences.293 Confronted with
observable changes in women’s roles, magisterial teaching shows a double mindedness
that attempts both to affirm women’s freedom and dignity while articulating normative
patterns for behavior. The latter counsel is articulated as normative, but shows little
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evidence of significant historical or cross-cultural scrutiny. This allows a uniquely postindustrial feminine ideal to inform magisterial articulations of women’s vocations.
The role of gender essentialism in magisterial thought raises two further
problems. First, it tends to obscure individual diversity, human adaptability, and cultural
capacities for change. Here, essentialism’s appeal is also its greatest pitfall. Clear
categorization and collective directives allows little room for individual experience;
especially for those whose experience is at odds with aspects of the prevailing gender
narrative. One clear outcome of this limitation is the almost wholesale inattention to
men’s capacity to fulfill certain traditionally feminine roles, such as the nurture of young
children. Certainly magisterial thought has begun to emphasize the importance of
paternal involvement in family life; but this is consistently presented as a secondary and
supporting role. Quite simply, there is no suggestion that a male could be a child’s
primary caregiver and little indication that men have any share in women’s capacity to
nurture.294
Second, human gender itself, in terms of potential diversities, is simply too
complex to be neatly fit within essentialist frameworks without admitting many
exceptions to dichotomous gendered categories. To capture the complexity of human
gender, these exceptions themselves would be numerous enough as to seriously
undermine the categories themselves. Such exceptions may occur at any of the levels at
which sexual difference is admitted to influence the human person. For magisterial
teaching, this includes the physical, psychological, and spiritual aspects of the human
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person. Although many such exceptions are simply passed over without notice,295
homosexuality has been the source of significant magisterial attention. The challenge of
nuancing gendered categories sufficiently enough to capture the complexity of human
gender while retaining credibility in the fundamental gendered distinction itself poses a
significant challenge. Unfortunately, magisterial teaching has largely failed to
acknowledge the generalist nature of its own gendered framework. A significant outcome
of this approach is that it has allowed teachings based on general categories to be
presented as universally binding.296
The hierarchical aspects of the magisterium’s concept of gender should also not
go overlooked. Within the earlier documents, the family is clearly understood as a
hierarchical society wherein men hold the highest authority. Both social observation and
appeals to divine law supported this view. With Vatican II, however, gender hierarchy
within the family was apparently disavowed as the language of mutuality and partnership
prevailed.
John Paul II placed great emphasis on both equality and sexual difference.
However, the imagery he employs is often suggestive of female subordination. This is
among the most significant critiques leveled against recent magisterial conceptions of
gender. Namely, that the emphasis on gender complementarity does not support equality
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so much as it covertly continues female subordination. This criticism gains greater
credibility in light of the fact that complementarity for John Paul II is plainly not always
an egalitarian concept. On the concepts of marriage and virginity, John Paul II explicitly
frames them as complementary while asserting virginity’s preeminence.297

Sexual Ethics
Post-Vatican II magisterial teaching on sex, marriage, and family is characterized
by an appreciation of the personalist moral methodology embraced at the council.
Ironically, Humanae vitae more than any other document has obscured the significance
of this methodological renewal and yet is the first papal encyclical to frame its
consideration of marriage explicitly in the terms of personalist moral concerns. It is
important to recognize the fact of the magisterium’s embrace of personalist moral
methodology before considering the nature and extent of its application within particular
teachings.
Paul VI’s encyclical united personalist concerns with a prohibition of
contraception and tied its argument closely to magisterial authority and the objective
precepts of the moral law. The encyclical disappointed reform-minded Catholics, many
bishops included, yet Paul VI was reserved in commenting on the encyclical throughout
the remainder of his papacy. John Paul II’s defense of Humanae vitae elevated the
encyclical’s importance and widened the gap between magisterial and revisionist moral
perspectives. In the hands of John Paul II, Humanae vitae came to epitomize a struggle
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over the value of the human person and the very meaning of human existence.298 The full
context behind these assertions is too complex to adequately summarize here, though a
few salient features deserve attention.
Humanae vitae immediately sparked controversy concerning its application of
personalist moral methodology. The document’s supporters saw its approach as rightfully
linking the physical and metaphysical realities of the human person while bringing these
to bear in its moral teaching. Its critics saw an importation of outdated physicalist
methodology under the cloak of personalist language, with moral conclusions ultimately
based on the physical structure of the act. Apart from Paul VI’s controversial judgment
on the moral matter of contraception, the encyclical’s positive vision of marriage has
provided far more common ground.
John Paul II’s strident defense of Humanae vitae raised corollary concerns of
physicalism within his methodology.299 John Paul II’s approach claims to unify the
physical and spiritual aspects of the person against dualist anthropologies, though his
anthropology appears itself to be based in the dualities of lust and reason, body and
spirit.300 With John Paul II, the debate over Humanae vitae grew in complexity and
importance as his central concern for truth, particularly “the truth about man”, provided
human sexual differentiation with metaphysical significance. More significant than his
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clear conviction that truth fundamentally grounds morality was the clarity and precision
with which John Paul II believed moral truths could be expressed. This perspective
removed ambiguity from the actions of those who practiced contraception despite the
Church’s teaching, as their bodies enacted intentions known to be contradictory to moral
truth. For Paul VI, Humanae vitae spoke to Catholic spouses of a better way. For John
Paul II, the moral judgment differentiated truth tellers from liars.301
Most significantly, John Paul II’s approach gave clear and stark voice to the
fundamental stakes of the contraception debate. Inasmuch as Humanae vitae promoted a
positive vision of marriage and encouraged ‘responsible parenthood’, John Paul II
clarified that both marriage and parenthood were essentially misunderstood by those who
enacted the lie of contraception which spoke at a fundamental level against the dignity of
love, marriage, and the sexual act. This attention to the sexual act itself, in relation to the
nature of marriage and parenthood, clearly influences considerations of family in John
Paul II’s thought. Perhaps more significantly, his attention to the body in response to
perceived dualisms, tended to downplay the traditional conviction that the particularly
Christian aspects of parenthood are contained in its spiritual ends. Paul VI’s assertion of
the importance of biological procreation already set Pius XII’s emphasis on spiritual
education in a new context. With John Paul II, Pius’s conviction is not lost, but it is
dramatically overshadowed by concerns related to biological procreation.
Family Structure
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Commitments to gender essentialism and sexual ethical norms appear to support a
particular family structure as ideal. First, this family is large. Having many children is
consistently associated with faith and generosity. In contrast, avoidance of pregnancy is
reserved for grave reasons while the means of doing so are fraught with potential
immorality. Additionally, social support for large families is repeatedly encouraged while
the social value of small families was questioned by Benedict XVI. Second, and
seemingly related, the ideal family is biologically related. An assumption of continuity
among genetic, gestational, and social parenthood is consistent throughout and assure
biological kinship a primary place. In contrast, considerations of adoption are rare and,
while adoption is usually presented positively, it is most often offered as an alternative to
abortion or as an option for infertile spouses in preference to artificial reproductive
technologies. Adoption gives rise to praise as a testament to the true nature of
parenthood, though, as presented above, this is set within a context largely focused on
biological procreation.
Finally, this ideal family is nuclear and autonomous, though each of these admits
to greater exceptions than the previous two. Repeated affirmations that marriage founds
the family, coupled with emphases on procreation, clearly support the nuclear norm, as
do assertions of male and female roles in parenting. Yet, John Paul II taught that
grandparents and the elderly, particularly in light of their vulnerability, have a claim to a
place within the family. Autonomy is supported through affirmations of the authority of
spouses in matters concerning their household and family. The extended family,
associations, and society at large serve as useful, but non-essential supports. Yet, these
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arguments are largely framed by concerns of state infringement on familial rights while
the family is encouraged to open itself outward in service to the Church and community.
Until the mid-twentieth century, the ideal family structure also explicitly included
a hierarchical ordering centered on male headship.302 The relatively quick transition away
from an overtly hierarchical model is significant, particularly as is was held to be an
unchangeable aspect of divine law. Since Vatican II, the magisterium has, at times,
suggested aspects of the earlier hierarchical ideal but has largely stood behind the
equality model.
The importance of outlining the operative ideal of the family lies in marriage’s
unique position as both a natural institution and a Catholic sacrament. Conceptually,
sacramental marriage is natural marriage brought to its fullness. As such, natural law
plays a significant role in the sacramentology of marriage such that articulating
marriage’s “authentic natural requirements” is essential for understanding its sacramental
nature. 303 As such, family structure often takes a prominent place in magisterial teaching.
In light of this, a parallel might be drawn between John Paul II’s approach to sexual
ethics and the family. In both instances, while the spiritual significance of actions is
important, the physical embodiment that makes those actions possible is fundamental for
moral reflection. In John Paul II’s thought, the nuclear family plays an analogous role in
the family’s vocation as the gendered human body plays in authentic sexual expression.
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Hence it is no surprise that John Paul II’s teaching on the family is largely repetitious of
his teaching on meaning of marriage and the dual roles of husband and wife.304
In terms of the concerns at hand, it must be asked to what extent “natural” aspects
of marriage should determine Catholic reflection on the sacrament. While it might be
argued that the natural and sacramental aspects of marriage need not conflict, the
evidence from modern magisterial teaching appears to suggest that emphasis on one
aspect often comes at the expense of the other. Though there is not space to provide a
thorough reflection here, the rather convoluted history of Christian perspectives on
marriage also bears on this consideration. Aside from Biblical resources and the
pronouncements of past councils and popes, Augustine and Aquinas provide the most
frequent historical resources within modern magisterial teaching on marriage. Yet even
within this relatively limited historical-theological engagement variations emerge.
Documents that rely more upon Augustine are different in significant ways from those
that utilize Aquinas. Indeed, the differences in conceptions is an underlying factor in the
‘ends or marriage’ debate that has characterized post-Vatican II theology of marriage.
Even admitting a complex theological history, it must be acknowledged that
Catholic sacramentology of marriage is based upon a theory of natural marriage which
resonates with certain rather undisputable human experiences. Fuller discussion will be
reserved for later chapters but this is nonetheless a significant point. Heterosexual sexual
relationships, biological procreation, and the need for stable social structures to support
the rearing of offspring are basic experiences of humanity which rightfully have import
within natural law moral systems. The central moral question, however, is to what extent
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the natural order of marriage intelligible and to what extent this should inform a
sacrament that is defined by its reflection of super-natural realities. Magisterial reactions
to families formed through adoption and families headed by same-sex partners help
clarify how this question is presently answered.

Contemporary Catholic teaching views same-sex unions as a direct threat to
healthy families as they constitute a social recognition of something as, or similar to
marriage, which cannot “even in an analogous or remote sense” fulfill the meaning of
marriage.305 Furthermore, same-sex parenting is said to be harmful to children.306 These
strong condemnations are based on two premises; same-sex couples are naturally
incapable of procreation, which is essential to marriage, and same-sex couples lack
sexual complementarity, which is the foundation of marital love and ultimately the
family.307 The first of these concerns is elsewhere is relativized, such as in marriages of
the elderly or the knowingly infertile, making the second essentially decisive. Thus, the
rejection of same-sex parenthood comes down to one decisive factor; sexual
complementarity. This line of argument ultimately asserts that no true family can result
without the foundational relationship between a man and woman; no other human
relationship can found a family.308 Yet a significant challenge in relating this argument
convincingly to a changing culture is the apparent lack of reference to actual parental
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capacity in the condemnation. It rests not only a sexual ethical judgment, but also on a
supposition that fatherhood and motherhood are essentially distinct functions. Neither can
replace nor even suitably replicate the other; they are dual incarnations of parenthood.309

Because the decision to have children is an act of love and generosity, married
couples who cannot conceive, yet desire children, may still enact these virtues through
other means, including adoption.310 Adoption and foster care are considered acts of love
and generosity that reflect an understanding of the meaning of true parenthood as
transcending biological kinship.311 And they enact a virtuous commitment to society to
which genetically related families should aspire.312 While the magisterium is generally
positive towards adoption, it is critical of certain adoption practices. International
adoption is presented as seemingly fraught with difficultly as the practice is considered
fueled by anti-life mentalities in wealthy nations and social inequalities in poor
nations.313 Private adoptions are also problematic, largely because oversight of adoption
is considered a proper duty of the state, such that these might circumvent proper
authority.314 Finally, John Paul II’s praises “adoption at a distance,” where wealthier
families commit to financially supporting families in need. Yet, John Paul II’s framework
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seems largely international. From the national perspective of the US, we might ask if a
teenage mother could morally chose to place her child for adoption if her decision is
based more upon her personal and professional aspirations than absolute necessity. It is
unclear if John Paul II could support such a decision, due to his relatively limited
attention to adoption, his stress on the responsibilities of parents, and his strong
association of women with motherhood.
Further, although magisterial teaching takes pains to assert that infertile couples
are nonetheless truly married, it is less clear if true families can be formed through
adoption.315 This is because it is unclear whether infertile couples who adopt children
simply realize the procreative end in a non-biological way or if adoption is a somewhat
lesser form of the procreative end. On the one hand, the praise offered for adoption and
concepts of spiritual parenthood suggest adoption as an authentic basis for the family. On
the other, the fact that adoption is primarily presented as an alternative to artificial
reproductive technologies and occurs among lists of other expressions of generosity
implies that it may not be a true alternative to procreation’s primary meaning. If adoption
is an authentic method of family formation, its presentation within magisterial writing
would suggest that fertile couples may fulfill the procreative end of marriage by means
other than biological procreation as well.
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Modern magisterial teaching is strongly influenced by an essentialist theory of
gender and its attendant assumptions about the roles of women and men in the family and
in society. This further implicates considerations of sex, marriage, and the family. In
particular, these underlying commitments promote bias favoring biological kinship and
tend to produce a constricted theology of parenthood which may be insufficient to ground
responses to contemporary challenges. The primacy of gender complementarity and
sexual ethical norms in magisterial teaching appear to not only reject family formation by
same-sex partners, but so privileges the biological family that it distracts from adequate
theological attention to adoption. Moreover, the centrality of gender essentialism informs
a theory of parenthood in which capacities for childrearing are largely dictated by sexual
difference. These distinct and complementary visions of motherhood and fatherhood pay
little attention to human adaptability, diversity, and the lived experiences of many parents
who have assumed nontraditional gender roles. Most significantly, the recent focus on
sexual complementarity, biological procreation, and gendered parental roles, has created
an account of marriage and the family that emphasizes natural foundations at the expense
of supernatural convictions. For example, even as John Paul II affirms that through
teaching the gospel, spouses become ‘fully parents’, the same document repeatedly
associates ‘responsible parenthood’ with rejection of artificial contraception.316

Family Function
Magisterial writings frequently discuss how the family functions, especially the
family’s benefits to its members, society, and the Church. Contemporary magisterial
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teaching has reclaimed the idea of the family as the “domestic church” and asserts that
daily life in the family is a true expression of Church.317 Just as the wellbeing of society
rests in the family, so too does the wellbeing of the Church.318 Within the family, all
members exercise their baptismal priesthood in a special way.319 Parents are the first to
evangelize their children and lead their children to maturity, salvation, and holiness.320
Further, the family is described as a learning and evangelizing community, a “domestic
church”, a “school of virtue”, and a “school of deeper humanity.”321
These functional descriptions suggest broad possibilities for conceptualizing the
family that go well beyond narrow emphases on gender, complementarity, and sexual
ethics. These affirmations have been obscured by methodological commitments that
privilege family structure over family function. As suggested above, this ordering has
much to do with a theory of gender and human sexuality and is amply indebted to John
Paul II’s particular form of personalism. That is, in John Paul II’s linkage of the physical
and meta-physical, spiritual realities tend to be routed through the natural order. For
example, the body serves as a conduit for divine love. To borrow a concept from
Christology, this amounts to doing theology of the family ‘from below’ such that the
natural and structural elements of the family precede considerations of supernatural and
elements. But the necessity of prioritizing the natural order can be questioned. That is, if
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a group functions like a family and appears to enjoy the spiritual benefits of a family, do
Catholic resources exist for claiming it as a family? A fuller consideration of this
question will be reserved for later chapters; however, an initial response is that such
resources do appear to exist within modern magisterial teaching. Moreover, these appear
to operate quite freely from the gendered and sexual preoccupations discussed above. For
example, despite the primary roles biological reproduction and kinship play, popes have
repeatedly suggested that the true meaning of parenthood goes beyond biological
relatedness. Most often this is located in spiritual education and service to the common
good. Additionally, conceptions of the family as a learning and evangelizing community
suggest that moral evaluations of the family must consider function over time. In other
words, structural assessments alone appear inadequate means of evaluating any particular
family’s ability to learn and evangelize.
Beyond the possibilities of reassessment offered by viewing magisterial teaching
through a functional lens, numerous biblical and traditional assertions endure in
magisterial teaching which may be beneficial to reconsiderations of Christian parenthood.
For example, long-held assertions concerning the primacy of discipleship in Christian
life, the primacy of spiritual identity over biological kinship, the identity of all baptized
believers as ‘adopted’ children of God, and the conviction that the Great Commission322
supersedes the command to “be fruitful and multiply”,323 all suggest significant potential
in this regard. As such, the concerns expressed above relate much more significantly to
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how present Catholic magisterial teaching tends to present the wealth of the Church’s
theological heritage than to interminable limitations.
Beyond the positive potential of these functional and conceptual resources, a
number of specific developments within magisterial teaching also deserve attention. The
shift away from hierarchical language to describe the family, coupled with acceptance of
women’s place in public life (conditioned as it is), has placed the modern family in a new
and historically unique context. Additionally, modern magisterial tradition holds
significant resources for conceptions of children. Respect for the child as deserving of
unique rights and a place of participation within the family is an aspect of this recent
thought that is well worth attention.

Conclusion
To briefly review, significant challenges in the relatively recent history of
magisterial thought relate to how the goods of procreation and education are balanced:
namely, the effect of Humanae vitae in forefronting sexual ethics and magisterial
authority in subsequent reflections on marriage and family, the effect of persistent
preferences for large families and celibacy, the changing status of women as conditioned
by gender essentialism, and recent inattention to both adoption and notions of spiritual
kinship. More generally, this chapter raised concern for how present magisterial accounts
of parenthood appear to be significantly shaped by sexual ethical norms and gender
essentialism and consequently struggle to speak to significant aspects of contemporary
parenthood. The following chapter will consider how revisionist Catholic moral theology
has utilized a greater variety of resources which have led to important responses to
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certain limitations in magisterial thought, even while remaining vexed by a similar set of
challenges.
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Introduction
In recent history, Catholic theologians have generally followed methodologies
marked by the personalist turn, informed by historical-consciousness and congenial to
experience as a source of moral knowledge.1 These trends have produced several
revisionist proposals for Catholic sexual ethics (including ethics of same-sex
partnerships) and theology of marriage and family. This chapter begins by introducing
general tendencies that characterize ‘revisionist’ Catholic theological methods. It then
considers three contemporary revisionist theological approaches to sexual morality; with
particular attention to depictions of parenthood in each. After this, it turns attention to
contemporary theological perspectives on marriage and family with similar concerns.
Having considered these resources, this chapter argues that revisionist moral
theology offers a more developed and sustained commitment to historical consciousness
than may be found in magisterial documents. Additionally, revisionists tend to challenge
gender essentialism and offer a more nuanced approach to sexual anthropology that is
shaped by a sustained engagement with contemporary experience as source of moral
knowledge. However, these writings are also insufficient to found a robust theological
account of parenthood because they tend to replicate the biological bias found in
magisterial moral teaching. This is largely due to a tendency to follow a similar method
of extracting principles of parenthood from sexual ethics. That is, despite significant

1

Many contemporary theologians have explained the divide that exists between the majority of
academic theologians and the views of the magisterium. Among others see James Keenan, A History of
Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century: From Confessing Sins to Liberating Consciences
(London: Continuum, 2010)., David F. Kelly, Contemporary Catholic Health Care Ethics (Washington
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2004), Chapter 10, Todd A. Salzmann and Michael G. Lawler, The
Sexual Person: Towards a Renewed Catholic Anthropology (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 2008), Chapters 2 and 3, and Charles Curran, The Development of Moral Theology: Five Strands
(Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2013), Chapter 3.
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disagreement between revisionist and magisterial perspectives on the subject of sexual
ethics, the presumed nature of the relationship between sexual ethics and conceptions of
parenthood remains remarkably similar. This chapter also reviews accounts of the family
that appear particularly helpful in moving beyond such limitations and concludes by
appraising the conceptual similarities and differences among revisionist and magisterial
perspectives. It calls attention directly to features of revisionist thought that provide
positive resources for a more comprehensive theological account of parenthood.

Part I: Revisionists Moral Theology
Defining “Revisionist”
A number of mid-twentieth century theologians (Louis Janssens, Joseph Fuchs,
Bernard Häring, Bernard Lonergan, et al.) gave shape to contemporary revisionist moral
theology. Each believed that the twentieth-century called for a renewal of Catholic moral
theology that would include greater attention to historical development and subjective
aspects of the Christian moral life.2 Although revisionism has been explained in several
ways, the features most pertinent to this project include the following:






Consensus that sexual ethics have been historically overemphasized in moral
reflection
Commitment to historicism and the possibilities for change in magisterial
teaching
Criticism of present magisterial sexual ethics as overly idealized, physicalist,
and procreationist
Commitment to experience as a source of moral knowledge
Rejection of strong gender essentialism

2

See. James F Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century (London:
Continuum, 2010).
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Historical Emphasis on Sexual Ethics
A long legacy of Christian fixation with the norms of sexual behavior appears to
remain influential in the content of Catholic moral theology in both magisterial and
revisionist thought.3 The persistence of this historic emphasis, in which the minutia of
sexual anxieties were treated with utmost seriousness,4 is exacerbated by magisterial
claims that sexual norms are unalterable due their intimate relation to theological
anthropology and/or divine law.5 At the same time, and for similar reasons, all sexual
norms are categorically claimed to be grave moral matter.6 Such assertions entangle
contested points in sexual ethics with contested issues of ecclesial authority to further
compound existing disagreements over moral methodology.
Numerous revisionists have expressed concern over this persistent emphasis on
sexual sin.7 Farley suggests that this legacy results from the “inexhaustible power” sex
appears have in cultures where sexual drives are repressed and sexuality is not well
understood.8 Lisa Sowle Cahill argues that the imbalance directs “disproportionate

3
See Peter Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early
Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). The book does a commendable job of parsing
the doctrinal implications associated with developing understandings of human sexuality.
4

See James Keenan, A History of Catholic Moral Theology in the Twentieth Century, Chapter 2.

5

See Humanae vitae, #4, Persona humana, #3, and Veritatis splendor, #47 – 54.

6

Catechism of the Catholic Church, #2331 – 2400. This assertion has been challenged and
reaffirmed repeatedly in recent history. For example, see Persona humana #9 and Charles Curran,
“Masturbation and Objectively Grave Matter: An Exploratory Discussion,” Catholic Theological Society of
America Proceedings 21 (1966): 95-109.
7

Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler, Sexual Ethics: A Theological Introduction (Washington
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 50.
8

Margaret A. Farley. Just Love: A Framework for Christian Sexual Ethics (New York:
Continuum, 2010), 223.
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energy” to sexual moral issues while ignoring more pervasive sins, “which lurk closer to
the tradition’s heterosexual, marital, and procreative heart.”9 She mentions domestic
violence, abuse, and various forms of manipulation within the family. Cahill is further
concerned that preoccupation with these subjects in the form of a “regulatory mentality,
infected by fear and ignorance of the sexual lives of its audience” threatens the reception
of Vatican II’s vision of the family as the domestic church.10 But Cahill is also concerned
that the concept of the ‘domestic church’ itself not be used to sanctify families at the
expense of Christianity’ eschatological vision, which critiques all social structures. 11

Idealism, Physicalism, and Procreationism
The idyllic nature of magisterial sexual norms is another frequent point of
concern. Many teachings appear to leave only a very narrow conceptual distance to
separate a moral ideal from its practical implementations. This is related to a classicist
conception of moral teaching which insists upon both objectivity and clarity in the moral
law. John Paul II, for example, accepted the legitimacy of gradual growth in moral life,
but rejected the “gradualness of the law” itself.12 Yet, the insistence that each and every
act must be evaluated by very high standards of morality has raised concern. Cahill

9

Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), 160.
10

Ibid., 210.

11

Lisa Sowle Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000),

4.
12

John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, Vatican, (November 22, 1981)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/ documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_
familiaris-consortio_en.html, #34.
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argues, for example, that John Paul II’s understanding of sex as a ‘total self-gift’
“depends upon a very romanticized depiction of sex.”13 Todd Salzman and Michael
Lawler state more bluntly, “the requirement of ‘total personal self-giving’ in each and
every sexual act… is nothing but ideology posing as reality.”14 Such idealism not only
leaves little room for the ambiguities of lived human experience but also tends towards
dualistic ethical discourse. For example, Cahill observes that in John Paul II’s thought, all
sexual acts that fall short of the moral ideal are themselves insidious. Such reasoning, she
surmises, results from misunderstanding the eschatological dimension of the spousal
relationship.15
The charge that magisterial teaching suffers from an implicit physicalist bias,
even as it has explicitly articulated moral norms from a personalist perspective since
Vatican II, is common within revisionist critiques.16 Specifically, the magisterial
determination that certain acts are always and everywhere illicit by the nature of their
object (a determination made apart from, or at least prior to, explicit attention to the

13

Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 203.

14

Todd A. Salzman and Michael Lawler, Sexual Ethics: A Theological Introduction (Washington
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 79.
15

Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics, 203.

16

Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, 52. By contrast, William E May has been a strong supporter
of the “personalism” of recent popes. The disagreement centers largely on how narrowly the “object” of
and act is rightfully conceived. May charges that revisionists (particularly McCormick, “proportionalists”,
and the drafters of the Papal Birth Control Commission’s Majority Report) have reconceived the object of
the act too broadly; such that their arguments are distortions of the Catholic moral tradition. In contrast,
revisionists claim that in Humanae vitae and the writings of John Paul II the object of the act, while paying
lip-service to personalism, remains narrowly bound to physical acts. See William E. May, “Moral
Theologians and ‘Veritatis Splendor,’” The Homiletic and Pastoral Review December 1994. Reprinted
online by EWTN, https://www.ewtn.com/library/THEOLOGY/MORALVS.HTM.
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context or subjective intentions of the moral agent) has prompted revisionist criticisms of
this form of personalist reasoning.17
A comparable line of concern is voiced by revisionists who detect a procreationist
bias within magisterial thought. From this perspective, biological procreation is assumed
to be the natural orientation of the sexual act.18 Christine Gudorf argues that this
assumption produces the beliefs that coitus is the only ‘real’ form of fulfilling sexual
expression, that sexual relationships without coitus are inferior or inherently nonsexual,
and that children are the ‘cost’ of sexual relationships among the unwed. In her
perspective, procreationism too often comes at the cost of pleasurable and emotionally
gratifying sexual relationships.19

Historicism and Potential for Adaptation
Revisionism presumes that moral theology is subject to continual adaptation in
response to changing contexts and growing human experience.20 One enduring revisionist
criticism of the former manualist tradition, which remains influential in foundations of
present magisterial teaching, is its reliance upon a ‘classicist’ worldview in which

17

John Paul II, Veritatis splendor, Vatican, (August 6, 1993) http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/
john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_06081993_veritatis-splendor_en.html, #80.
18

Salzman and Lawler, Sexual Ethics, 52. Cf. Christine Gudorf, Body, Sex and Pleasure, 29 – 50.

19
Gudorf, Bodies, Sex and Pleasure, 30. In the context of this chapter it may be notable to
acknowledge that Gudorf is both a biological and adoptive mother.
20

“Revisionism has made historical consciousness a foundational point of its ethical theory. It is,
in a sense, the sine qua non of revisionism… As an ethical theory grounded in historical consciousness,
revisionism, by definition, is somewhat contingent.” Todd A. Salzmann, What Are They Saying About
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“natural law is static, necessary, fixed and universal.”21 Consequently, moral judgments
based in natural law are considered definitive and immutable. In contrast, ‘historical
consciousness,’ regards reality as “dynamic, evolving, changing, and particular.”22 This
more recently developed worldview reconceives natural law and looks with suspicion on
absolute moral prohibitions; especially when posited in terms of discrete physical acts.23
The implications for authoritative moral teaching are clear. In Margaret Farley’s words,
“if the rationales behind longstanding beliefs and practices are no longer persuasive in
the context of the tradition as a whole, then the practices and beliefs will be challenged,
and they may need to change.”24 Revisionists have indeed argued for change on number
of moral teachings related to human sexuality, while the magisterium has remained wary
of admitting the need for, or even the possibility of, those very changes.25

Experience as a Source of Ethics
The methodological orientation of revisionist moral theology establishes a
commitment to an explicit and sustained use of ‘experience’ as a source of Christian
ethics.26 Revisionism is sensitive to the interpreted nature of all human experience, yet
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values it as a source that keeps morality connected to lived realities and provides grounds
for reasonable dialogue across religious divides.27 While the magisterium tends to
recognize some role for experience, it has criticized its role in revisionist methodology.
The USCCB’s Committee on Doctrine’s response to The Sexual Person, for example,
criticized the authors for making experience the “primary source” of moral theology.28 At
the same time, the committee rejects experience as a legitimate resource for positing
moral norms that would challenge magisterial teaching.29 Likewise, the CDF criticized
Farley’s ambiguous use of magisterial teaching as an authentic guide for interpreting
scripture and tradition in her book Just Love, but offered no other potential moral guides.
Both responses give the impression that magisterial teaching stands alone as the resource
and hermeneutical norm for Catholic moral theology. Such posturing, without
explanations of experience’s proper role as a resource for moral reflection, fuels
revisionist criticisms of deficiencies in magisterial self-understanding and moral
method.30
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Gender
Despite previous attempts to justify women’s subordination to men as a matter of
divine law, such as found in Arcanum31 and Casti connubii,32 Catholic teaching regarding
gendered familial and social roles has developed in recent decades. While strong
affirmations of traditional gender roles have waned in some aspects of magisterial
thought, they remain influential in others. Revisionist theologians disavow gender
essentialism more thoroughly by presuming a greater role for social construction in
gender identities. Their critique of gender essentialism is also related to their embrace of
historical consciousness, their use of experience as a source of moral knowledge, and the
influence of feminist insights.
Theologically, gender essentialism tends to produce theories of complementarity,
which may be conceived ontologically, as well as prescriptively for gender roles. Yet,
complementarity remains historically linked with hierarchical assumptions and
patriarchal applications.33 Whether gender complementarity can serve as a viable
theological ideal despite this heritage remains a point of dispute. John Paul II’s ‘Theology
of the Body’ and ‘New Feminism’ rest on the conviction that truly equitable
complementarity is possible. Farley, however, surveys prominent advocates of
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complementarian thinking (including Barth, von Balthasar, and John Paul II), and
concludes that the concept is irretrievably patriarchal. She argues that complementarian
characterizations serve as “social and cultural stereotypes that promote hierarchical
relations.” These do not ultimately “succeed in making us complements across a gender
divide.”34 Salzman and Lawler, respond to similar concerns by offering a revised notion
of ‘human complementarity’ that is not reliant upon gender.35
Further disparity exists between magisterial and revisionist perspectives on the
value of distinguishing ‘sex’ (the biological fact of sexual differentiation) from ‘gender’
(a collective interpretation of that fact).36 This approach gained wide acceptance in
academic circles for a time and remains influential, though it has more recently been
criticized as overly simplistic. Magisterial documents show little appreciation for the
value of such a conceptual differentiation and, at times, question its validity. 37
Differentiating sex from gender helps to illumine the role of cultural construction in
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conceptions and interpretations of sexual difference. This works against a magisterial
approach that, focusing on natural law, tends to suggest that authentic interpretations of
sexual difference can be drawn directly from the order of creation properly considered.
Throughout the last century, gender has also been associated with understanding one’s
own human dignity.38 Revisionists, however, tend to find the differentiation useful,
particularly as it gives greater attention to diversities in gendered experience.39

Part II: Sexual Ethics
Introduction
This section considers the work of revisionist Catholic moral theologians within
the field of sexual ethics by considering the thought of Lisa Sowell Cahill, Margaret
Farley, and Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler. Cahill’s Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics
is a formative attempt to bring the insights of feminism to bear on traditional Catholic
moral theology. It takes a comparatively broad perspective on moral theology in its
attempt to unite concern for justice with a restrained moral objectivism and includes
direct considerations of family and parenthood. Farley’s Just Love applies norms for
justice to interpersonal relationships and explores the ethical implications. Her work
parallels a methodology characteristic of Catholic Social Teaching in applying ethical
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principles to suggest grounds for appropriate moral deliberation while allowing ample
room for contemporary experience as a source of moral knowledge.40 Salzman and
Lawler’s The Sexual Person and its simplified revision, Sexual Ethics, are based most
clearly within the traditional frameworks of Catholic sexual ethics but utilize a revisionist
natural law methodology to reconstruct significant anthropological foundations. Both Just
Love and The Sexual Person received criticism from the magisterium; primarily
regarding deviations from official Catholic teaching.41 Salzman and Lawler, for example,
contend that contemporary Catholic sexual ethics ought to be acknowledged as in a state
of uncertainty.42 Their ecclesiastical critics affirm the clarity and conclusiveness of
official Catholic teachings. Cahill’s centrist approach largely avoids such direct
confrontation while enabling her to make critical observations of both Catholic teaching
and prevalent liberal ideals.
Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics
Sex Ethics and Marriage
Cahill offers relatively brief reflections on sexual ethics and marriage specifically.
She is chiefly concerned with gender and human sexuality. For example, she offers the
opinions of numerous authors but does not commit to a normative interpretation of sexual
orientation.43 Instead, she identifies fundamental questions raised by these opinions; such
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as what moral implications the human potential to distinguish between the desire for
sexual intimacy and the possibility of procreation. Likewise, she considers potential
malleability in human sexuality and suggests that if “sexual orientation is in fact pliable,
then the question returns of the moral warrants which would make sexual object choice
commendable, condemnable, tolerable, or neutral.” She adds that both gender
complementarity and reproductive potential in partnerships still invariably arise as
challenging questions.44
Cahill’s moderation opens her to criticism from both sides. In staking this ground,
she neither explicitly supports magisterial teaching on specific sexual acts, nor advocates
strongly for the specific implications of the experience she proffers in revising Catholic
teaching. For example, while magisterial teaching proceeds from a heteronormative
conception of the nature of human sexuality, Cahill presents potentially conflictual
evidence. Yet, she refrains from advocating for specific revisions to Catholic teaching in
light of the implications of this evidence.
Cahill is less reserved in her considerations of marriage and points to clear
tensions in the 1983 Code of Cannon Law. She argues that these result from its attempt to
set conclusions “derived from the notion of marriage as a contract” beside Vatican II’s
“covenant and partnership language.”45 Cahill further asserts that present ambiguities are
symptomatic “of the lasting influence of the perspective on sexual danger that has given
form to most of the tradition.”46 In contrast, she presents marriage as a Christian vocation
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while contending that “from primitive Christian times, marriage was respected as a realm
in which a disciple could give practical expression to faith, and whose internal order
could even be transformed by agape.”47

Family, Children, and Parenthood
Cahill’s primary concern in her consideration of the family involves the “relative
importance and possible interdependence of intentional commitment and biological
kinship in forming families.”48 She notes that the majority of authors “see culture and
choice as taking precedence over ‘merely’ biological relations.” Still, her sources differ
on how biological relations should remain significant in “defining the family and its
moral relationships.”49 Cahill rejects the argument that ‘kinship’ itself is a western
anthropological construction that cannot be applied across cultures.50 Yet, she argues that
feminists are also right in resisting idealizations of the private-nuclear family. These
perpetuate “the post-industrial, capitalist public-private split, and the confinement of
women in the domestic sphere.”51 What Western society lacks, Cahill contends, is
significant attention to the family’s social goals. It is not biological kinship itself that
raises concern, but rather the consistent institutionalization of biological kinship in terms
of “the organization of labor, exchange of goods, and inheritance of property.” In this
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framework, childrearing is generally “subsidiary to these purposes, rather than an end in
itself.”52 Such a perspective stands in tension to aspects of the tradition that have
emphasized the goodness of parenthood itself and the social goals of the family.
In Cahill’s perspective, “the family is a set of alliances which is in its genesis
dependent at least as much on biological linkage as on self-commitment and contract.”
She explains further that kinship ties can be conceived more or less extensively, may
have uncertain boundaries, or may be fictive.53 “But” she writes “‘family’ has a basic and
constitutive relation to biological relationship… for which other relations, however valid,
are analogues, not replacements.”54 She continues,
“The ideal family is not necessarily the nuclear family. But it is in the family that both biological
parents nurture children physically and emotionally, and educate them by example for larger social
roles… In the Christian perspective in particular, the ‘successful’ family does not ensure only its
own welfare… but is able to extend altruistic identification with, and sacrifice for, kin to include
neighbors, more distant community members, and even strangers… The New Testament
household churches and the metaphor of the family as the ‘domestic church’ in patristic writings
and in Roman Catholic teaching, are examples of the power of Christian commitment to transform
body-based family sympathies without eradicating them.” 55

The tension Cahill posits between the importance of biological kinship and that of
individual choice and desire becomes more pronounced in her considerations of assisted
reproductive technologies (ARTs). Cahill acknowledges the goodness of desiring to share
genetic parenthood with one’s spouse and, for women, gestational motherhood with one’s
child.56 She is concerned with the present ability to disassociate genetic, gestational, and
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social parenthood.57 And she criticizes public discourse on ARTs for subjecting “the
embodied relationality of sex and parenthood… almost entirely… to the primacy of
choice.”58 But Cahill also identifies a contrary and problematic reductionism in
magisterial teaching on this matter. This tends toward equating parenthood with
procreation; especially when procreation is conceived narrowly as a condition of
openness within individual sexual acts.59 In response, Cahill asserts that the “meaning of
parenthood, cross-culturally, historically, and experientially, is more social than either
alternative.” Procreation needs to be reinterpreted as parenthood; “a social relationship
over time in which the emotional bonding of parents and child is as important as the
physical realities of conception, birth, and kinship and the socioeconomic functions of the
intergenerational family.”60
To understand procreation as parenthood rectifies poorly integrated concepts
within Catholic theology of marriage; including procreation, love and union.61 Cahill
writes, “Parenthood joins the relation to one’s mate with the relation to one’s children,
through co-parenting.”62 Later she adds, “Parenthood makes sex (the couple’s sexual
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relation) fully accountable for, and contributory to, human well-being and
interdependence in communities beyond the couple.” That is, “their union in parenthood
is a specifically sexual mode of social participation.”63 For Cahill, ‘parenthood,’ succeeds
where ‘procreation’ fails because it redirects the physicalist-personalist polarity to
essentially social meanings. Further, Cahill suggests love as the guiding moral condition
of marriage, sex, and parenthood. This love-dimension of spousal relationships can be
“understood to extend to their domestic, social, and parental partnership.”64

Critical Appraisal
In Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, Cahill’s methodology offers a valuable
precedent for bringing both feminist convictions and experiential evidence into
productive dialogue with magisterial teaching. Cahill’s skillful navigation of the terrain
between divergent perspectives, on topics replete with difficulty, is impressive. Still, the
book raises points of concern. Why, for example, does Cahill’s concern for the embodied
importance of gender and sexuality not lead her to offer a more assertive position in
relation to homosexuality? That is, the seriousness with which Cahill takes human
embodiedness joined with her disillusionment with procreation as an effective norm for
the marital sexual relationship, suggests potential for a Catholic reappraisal of
homosexuality. This potential, when joined with her emphasis on the social goals of the
marital relationship, opens clear possibilities for a more thorough going reappraisal of the
potential theological goods of same-sex relationships. The answer appears to reside in
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Cahill’s methodology, which retrieves an Artistolian-Thomistic framework and, through
this, shares certain similarities with magisterial thought.
Cahill’s vision of the family is based around a core of biological kinship. She
argues that her position can be supported with sociological evidence. It also has
agreements with magisterial thought, and the opinion of Aquinas; who derived parental
responsibility from biological parenthood.65 On the other hand, Cahill is quite explicit in
articulating a framework in which both biological and fictive kinship play important
roles. And she makes clear, fictive kinship has significance, and may open the family to
greater social contribution. Positing fictive kinship as an important dimension of familial
relations allows Cahill to call attention to the social mission of the family.
However, the centrality of biological kinship in Cahill’s vision suggests that these
two forms of kinship form a duality between real-biological kinship and false-fictive
kinship. In this framework, fictive kinship remains good, but derives its meaning from
being analogous to biological kinship. This appears to be the same ordering that grounds
the question posed to magisterial teaching in the last chapter – whether adoptive families
can be said, unambiguously, to be ‘real’ families. The same tension would explain
Cahill’s hesitancy on the topic of homosexuality. That is, assessing the potential value of
false-fictive kinship for sexual partnerships that are naturally incapable for producing
real-biological kinship becomes a complex matter. That such a framework is at least
implicitly operative in Cahill’s thought is more evident in her perspective on adoption.
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Cahill’s brief and realist comments on adoption stand in rather stark contrast to a
much more extensive and creative engagement with biological kinship.66 There is no
romanticism in her account of adoption in which she presents adoption as form of “crisis
management.”67 Cahill cautions that all parties involved must “come to terms with their
‘loss’ of a unified bio-social child-parent relation.”68 Granting that serious problems do
indeed exist for claiming adoption as an unambiguous good, the absence in Cahill of an
explicitly theological vision of adoption is notable. While she considers the sociological
and personal turmoil often linked to adoption, theological motivations and commitments
are peripheral. In fact, she appears to define adoptive kinship precisely by its distance
from biological kinship.
Cahill’s perspective on adoption takes seriously the natural good of biological
kinship and its relation to social parenthood. However, from a theological perspective it
may be asked if kinship can or ought to be so singularly linked to biological foundations.
Like magisterial perspectives, Cahill’s vision of the family derives its social meaning
secondarily from its natural structure; though the similarity exists in relation to biological
kinship not specific sexual acts.69 Yet, the Christian tradition may warrant a deeper
appreciation of the value of ‘fictive’ kinship than Cahill is willing offer. For example,
early Christian martyrs staked their lives on “fictive” kinship often over an against the
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will of biological kin. There are many more Biblical and traditional warrants that suggest
“fictive” kinship plays a greater role that either Cahill of the magisterium suggest, but
these will be addressed more thoroughly in later chapters.
The scant attention Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics Cahill’s pays to children or
childhood as subjects in their own right is also noteworthy. Cahill’s remarks on children
generally refer to parental duties. Several factors are associated with children’s
wellbeing; including inter-personal commitment and familial stability. While Cahill
skillfully brings sociological data to bear on other topics, the opportunity to utilize such
resources in developing an account of children’s needs is regrettably missed.
Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics intentionally leaves many lines of inquiry
unresolved as it claims a middle ground precisely by questioning oppositional views.
Cahill’s centrist position, however, appears to lean strongly towards an approach
characteristic of magisterial thought in its conceptualization of parenthood. This produces
similar limitations as it derives its conception of parenthood via biological procreation.
Just Love
Sexual Ethics and Marriage
Margaret Farley’s Just Love approaches sexual ethical questions through
principles of justice. Farley writes, “love is true and just, right and good, insofar as it is a
true response to the reality of the beloved, a genuine union between the one who loves
and the one loved, and an accurate and adequate affective affirmation of the beloved.”70
Conversely, “love is false or mistaken when it does not accord with the nature of the
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relationship between lover and loved.”71 These observations serve as the “formal
principle of justice in loving.” The ‘material’ principles rely upon interpretations of
human realities, including “their needs, capacities, relational claims, vulnerabilities,
possibilities.”72 Farley explains, “what I propose is an inductive understanding of the
shared concrete reality of human persons that includes the following: Each person is
constituted with a complex structure… Human persons are essentially relational…
Persons exist in the world.”73 The last point includes institutional relationships, present
actualities and potentials, and individual uniqueness. In her assessment of basic human
realities, Farley remains cognizant of “the partiality of our knowledge, the historical
changeability of knowledge and the variations of human self-understandings from culture
to culture and across time.”74
Farley’s methodology for considering sexual ethics is unique among Catholic
theologians. Still, she supports several revisionist claims and commits to the possibility of
moral approval of specific sexual acts considered illicit in official teaching (masturbation,
pre-marital sex, homosexual sex, etc.). Yet, Farley is unwilling to jettison tradition
entirely; instead her criticisms are primarily driven by a commitment to forefront
principles of justice even in opposition to authoritative teaching that is said to be based
upon the objective moral order. Farley contends that the three classic Christian norms for
marriage remain valuable guides, namely: monogamy, sexual exclusivity, and
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permanence. She also argues that marriage and love share similar goals; “embodied and
inspirited union, companionship, communion, fruitfulness, caring and being cared for,
opening to the world of others, and lives made sacred in faithfulness to one another and
to God.”75
Farley’s ethics are directed by the principles of ‘fruitfulness’ and ‘social justice.’
These suggest that ethical sexual relationships tend toward growth and the common good.
‘Fruitfulness’ is related to the traditional good of ‘procreation,’ though Farley posits a
much wider meaning that includes growth in loving relationships, care, and justice.76 She
acknowledges that biological reproduction is a good that is not accessible in all sexual
relationships but emphasizes that non-reproductive sex acts may still be fruitful in ways
other, but not lesser than, biological procreation.77
Like Cahill, Farley affords significantly greater attention to ARTs than to
adoption as an alternative means of family formation. To her credit, Farley does not
follow a common tendency to insert praise for adoption as a means of contrasting the
moral challenges of ARTs, which commonly presents adoption as a licit alternative rather
than a positive moral good in its own right. Given her understanding of ‘fruitfulness,’
adoption might be considered implicit within Farley’s argument.
Family, Children, and Parenthood
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Considering normative family forms, Farley argues that there are great, though
perhaps not unlimited, possibilities for producing human happiness and flourishing. Like
Cahill, Farley rejects strict familial gender roles, but is significantly less concerned to
champion traditional structures based on kinship as inherently valuable. Farley argues
that it is mistaken to consider the family as a “natural ‘given,’ interior to society and with
an internal meaning that needs no critiquing as to its justice or injustice.” She further
criticizes the “almost insatiable desire” for biological children that drives a billion-dollar
ART industry.78 Instead, determinations of the ‘good family’ are not about preferences or
idealizations of a ‘best’ model so much as they are about the “justice and love that a
model makes possible.”79 For this reason, Farley is hesitant to define the family in terms
of structure or define outer boundaries. She writes, “every configuration that ‘works,’ that
functions reasonably well in facilitating and undergirding a life for people together in
mutual affection and flourishing, perhaps especially when it comes to the rearing of
children” ought to be celebrated.80
Children and parenthood are occasional points of reflection for Farley, but not
primary considerations. Yet, because Farley’s methodology moves from broad principles
toward increasingly specific applications, the inability to engage every specific topic is a
defensible limitation. The framework Farley is primarily intending to develop is easily
stretched to subjects not included in scope of the book itself.
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The most direct considerations of children and parenthood are largely limited to a
chapter on relationships.81 It is notable that despite Farley’s reframing of ‘procreation’
into the much broader concept of ‘fruitfulness,’ children and parenthood remain
conceptually significant within her sexual ethics. She argues that, as an ethical principle,
no child should be conceived who will not be born into a context conducive to his or her
growth. Though she admits this is an unenforceable standard, the principle links
parenthood and sexual ethics such that these “can be assessed in terms of whether or not a
child will be affirmed in her relationality and her development of a capacity for selfdetermination – whether or not she will be respected and nurtured in the features of her
being that constitutes the core of her humanity.”82 Additionally, Farley’s articulation of
love appears inclusive enough to embrace an understanding of parenthood, though she
focuses on ethics between sexual partners. In the context of parent-child love, the mutual
reciprocity around which Farley frames her concept of love would require revision.83

Critical Appraisal
While Farley’s effort has produced an insightful look at Christian ethics from a
consistent commitment to social justice, it also tends toward oversight of specific issues.
This cannot be totally avoided given her method of moving from broad principles toward
increasingly specific applications. On the whole, however, there is reason to desire more
balanced attention to certain areas. Children and parenthood, for example, are only
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occasional points of reflection for Farley and rarely do these become primary
considerations even at times when she has appeared to raise legitimate questions. At the
same time, Farley offers fodder for criticizing contemporary conceptualizations of
parenthood and its relation to sexual ethics. Nonetheless the specific implications of
Farley’s opinions and criticisms remain somewhat ambiguous in relation to children and
parenthood.
For instance, Farley offers grounds for supporting same-sex partnerships, and
suggests support for same-sex parenthood, but does not connect this to an integrated
understanding of parenthood. Farley argues that heterosexual and homosexual sexual
relationships can be evaluated on the same standards.84 She asserts that objections on the
grounds of the possibility of procreation “represent either a failure of imagination or a
narrowness of experience that disallows an appreciation of all the ways in which humans
bring life into the world, and all the ways that the world needs new life from those to
whom the gift of love has been given.”85 And she suggests that arguments in support of
same-sex marriage are stronger than those that cite possible negative implications for
‘traditional marriage’.86 Yet, Farley stops short of urging support for same-sex marriage
and instead argues that same-sex couples should be allowed to determine the suitable
institutional form of their own relationships.87
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Farley’s reservation on the institutionalization of same-sex relationships leaves
the question of same-sex parenthood resting in a conceptual gap. Farley gives no reason
why same-sex partners could not raise children, yet she does not consider how the
existence of children might legitimately impact the both nature of that relationship itself.
The presence of children in a relationship certainly alters the stakes of moral evaluation.
If same-sex relationships are governed by the same principles as heterosexual
relationships they ought to embody both fruitfulness and social justice, which could be
expressed in parenthood. Yet Farley’s justification goes no further than sexual ethics,
even as it opens the door to parenthood. In so doing, she fails to take the existence of
children themselves seriously and connect this to the known benefits for children offered
in her reflections on marriage. Instead, Farley ends with the self-determinations of adults.
Farley’s oversight in not recognizing the need to integrate same-sex parenthood
within some sort of stable, socially structured context, in the same manner as her
argument for the value of heterosexual marriage, belies a general inconsistency in
applying children’s needs as an evaluative condition for adult relationships. While Farley
suggests adult capacities that may be required of parenthood and employs the possibility
of parenthood as an evaluative tool, her ethic remains centered in adult sexual
relationships and does not consistently connect all the social, familial, and relational
points that she herself raises. This is not to say that Farley, a Catholic nun, is somehow
obligated to argue for same-sex unions or marriage. Instead it is to point out that even as
Farley proceeds from a vastly different methodology and comes to a very different moral
evaluation of same-sex relationships than does the magisterium, she too arrives at
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parenthood through sexual ethics while appearing to presume that adequate justifications
for sexual behavior somehow serve as sufficient grounds for parenthood.

The Sexual Person and Sexual Ethics
Sex Ethics and Marriage
Salzman and Lawler’s books critique aspects of official Catholic teaching on
sexual moral theology and deconstruct the methodological and anthropological
commitments it is based upon. In response to these criticisms, they offer a revised
theological anthropology and articulate its implications for sexual ethics. Their method
takes Catholic moral tradition seriously and centers on a Thomistic natural law
framework. Salzman and Lawler’s primary contention with modern developments in
Catholic moral theology, especially in the twentieth century, relates to its classicist
underpinnings. As such, they scrutinize official teaching in light of both internal
inconsistencies and new knowledge. Their own method relies upon historical
consciousness and offers a different model of appropriating tradition for the present,
which is more engaged with experience as a source of ethics.
Salzman and Lawler acknowledge that sexual ethics and marital ethics are largely
synonymous within Catholicism and, despite a few reservations, accept the wisdom of
this association.88 The revisions they do propose result primarily from founding
traditional forms of reasoning on “a more adequately considered unitive sexual
anthropology.”89 Their “renewed Catholic anthropology” holds two basic commitments,
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fully integrating personalist insights into official teaching and revising the overly
procreationist and acts-centered magisterial approach.90 These commitments arise out of
modern theological developments related to the ends of sexuality and marriage.91
Salzman and Lawler argue that important figures throughout the tradition have
recognized the relational bond of the spouses as the most definitive aspect of Christian
marriage. With Aquinas, however, the hierarchy of ends, which places procreation as
primary and companionship as secondary, become firmly instantiated within the tradition.
The authors take issue with Aquinas’ definition of the primary purpose of the human
institution of marriage by a generically animal capacity.92 In addition, they draw attention
to the significance of the shift in twentieth century considerations of the hierarchy of ends
from an earlier view of marriage to an emphasis on sexual intercourse specifically.93
Like Cahill and Farley, Salzman and Lawler advocate a more expansive
understanding of ‘procreation’ that can encompass broad meanings of ‘new life.’94 In
reference to Gaudium et spes they write, “The marital relationship finds an essentially
nurturing component in just and loving sexual acts that procreate, occasionally in a
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biological sense, always in the sense of creating life for the couple, their bonded
relationship, their family, and their wider community.”95
A central objection of the authors is to the manner in which official Catholic
teaching has employed personalist ideals following Vatican II. They argue that the
council had set the stage for renewal, yet traditional prohibitions grounded in physicalist,
act-centered reasoning have not only persevered, but have been roundly defended.96 The
Sexual Person devotes two chapters to exploring the fundamental divides in
contemporary Catholic moral theology on which this objection rests. A critique of the
idea of ‘complementarity’ as employed in magisterial and traditionalist sources emerges
from this effort.
The authors identify several forms of complementarity within magisterial
teaching and organize these as forms of ‘biological’ or ‘personal’ complementarity.
Biological complementarity includes ‘heterogenital’ and ‘reproductive’ complementarity.
Personal complementarity includes ‘communion’, ‘affective’, and ‘parental’
complementarity.97 They argue that, in magisterial sources, communion complementarity
is central to the expression of conjugal love and relies essentially upon heterogenital
complementarity.
Salzman and Lawler identify affective complementarity as “the crux of
magisterial teaching on sexual complementarity, because it intrinsically links biological
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and personal complementarity.”98 Aside from external genitalia, they inquire, what
essential attributes divide the genders? They identify biological maternity and paternity
as another differentiating feature (though these are dependent upon genitalia and
reproductive organs) and argue that gendered stereotypes bear the weight of the
remaining case for complementarity. “Femaleness is defined primarily in terms of
motherhood, receptivity, and nurturing and maleness is defined primarily in terms of
fatherhood, initiation, and activity.” They contend that this “does not adequately reflect
the complexity of the human person and relationships.”99 Salzman and Lawler conclude
that the concept of complementarity in magisterial teaching “is entirely unsubstantiated
by any scientific evidence.”100 In response, Salzman and Lawler argue that personal
goods must be privileged over physical realities and, on this basis, advance a revised
account of sexual ethics based upon a more nuanced anthropology.101
Salzman and Lawler argue that this conception of complementarity rests on weak
foundations when human sexuality is considered comprehensively. They argue that, when
genital complementarity ceases to be decisive, the difference between homogenital
intercourse and knowingly infertile heterogenital intercourse becomes obscure. In
addition, evidence suggests same-sex partners can experience affective complementarity.
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From their perspective of ‘wholistic complementarity’ homogenital sexual acts, like
heterogenital sexual acts, are potentially morally justifiable.102

Family, Children, and Parenthood
Salzman and Lawler consistently utilize children’s wellbeing as an evaluative tool
for sexual ethics; specifically as a means of critiquing magisterial teaching. For example,
the authors criticize the CDF for arguing that children’s wellbeing rests upon parental
complementarity (subject to heterogenital complementarity) as a reason for rejecting
same-sex parenting. In response, Salzman and Lawler cite a growing body of evidence to
suggest children’s wellbeing is not, in fact, closely associated with the heterogenital
complementarity of their parents.103 Salzman and Lawler appeal to children’s needs again
to refute the hierarchy of ends. They write,
The union of the spouses tends naturally to the birth and nurture of new persons, their children,
who focus the fulfillment of their parents, both as individuals and as a two-in-oneness… social
scientific data demonstrates that the well-being of the child is a function of the well-being of its
parents, suggesting that the relationship between the spouses is the primary natural result of
marriage, since all other relationships in the family depend on it. 104

Similarly, children’s wellbeing is used to critique assertions of the inseparability of the
procreative and unitive meanings of intercourse. “The genuine procreation of children,
which always intended and continues to intend their education and nurture beyond mere
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biological generation… depends on the happiness and stability of the relationship
between the spouses/parents.”105 Further they argue,
The demands of the good of marriage, the good not only of the couple but also of their existent
children, can on occasion take priority over the good of procreation. A compromise may be
needed between the good of the spouses and the good of procreation… Not every married couple
need procreate, or even be open to procreation, every time they have intercourse; indeed, as Pius
XII taught, not every couple need procreate at all.106

Although Salzman and Lawler’s books are too centered on anthropology and
sexual ethics to include significant considerations of family, children, and parenthood,
they frequently acknowledge the implications of their argument for these realities and
employ social-scientific research to substantiate their claims.

Critical Appraisal
Salzman and Lawler express agreement with other authors regarding the
idealization of sexual intercourse in magisterial thought, yet they occasionally tend
toward this themselves. While emphasis on the importance of sexual acts may be
expected in books on sexual ethics, at times the authors’ valuation appears to distort sex’s
place within a matrix of concerns that includes marriage, children, and parenthood. For
example, Salzman and Lawler express agreement with Gaudium et spes’ teaching that the
act of intercourse is the “perfection of conjugal love.”107 Yet this seems at odds with their
criticism of John Paul II for idealizing the potential of sexual acts and with their concern
that Aquinas defines an animal capacity as the primary end of marriage. In so doing the
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authors misrepresent Gaudium et spes, which implies that sex serves the perfection of
conjugal love, not that sex itself embodies that perfection.108 Salzman and Lawler appear
to be attempting to support a positive evaluation of the sexual act (which at times seems a
rather fragile newcomer to Catholic thought) but in so doing replicate another recent
trend of idealizing sexual intercourse. The problem with this idealization is that the praise
offered can distract from more problematic underlying assumptions. In this case, Salzman
and Lawler suggest that the Christian vocation of marriage might be embodied in good
sex; a sentiment that runs parallel to statements of John Paul II criticized above. If
marriage, including the conjugal love that defines it, is a Christian vocation, its
‘perfection’ should be tied to a supernatural end, while sexual expression would be a
service to that end. This simply parallels the criticism the authors make of Aquinas’
ordering of the ends of marriage. Gaudium et spes itself suggests that such perfection
may be found in the perseverance of this love in “bright days or dark.”109
A similar tendency may also be surmised from Salzman and Lawler’s
prioritization of good sex as foundational to family formation (by conception or adoption)
and to sustaining the health of the marriage, family, and children’s wellbeing. Again,
while sexual acts may well play an important role, the centralization is misplaced and
replicates problematic traditional preoccupations. A limited theological vision of
parenthood may be a factor in Salzman and Lawler’s admittance of certain superlative

108
“[Conjugal love] is uniquely expressed and perfected” through the intimacy appropriate to
matrimony. Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, Vatican, (December 7, 1965)
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ ii_vatican_council/documents/vatii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html, #49. The Sexual Person is in error when citing #51 which
concerns the regulation of birth.
109

Gaudium et spes, #49.

128

claims about sex. More explicit attention to the specifically Christian vocation of
parenthood could have served to reduce the centralization of sexual expression.
Further limitations in a theological vision of parenthood may be at work in their
presentation of adoption and same-sex parenthood. The relationship between adoptive
and biological parenthood is not clarified. This ambiguity joined with their high valuation
of sexual intercourse, once again leaves the authors open to the criticism made of Cahill
above. Namely, that through a Thomistic natural law framework, they have replicated a
tendency to base their concept of parenthood essentially on biological kinship to the
exclusion of other forms.
Their limited vision of parenthood becomes more evident when their argument for
the moral acceptance of homogenital sexual acts is compared to their argument for samesex parenthood. While the former utilizes a thorough rethinking of complementarity and
the human person, the latter is exclusively based upon experiential evidence. In effect,
their justification for same-sex sexual relationships functions as theologically sufficient
to justify same-sex parenting; while social-scientific data bear the weight of this second
claim.110 Like Cahill and Farley, Salzman and Lawler’s project is not primarily concerned
with same-sex parenthood. Nonetheless, their arguments lead them to justify same sex
parenthood even as their grasp of the further theological implications of that justification
appears insufficient as it relates to theological conceptions of parenthood.

Conclusion
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Each of the books above offers points of contention with magisterial teaching and
utilizes revisionist methodological commitments. However, each author demonstrates
certain points of limitation that reflect those identified in modern magisterial teaching by
the previous chapter. Specifically, thin theological accounts of parenthood appear to
compliment much more substantial sexual ethical arguments while the former in many
ways functions definitively for the latter. As with magisterial sources, this tendency
suggests that the Christian vocation of parenthood is contingent upon, and primarily a
function of, sexual morality. Interestingly, though the authors disagree to varying degrees
with magisterial teaching on same-sex relationships, it is in their considerations of these
where the connection between sexual ethics and parenthood often becomes most obvious.
While sexual ethical norms are well-developed, thin theological accounts of parenthood
limit reflections on how same-sex parenthood may contribute or distract from the
Christian vocation of parenthood. Farley and Salzman and Lawler differ significantly
from the magisterium in utilizing sociological data to support same-sex partnerships yet
the evidence is not integrated into a theological account of parenthood itself. Perhaps
relatedly, adoptive parenthood remains a peripheral subject which receives little direct
attention and few theological arguments to substantiate its place within the Christian
tradition.
Each author grapples with the implications of contemporary experience for
Catholic sexual moral theology and each tends to refute strong gender essentialism as a
result. In doing so, they allow contemporary experience to function as a more centralized
source of moral knowledge than found in magisterial teaching. However, these writings
also tend to replicate magisterial thought by drawing conceptions of parenthood primarily
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from sexual ethical norms and some level of commitment to biological kinship as the
presumptive normative form of kinship.
Though it has been argued above that the specific contexts often call for a more
thorough engagement with the theological concept of parenthood, the emphasis on sexual
ethics found throughout these books may seemingly be a consequence their primary
subject matter. That is, books on sexual ethics reasonably focus on sexual rather than
more peripheral considerations, such as parenthood. Therefore, to substantiate these
concerns more fully, the second half of this chapter turns to writing on marriage and
family. Here again, it will be argued that although many useful insights are available,
remarkably little research describes parenthood as a subject of theological concern in its
own right.

Part III: Marriage and Family
Overview
In recent decades, Catholic theological writings on marriage have focused on the
sacramental theology of marriage (especially in relation to cohabitation), the bond of
marriage, annulment, and divorce.111 Several theologians have proposed revised
theologies of marriage to counter the impact that patriarchy and the ideal of celibacy have
had historically in shaping Catholic theology of marriage.112 In this task, recoveries of

111
Cf. Chapters 4 and 5 in, Michael G. Lawler and William P. Roberts, eds., Christian Marriage
and Family: Contemporary Theological and Pastoral Perspectives (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical
Press, 1996).
112

Gaile M. Pohlhaus, “Feminism and Christian Marriage: a Progress Report,” in Christian
Marriage and Family: Contemporary Theological and Pastoral Perspectives, eds., Michael G. Lawler and
William P. Roberts (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1996), 93.

131

biblical perspectives as well as awareness of the historical diversities and developments
within Christian views on marriage are prevalent.113 This preoccupation may have
distracted from reflection on the theological identity of parenthood within the field.
A survey of nine recent Catholic scholarly books on marriage and family reveals
that sacramental theology of marriage and sexual ethics each receive significantly more
direct attention than considerations of the family, parenthood, or children (“fatherhood”
does not even appear in all indices).114 Though this perusal of recent writing is not
comprehensive and cannot speak to the relative influence of each book, it does seem to
suggest the tendencies of established scholars within this field. Parenthood receives less
than half the total pages devoted to sexual ethics and less than a quarter compared to
sacramentology of marriage. Notably, spirituality of parenthood is the most common
approach to the topic within the texts surveyed. Direct consideration of children reveals
even greater paucity, despite the growing academic field of childhood studies (a subject
of a later chapter). This is remarkable given the significant attention sexual ethics
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continues to receive. Catholic moral tradition tends strongly towards a ‘natalist’ bias115
which is evidenced by greater concern for how children are made than how they are
raised. Such a bias naturally leads to neglecting adoptive parenthood which falls beyond
its center of concern.
Despite revisionist inclinations to expand and reconfigure the concerns of sexual
ethics, revisionist moral theology remains centered on relatively narrow concerns. Still,
several recent publications have begun to reshape the conversation by turning attention
more directly to the operation of family systems and the theological convictions that
ground the Christian family. In this respect, Vatican II’s reassertion of the family as the
domestic church has played a significant role.116
The first part of this chapter critically discussed the way various revisionist texts
treat parenthood. The veracity of this critique depends upon sex, marriage, and family
being closely connected in Catholic thought such that texts on sexual ethics can be
assumed to bear on conceptions of parenthood. This linkage is not only evident
throughout magisterial and revisionist sources, but concretely shapes Catholic sexual
ethics. Importantly, however these connections also display an inner hierarchy which
proceeds from sexual ethics and is shaped by a normative conception of biological
kinship. By structuring the relationships in this way, moral commitments are skewed
towards sexual ethics which permits the continuation of underdeveloped conceptions of
parenthood. Counteracting this pervasive tendency, so as to theologically consider
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parenthood in its own right, requires careful delineation of concepts within the subjects of
sex, marriage, and family, while affirming their fundamental relatedness. Present
theological writing has not sufficiently attended to this task.
Todd Whitmore has argued that contemporary Catholic thought has tended to
assume a common anthropology of the child without explicit consideration of what this
might be.117 The limited attention recently given to the study of children as subjects in
their own right, not subsumed within reflections on the family or motherhood, is a
hopeful sign.118 Recent works have begun to fill this void in contemporary theological
concern while arguing that such a void is out-of-step with the greater Christian
tradition.119 The Child in Christian Thought, edited by Marcia J. Bunge, surveys
theological conceptions of childhood in Christian history through the writings of major
theologians and movements.120 David H. Jenson argues that children provide an essential
vantage point into Christian faith.121 And Bonnie Miller-McLemore considers the
theological meaning of childhood and parenthood for Christians today.122 This hopeful
trend will be addressed more clearly in the following chapter. At present, it is enough to
suggest that just as ‘children’ can be treated as viable subjects of theological inquiry
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without necessarily negatively influencing the related ideas of family, parenthood, or
procreation, so too parenthood deserves greater direct theological attention as a subject
related to sex, marriage, and family that is not absorbed by these. Furthermore, this
perspective already finds some support in contemporary magisterial and revisionist
thought.
The remainder of this chapter considers works within the theology of marriage
and family that offer particularly helpful contributions to a more adequate theology of
parenthood. First among these is Lisa Sowle Cahill’s Family a Christian Social
Perspective. While her earlier work, considered above, focused on sexual ethics and
gender, this text offers more substantial resources for understanding the Christian family
as a unique community within the broader social context. This is followed by Julie
Hanlon Rubio’s A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family and Family Ethics, both
valuable contributions to the field which advance the author’s efforts to move
Catholicism beyond the divisiveness fostered in the wake of Humanae vitae. Lastly,
Richard Gaillardetz’s appropriation of the Eastern Orthodox concept of ‘generativity’
receives brief attention as a helpful concept for advancing the present conversation.

Family a Christian Social Perspective
Lisa Sowle Cahill’s Family; A Christian Social Perspective presents a Christian
account of parenthood by framing theologically considered parental functions within the
Christian family’s social obligations. She observes that, historically and cross-culturally,
kinship and the body are important for grounding the family in material needs, yet
marriage also introduces “the importance of affiliation through free choice in defining
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family ties.”123 Likewise, observations of continuity are balanced against disruption and
difference. She writes,
Although family as created by kinship and marriage is the most basic family form or definition of
family, it is not the only or exclusively legitimate form. It is basic in that it prevails across cultures
as an important social institution and provides the fundamental working concept of the family for
most individuals and societies. There are other types of human alliance, however, for mutual
economic and domestic support, as for reproduction and childrearing, that are analogous to the
basic kin- and marriage-based family.

Cultural practices of adoption are illustrative of these diversities, even as adoption by
near kin is often preferred. Cahill concludes that absolute clarity on the definition of the
family is both difficult and unwise. Instead, she advances an “inclusive and supportive
approach to family life, one that can hold up ideals such as male-female coparenting and
sexual fidelity without thereby berating and excluding single-parent families, divorced
families, gay and lesbian families, blended families, or adoptive families.”124
Three convictions frame Cahill’s argument. The first concerns human nature and
the goals of civil society. She writes, “Humans have a natural capacity for intimacy,
empathy, compassion, and altruism that can be learned and fostered in close associations
like the family...”125 Through proper socialization, these innate human capacities can be
developed to serve Christian goals by extending towards the larger community. Thus,
“The moral task of families and of civil society in general is to enhance these capacities
and to discourage their opposites.” Her second conviction is that sin, specifically in the
form of collective egotism, constitutes “a dark side of all human associations that family
theorists do well to keep in mind, so as to counteract it more effectively.” Her third
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conviction relates to the transformative influence of Christian faith in human relations.
Yet, the Christian family and its vocation to embody discipleship nonetheless remains
grounded in the ambiguities of earthly existence.126 In articulating these three
convictions, Cahill addresses the classic features of a Christian anthropology (nature, sin,
and grace) in the context of the family. She suggests that humans, by nature, are both
relational and capable of growth while human nature is further contextualized by the
realities of both sin and grace.
Cahill recognizes that Christian discipleship is possible only within the highly
complex terrain of earthly existence. As such, she acknowledges Jesus’ ambiguity toward
the family and presents the mixed messages of the early Christian witness. In so doing,
she pays close attention to the complex, and perhaps conflicting, obligations of Christian
faith and familial commitments.127 Cahill surmises, “Although it is probably true that
Jesus did not repudiate family simply as family, it is not enough to say that he only
wanted his followers to put family claims in perspective. Jesus as remembered by the
early Christian movement presents family life with a deep and momentous challenge.”
For Cahill, this challenge is a call to “radical transformation.”128
Following this biblical precedent, Cahill stays closely attuned to the potentially
negative moral dimensions of the family. She argues that legitimate concern for family
well-being can easily lead to justifying and supporting existing hierarchies.129 And she
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notes, “family belonging is potentially idolatrous, a socially acceptable form of arrogance
and greed.”130 This idolatry is evidenced by the insularity of families who exercise a form
of collective individualism and fail to fulfill the obligations of their Christian identity.
Rather, a Christian family reaches beyond its own social and economic sphere.131 She
explains, “The primary values defining the Christian family are the same values that
define the ‘new family and Christ’: other-concern and compassionate love that overlooks
socially normative boundaries and is willing to sacrifice to meet the needs of others.”132
Considering these tensions further she writes,
To overcome the perils that family identity presents, it is necessary for Christian identity to
transform the family’s self-promoting and exclusionary tendencies and to enhance the abilities to
teach affection, empathy, and altruism. On the basis of these dispositions, Christian families will
be able to cultivate reciprocity and equality internally and to foster the compassionate sharing of
goods with outsiders.133

Despite Cahill’s concern that the Christian family recognize its own Christian
vocation, she is also keenly aware of the potential dangers of closely associating the
family and the church. For instance, Cahill highlights the social orientation of the
“domestic church” in magisterial teaching, yet argues that neither patriarchy nor the
negative effects of global capitalism have been sufficiently critiqued.134 She asserts,
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naming the family as ‘church’ can just as easily lead to domesticating the eschatological
edge of Christianity as to sanctifying families; and likely will lead to both.135
She further argues that the family’s mission as an inter-generational association of
Christians underwrites its Christian identity. That is, structural definitions of the family
are less significant than assessments of family function in light of Christian
commitments.136 Cahill writes, “if the socially radical meaning of Christianity is taken
seriously, Christian families can become vehicles of social justice, even as they
strengthen and build upon their bonds of kinship, affection, and faithfulness.”137 This
conviction finds a contemporary exemplar in African-American families that have
provided mutual support and maintained a marital and parental ideal while remaining
broadly inclusive of diverse family structures.138 While the contexts that have provided
the need for these responses within black Christian communities raise concern, the
communal means of support and acceptance provides a valuable framework for a broader
Christian perspective on the family.
Cahill’s understanding of the family does not make all family structures equal;
some are apt to produce greater human happiness and social betterment, especially those
that tend towards fidelity and commitment. Still her perspective “opens up the possibility
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that even ‘nontraditional’ families may exhibit the most important Christian family
values, and for that reason be authentic domestic churches.”139
Cahill makes a qualified acceptance of the appraisal that the modern family is in
crisis but is careful to avoid to identifying this crisis narrowly with demographic shifts
within the domestic sphere. Instead, she argues that the crisis must be addressed with
respect to both personal-moral and social-economic concerns.140 Likewise, Cahill
partially accepts the view that the ascendency of ‘individualism’ is responsible for
dissolving family structures, but also calls attention to the destructive effects poor
education and joblessness have on the families of the urban poor.141 Cahill writes
“certainly poverty correlates with unwed motherhood” and argues further, on the basis of
sociological data, that “poverty is the cause of single-parent families. Poor education and
joblessness are disincentives to marriage.”142
Considering children, Cahill observes that the uniqueness of the Christian
family’s vocation centers on its duty of committing children “to Christian purposes,
mainly, worship of the God revealed in Jesus Christ and to love for neighbor and
enemy.”143 Through the Christian family, children are embedded in the Christian life
established by their parents and other family members and learn to participate in broader
communities specifically as Christians. Cahill writes, “The child grows to share the larger
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community of religious experience and moral service that the family represents in
miniature.”144
Characteristically, Cahill’s work is also concerned with gender. Within the family
and society, gender can function as a “line of division marking access to social benefits.”
Such a demarcation tends to produce dichotomous gender roles which generally result in
preferential roles for men. These roles are reinforced “by ideology and by physical force,
both direct and indirect.”145
Considering John Paul II, Cahill observes his emphases on the fair distribution of
wealth and his introduction of the historically novel concept of the family as “a sphere of
relative gender equity.”146 Yet, Cahill observes, “an irreducible ambivalence of the papal
approach to gender owes to John Paul II’s firm espousal of a complementarity model of
equality.”147 But from Cahill’s perspective, “Christian interpretation of family life must
confront the possibility that traditional family structures should be replaced, not
reinforced, in the domestic church.”148
Cahill’s argument in relation to gender roles is especially significant in its
permission to allow Christian ideals to challenge and reconstruct long-accepted norms of
family structure and function. She argues,
[A]n important task for the church’s mission to Christian families today is to discover or create a
family identity that is genuinely countercultural. While examples from the tradition carry
liabilities, they also manifest certain strengths.… Christian family evangelization today, however,
must improve upon these models by refusing to capitulate to any hierarchies of sex, class, and
144
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wealth that contradict the essence of Christian social ethics: to embody the reign of God in human
society by including the neighbor, stranger, and enemy in a new family of sisters and brothers in
Christ.149

The final chapter of this project will make further use of the precedent offered
here by Cahill, framed within the specific terms of Christian parenthood. For now, it is
worth noting that Cahill’s attention to the transformative potential of Christian
commitments, even within aspects of family life that have been long considered natural,
and therefore normative, affords a valuable precedent. In addition, Cahill offers a vision
of the family that is not bound to a particular structure, but instead evaluated on the basis
of function in relation to the family’s Christian vocation. Although she focuses on social
practices, specifically in the political and economic realms, her assessment of the family
is also framed by a specifically Christian anthropological commitment to addressing the
complex interplay of nature, sin, and grace. Each of these insights may contribute to a
broader theological vision of parenthood.

Family Ethics and A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family
Like Cahill, Julie Hanlon Rubio identifies the family as a point of convergence
between private and social spheres and employs a method that is both appreciative and
critical of the tradition.150 Throughout both books, Rubio is often in dialogue with John
Paul II but rarely finds total agreement. Her earlier book, A Christian Theology of
Marriage and Family, offers more direct criticisms of John Paul II, who she portrays as a
moderate standing between modernist conservatives and postmodernist liberals. Perhaps
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her most piercing criticism is directed at the late pontiff’s portrayal of the family, which
she argues, “never steps out of the ideal realm to touch the reality of individual
families.”151 In Family Ethics, Rubio is likewise concerned with the idealism of John
Paul II as well as the disproportionate emphasis he placed on sexuality and sexual love in
comparison to lived experience.152 She argues that the imagined harmony of the holy
family, “Mary, submissive and nurturing; Joseph quietly protective, a good provider; and
Jesus, the holy obedient child” and the idealization of large, pious families create
obstacles for many families to hear the church’s message.153 She writes, “In short, images
of holy families often stand in the way of right hearing and impair right response.”154
These idyllic visions must be replaced with theologies that recognize the limitations and
challenges of real families and do not treat these realities as aberrations. Thus, Rubio
centers concern explicitly in the daily lives of families and utilizes Bernard Cooke’s
vision of marriage as the ‘sacrament of friendship’ to bring balance to the late pontiff’s
idealism.155
John Paul II’s application of complementarity is another point of concern.156
Rubio draws upon Cahill to consider both the reality of gender differentiation as well as
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ambiguities in gender roles as found in biblical and experiential evidence.157 In her earlier
work, Rubio is particularly assertive about the inconsequential nature of gender in
relation to Christian discipleship.158
Beyond these specific disagreements with John Paul II, Rubio also objects to
those who find unambiguous support for the family in the New Testament. She writes,
“Despite traditional theological claims to the contrary, family values are hardly prevalent
in the New Testament. Jesus himself locates his vocation outside of his family.”159 Later
she adds, “Jesus poses troubling questions about the compatibility of discipleship with
family duties.”160 Rubio observes that the decreased importance of ‘family values’ results
from the pride-of-place held by discipleship in the early Christian perspective on family
life. Christian marriage not only founds the family, Christian marriage is discipleship. As
a result, discipleship is not a natural outcome of family life but a hard-fought and often
conflictive negotiation of values.161 She writes, “The public nature of discipleship is
evident in the life of Jesus. Jesus himself acknowledges the conflict between serving God
(in his public preaching) and serving his family.”162
The implication of Rubio’s argument is near at hand; the roles of non-biological
kinship and discipleship in the New Testament undermine absolute assertions centered on
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‘natural’ family patterns. In her earlier book, Rubio writes, “The kinship bond and all the
ethical priority that comes with it are called into question, because the Jesus of the
Gospels preaches that family, like money and power, can be dangerous to the person who
wants to live a holy life.”163 Rubio asserts that these realities do not imply that the New
Testament is anti-family, but that contemporary readings must be nuanced. Later, citing
Ted Peters, she takes the argument further. He writes,
Jesus stressed beyond-kin altruism. When he enjoined us to love our neighbor, he frequently
illustrated that teaching with stories of foreigners such as the Good Samaritan. He told us to love
our enemies. He gave no priority to one’s biological kin, family, tribe, or nation. Applied
internally to families, this translates into love of social kin even when they are not biological kin.
Sociobiology may be illuminating but, in my judgment, it certainly is insufficient for such an
ethical foundation a Christian could embrace.”164

Peters’ research demonstrates that “Christians love children not because children belong
to them, but because children belong to God. Their commitment to their children is
rooted primarily in love, not biology.”165
Like early Christians, Rubio argues, contemporary Christians are called to
recognize the tensions between discipleship and family obligations and to respond to
these with a ‘radical reprioritization’ of commitments.166 She explains, common to
Christian perspectives, “we find a strong valuing of marriage rooted not in kin but in faith
and a challenge to bring family outside of its own concerns to embrace a larger mission
using its unique strengths.”167 Thus, Rubio posits that Christian parents are called to a
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‘dual vocation’ which is both inwardly directed to the wellbeing of the family and
outwardly directed to the betterment of society.168 She adds that this commitment applies
equally across genders. “Jesus did not ask different things of male and female followers.
Does not ask different things of mothers and fathers, beyond pregnancy and nursing.
Rather, the dual vocation of parenthood belongs to everyone.”169
This perspective helps Rubio expand her understanding of family commitments as
existing both within and beyond the bonds of biological kinship. She writes, “it is natural
for parents to have a desire to form their children and John Paul II certainly affirms
parents place is primary educators of their children. Still, it seems possible and perhaps
more traditional to allow for parents’ primary interest in combination with the influence
of other adults.” Not only might this approach better reflect historical Christian
commitments, it also finds parallels in cultural realities. Citing African-American
experience, Rubio writes, “children are seen not as private property, but is vulnerable
human beings who need the care not only of blood mothers, but of grandmothers, sisters,
aunts, cousins, and neighbors, the other mothers who share in the project of child
raising.”170 John Paul II strongly asserted the need not to view children as private
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property, yet his emphasis stayed with the objectification of the child as human person
and as such directed more attention the aspect of property than privacy. Rubio takes aim
at the second implication to this thought; not being private implies an ability to be shared.
Rubio’s concern with the privatization of the modern family finds ample support
in the distinctive place the family holds as a source of social change in Catholic Social
Teaching (CST). Rubio observes CST’s emphasis on the importance of developing
individual virtue within a community as well as the fact that families, not labor unions
alone, are counted among the ‘intermediate associations’ that can promote dramatic
social change.171 Rubio identifies four primary roles proposed for family in CST; “work
as vocation, personal responsibility for social change, the social mission of the family,
and the transformation of culture.”172 She writes, “The genius of Catholic teaching on the
family is its refusal to limit families by telling them to simply focus on themselves.
Christian families, from this perspective, are to grow in self-giving love within and
outside the bonds of kinship.”173 In contrast, some would suggest that the family lies
beyond the scope of CST, but this mistaken notion itself, Rubio argues, arises from an
overly privatized view of the family and a limited conception of the family as a
community.174 Rather, “family is a fundamental part of the Catholic social tradition’s
vision of social reform.”175

171

Rubio, Family Ethics, 44.

172

Ibid., 51.

173

Ibid., 30.

174

Ibid., 38.

175

Ibid., 39.

147

Throughout her books, Rubio joins a commitment to exploring the breadth of the
tradition with a refusal to allow idealizations of family life to obscure the practical
implications of Christian discipleship. In her earlier work, she insightfully explores
diversities in Christian conceptions of marriage, family, and parenthood that stand in
some tension with contemporary discourse. Most notably, she argues that contemporary
accounts of the family are more private and parent-centered than the tradition demands.
In her later work, Rubio helpfully shifts considerations of parenthood and the family
away from sexual ethics and structure. Furthermore she offers a rich critique of the
consequences of idealism as well as insightful articulations of what the Christian call to
discipleship might look like within the realm of parenthood as a contemporary Christian
vocation. When taken together, Rubio’s books offer a thorough rejection the ideal of a
private, autonomous, biological nuclear family as insufficient in itself. Instead Christian
families should aspire to be socially engaged, open communities that are grounded in
practices of discipleship and set within a broader Christian community. In this context,
parenthood is framed by discipleship and requires communal support.

Gaillardetz on Generativity
Richard Gaillardetz’s book on marriage, A Daring Promise, appropriates the
notion of ‘generativity,’ drawn from Orthodox thought. Generativity is similar to the
expanded notions of procreation often adopted by revisionist theologians; however
generativity as explained by Gaillardetz is also clearly connected to Christian
discipleship. Differences in interpretations of ‘procreation’ tend to relate to how closely
or loosely it ought to be associated with biological reproduction. As such, whether
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adoption, social outreach, and other commitments directly fulfill the procreative end of
sex and marriage for all couples, only for couples who cannot biologically procreate, or
only analogously for all couples, remains a continuing point of ambiguity within Catholic
theology. Generativity, however, begins from a much broader perspective that suggests a
greater capacity to encompass the complex, and possibly conflictual, Christian calls to
discipleship and parenthood.
According to Gaillardetz, the Orthodox tradition understands that the love of the
married couple replicates the love of the Trinity. In the Trinity, “the love between two
(the Father and the Son) is not self-contained but ‘spills over,’ as it were, as Spirit. The
triune life of God is characterized not only by a profound mutuality of love between the
Trinitarian persons, but also by a fecundity, a superabundance in which God’s love
overflows outward into the world.” Following from this perspective, the love of Christian
couples should not be self-contained but should be expected to similarly overflow in lifegiving ways; biological procreation being one example. From this perspective,
“childbearing is not seen as an obligation of married life… but as a ‘felicitous outcome’
of the nuptial union.” Gaillardetz continues,
For most married couples the generative power of their love will indeed be expressed in
childbearing and childrearing… But generativity, the drive to see our love bear fruit in the world,
can be expressed in innumerable ways. This is the aspect of Christian mission which is so strong
in the Orthodox view of marriage and relatively undeveloped in most other Christian traditions. 176

This concept appears to hold significant potential for transforming the Catholic concept
of procreation. First, its theological foundation provides a clear account of children as
both gifts and a natural result of marital love. Second, it avoids objectifying children as
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an obligation or a form of legitimization for marriage and human sexuality. And third, it
clearly encompasses adoption, social service, and other expressions of social commitment
as belonging authentically to marriage without raising the question of if these qualify in
fulfilling marriage’s legitimate end.

Conclusion
The commitments that characterize revisionist Catholic theological methods both
define these scholars in distinction from magisterial teaching and represent important
contributions to contemporary theology. Each source presented above demonstrates intent
to operate within the context of the Catholic tradition while addressing perceived
shortcomings in official teaching. This commitment has produced a number of insights
that are helpful to the task of developing a broader theological account of parenthood.
The revisionist authors above express concern that magisterial teaching on the family is
too tightly linked to the nuclear family, especially as this is accompanied by implied or
explicit parental roles based on gender. Likewise, they express concern that the
commitments of magisterial teaching are idealistic and do not speak adequately to the
complexity of contemporary familial realities.
These observations are important, yet the responses offered by revisionists are
themselves limited and tend to replicate biases also present in magisterial writing,
especially when moving from considerations of sexual ethics to conceptions of
parenthood. For example, with the magisterium, the authors above agree that openness to
adoption is a positive expression of Christian parenthood. Yet theological explanations of
why this is so and how adoptive parenthood relates to biological parenthood and marriage
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are under-developed. The support appears to follow from both their emphasis on
Christian social commitments and broad interpretations of the ‘procreative’ end of sex
and marriage.177 Neither option, however, provides a sufficient account of why adoption
is a specific good in relation to Christian parenthood theologically considered.
A second example, this one in opposition to the magisterial teaching, is the
support for the potential morality of same-sex parenthood. Here the defense moves from
a rational for justifying same-sex sexual acts, to parenthood. Yet theological defenses of
same-sex childrearing tend to rely on sociological evidence with little theological
argument from the nature of parenthood itself. The introduction to this project suggested
that magisterial opposition to same-sex adoptive parenthood centers on sexual ethical
concerns rather than parental capacities. Revisionist arguments, though disagreeing in
their conclusions, tend to replicate this very pattern. In both instances, moral
justifications of sexual relationships appear to validate or invalidate parental capacities.
Still, revisionist authors contribute a number of valuable insights for advancing
conceptions of parenthood. These include incorporating experience (particularly in the
form of social-scientific findings), historical consciousness, and broadened
anthropological frameworks with more nuanced conceptions of human gender into moral
methodology. Moreover, attempts to redefine and expand the theological notion of
‘procreation’, commitment to justice as a norm for human relationships, and gestures
towards the significance of human capacities also offer useful grounds for a broadened
theological anthropological account of parenthood.
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Moreover, books by Rubio and Cahill also offer significant grounds for
advancement. This includes a concept of familial Christian discipleship that is not
contingent upon a specific family structure, but is linked to the vocation of the family
itself. Making this argument, however, requires both Cahill and Rubio to acknowledge
that the call to Christian discipleship does not always fit neatly with family commitments.
This tension runs throughout the tradition and is first attested to in a complex and often
ambiguous New Testament attitude toward the family. The authors also seek to open
privatized conceptions of the family to more broadly social understandings. This includes
familial commitment to social service and welcoming more communal notions of
childrearing.
Rubio is more explicit in de-centering biological kinship within her theological
vision of the family. Christian families are grounded in love and discipleship. Biological
kinship, although it retains significance, is a lesser good in relation to these central
convictions. Rubio’s work also offers significant theological reasons for questioning the
idealizations of the family prevalent in recent thought in terms of the practical
implications for modern families.
Cahill’s contribution is nearer to the anthropological question. Though she does
not express it in these terms, her convictions in Family center around the complex
interrelation of nature, sin, and grace; concepts at the heart of Christian anthropology. In
addition, her approach is framed by relational anthropological commitments, as well as
basic human capabilities which must flow from an anthropological vision. Cahill’s
concern, however, is directed towards the family more generally than it is to parenthood
in particular. Yet, even as she retains biological kinship as a locus for defining the family,
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she emphasizes the importance of functional evaluations of how various domestic
arrangements evidence Christian virtues.
The expanded notions of ‘procreation’ offered by revisionists – variously
described as parenthood, fruitfulness, and generativity – build upon suggestions within
magisterial documents that procreation includes meanings well beyond biological
reproduction. Yet, Gaillardetz’s notion of generativity offers a more promising approach
as it goes beyond simply adjusting the scope and priorities of ‘procreation.’ Generativity
speaks to a theological reality about the very nature of Christian love. As such it is able to
place biological reproduction as well as social commitments as its authentic outcomes
without these appearing as potentially rival commitments. Moreover, generativity
distances a theological account of parenthood from sexual ethics by both grounding
parenthood in a theological reality and decentering sexual reproduction.
Having surveyed these resources, it is now evident that the major disagreements
between magisterial and revisionist accounts are primarily methodological and largely
influenced by differing frameworks for understanding the significance of human gender.
These disagreements are most pronounced in matters of sexual ethics but diminish as
considerations move toward family function; specifically the Christian family’s role in
society. Concerning these matters, authors tend to criticize inadequate reception of
Catholic Social Teaching as it concerns the family while the major disagreement
concerns the level of idealization within magisterial thinking of the biological-nuclear
norm as well as pious and harmonious family life. As such, a more firm and
comprehensive vision of parenthood, that is allowed a degree of distinction from sexual
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ethics, has the potential to unite insights from Catholic sources that are often oppositional
while speaking more coherently to present realities.
The following chapters now turn to considering how these pieces might be fit
together fruitfully to begin to construct an expanded theological understanding of
parenthood by drawing on resources found in history, the social sciences, and the
humanities.
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Introduction
Many of the authors cited in previous chapters provide historical surveys to
support their argument, which testifies to the importance of historical evidence for
theological considerations of sexuality, marriage and family. Magisterial documents tend
to reference historical figures, ideas, or events primarily to demonstrate continuity and do
not generally rely upon extensive critical research. Revisionist theologians employ
critical research to demonstrate historical developments, diversities, and the cultural roots
of religious ideals.1 Theologians who are more inclined to defend magisterial teaching
employ similar methods but emphasize continuity and consistency throughout these
developments. Feminist theologians tend to center historical criticism on gendered
hierarchies and ideologies which have left women’s voices silent, lost, or muted.2 Each of
these approaches offers insight into how parenthood has been understood throughout
Christian history, yet, each also tends to replicate the concerns of its authors who have
been inclined to undervalue parenthood as a theological consideration in its own right.
This chapter is an effort to redress some of this oversight by revisiting the
historical data with attention to diversities in Christian conceptions of the family,
children, and parenthood. The first part of this chapter considers New Testament and
Early Christian sources. The second part explores conceptions of the child throughout
Christian history and the relation of these to historical and ideological developments.

1
Cf. Rosemary Radford Ruether, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family (Boston:
Beacon Press, 2000). The greatest forces of change appear to be cultural and religious ideals as well as
social and economic pressures. Theological commitments are only one among many forces of change or
preservation in family systems.
2

Ruether, Christianity and the Making of the Modern Family, 5.
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The third part turns attention to forms of Christian childrearing beyond the biological
family in order to establish greater diversities in historical contexts for childrearing than
is often acknowledged.3 Throughout, this chapter intends to demonstrate that presently
influential notions of kinship within Catholicism require significant reconsideration in
light of the historical evidence. Specifically, the assumption of biological kinship’s
fundamental place within Christian conceptions of parenthood will be called into
question in light the historical diversities of Christian caregiving practices and the
theological motivations behind these. This investigation is not intended to negate the
value of the biologically-based family unit, but only to call into question the central place
the fact of biological kinship itself often occupies in theological conceptions of
parenthood.

Part I: Early Christianity
New Testament Perspectives
Assessing the New Testament’s perspectives on children and parenthood is
complicated at several levels. First, the New Testament itself is the work of many hands
which provide different perspectives. Second, the New Testament is shaped by both first
century Greco-Roman society as well as Jewish culture, neither of which held simple or
entirely consistent perspectives on children and parenthood. Third, the New Testament
neither wholly accepts nor wholly rejects these prevailing cultural and religious

3
This perspective responds to the observation of Annelies van Heijst in her study of orphan care
by women religious that “Theologians, philosophers, psychologists and sociologists” have been generally
inattentive to practices of providing care, especially when these are found beyond the family unit. See,
Annelies van Heijst, Models of Charitable Care: Catholic Nuns and Children in their Care in Amsterdam,
1852-2002 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 13.
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assumptions.4 Thus the New Testament is a collection of perspectives from writers, each
influenced by regional variations in composite socio-religious identities, who respond to
complex and somewhat contradictory socio-religious ideals with varying levels of
acceptance and criticism. The following section attempts to clarify components of these
perspectives with attention to conceptions of children and parenthood.

Greco-Roman Context
Among the Greco-Roman upper class,5 the ideal household was built around a
single, two-parent family with their children, possibly their children’s families, and their
slaves and slaves’ families.6 Yet circumstances and customs created significant diversity
in actual household forms. Substantial differences in age at marriage produced much
younger wives who might outlive their husbands by decades. Alternately, childbirth
posed a substantial risk to the lives of women and would have produced many widowers
and subsequent remarriages. Infant and child mortality rates were high while low life
expectancies probably left few grandparents.7 Thus, mortality at all ages would have

4

Judtih M Gundry-Volf, “The Least and the Greatest: Children in the New Testament,” in The
Child in Christian Thought, ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 36.
5

The historical record best attests to conditions of the affluent. It is uncertain the extent to which
these practices and ideals were shared by the majority of society.
6

Beryl Rawson, “The Roman Family in Recent Research: State of the Question.” Biblical
Interpretation 11 no. 3 (2003), 121.
7
“Saller’s work has shown that mortality rates were such that by early adulthood most young men
and women had lost their paterfamilias and were sui iuris. Many children were deprived of a close
relationship with a parent by a parent’s early death. At the age of five, the probability of having a father
alive was perhaps 88 per cent, but by the age of ten this had reduced to about 75 per cent, and by the age of
fifteen it was about 63 per cent. Corresponding figures for mothers were 91, 81 and 72 per cent.” Ibid. 127.
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assured variations in family forms.8 In addition, age differences among children were
probably much greater than in modern times such that even a relatively large family
would not necessarily imply siblings of close ages.9
The Roman household was also ordered hierarchically based on gender, age, and
class.10 The eldest patrilineal male, the paterfamilias, stood as lord and insurer of good
order over all within the household. Wives were subservient to husbands and children to
their parents; but first and foremost to their fathers. But while authority flowed from the
top down, shame moved in both directions. This added greater importance to the
supervision of those of lower status (i.e. women and children) as their misconduct would
be a mark on the honor of patrilineal male kin.11 Theoretically, the authority of the
paterfamilias extended even to life and death, but circumstances tended to limit the
exercise of this power. Short life expectancies and late ages at marriage left relatively few
years for most men as paterfamilias. For those who did live to advanced age, adult sons,
while still technically under their father’s rule, often held separate residences. In practice,
newborn infants alone had their lives’ in their father’s hands. Unwanted infants were
generally exposed (i.e. abandoned in a public space). Exposure could result in the infant’s
death, but many exposed infants were probably claimed. This could lead to lives of

8

Suzanne Dixon, The Roman Mother (London: Croom Helm, 1988), 32.

9

The reasons for this spacing include infant mortality as well as social and economic factors, thus
Roman mothers tended to bear children throughout the entirety of their fertile years. Rawson, 128.
10

Dixon, 13.

11

The importance of hierarchy in Greco-Roman family leads Cahill to conclude that it was (and
may remain) “the nexus of relationships of social inequalities maintained by structures of precedence and
subjugation.” Lisa Sowle Cahill, Family: A Christian Social Perspective (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
2000), 20.
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slavery, physical labor, prostitution, or even intentional mutilation for begging. But
exposed children were also adopted and raised by families, apparently even those of
higher classes. To complicate matters, in some cases the biological parents of exposed
children who were subsequently adopted petitioned later to have them returned.12
Wives, though second in status to husbands, could hold positions of considerable
authority within the family; especially when they controlled a portion of the household’s
wealth, which a widow might administer for decades after her husband’s death.13
Although physical separations in public and private spaces served to shelter female
family members, the division did not include a separation of genders within the
household, nor did it reflect a conceptual differentiation between public-economic and
private-familial spheres.14 Women’s space was central to the household’s economic
production.15 In addition, Roman mothers were not primarily associated with nurturing
small children as domestic servants and wet nurses assumed most of these tasks.16 With
age children grew in status and responsibility for their direct oversight transitioned from
household servants, to teachers, to custodians.17 Roman moralists often protested the
evidently common practice of assigning the care of infants to the lowest rung on the
domestic hierarchy. However, there is ample reason to believe that such arrangements
12

Hugh Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society Since 1500, 2nd ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2005), 22.
13

Dixon, 28.

14
Rawson, 123. Cf. Carolyn Osiek, “Pietas In and Out of the Frying Pan,” Biblical Interpretation
11, no. 3 (2003), 166 – 172.
15

Cahill, Family, 22.

16

Dixon, 105.

17

Ibid., 142.
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were retained as much in response to maternal mortality as by cultural convention.18
Mothers, though not usually the direct caregiver, consistently held a center relational role
within the family that helped solidify kin relationships and familial cohesion.19
Children, especially infants, held a marginal status in Greco-Roman society where
undesired infants of any class might be exposed and the children of slaves were sold
freely. Burial customs suggest that infants and young children, whose deaths were
common, were regarded with much less emotional attachment than adolescents.20 The
strongest lament appears to have been for children who died on the cusp of adulthood.
Still, Roman parents also formed strong emotional bonds with the children they did raise,
and the deaths of young children were occasionally mourned deeply by parents.21
Children were valued as objects of affection, heirs who would assure their father’s
memory, and often as economic assets. But the value of any individual child depended
upon conditions within the household, the effort and assets parents were willing to invest
in childrearing, and the child’s gender. 22 The overarching view was that children were a
thing to be developed and only through diligent and strict parenting might they be shaped
into respectable adult citizens.23 As such, choosing to raise a child was recognized as a
considerable investment.

18

Ibid., 17.

19

Ibid., 35.

20

Cunningham, 23.

21

Dixon, 26.

22

Cahill, 30.

23

Gundry-Volf, 31 – 34.
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Although marriage was understood as being for children, family limitation was
widely practiced. As Suzanne Dixon writes, there are many “sober, casual references to
the economic and emotional burdens of child-rearing” which indicate “that parenthood
was not universally viewed as desirable.” Family limitation was probably common
among poor families but was also a concern among the wealthy who may have viewed
children as “a source of anxiety and long-term expense to their parents.”24 The inverse
correlation between prosperity and family size held as true for first century Romans as in
modern times. Family limitation, in itself, does not imply a low valuation of children, but
tends to be associated with “strong sentimental attachment to children and a serious view
of the parental role.”25 Among the upper classes, increased economic and social
obligations as well as the costs of educating and preparing heirs increased parental
obligations perhaps even beyond correspondence with their resources.26
Within the specifically Jewish culture of this era, the obligation to have children
was very strong. First century Jewish males could be legally compelled to marry after
their eighteenth year.27 The status of Jewish wives was tied to the number and gender of
their children while childlessness was considered a tragedy; even an act of divine
punishment.28 Children were a central factor in the Abrahamic covenant which may have
24

Dixon, 23.

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid., 21. Low fertility rates near the turn of the first century CE motivated legislation aimed at
reducing celibacy, childlessness, and adultery with the intention of creating more legitimate heirs among
the upper class.
27

Theodore Mackin, S.J., “The Primitive Christian Understanding of Marriage” ” in Perspectives
on Marriage: A Reader, eds. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001), 23.
28

Ibid., 27.
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encouraged greater religious significance to childbearing and better treatment of children
generally.29 Yet, Jewish conceptions of children were not far afield from Greco-Roman
ideals. Throughout the Old Testament, “children are viewed as ignorant, capricious, and
in need of strict discipline.”30 However, the idea of children as gifts from God provided
children with an inherent value that was not found in the surrounding culture. This
recognition of inherent worth proved pivotal in Christianity’s reappraisal of childhood.31

The New Testament
As seen in the previous chapter, both Julie Hanlon Rubio and Lisa Sowle Cahill
have observed that New Testament perspectives on the family can appear inconsistent
and conflictual. According to Cahill, two distinct views informed early Christianity’s
understanding of the family. The first is a general acceptance of prevailing hierarchal and
patriarchal family structures conditioned by Christian convictions. This
accommodationist trend is exemplified most clearly in the household codes of Ephesians
and Colossians and was the dominant influence as the tradition developed. The second
perspective, which lost influence over time, is often hostile to familial obligations and
finds clearest support in the words of Jesus as recorded by the synoptic gospels. At its
greatest extent, Cahill claims, Jesus’ dichotomy of discipleship and family demands “that
family relations be completely repudiated and abandoned.”32 Rubio adds that Mark 3: 31

29

Gundry-Volf, 35.

30

Ibid.

31

Marie A. Failinger, “Co-Creating Adoption Law: A Lutheran Perspective” Dialog: A Journal of
Theology 51, no. 4 (Winter 2012): 267.
32

Cahill, 29.

167

– 35 “proposes a new radical moral standard that threatens the most basic family loyalties
and engenders the most difficult conflicts between family and religious commitment.”33
Moreover, Christine Gudorf writes,
Jesus opposed the generally accepted primacy of familial duty, especially filial duty, in his refusal
to interrupt his teaching to see his mother and brothers (Mk 3:31-35), in his refusal to sanction
burying one’s father before taking up the duties of discipleship (Lk 9:59-62), and in rebutting the
woman who blessed his mother for having birthed him (‘Blessed rather are those who hear the
word of God and keep it!’ Lk 11:27-28).34

However, elsewhere Jesus appears more amenable to the family. For example, Jesus
indicates support for marriage in his firm rejection of divorce.35
Rubio and Cahill offer differing resolutions to the New Testament tensions they
identify.36 For Rubio, these tensions represent an ongoing dynamic between familial
obligations and the demands of the Gospel. She describes these as ‘dual vocations’ which
Christian parents inhabit. For Cahill, the conflicting voices of the New Testament are
reconcilable when understood as a critique of power structures and a call to reprioritize
commitments. Cahill’s reasoning is based on her observation that the New Testament
consistently seeks to decenter hierarchical relationships and to subvert self-interested

33
Julie Hanlon Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family (New York: Paulist Press,
2003), 48. Rubio also finds Luke 2:41-52 significant for the child Jesus’ dismissal of his parent’s concerns.
34

Christine E. Gudorf, “Western Religion and the Patriarchal Family,” in Perspectives on
Marriage: A Reader, eds. Kieran Scott and Michael Warren (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001),
286.
35

Matthew 19: 1 – 9, Mark 10: 11 – 12

36

A significant facet of the New Testament’s apparent ambiguity towards the family is the fact
that the organization of the New Testament canon suggests a false chronology in which the harsher words
of Jesus in the Gospel are later resolved by the epistles. Carolyn Osiek observes, “If we are correct about
the time of writing of the Synoptic Gospels, these subversive texts that advocate abandonment of family in
favor of the new grouping of disciples are more or less contemporary with the first Christian manifestations
of imperial ‘family values’ in Colossian and Ephesians, with the Pastorals falling not far behind.” Osiek,
171.
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concepts of family.37 According to Cahill, even Jesus’ use of the term abba was
essentially anti-patriarchal.38 By calling God ‘father,’ Jesus challenged the role of the
paterfamilias, the center of familial honor and obligation.39 Key to her interpretation is
Mark 10:29-30, in which Jesus includes fathers among those left behind for the sake of
the Gospel, yet does not again include fathers among those who will be received back in
the kingdom (as are brothers, sisters, mothers, children, houses and fields).40
If Jesus’ words are taken to indicate a subversion of the power culturally
associated with fathers, as Cahill claims, Jesus’ perspective on mothers remains more
complex. Mothers were subordinate to fathers but could still exercise relatively strong
influence within the family. This requires that Jesus’ attitude towards motherhood, which
could also be a source of power in conflict with the Gospel, be viewed in light of his
relatively high regard for women. Christine Gudorf observes,
While Jesus never directly contravened the dominant/subordinate relationship prescribed for
husbands and wives in patriarchy, he did give many examples extraordinary in his time of respect
for women, and he demonstrated support for breaking the stereotypically servant role of women in
the home (Mary and Martha, Lk 10:38 – 42). Perhaps the strongest evidence for a New Testament
tendency to contravene patriarchy comes from Gal. 3:28 and the examples of Paul’s epistles of the
leadership roles given to women in the early church, some of whom, like Prisca, shared authority
in the church with their husbands ([12], Ch. 5).41

Furthermore, Jesus distanced himself from the Jewish tendency to value women for their
procreative maternal roles. Rubio notes, “[Jesus] places the work of the gospel above this

37

Cahill, 29.

38

Cf. Matthew 23:9

39
Cahill, 31. Whether Jesus’ use of abba was distinctive or had cultural precedent is a topic of
scholarly debate.
40

On this point, Rubio agrees that the absence indicates that the power culturally associated with
fatherhood has no place in the coming kingdom. Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 51.
41

Gudorf, “Western Religion and the Patriarchal Family,” 286.
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nurturing work, suggesting that nurturing is not to be the primary form of God’s word for
women who follow him.”42
Decentering filial obligations to fathers and mothers relativizes the importance of
biological kinship itself.43 In response to Mark 3: 31 – 35, Rubio suggests that a more
gracious possibility existed for Jesus to have halted his family’s intervention by
acknowledging the importance of his work. Yet, Jesus used the opportunity “to call the
whole nature of the kinship bond into question. He says very plainly that those he has
gathered round him are his new family, and he seems to deny all loyalty or duty to his
family of origin.”44
Jesus’ attitude toward children also diverged from cultural trends. Cicero had
written that childhood itself was a condition unworthy of praise and that being childlike
was entirely undesirable in adults.45 Even among Jews, Jesus’ assertion that the kingdom
belongs only to those who receive it like a child was extraordinary. Rubio observes, “To
those who thought of children as objects requiring care and formation, Jesus suggests
quite plainly that children have qualities adults ought to develop.”46 Moreover, Jesus’

42
Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 50. 1 Timothy 2: 8-15 appears to stand in
significant tension with this perspective.
43

Cahill, 18.

44

Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 48.

45

Gundry-Volf, 32.

46

Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 151.
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holding children in his arms47 may have been a demonstration of the service required of
disciples while subverting cultural expectations of children’s value.48
Judith Gundry-Volf argues, that Jesus “cast judgment on the adult world because
it is not the child’s world… He invited the children to come to him not so that he might
initiate them in the adult realm but that they might receive what is properly theirs — the
reign of God.” The radical aspect of Jesus’ teaching, Gundry-Volf contends, is the
seriousness with which he took children’s faith. She writes, “they are not only to be
formed but to be imitated; they are not only ignorant but capable of receiving spiritual
insight; they are not ‘just’ children but representatives of Christ.”49
However, critical responses to this interpretation of Jesus’ actions may also be
raised. For example, Jesus uses children primarily as teaching tools for his adult audience
such that his actual interactions with children are secondary to a message that is being
directed to adults. Additionally, Jesus’ interactions with children usually come at the
request of adults (particularly parents requesting healing for children) or are used within
the Gospel narratives to reveal and clarify Jesus’ own identity.50 Finally, Jesus’ apparent
prioritization of children may not relate to any essential quality of childhood or children

47

Mark 10:16.

48

“Children in Jesus’ social world are not generally regarded as having value in their own right;
hence the common practice of exposing infants, which the early Christians reject. Jesus’ saying that one
must become ‘like a child’ to enter the rain of heaven has impact precisely because of children’s negligible
status. Childlikeness can symbolize the transformation of priorities and radical countercultural lifestyle
required of disciples.” Cahill, 30.
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Gundry-Volf, 60.
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Matthew 21:16, “And Jesus said to them, ‘Yes; have you never read, 'Out of the mouth of
infants and nursing babies you have prepared praise for yourself’?’”

171

themselves, but could be connected primarily to their low social status whereby they are
exemplars of powerlessness.
The New Testament calls into question basic familial allegiances centered on
biological kinship and offers perspectives on women and children that stood in significant
discontinuity with prevailing cultural trends. These perspectives appear to support
Cahill’s argument that Jesus’ primary critique is directed at centers of earthly power;
which included fathers, mothers, and kin. Still, it is the obligations understood to arise
from kinship that are given greater scrutiny than the existence of the family itself. It is
also difficult to ascertain the degree to which position itself (i.e. fatherhood, motherhood,
childhood) or cultural interpretations of that position are being addressed. Still, the extent
of egalitarian ideals in both Jesus’ ministry as well as early Christianity is a matter of
dispute.51 As Adrian Thatcher contends, if Jesus’ apparently pejorative views of kinship
can be explained as criticisms of centers of authority; why is there not more explicit
criticism of the highest level of Greco-Roman allegiance; the state.52 If a critique of
power structures lies at the heart of the New Testament’s criticisms of the family, a more
sustained critique of imperial authority should be evident as well.53 Additionally, Cahill’s

51

One example is John H. Elliot’s thorough criticism of the argument for Jesus and Early
Christianity’s egalitarianism espoused by John Dominic Crossan, Gerd Theissen, and Elisabeth Schüssler
Fiorenza. See, John H. Elliott, “The Jesus Movement Was Not Egalitarian but Family-Oriented,” Biblical
Interpretation 11, no. 3 (2003): 173 – 210.
52
For example, whereas Jesus can be entirely dismissive of allegiance owed to biological kin
(Mark 3: 31 – 35), he offers a compromise view of what is owed to the state and to God. (Mark 12:17, Luke
20:25 and Matthew 22:15).
53

This is not to say that criticisms of imperial authority do not exist and are not pervasive but that,
comparatively, they would seem to require greater emphasis if authority is the central concern.
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perspective does not thoroughly account for Jewish trends prior to Jesus which had
already privileged allegiance to God above familial obligations.
Whatever resolution one finds preferable, consistency throughout the New
Testament appears difficult to maintain while Jesus’ apparent rejection of familial
obligations complicates any attempt to read the New Testament as unilaterally profamily. Yet, as Elliot argues, the tensions present in the Gospels do not indicate that Jesus
or early Christians were ‘anti-family’, “Their point is rather that the new primary
allegiance of followers of Jesus is ‘the new solidarity which consists of the eschatological
family of God.’”54 The New Testament perspective recognizes potential conflict between
familial obligations and faith commitments yet affirms marriage and the dignity of each
family member.55 Jesus’ ministry was also reliant upon households as places of public
gathering and teaching as well as centers for hospitality and rest. In addition, there is a
prevailing positive attitude towards children, as children, throughout the New Testament,
even as these references are relatively sparse.

Early Christian Sources
Following the composition of the New Testament texts, Christians continued a
complex relationship with the idea of the family in both adopting and rejecting aspects of

54

Elliott, 200.
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Adriana Destro and Mauro Pesce claim that even the application of the term ‘family’ to the
period is problematic in so much as it is a temptation for anachronism. They write, “in the first century
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primary kinship ties but also to communal existence and work, property and power that bind kin and nonkin people.” Adriana Destro and Mauro Pesce, “Fathers and Householders in the Jesus Movement: The
Perspective of the Gospel of Luke,” Biblical Interpretation 11, no. 3 (2003): 212.
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prevailing cultural perspectives within Christian practice. One telling sign of
Christianity’s divergence from its surrounding culture is the new evaluation Christians
made of adoption.56 Stephen Post argues that Christianity prioritized love over biological
kinship which is evidence in early Christian’s willingness to allow children to be raised
by non-biological kin when this suited the children’s best interest. In fact, Post argues,
the rationale for claiming adoption as a good came from Christians’ own theological selfunderstanding as having been adopted by God in baptism. For Post, a remarkable feature
of the early Christian understanding of the family is the willingness to extend love
beyond biological kinship.57
Julie Hanlon Rubio adds that this willingness is at the heart of what separates
Christian families from their Roman and Jewish counterparts. She writes,
We know that Jesus’ message included the claim that his real family was a Christian community
not his mother and his brothers. We know that others noticed that the Christians sometimes left
their biological families for their new Christian families. And we know that the Christians were
often seen as unpatriotic and immoral, as family-wreckers, because they sometimes refused to give
into what was expected of them.

This does not indicate that Christians held the family in low regard. Instead it suggests
that the early Christian theological framework committed them to an interpretation of kin
obligations that was not centered on biological kinship which in turn committed early
Christians to a conception of the family that stood in tension with cultural norms. Rubio
explains, “All of this means that family to the first Christians was an expansive term that

56

Rubio, A Christian Theology of Marriage and Family, 54.
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Stephen Post, “Adoption Theologically Considered,” Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1
(Spring 1997): 152.
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references not just the household, but, more importantly, the community of disciples of
Christ.”58
Unique evidence for the conceptual distance between the biological family and
the new family of Christians comes from early Christian martyriologies. These also
heighten the New Testament tension between Christian faith and family obligations to an
extent rarely appreciated in contemporary writing on the family.59
In the early third century account of the Passion of Perpetua and Felicity, the
young mother and future martyr, Perpetua, listens to the pleas of her father that she avoid
death for the sake of her family; especially for his own sake and that of her infant son.
Perpetua remains resolute in seeking martyrdom.60 Meanwhile, a pregnant companion,
Felicity, rejoices at her early labor which enables her to be martyred alongside the fellow
Christian prisoners.61 The narratives suggest tension between motherhood and
martyrdom, with martyrdom clearly presented as the more desirable Christian calling.
The accounts of both mother-martyrs describe their children primarily as impediments
and burdens during the approach to martyrdom. Neither suggests significant attachment
between mother and child. Arrangements for the future care of the children are explicitly
recounted in each narrative but no evident moral concern (aside from that expressed by
Perpetua’s non-Christian father) arises over the children being raised without their
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biological mothers.62 For both Perpetua and Felicity the opportunity to confess the faith,
and the martyrdom that followed, clearly superseded any obligation to provide direct care
for biological children.
In the Acts of the Martyrs Carpus, Papylus and Agathonicê,63 both Papylus and
Agathonicê claim to have children, though it is revealed that Papylus is referring to
fellow Christians as ‘spiritual children.’64 Agathonicê, however, has biological children
and is urged by the crowd of non-Christian onlookers to take pity on her children and not
go through with her martyrdom. Agathonicê replies that her children have God to watch
over them. She then leaps to her death atop the fire that has already consumed her
companions.65
Minimally, these narratives demonstrate that Christianity’s strand of skepticism
towards familial obligations did not end with the Pastoral Epistles’ apparent counsel for
greater cultural conformity in domestic affairs.66 Instead, biblical support for orderly
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domestic life, such as 1 Timothy’s counsel that women “be saved through childbearing—
if they continue in faith, love and holiness with propriety,” stand in tension with
martyriologies in which articulate, determined women abandon motherhood and yet serve
as models of faith.67
From the perspective of these female martyrs, the fact of motherhood appears to
have been a relatively minor consideration in comparison to their commitment to the
Christian faith. That these women were recognized as examples of faith whose stories
were recorded to inspire latter Christian readers further calls into question Christianity’s
relation to familial obligations. No moral concern is voiced within these narratives by a
Christian concerning the obligations of biological mother to raise her own child. In the
case of Agathanicê even basic arrangements for her children’s care are absent while, as
with Perpetua, it is non-Christians who express concern for the children.
The second century apocryphal text, The Acts of Paul and Thecla, provides
another example of a female Christian heroine choosing faith over familial commitments
as Thecla leaves a fiancé behind to join Paul’s missionary journeys.68 The Acts of Paul
and Thecla also provides evidence of the growing influence of an idealization of virginity
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which shaped early Christianity.69 If Cahill’s analysis of two distinct trends within
Christianity is correct, the rise of one over the other was likely influenced by
developments in vocations for celibate women. These vocations afforded Christian
women a means of valuation distinct from their procreative abilities and freed them from
familial obligations. However, they may have also helped reshape early ambiguities in
Christian thought into a divisive framework between women who lived in sexual purity
and those who married.
Thecla’s decision foreshadows the rise of consecrated virgins and women
religious which grew out of both an admiration for virginity and the complications
created by familial commitments. Yet, this development was conditioned by a distrust of
human sexuality and may have encouraged a “two-path” view of Christian vocations
which at times denigrated marriage as the inferior of the two Christian options. Rosemary
Radford Ruether observes that the early centuries of Christianity saw “a gradual synthesis
between patriarchy and celibacy.”70 Bearing children not only complicated total
commitment to the faith, but, in a religious culture increasingly enamored with celibacy,
was also a clear sign of having given into the body’s sexual appetites. Peter Brown
writes, “When Simplicia, a Roman nun, died in middle age, all that needed to be said of
her was that ‘she took no heed to produce children, treading beneath her feet the body’s
snares.’”71 In the centuries immediately following the New Testament’s composition, the
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pendulum had swung far to the side of celibacy,72 and it took effort for Christianity to
reclaim a life that included sexual reproduction as legitimately Christian and possibly
even holy.

Patristics
For Ambrose of Milan (340 - 397), sexuality was evidence of human sinfulness
which stood in glaring contrast to Christ’s purity. Christian sanctification was dependent
upon suppressing sensuality, which itself had no redemptive value.73 Ambrose’s
contemporary, Siricius (334 – 399), bishop of Rome, was likewise concerned with human
sexuality and advocated for a celibate clergy. Even starker expression was found in the
asceticism of Jerome (347 – 420) for whom sexuality constituted men and women as
perpetual and mutual sources of temptation.74 Among his generation, Jerome’s disdain
for all things sexual, which led him to question if even martyrdom could remove the “dirt
of marriage,”75 marked an outer edge that was not embraced by his co-religionists, even
in an era shaped by fascination with virginal purity. 76
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When considered with these near-contemporaries, Augustine of Hippo’s (354 –
430) apprehensive view of human sexuality and limited affirmation of Christian marriage
appears a significant achievement in moderation. What separated Augustine’s approach
was a fundamental conviction that human bodies and sexual reproduction were aspects of
God’s created order, not consequences of humanity’s fall. Whereas earlier authors had
written of Adam and Eve as nearly angelic beings, Peter Brown writes, “Augustine
invariably wrote of Adam and Eve as physical human beings, endowed with the same
bodies and sexual characteristics as ourselves.” God had commanded Adam and Eve to
procreate before the fall, clearly implying a place for sexual intercourse and reproduction
prior to rebellion.77
Before Augustine, Christians wrestled with uncertainty about the continuation of
the human race; Augustine’s perspective removed the apparent conflict between
procreation and salvation. Still, as Brown observes, Augustine salvaged the inherent
goodness of sexuality and procreation at the expense of transferring anxiety inwardly. It
was no longer humanity as such that required explanation but the deeply distorted human
will. “The twisted human will, not marriage, not even the sexual drive, was what was
new in the human condition after Adam’s fall.”78 For Augustine, sexuality itself is a
created good, but fallen humanity’s experience of sexual desire is immensely distorted by
a weakened and rebellious will. Brown writes,
“[The body] remained, for Augustine, a source of unrelieved disquiet. In order to convince the
learned readers of his City of God and of his tracts against Julian, Augustine appealed to the
authority of the ancients. He opened the sluice-gates of Latin Christian literature, quite as
drastically as had Jerome, to let in the hard male puritanism the Romans relished in their ancestors
and their favorite authors. An ancient Romans’ harsh distrust of sensual delight and a fear that the
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body’s pleasures might weaken the resolve of the public man added a peculiarly rigid note to
Augustine’s evocation of human beings forever exposed to a merciless concupiscence. 79

Augustine’s approach at once explained the place of human sexuality in the
created order and Christian participation in the continuation of the human race. This
removed one layer of the complexity but the hermeneutic question of the New Testament
concerning how the mutual obligations of faith and family are to be worked out remained.
In this regard, it is significant that procreation was assumed to be a duty owed to the
empire as well as a divine injunction. Children for God and for empire become the central
means by which sexual intercourse was justified.
Augustine’s contemporary in the East, John Chrysostom (347 – 407), provides a
more developed perspective on the life of the Christian family. Chrysostom had once
been persuaded that a Christian child’s best interest was to be raised in a monastery, but
through pastoral experiences became convinced of the family’s principal responsibility in
forming children for faith and morality.80 Despite the concerns of his western
contemporaries, Chrysostom indicates no desire to justify the existence of sexuality or
marriage. Instead, he gave these broadly positive interpretations and devoted his greatest
concern to the moral problem of greed.81
Chrysostom understood the family as a center of charity with a Christian
obligation to proclaim the Gospel and serve the poor. In recognition of its parallel
mission with the Church, Chrysostom described the family as the ‘domestic church.’ This
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‘domestic church’ was not based in biological kinship, but upon the communal nature of
salvation which made children in the home the nearest of social relations. Chrysostom
was also acutely aware of the tendency for families to become self-serving and for
parents to neglect their Christian duties.82 Chrysostom afforded such weight to the
parental obligation, which he viewed as parallel to Christ’s own task for all humanity,
that he tied parents’ own salvation to the virtue evident in their children.83 For
Chrysostom, parents are artists who carefully sculpt their children. In so doing, Marcia
Bunge writes, “they are helping to restore the image of God in their offspring and thereby
forming them into ‘wondrous statues of God.’”84
In the Patristic writings of the mid-fourth to early-fifth century, anxiety over
sexuality became increasingly pronounced in Christian thought. Augustine was able to
reconcile the existence of sexuality with the goodness of creation and posit marriage as a
form of friendship fit for the communion of the redeemed.85 But, Augustine provided
only a thin explanation of the goods of marriage, did little to develop a Christian
understanding of family life, and was not able to affirm sexual intercourse as good in
itself.86 Peter Brown concludes that, from Ambrose and to Augustine, anxiety of human
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sexuality injected “a powerful and toxic theme into medieval theology.”87 In the East,
Chrysostom developed a more thorough account of the Christian family than did
Augustine, but was not directly concerned with the same issues as his contemporaries in
the West.

Summary
A survey of the historical evidence shows that there is no single New Testament
or early Christian perspective on children, parenthood or the family. Though there are
some strains of continuity, the New Testament is characterized by its recognition of
tension and potential conflict between familial obligations and faith commitment. In the
second and third centuries, martyriologies and apocryphal texts give evidence that this
tension shaped the lives and aspirations of Christians. In these texts, the tension is firmly
resolved in favor of faith and at the expense of biological kin, with only non-Christians
raising moral concern a the maternal obligation to rear children. Still, such texts were
inspirational narratives and may not have reflected the more domestic commitments of a
majority of Christians. In the Patristic era, praise of virginity and anxiety over human
sexuality raised doubts of if marriage could ever be a Christian vocation. Augustine,
while embodying many of the concerns of his contemporaries, was able provide a
moderate resolution, even as he gave definitive shape to a Western Christian
understanding of sin and its connection to sexual reproduction. Chrysostom spoke
directly to the concerns of family life and gave the Christian family an explicit task of
charity while describing the parental task in parallel terms to the work of Christ.
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Part II: Historical Developments
Conceptions of Childhood
Contemporary scholarship has renewed appreciation for the diversity of historical
Christian perspectives on children and childhood. Among the most noteworthy of recent
projects is The Child in Christian Thought, edited by Marcia Bunge, a collection of
essays that considers the perspectives on children and childhood of a number of
theologians and movements throughout history. Perhaps the most significant claim made
by the collection is that attention to the child as a legitimate subject of theological
reflection is not a new trend, but a long tradition. The book is extremely valuable for the
task at hand because conceptions of parenthood are intimately linked with conceptions of
childhood. And these have enjoyed considerable diversity throughout Western Christian
history.
Recent theological interest in childhood was spurred largely by sociological and
historical research. Phillip Ariès’ thesis that “childhood” is a relatively recent innovation
has become a requisite subject for subsequent research on the history of childhood.88
Other scholars have agreed that attitudes and treatment of children have varied
considerably across time and place and have often identified the eighteenth century as a
pivotal period of change that has shaped the modern era.89 Among the most common
criticisms leveled against Ariès’ thesis is the contention that, while Ariès claims to
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identify the origin of the concept of childhood, he in fact identifies only the origin of its
particular modern variation.90 David Archard helpfully employs John Rawl’s distinction
between concept and conception to clarify. A concept is basic and distinguishes one thing
from another (e.g. children from adults). A conception is a construction of principles
related to that concept (e.g. the age at which children become adults). In these terms, the
critique argues that Ariès misidentifies a conception as a concept. Thus, while all times
and cultures have held some concept of childhood, conceptions are diverse and subject to
change. Such changes may be profound and can offer valuable insight into the conditions
and ideals of an era.91
In addition, Archard identifies three paradigmatic models in historical conceptions
of childhood, which usually admit degrees of admixture. The ‘developmental model’ is
the most recent and is heavily influenced by modern scientific insight. This model may
emphasize psychology and focuses on the process by which a normative status is attained
(e.g. healthy, mature adulthood). As a potential weakness, however, this model can
devalue childhood as merely a stage on the path to adulthood.92 The remaining two
models are defined by emphasis on either innocence or sinfulness. Archard offers earlymodern Puritans and Calvinists as the strongest proponents of the ‘child as corrupt’
model. This view takes the moral lives of children seriously but can also stress constant
oversight and harsh correction to restrain or break children’s unruly wills. Conversely,
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the Romantics most clearly embraced the ‘child as innocent’ model. This perspective
fears the corrupting influence of adult society on children’s natural innocence, but tends
to associate children with powerlessness and can undermine their moral agency. Though
the extremes of these last two models are mutually contradictory, Archard argues that
they have been tenuously held together throughout much of Christian history. 93
Archard is correct in recognizing that significant Christian figures have wrestled
with both the sinfulness and the innocence of children. Yet, from a theological
perspective, his assessment is limited. Archard relies heavily on philosophical sources
and his use of theological sources tends to lack nuance as it focuses on traditionally
Protestant concerns. For example, while he emphasizes Christian conceptions of
childhood innocence as directly connected to children’s powerlessness to sin, recognition
of children’s limited abilities to sin or to enact virtue is more characteristic of Catholic
perspectives.94 As a consequence, Archard’s application of the developmental model
appears limited. Instead of having arisen with modern science, the developmental
approach can be found in theologians who concern themselves with growth in virtue,
sanctification, or theosis and have taken children seriously as moral agents.

Christian Thought
In briefly revisiting Augustine and Chrysotom with attention to their conceptions
of childhood and Archard’s models, it appears that Chyrsostom’s conception relies on an
innocence model while Augustine is far more attentive to children’s sinfulness.
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Parenthood and childhood are so closely linked in Chrysostom’s opinion that
whenever there is a crisis of childhood, a crisis of the parenthood surely also exists. Thus,
Chrysostom’s conception of childhood is most directly gleaned from his advice to
parents.95 Chrysostom’s association of parenthood with the work of Christ and the
Church signals his teleological perspective. Observing the importance of parenthood in
Chrysostom’s thought, Vigen Guroian writes, “parents hold not only an ecclesial office
but also a soteriological one, a salvific one. God has put parents in care of their children’s
souls, and whether a child inherits the kingdom of heaven relies upon the care he or she
receives from parents.”96 From this view, Chrysostom appears to understand children, as
a tabula rasa yielding totally to their parent’s efforts. In Archard’s words, this amounts to
an ‘empty’ innocence as it rests primarily on inability.97
The soteriological perspectives of Chrysostom’s place and time did not encourage
great concern for inherent sinfulness. Among Chrysostom’s theological forebears,
Irenaeus was convinced that the fulfillment of perishable humanity awaited in
reconciliation with and transformation into the imperishable98 and Athanasius reflected
on the Image of God and the problems of freedom and materiality.99 However, in the
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West, among Christians in Africa and Italy, the idea of inherited sinfulness was emerging
and Augustine’s thought on the matter inaugurated distinctly Western anthropological
and soteriological trajectories.100
Although Augustine wrote little about his own experience of parenthood, he was
an astute observer of humanity and saw both “beauty and terror” in the behavior of
children.101 For Augustine, childhood provided a powerful metaphor with which to
explain human nature. Infants in particular, “revealed a non-innocence that phased into
increasing accountability as children matured into adulthood.”102 These observations,
coupled with his theological account of inherent human sinfulness, informed Augustine’s
belief that children were not born innocent but lacked only the ability to sin. He held that
children possessed a corrupt will bent toward sin and were culpable for the
consequences.103 Augustine once held that children who died before baptism were to be
counted as martyrs but later became committed to the necessity of baptism for salvation.
Augustine’s legacy is very much influenced by his struggle with the question of the
unbaptized innocents. Cristina Traina writes, “The history of the theology of childhood
might well be cast as the history of the struggle to preserve and express Augustine’s
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doctrine of original sin without eroding beliefs in both divine justice and divine mercy
toward the weak and vulnerable.”104
For Augustine, children are only non-innocent; they still lack the power to
actualize this disposition in any substantive way and therefore their condition itself does
not justify harsh treatment. Instead, in the physical punishments of children Augustine
was inclined to see the sinfulness of adults who were greater only in power.105 For
Augustine, Martha Ellen Stortz writes, “An adult merely replicated and amplified the sins
of the child.”106 Thus, Augustine’s use of a ‘child as corrupt’ model must be understood
within his anthropological approach which viewed all humanity as fundamentally corrupt
and in need of the grace of baptism.107 From this perspective, the primary duty of
Christian parents is to baptize their children. Beyond this, Augustine’s approach adds a
powerfully egalitarian perspective to the human condition. Even as he imagines adults as
grown-children, he gives credibility to the moral lives of children.108 This introduces a
degree of ambiguity to the relations of adults to children in as much as adults may be
equally inclined to act sinfully and may do so more skillfully.109 Stortz concludes that
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childhood, human nature, and baptism are tightly interwoven elements of Augustine’s
theological conception of childhood which founded a “highly ambiguous legacy” of
Western Christian views of childhood.110
In the middle ages, the notion of family emerged more clearly as households
across social strata became more uniform and increasingly centered on kin relations.111
Fluctuation in Christian conceptions of childhood continued. Augustinian notions of
original sin joined with admiration of virginity to inform a low religious valuation of
procreation. And, as with earlier martyrs, the willingness to renounce one’s children for
the sake of faith was thematic in medieval hagiographies.112 Furthermore, the wisdom of
old age tended to be prized above the innocence of the young. However, Christian society
in general maintained a higher valuation of young children than had been common in
Greco-Roman society.113 And medieval literature offered images of pure and innocent
children with “an ability to seize on truths hidden from adults…”114
In the eleventh century, Anselm of Canterbury (c. 1033 – 1109) “emphasized a
child’s need ‘of loving-kindness from others, of gentleness, mercy, cheerful address,
charitable patients, and many such-like comforts.’” By the thirteenth century, Anselm
was a favored source in preaching manuals which offered sample sermons covering
issues related to childhood. These “recognized stages in childhood, urge the importance
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of encouraging learning, and stress the desirability of moderation in punishment” and
became incredibly popular into the fifteenth century.115 The high middle ages also
initiated a new appreciation of individual freedom over and against family intentions.116
Medieval hagiographic literature attests to this tension as it alternately “praises absolute
filial obedience and rewards independent mindedness.”117
Parenthood was likewise a subject of some ambiguity. Medieval Christians saw
the position of the commandment to honor mother and father as the first on the second
tablet as a clear sign of its foundational importance in the divine plan for society. Indeed,
this command came before such basic social principles as the prohibition of stealing and
killing.118 John of La Rochelle (c. 1200 – 1245) argued that the positive phrasing of this
commandment demonstrates that giving honor to parents is never wrong.119 However, the
tension between this commandment and a vocation to religious life arose repeatedly. John
of La Rochelle argued that greater goods, such as entry into a religious order, could
mitigate this duty and were not true conflicts anyhow since “the prayers of a vowed
religious will, in the long run, do parents more good than providing them with food
drink.”120 Aquinas disagreed, arguing that care for one’s ailing parents should prohibit
acceptance into religious life.
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Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224 – 1274) added a new dimension to Augustine’s legacy
by uniting the divergent anthropologies of Augustine and Aristotle; the first characterized
by original sin and a corrupt will, the second by rational capacity and potential for
virtuous growth.121 Additionally, Aquinas was encouraged by a medieval trust in the
actual innocence of creatures incapable of committing sin. Nonetheless, he affirmed
Augustine’s conviction that original sin itself prohibits salvation. Thus, for Aquinas the
unbaptized child is underserving of salvation, yet incapable of either intending sin or
desiring baptism. Aquinas’ solution was to create a middle ground in the stark choice
between salvation and condemnation; limbus puerorum. Limbo is a destination fitting the
conditions: union with God is denied, but torment is spared.122
Despite having spent most of his young life away from home, Aquinas believed
that parents, especially fathers, deserve full credit for their children’s success or failure.
He supported sweeping parental rights, including the rights to betroth or commit a child
to a religious order; though these were limited by the child’s consent at maturity.123
Foundational to these claims, was Aquinas’ belief that the work of procreation establishes
natural rights of parents. Just as the craftsman rightfully owns that which he creates, so
too does the parent.124 Parental rights based on creation alone might suggest that mothers
hold greater rights than fathers, in proportion to reproductive roles, yet for Aquinas
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paternal authority was central.125 The idea of “shared substance,” which was linked to a
father’s desire to see his own legacy continue, buttressed Aquinas’ argument from labor
and solidified a father’s priority.126 Within an Aristotelean theory of fetal development,
the father’s seed was the substance from which new human life developed, requiring only
the protection of a mother’s womb.127 This made progeny a literal extension of their
father, and, Aquinas argued, the reasonable man will recognize this and will attend to his
children as if they were his own body.128
The argument from shared substance did more than reinforce Aquinas’ patriarchal
views, it also solidified parental duties in response to social conditions. During Aquinas’
lifetime, child mortality may have reached 50% and was driven by not only by
unsophisticated sanitary and medical practices, but by “high rates of abandonment,
exposure, infanticide, overly harsh beatings, fatal ‘trials’ of suspected changelings, and
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suspicious overlaying of children in bed.”129 Aquinas’ argument “encouraged
strengthening the natural bonds of love” while grounding parenthood in natural facts
which parental duties more difficult to disavow.130 Moreover, Aquinas believed that
parental rights were both natural and rational, and therefore, universal. As a consequence,
Aquinas twice argued that to baptize a Jewish child against parental will is a greater sin
than allowing the child to die unbaptized.131 Further, he asserted that the primary evil of
fornication was not sexual sin but the failure to assure the wellbeing of potential future
children.132
Aquinas’ argument for the natural rights of parents leaves parental rights of
adoptive parents with uncertain origins. From a soteriological perspective, Aquinas
employed adoption metaphorically to differentiate the divine adoptive sonship of
Christians from the divine substantial sonship of Christ. Aquinas does assert that God’s
adoptive fatherhood gives rise to duties on God’s part. However, these duties are based
on the human identity as ‘image of God’ and thus the duties once again run through
created origin and shared qualities.133
Aquinas’ understanding of nature and grace as cooperative, emphasis on
education, and teleological outlook all suggest a developmental view of childhood. For
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Aquinas the child is both corrupt and innocent; but most importantly, incomplete. He
measured the developmental process primarily as a growth in capacity to reason, showed
little interest in the particularities of child rearing,134 and placed the rational adult male
Christian as the normative end.135 In Aquinas’ perspective, childhood is truly good in as
much as it reflects divine wisdom and therefore “is an appropriate and necessary stage
within the lifelong journey toward perfection in which adults too are engaged.”136 Yet
childhood is not to be admired in as much as Children lack wisdom and active virtue.137
In fact, Aquinas compares the child under the age of reason to an irrational animal.138
Aquinas represents the clearest developmentalist encountered so far as he values the
process, but does not admire any stage prior to the normative end.
Throughout the late middle ages, Christian piety turned increasing attention to the
needs of children. By the Reformation era, interest in Christian childrearing had united
with a general concern for morality and discipline. This outlook, to some extent, came at
the expense of individual liberty as communal obligations assumed primary moral
significance.139 As a result, three of the Reformation’s most prominent figures,
Desiderius Erasmus (1466 – 1536), Martin Luther (1483 – 1546), and Jon Calvin (1509 –
1564), held most clearly to a ‘child as corrupt’ model that stressed the importance of
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parental involvement. This perspective assumed unique form in each, yet is united by the
conviction that the child contained both wonderful and monstrous possibilities and only
through diligent supervision and education might a respectable adult be formed. As
Erasmus writes,
The child that nature has given you is nothing but a shapeless lump, the material is still pliable,
capable of assuming any form, and you must so mould it that it takes on the best possible
character. If you are negligent, you will rear an animal; but if you apply yourself, you will fashion,
if I may use such a bold term, a godlike creature.140

The reformers expressed similar attitudes and idealized the “pious, disciplined,
obedient, and teachable child.” To rear such children required great effort; metaphors of
horticulture and animal husbandry abounded. Left alone, like a field or animal, a child’s
natural trajectory was towards wildness and rebellion; thus the parental duty was to
domesticate and Christianize. These beliefs were underwritten with scriptural support. In
the mid-sixteenth the English philosopher Thomas Beccon wrote, “a child in Scripture is
a wicked man, as he that is ignorant and not exercised in godliness.’” Contemporaries
imagined all manner of evil desires lurking within the hearts of children; even the unborn.
Although the Reformation era shared similarities with medieval concerns for education
and childcare, it was marked by this growing fear of the child’s inner corruption.141
Erasmus, like other Renaissance humanists, called attention to “the importance of
infancy and early childhood in the development of good Christians and good citizens.”142
He published a series of books and essays on the topic which drew heavily from classical
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sources.143 Erasmus’ greatest concern was that early education not be postponed by either
the coddling of female caregivers or the negligence of fathers. This emphasis stemmed
from his belief that the young child had an innate desire to learn and was capable of
absorbing information at a greater rate than in subsequent ages. Erasmus encouraged
parents to take control of their children’s education and saw rationality and self-control as
instilled in children by the hard work of parents and educators.144 However, he clearly
distinguished himself from those who emphasized original sin, arguing instead that adults
are often culpable for corrupting young minds.145 And Erasmus was horrified by the
practice of beating children, either at home or in schools. He greatly lamented the
existence of schools which were supposed centers of education but were in reality centers
of “brutal abuse.”146
Martin Luther vociferously disagreed with Erasmus on the freedom of the human
will and expounded a radical understanding of grace that founded a distinctly Protestant
soteriological perspective. Despite the dramatic religious, social, and political changes
brought about by the Lutheran Reformation, domestic life underwent relatively little
change.147 Luther and his Protestant colleagues tended to replicate concerns for good
order, community, and education that also characterized their Catholic counterparts. Jane
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Strohl observes, Lutheranism “allied itself with the status quo and may well have proven
more successful at the task of socialization than evangelization.”148 Moreover, Luther
viewed the home as a safe haven for the formation of children in the faith apart from the
dangers of the world, flesh, and devil.149
Luther’s apparent social conformity should not distract from the extent to which
his theological opinions reinterpreted the significance of domestic life. For example
Luther writes,
Now you tell me, when a father goes ahead and washes diapers or performs some other mean task
for his child, and someone ridicules him as an effeminate fool…my dear fellow you tell me, which
of the two is more keenly ridiculing the other? God, with all his angels and creatures, is smiling —
not because that father’s washing diapers, but because he is doing so in Christian faith. Those who
sneer at him and see only the task but not the faith are ridiculing God with all his creatures, is the
biggest fool on earth.150

Luther accepts that washing diapers is a particularly demeaning task for a man, yet
upholds such service as exemplary evidence of Christian faith. Thus, while he generally
accepted cultural standards, Luther opened possibilities to subvert cultural logic.
Like his contemporaries, Luther was also a strong supporter of broad parental
rights. He writes, “there is no greater or nobler authority on earth than that of parents over
their children, for this authority is both spiritual and temporal.”151 Luther even asserted
that a lack of parental consent could be grounds for the dissolution of a marriage.152
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In agreement with Augustine, Luther held that the very first duty of Christian
parents is to have children baptized quickly. Luther further described parents as “apostles
and bishops” of their children. Yet, he also described all Christians who teach the Gospel
as apostles and bishops of their neighbors.153 Like Chrysostom, proximity differentiates
the parental vocation inasmuch as children are their parent’s nearest neighbors in need.154
Thus, Luther views the family through the paradigm of neighbor love, such that the
demands of parenthood extend to all Christians who are equally compelled by faith to
attend to those in need. It may not be inconsequential that Luther’s own experience of
parenthood included raising several children from among his kin.
Luther’s primary view of children appears to be as Christian disciples, which is
marked by corruption as well as grace. Children are inherent and culpable sinners who
are incapable of seeking salvation by their own power but offered salvific grace through
baptism.155 The baptized child shares in the conditions necessary for salvation and
faithful discipleship and, as a result, has a duty to bear witness, through Christian service
and love, to the grace already received.156 In Luther’s theology the child is vulnerable,
but not incomplete. In fact, Luther supported infant baptism precisely on the grounds that
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children are incapable of reason and therefore free of the uncertainties that come with
rationality.157
In comparison to Luther, Calvin held a more pessimistic theological
anthropology, a more developed commitment to predestination, and a greater confidence
in the civil authority’s duty to promote the faith and intervene in domestic matters.158
Calvin’s emphasis on the depravity of the human condition led him to argue that “even
infants bear their condemnation with them from their mother’s womb.” Despite not
having yet sinned, “they have the seed enclosed within themselves. Indeed, their whole
nature is a seed of sin; thus it cannot be but hateful and abominable to God.”159 And yet,
Calvin believed that children have active spiritual lives and that even infants can
proclaim God’s goodness.160 Furthermore, he disagreed with Luther and Augustine, and
urged Christian parents to trust that salvation would be extended to their children.161
Though his understanding of the depth of sin seems contrary to this conclusion, Calvin’s
confidence in God’s mercy rested not in his anthropology, but in his commitment to
double-predestination. In this view, salvation resides entirely in the eternal decrees of
God who has absolute freedom to choose the elect.”162 All Calvin asked was that
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Christian parents who were certain of their own salvation have confidence that God
would extend salvation to their children as well.
The Protestant Reformation, despite its domestically conservative bent, did
initiate some reappraisal of the Christian home and education. Protestants came to see the
family “as a microcosm of the church and the state, both in the sense that in its internal
government it should marry those larger institutions, and in the sense that the family
should be a nursery of both the church and state.”163 The consequence of placing this
importance on the family was an increased emphasis on paternal responsibility.
Fatherhood assumed central importance in managing the family, while mothers were to
be virtuous and honorable.164 The identification of patriarchal marriage with an “order of
nature” further cemented this framework in Protestant imagination.
By the seventeenth century, the ideal Protestant family was a ‘little
commonwealth’ governed by paternal authority and populated with obedient, submissive
children. Catholicism generally lagged behind, but followed similar developments.
Catholic religious literature gave increased attention to parental duties and
encouragement of paternal authority grew; though this was supported by the traditions of
Roman law. Catholic thinking increasingly recognized the domestic sphere as a place of
affection which required a pious mother.165
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Protestants also led in advocating for public education. Martin Luther had viewed
education as the responsibility of parents, but added the condition that, should parents fail
in their duty, competent authorities were obligated to intervene.166 Later in his life, Luther
began to support compulsory public education. Other reformers went much further and
argued that children belong first to the community, and secondarily to their parents. Still,
government provided education did not become common until the eighteenth century.167
The eighteenth century, identified by Ariès as the origin of modern childhood,
was indeed a significant period of philosophical and theological development. As a
preeminent figure in the Enlightenment, John Locke (1632 – 1704) emphasized teaching
children to learn to submit to authority, so that as adults, they would learn to submit to
the authority of their own reason.168 Locke was among the first to approach childrearing
from a principally secular perspective and argued chiefly from ‘natural rights’ with little
reference to Christian scripture.169 In eighteenth century America, the influence of such
thought was met with ambivalence while Jonathan Edwards (1703 – 1758) arose as a
powerful conservative Protestant voice during this era of social change.
Edwards’ religious convictions were partially fueled by fear that traditional
Puritan society was collapsing. Not only did paternal authority appear to be in decline but
the increasingly industrial economy now allowed children to relocate far from home and
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find employment.170 In response, Edwards vigorously reclaimed traditional Protestant
doctrines. But, unlike the reticence characteristic of earlier theologians, Edwards reveled
in his descriptions of hellfire and described God’s damnation of infants as “exceedingly
just.”171 Edwards wrote, “As innocent as children seem to us… if they are out of Christ,
they are not so in God’s sight, but are young vipers, and are infinitely more hateful than
vipers…”172 Yet, the possibility of salvation created a double-image of children within
Edwards’ thought. Having gone from full of sin to full of grace, the born-again child
gained the upper-hand if his or her parents were not similarly redeemed.173 By
centralizing God as an ultimate and central authority, Edwards relativized the authority of
parents, even as he lamented the breakdown of the patriarchal family.
While Edwards resisted social change in America, the Romantics welcomed
transformation in Europe. In direct opposition to Edwards’ defense of paternal authority,
John-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778) promoted the priority of mothers within the
family. As the eighteenth century progressed, romantic ideals mixed with changing social
and economic circumstances to solidify childrearing as dimension of women’s authority.
Hugh Cunningham writes, “The consequences were striking. In the third quarter of the
eighteenth century the death rate of English aristocratic children under the age of five
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dropped by 30%.”174 In the early nineteenth century, men and women alike were assumed
capable of caring for children, at least in a basic sense. But by the mid-nineteenth
century, the qualities fitted for childcare “were declared to be natural to the female
sex.”175 Yet even as the qualities of womanhood became increasingly associated with
domestic caregiving, ordinary mothers’ capacities as educators, which had been
presumed, now fell into question.176
Prevalent conceptions of children also underwent significant development during
this period. Nearly to the end of the eighteenth century, popular Christian writing
portrayed children as filled with evil intentions which could only be curbed by severe
discipline.177
By the nineteenth century, children had transitioned from economic asset to
liability, but had gained sentimental value as the innocence of childhood was increasingly
accentuated. Christians now described children as having recently come from the hands
of God, as the future Cardinal Newman wrote, “with all the lessons and thoughts of
heaven freshly marked upon him.”178 This revolution in the conception childhood was
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also influenced by increasing rigidity in male and female social roles which placed
greater emphasis on the proper socialization of children.179
Amidst these changes, Horace Bushnell (1802 – 1876) offered a Protestant
developmental approach to childhood that has had lasting influence. Famously Bushnell
advised, “the child is to grow up a Christian, never knowing himself as being
otherwise.”180 He placed emphasis on parental involvement and trust in the “near salvific
power of a godly mother.”181 Bushnell also stressed children’s pliability and helplessness
in the face of negative adult influences more than their innate sinfulness, though he
accepted this as well.182 Theologically he declared, Christ is not “‘the Savior of adults
only!’… but ‘a savior for infants, and children, and youth, as truly as for the adult
age.’”183 Bushnell’s views were initially dismissed among more conservative
evangelicals but by the end of the nineteenth century most American churches had
“settled into a regular package of weekly Sunday school instruction and family devotions,
not dire warnings about infants being consumed by the fires of hell.”184 In the twentieth
century, the social sciences offered new support for Bushnell’s views. Insistence on good
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order had been superseded by emphasis on “companionship, play, and emotional
intimacy between parents and children.”185

Summary
The Western Christian tradition contains diverse and competing conceptions of
children and childhood. Archard’s three-part paradigm paired with contemporary
research on the theology of childhood help to clarify this legacy. In general, the ‘child as
corrupt’ model exercised greatest influence in Augustine, Edwards, and theologians of
the Reformation era. The ‘child as innocent’ model characterized Chrysostom, the
Romantics, and perhaps Anselm. Aquinas and Bushnell are the clearest exponents of the
developmental model, which has gained dominance in the contemporary period; though it
has also been significantly transformed by the social sciences.
Reconciling the doctrine of original sin, which creates sinners of even the smallest
children, with the belief that God’s compassion resides with the weak and vulnerable has
been a central challenge throughout the Christian tradition. After Aquinas, the Catholic
tradition held a negotiated view in which Limbo functioned as a necessary theological
compromise. Yet Limbo’s existence rests on weak biblical support and was primarily
speculative. As such, Limbo remained a theological opinion within Catholicism that was
not appropriated by Protestants, who instead continued the unsettled trajectory of
Augustine’s struggle with the possibility of salvation for unbaptized infants. Yet,
Protestant responses have varied and cannot be simplistically correlated to the depth of
sin a theologian ascribes to the fallen human condition. Notably, it is John Calvin, not
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Luther or even Erasmus, who placed greatest confidence in the possibility of salvation for
unbaptized children.186
Conceptions of parenthood have also developed alongside these diverse
conceptions of childhood. Some stress the importance of parental involvement; others the
involvement of all society. The strongest advocates of parental authority tend to be those
who embrace either a ‘child as corrupt’ or a ‘development’ model of childhood; though
the form of involvement varies with each. After the Reformation, the question of whether
parents or civil or ecclesial authorities were primarily responsible for education became
pronounced. Moreover, gender-based roles within the family changed. At times paternal
authority was stressed, at others, maternal nurture. Jonathan Edwards seems to have
accidentally backed into the problem, known already in the New Testament, that
emphasizing submission to God alone also relativizes centers of earthly power, such as
fathers in the patriarchal family.
Finally, Christian tradition provides different accounts regarding the source of
family unity and grounds for parental rights and obligations. For both Chrysostom and
Luther, Christian charity and the obligation to serve neighbors in need are important
features of the family’s cohesion. Aquinas emphasized that the family is grounded in the
natural bonds of kinship and the obligations arising from procreation.187 None of these
thinkers, however, centered the opinion on only one view. Aquinas employed a non-
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biologically based argument that parents were obliged to care for children because they
embodied God’s goodness and are made in God’s image.188 And Luther saw the family as
a “critical order of creation within God’s temporal governance.”189 Because this
particular question is pertinent to the project at hand, this chapter now concludes with a
brief historical sketch of Christianity’s history of care for children beyond the context of
the biological family.

Part III: Christian Practices in Adoption and Orphan Care
Introduction
An adequate consideration of the Christian history of adoption must first
recognize that present forms of adoption bear little resemblance to earlier historical
practices. Modern legal adoption, for example, finds its Western precedent in Roman
hereditary law, which was primarily concerned with making heirs for the transfer of
property. In Roman practice, only the Roman father could adopt and he typically adopted
a consenting adult male heir.190 These origins stand across an enormous conceptual
divide from the popular American idea of a young, presumably infertile, couple seeking
an unrelated infant to raise as their child. This modern ideal arose rather suddenly in the
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late nineteenth century but was carried forward with remarkable force, not least due to its
support within the growing and increasingly influential field of social work.191
Between Ancient Rome and contemporary America, lies a complex history that is
characterized most often by private, informal, and non-legal arrangements for the care of
orphaned or abandoned children. Because of the significant differences in past and
present practices, it is helpful to conceptualize pre-modern adoption more broadly as
practices of guardianship and caregiving for non-biological kin. Legal guardianship has a
formal history in western society but often tells us little about the arrangements and
conditions of a child’s upbringing. Caregiving, on the other hand, has often been based
on reciprocal economic relationships and has varied considerably for children who found
care beyond their extended kin group.192
The following section attempts to clarify some of this diverse heritage by
identifying major lines of historical practice. It then turns to recent scholarship on two
practices that are particularly informative for understanding contemporary conceptions of
adoption and orphan care. First, however, a brief note about the biblical and theological
foundations of adoption and non-kin care is in order.
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In the Hebrew Scriptures, God is often identified with care for the orphan193 and
Deuteronomy arranges for the just treatment and financial assistance of orphans.194 In the
New Testament, care for the orphan remains an important act of piety,195 Jesus relativizes
kin allegiances, and a metaphor of adoption functions as an important concept within
Pauline soteriology.196 During the time of the New Testament’s composition, a growing
identity as a family united by faith through baptism made theological orphans and
adopted siblings out of the entire Christian community. Drawing upon this heritage,
Herbert Anderson has observed that, in baptism, parents recognize that “their children are
not their children, for they belong to God who has called them into existence and calls
them into service of the world.”197 From a theological perspective, baptism abrogates
biological parenthood in two important ways, by redefining both ‘ownership’ of the child
and the child’s ‘family.’ These biblical and theological ideals of care for the orphan and
the new kin relations of the Christian faithful were not developed seamlessly or always
with great care throughout Christian history. Changing conceptions of the family, the
child, and religious and secular obligations, gave rise to responses to orphaned or
abandoned children. Nonetheless, Christians have largely identified care for these
children as an act of faith.
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Transfer of Care and Care Practices
Throughout most of Western Christian history, the majority of children whose
parents were unable to provide for them found care among kin. In a practice inherited
from Roman law, members of the extended family were legally bound to assume
responsibility for orphaned children. The extensive mapping of kin relations, which
increased with stricter consanguinity laws in medieval Europe, generally assured that
some obligated party would be found.198
Beyond kin groups, religious orders served as another resource for care. The
sixth-century Rule of Saint Benedict offers several directions for proper childcare (most
often concessions made for the young) and gives no indication of this being an
exceptional practice.199 The rules of some other medieval religious communities even
required the community to maintain a set minimum of orphans in their midst.200 In the
East, Byzantium established public institutions for care, such as the Orphanotropheion, in
the early medieval period.201 Until the fifteenth century, however, Western Christian
society remained far more agrarian and did not feel the same need for such institutions as
the more urbanized East.
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The practice of exposure was predominantly accepted as a fact of life during
Roman times and Christian society retained the practice with relatively little comment. 202
Christians did, however, lament the conditions that drove parents to abandon their
children203 and took a decidedly stronger stance against infanticide.204 The reason behind
this general acceptance may correspond to John Boswell’s argument that exposure
functioned primarily as an informal means of adoption and most often resulted in new
guardians for abandoned children.205 Ẻcole Française de Rome adds that, with the
fifteenth century expansion of institutionalized care in the West, greater anonymity
encouraged abandonment. Eventually this resulted in overcrowding within institutions of
care and dramatically increased mortality rates.206 By the mid-eighteenth century, “death
rates at the Milan asylum and in the newer infant orphanages in Paris and Vienna were
approaching 80 percent of the babies left in their care.”207
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Beyond the orphaned and abandoned, many children were provided for by
caregivers other than their biological parents, even while their biological parents
remained responsible for them. This reflects the realities of family life and the need for
all adults to participate in the family economy. Historically, mothers and fathers worked
fields, tended livestock, slaughtered, harvested, prepared food, produced essential and
saleable goods, and operated businesses to support their family. Because sustenance often
required female work, female work was not associated narrowly with childcare. Instead,
these myriad obligations supported the assumption that any capable adult could provide
care for children if needed. This was experientially proven by the often central role
grandparents, siblings, and wet-nurses played in childcare.208 In addition to non-maternal
care within the home children were often sent away for schooling or apprenticeships. In
both instances care providers were selected based on their functional capabilities and the
needs of the family and child without being essentially bound to biological or gendered
constraints.

Institutional Care by Women Religious
In Models of Charitable Care, Annelies van Heijst studies the care practices and
spiritual self-understandings of the Ursuline sisters who operated an asylum in
Amsterdam throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. She contends that while
the care services of Catholic religious societies have been an unparalleled social
contribution throughout recent centuries, historical and popular interest has tended to

208

“It has probably been historically accurate to posit that contemporary working mothers with a
40-hour workweek spend more time interacting with their children than their ancestresses did.” Gudorf,
“Western Religion and the Patriarchal Family,” 297.

213

focus on abuses and maltreatment.209 Her primary rebuttal to such criticisms is that the
Catholic religious who ran these institutions responded out of charity, not duty, to answer
and alleviate a legitimate social need. Because they voluntarily shouldered a share of a
social problem with good intentions, they should not be criticized for having done so
imperfectly. Therefore, within the critical literature, blame is misdirected when the
people and institutions who were helping to alleviate the problem, not the people and
institutions that were fueling the problem, receive greatest scrutiny. Heijst clarifies, “A
discussion about the mode of care is not legitimate unless the basic need for care has been
acknowledged.” In addition, the complications and challenges children already endured,
and which surely left impressions on the rest of their childhood, are rarely sources of
scrutiny. Heijst observes, one author blames the nuns for her mother’s lifelong ineptitude
in dealing with men but passes over the absence of the author’s biological grandfather
without criticism.210
In Heijst’s analysis, the Ursulines assumed a dual self-identification as both
mothers and children. In relation to the children in their care, the nuns imagined
themselves as mothers, but within the framework of ‘true’ motherhood based on spiritual
love routed through Christ. This ‘true’ motherhood experienced all the joys and sorrows
of biological motherhood but remained unstained by biological or personal attachment.
One advertisement to attract new members to congregation read,
And now it is precisely the love of God, to whom the religious dedicates her entire life and all her
works, that gives you the power to do this beautiful and abundant work. In this work of charity she

209

Heijst, 92.

210

Ibid., 96.

214

can make use of her female skills, which are aimed at motherhood, to be used to the child and yet
keep her entire heart free for God.211

The sisters’ self-understanding relied upon recognition of spiritual kinship as well as a
conception of charity as unidirectional, from giver to receiver.212 This spiritualized
motherhood produced practices of care which left the sisters both physically and
emotionally distant from the children in their care. Heijst adds, “It should also be noticed
that the ascetic anti-worldly dualism provoked a certain indifference with regard to
experience of pain in the care receivers, since in the sisters’ philosophy of life suffering
was qualified as ‘good’.”213 In addition, the sisters were instructed not to favor individual
children, nor to allow special friendships among children. Only small children were
allowed close physical contact; with older children, even combing hair was prohibited.
Both physical and emotional closeness were generally regarded suspiciously as sources
of evil and were often sexualized.214 Heijst writes, “the object of care was primarily the
human soul, and the soul is conceptualized, in the dualistic theology of the time, as a
nonphysical, or even anti-corporeal, entity.”215
While the Ursulines imagined themselves as spiritual mothers, they
simultaneously imagined themselves as children as well; especially in relation to the male
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clergy.216 Yet, the child metaphor was not only evidence of hierarchical gender and
clerical relations, it permeated the entire spirituality of the sisters. Heijst concludes that
the self-representation as children reinforced practices of care based on religious kinship
that “constructed solidarity between strangers. Kinship on the level of faith resulted in a
practice of responsibility; Catholic adults begin to take care of neglected children that
they did not know.”217 In the modern era, therefore, examples once again exist of care
practices being based on functional requirements and non-biological kinship. However, in
this context of institutionalized care by women religious, caregivers were not chosen
based on children’s needs. Instead, these women self-selected into care giving practices
driven by a religious commitment to alleviate social needs and for the sake of the
children themselves, for whom the women would become spiritual mothers.

American Orphan Trains
Colonial America made much freer use and recognition of adoption and
apprenticeship than did England, from which most laws had derived.218 With
industrialization, immigration, and urbanization, Eastern cities grew and became
increasingly crowded. This transformation created high rates of poverty in both urban and
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rural areas.219 Religious and secular aid organizations responded by creating and
expanding orphan asylums.220
Near the time of the civil war, major shifts also occurred in American conceptions
of children and the family. These were influenced by thinkers, like Bushnell, who
extolled the natural virtues of the family for childrearing and labeled all other
environments ‘artificial.’ Simultaneously, paternal authority over children was reduced as
judicial discretion became an increasingly important component of custody rulings;
largely influenced by the growing view that women had a natural capacity for
childrearing.221
In post-bellum American cities, overcrowding in asylums, partially due to their
success in reducing child mortality, became a major problem. Charles Loring Brace,
influenced by the English practice of ‘transportation’ which was designed to relocate
needy children away from urban centers, devised a solution that would place children in
Christian homes while responding to the economic needs of his time.222 This system,
known as ‘placing out,’ was organized by The Children’s Aid Society of New York and
utilized the rapidly growing railway system to transport children from eastern urban
centers to the western frontier.223 From the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century
219

Ibid., 4.

220

Dianne Creagh, “The Baby Trains: Catholic Foster Care and Western Migration, 1873 – 1929,”
Journal of Social History 46, no. 1 (2012): 198.
221

Carp, 5.

222
As a child Brace listened to the sermons of Horace Bushnell, who may have been influential in
his decision to become a minister. Holt, 41-42.
223

The western ‘frontier’ continually shifted as a result of rapid westward expansion. Originally,
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois were considered frontier destinations. By the early twentieth century these states
were themselves sending children to the American Southwest.

217

the orphan trains, as they came to be called, placed out more than 200,000 children.224
The system was encouraged by the widespread belief that institutional care and cities
themselves were detrimental to children’s development.225
Though Brace’s system was most influential, other Protestant organizations soon
replicated the practice.226 Such groups accepted children from Catholic parents but would
not place them with Catholics. And, as a consequence of biases of the time, Italian and
Slavonic children were generally not accepted for placement. These realities caused
alarm among Catholic bishops who, gathered in Baltimore in 1866, lamented that
Catholic children were being transported to western homes were they would be “brought
up in ignorance of, and most commonly in hostility to, the religion in which they had
been baptized.”227 Self-segregation from the dominantly Protestant culture constituted an
important aspect of the American Catholic identity. But it also required Catholics to be
self-sufficient in responding quickly to the needs of their coreligionists brought on with
each new wave of immigration.228 In 1969 the New York Foundlings Hospital operated
by the Sisters of Charity of St. Vincent de Paul began what became the most prominent
Catholic placing out program.229
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Brace’s model reflected a marriage of the Protestant work ethic with social charity
which answered social and economic needs out of religious commitments.230 The
Children’s Aid Society worked with city asylums and placed older children, especially
boys, with willing rural families who would provide for their care and education but who
were also in need of additional laborers. Especially for adolescent boys, indenturing was
a common and legally permissible practice in many western states.231 As a matter of
commitment, the Children’s Aid Society did not participate in indenturing, as did some
other agencies, but because its contracts were primarily verbal, foster parents could
simply obtain indenture on their own.232
Brace’s system resettled a large number of children, but was not free of problems.
Placed children deserted their homes with relative frequency such that re-placing children
was a common task. In addition, because receiving parents were not arranged beforehand,
the children were set on display at destination towns for public evaluation by potential
parents. The children could be asked to perform, farmers in need of laborers were
allowed to scrutinize children’s physical features, and children had their nationality,
background, and other personal information read aloud to the gathered crowd.233
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In contrast to Brace’s system, which did not generally place babies due to the
challenges of their transport (including their potential to cause a ruckus with eager
parents at train platforms), the Foundling Hospital generally placed infants and young
children. To facilitate this, the Sisters of Charity relied upon local clergy to arrange
homes prior to the children’s transport. An identifying number was then sent to the new
parents and stitched to the children’s collars.234 Yet, even among the Foundlings
placements, life included a good deal of labor and not all placements could be sustained.
Both organizations maintained contact with children and dealt with many challenges in
securing lasting homes.235 Correspondences with adoptees reveal that they were often
treated unequally with biological children and frequently subject to criticism.236
A good deal of uncertainty surrounds what information was being shared by the
institutions with those on either end. It is unclear, for example, if receiving parents were
aware that the majority of children being relocated had at least one living parent and had
been surrendered as a result of poverty, inability, unwed mothers, or broken marriages. 237
Back in New York, the institutions avoided acknowledging the true perils of rural farm
life, which was instead liberally idealized.238
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The orphan train system was predominantly a white phenomenon. Records from
the Foundling and the Children’s Aid Society indicate that children of African, Chinese,
Slavonic or Spanish descent were placed at dismally low rates.239 An infamous episode
unfolded in 1904 when a French Catholic priest in Arizona arranged for a placement of
about forty children of Irish descent (the most desired ethnic group at that time).240 The
Foundling sisters evidently did not realize that working class Hispanic families had been
arranged to receive the children. This placement so agitated the European Protestant
townspeople that within days a mob was formed which then abducted the children. When
the Foundling intervened in an attempt to reclaim the children, local residents refused to
cooperate. The ensuing legal battle ended in the Supreme Court which upheld the
confiscation of the children and overrode the Foundling’s claim to guardianship.241
Both the primary Protestant and Catholic systems of placing out relied upon a
religious responses to the social need caused by overcrowded city asylums. Each system
took unique form in part due to the ideological commitments of their administrators, yet
both operated under the assumption that placing children with Christian strangers served
the best interest of the child, even while many of their parents were known to be living.
Denominational and racial divisions, however, reveal the operative limitations of nonbiological kinship within American Christian thought patterns of the time. Protestants
would accept children from, but not place children with Catholic guardians while
Catholics quickly recognized that they themselves would have to actively protect their
239

Ibid., 206. Cf. Holt, 73.

240

See Linda Gordon, The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2001).
241

Creagh, 206.

221

insular Catholic self-identity. Race, however, united the judgments of both groups. Both
systems were directed towards white children and families, and when a French priest
placed Irish children with Hispanic families, both immediately recognized the “mistake.”
Interestingly, Irish children themselves were held as most desirable because their features
often allowed them to be passed off as the same nationality as their adopting families.
Thus, even as the system itself operated on religiously motivated commitments to nonbiological kinship, the appearance of biological kinship remained important.

African American Kinship Patterns
While African Americans have not been a large demographic segment of
American Catholics and Catholics have not been a large proportion of African
Americans, historic US black family patterns provide a unique and noteworthy variation
on conceptions of kinship within Christian history. Historical responses by African
Americans to family fragmentation cause by to weighty and intrusive external forces
gave rise to concepts of kinship that resemble early Christian convictions in intriguing
ways.
Throughout US history, African Americans have suffered unique challenges in
their efforts to sustain biological family networks. Enslaved individuals held no control
over their family’s future within a system that denied rights to marriage and citizenship in
addition to degrading their very status as human persons. Slaves were often bought and
sold without serious regard for family units. Sexual contact with female slaves could be
coerced by white male slaveholders who rendered sexual exclusivity beyond a slave’s
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control.242 Such liaisons gave rise to many mixed race children who inherited the social
status of their mothers.243
In West African cultures, knowledge of one’s kinship and lineage had been highly
valued, but in response to the frequent disruption of family units, uncertainty of lasting
contact among biological relations, and coerced sexual acts leading to children born into
slavery, American slaves redefined kinship as feature of the enslaved community itself.244
In doing so, blacks found themselves within a family network even despite conditions
that undermined the permanence and stability of bonds among biological kin. Unlike
early Christians, American slaves did not voluntarily disavow biological kin, but in the
absence of these bonds they similarly responded by utilizing a non-biological concept of
kinship to redefine and sustain kin networks.
When the institution of slavery’s direct assault on biological kin groups was
ended, kin networks among African Americans took on new form in light of the
possibility of stable family units. During the Reconstruction Era and into the twentieth
century, black women’s experience differed markedly from that of the leaders of the
nascent feminist movement growing among upper and middle-class white women.
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Instead of seeking freedom from domesticity, African American women sought to
withdraw from the workforce in order to support their families. Unlike whites, black
women had always worked fulltime and had no social experience of a clear separation
between the public-economic and private-domestic spheres. Instead, paid employment for
black men provided the new possibility of motherhood without fulltime participation in
the workforce. 245 However, “while many women tried to leave the paid labor force, the
limited opportunities available to African American men made it virtually impossible for
the majority of Black families to survive on Black male wages alone.”246 Employment for
black males often paid a salary sufficient to sustain a family, yet opportunities were
limited and blacks were much more vulnerable to lay-offs and unemployment than their
white counterparts. Because of this instability the majority of African American mothers
were compelled to take low paying but steady jobs in service work.247 As such, the
majority African American mothers from slavery through the dawn of the Civil Rights
Movement worked fulltime outside the home. Once again, African Americans relied
upon extended networks of kin, biological or not, to provide means of support for
childrearing and to sustain kin networks given the pressures of the social context. At
times, temporary arrangements for childcare even led to long-term informal adoption.248
Markers of a history of extended kinship patterns remain embedded in
contemporary African American society. Grandmothers, aunts and other women within
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the community are frequently referred to by maternal names such as ‘momma.’249
Patricia Hill Collins explains,
Fluid and changing boundaries often distinguish biological mothers from other women who care
for children. Biological mothers, or bloodmothers, are expected to care for their children. But
African and African-American communities have also recognized that vesting one person with full
responsibility for mothering a child may not be wise or possible. As a result, othermothers—
women who assist bloodmothers by sharing mothering responsibilities—traditionally have been
central to the institution of Black motherhood.250

Throughout this history, African American conceptions of kinship have been
resilient and adaptive in response to oppressive social conditions which challenged and
often destroyed the autonomy and privacy of biological families as well as forced the
majority of adult parents into fulltime work whenever available. This is not to suggest
that biological kinship was devalued. The fact that many former slaves invested great
effort into locating biological kin251 and that African American mothers in following
centuries sought to free themselves from employment in order to be present in the home
both demonstrate the value of biological kinship. And yet, communal forms of kinship
that were not defined by biological relatedness took root within the social context and
sustained individuals throughout difficult circumstances.

Conclusion
Care for children has been negotiated in myriad ways throughout Western
Christian history and has included forms of kin guardianship, non-maternally centered
domestic caregiving, spiritual interpretations of ‘true’ motherhood, and a diversity of
adoption practices. Throughout, kinship based on biological ties has often been central,
249
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but faith based kinship has also served as a powerful resource to support practices of care.
Biblical and theological resources offer numerous precedents for the implications of
religious kinship, especially the importance of the metaphor of adoption in Christian selfunderstanding. Historical transitions have also encouraged the emergence of a narrow
focus on two-parent families, with restricted roles for mothers in particular, despite much
more expansive historical precedents. This raises the question as to whether biological
kinship, or the willingness to construct kinship ties based on children’s needs, is the more
fundamental Christian ideal. Much in historical Christian practice, modern magisterial
teaching, and contemporary Catholic theological writing, seems to suggest the priority of
biological kinship. However, functional ways of approaching caregiving based on the
needs of families, children, and social conditions also arise and underlie the institutional
care practices of women religious, the phenomenon of orphan trains, and the extended
networks of kinship utilized by African Americans mentioned above. These examples
stand as counter-arguments against assuming the fundamental decisiveness of biological
relatedness within the Christian tradition’s interpretations of kinship. Instead, Christian
kinship, whether arising from biology, baptism, communal identity, or social
commitment, is always a theologically interpreted reality. While the fact of biological
relatedness has often held precedence in these interpretations, at times convictions more
central to the heart of the Christian message have provided the fundamental realities from
which caregiving practices are explained. The following chapter considers the potential
of the social sciences to reshape Christian conceptions of parenthood in light of
children’s needs and the always interpreted nature of Christian kinship.
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Introduction
Previous chapters have argued that modern Catholic conceptions of parenthood
are so closely tied to sexual ethics and biological kinship that they may undermine nonbiological forms of kinship which have traditionally been accepted and even praised. In
modern magisterial teaching, conceptions of parenthood are supported by an essentialist
theory of gender which shifts emphasis to family structure and gendered parental roles.
Contemporary revisionist Catholic theologians generally refute this operative theory of
gender, but similarly tend to allow sexual ethics to guide their approach towards
parenthood. Yet the history of Christian thought and practice suggests more expansive
possibilities than either of these propose.
Despite the Catholic propensity for allowing sexual ethical norms to decisively
influence conceptions of parenthood, clear explanations of how sexual ethics, marriage,
family, and parenthood are actually connected can be elusive.1 In the magisterial
framework, complementarity appears to bear the burden of connecting these concepts.2
Revisionist theologians, often employ social-scientific data to argue that parental abilities
can and do exist beyond the biological nuclear family, however, they tend to offer thin
theological explanations. Frequently, this data is employed for the purpose of justifying
moral judgments about adult sexual relationships. Though differing in their use of social
scientific research for sexual ethical arguments, both perspectives tend rely upon sexual

1
Lisa Sowle Cahill, “Same-Sex Marriage and Catholicism in Inquiry, Thought, and Expression,
vol. 2 of More than a Monologue: Sexual Diversity in the Roman Catholic Church, eds. J. Patrick
Hornbeck II and Michael Norko (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014), 154.
2

Cf. Todd A. Salzman and Michael G. Lawler, The Sexual Person: Toward a Renewed Catholic
Anthropology (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 141.
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ethics for their constructions of parenthood without sufficient attention to how the
observations of the social sciences can contribute to a theological vision of parenthood
itself.3
This chapter engages research from the social sciences to assess the veracity of
moral theological claims related to parenthood and child wellbeing. It contends that,
although the ‘traditional’ family is linked to favorable child outcomes statistically,
available data is nonetheless complex and problematizes universal claims.
Acknowledging the statistical benefits of one particular family structure is distinct from
claiming that other family forms are untenable or categorically inferior.4 Family forms
must be evaluated individually as to their outcomes and with due attention to nuances in
the research and the social contexts in which actual families are embedded. When the
data is given this careful scrutiny, biological kinship, parental gender roles, and family
structure, each fail to be categorically determinative for child wellbeing. Instead, external
factors (such as social and economic forces), parental abilities, and family function
emerge as significant. Because of this, a theological conception of parenthood that is
centered on child wellbeing cannot prescind from a structural model of family alone, but
must attend to the capabilities and function of adult caregivers themselves as well as the
concrete realties that shape families’ social contexts.

3

The use of the ‘social sciences’ throughout this chapter relates primarily to sociology and
psychology, while anthropology and history are also at times utilized. History is not always considered
among the social sciences, yet often plays an essential role in the research of the other disciplines. It should
also be noted that research on the family within the American context can be a politically charged reality.
As such, I have attempted to select a balanced representation of available resources.
4

Throughout this chapter, ‘form’ is used as a general term and refers to any specific type of family
(nuclear, stable, wealthy, etc.), ‘structure’ refers to the make-up of a family in terms of its constituents
(nuclear, biological, etc.), and function refers to the operations of a family (socially oriented, stable, etc.).
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The methodological commitment of this chapter to evaluating parenthood based
on function directs its engagement with social scientific data. At the same time, it
attempts to respond the particular limitations identified in both magisterial and revisionist
perspectives. This chapter presumes that authentic Catholic moral theology is rightly
directed towards human flourishing, such that studies of human wellbeing have a
legitimate role in verifying and challenging moral theological claims.5 This commitment
to human flourishing founds the chapter’s use of social scientific research as a critical
resource for moral theology, which is also common to revisionist theological methods.6
The Catholic magisterium likewise acknowledges the value of these resources but the
form of natural law reasoning it often employs tends to privilege certain modes of reason
and established tradition. As such, magisterial teaching tends to make less explicit use of
the social sciences, uses such data selectively in support of particular claims, and
relegates direct application to matters of pastoral care.7 This chapter will take a
fundamental conviction of natural law reasoning, that moral knowledge can be arrived at
through engagement with the created order, as sufficient validation for utilizing
experiential evidence substantively in moral theological analysis.8 It is through this

5

The relationships between the social sciences and moral theology have been explored by a
number of authors. Among others see, Michael G. Lawler, What Is and What Ought to Be (New York:
Continuum, 2005). and Don Browning, Christian Ethics and the Moral Psychologies (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2006).
6

See, Todd A. Salzman, “What are they Saying about Catholic Ethical Method?” (New York:
Paulist Press, 2003), 11. And Lawler, 20 – 23.
7
Vatican II, Gaudium et spes, Vatican, (December 7, 1965)
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_ vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_
gaudium-et-spes_en.html, #62. For a critique of this use of social scientific information in Magisterial
teaching see, Stephen Pope, “Scientific and Natural Law Analysis of Homosexuality: A Methodological
Study,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1 (Spring, 1997): 89 – 126.
8

Salzman and Lawler, 7.
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methodological commitment that child wellbeing can be employed as a norm for
theological conceptions of parenthood.
Importantly, because child wellbeing comprises a norm for parenthood, parental
forms and functions will be assessed in terms of their contribution to desirable child
outcomes. From this perspective, it is not sufficient to claim the benefits of a particular
conception of parenthood without identifying its functional relationship to child
wellbeing.9 For example, some divisions of parental roles may be associated with
particular desirable outcomes, but the fact of this association alone is insufficient for
moral judgment. Instead, it must be asked why particular divisions of parental roles tend
to yield desirable outcomes. By pressing this question, a greater understanding of the
relationship between child wellbeing and parental function might be achieved.
On the other hand, it must also be recognized that the concept of ‘child wellbeing’
itself proceeds largely from value judgments about desirable qualities for the human
person. While some of these are basic (physical health, educational achievement,
psychological adjustment, etc.),10 others are more closely bound to religious
commitments (social altruism, moral development, development of an inner spiritual life,

9
This use of function should not be confused with ‘functionalism’ as used within psychological
and sociological research, even as some overlap may exist. In both psychology and sociology,
functionalism refers to perspectives that evaluate behavior based on psychological or sociological needs.
Functionalism, in these disciplines lacks the teleological orientation of a theological approach in as much as
they tend to view behavior as reactionary to existing needs rather than as seeking to attain theological
goods. Within sociology, functionalism is further divided into two very distinct categories. Tallcott Parsons
was influential in establishing a functionalist theory in which society depends on institutions to serve its
essential needs whereas the functionalist theory of Bronislaw Malinowski argues that institutions grow out
of social needs. See, Martin Albrow, Sociology; The Basics (New York: Routledge, 1999), 110 – 111. and
Hillary Rodrigues and John Harding, Introduction to the Study of Religion (New York: Routledge, 2009),
56 – 59.
10

It is also important to acknowledge that some of the human goods associated with child
wellbeing that appear basic have not always been so, and are not always valued cross culturally. Education
for all children, not just males or the affluent is one such example.
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etc.). The former includes goods that can often be expressed in terms of human rights, the
latter in terms of values. This complexity in the notion of wellbeing calls attention to the
reality that the Catholic vision of human flourishing, towards which moral theology is
directed, is significantly broader than most social-scientific inquiries are designed to
measure. Because the aim of this research is to explore bases for a Catholic theological
account of parenthood based on child wellbeing, its notion of child wellbeing must
include a theological vision of human flourishing and the value commitments this
produces. That is, child wellbeing measured by basic social scientific standards of human
wellbeing is something less than what a theological account of parenthood aims at
achieving in as much as human flourishing is defined by the human person’s ultimate aim
at communion with God. Here again, structural realities may be associated with certain
desirable outcomes, but how they functionally contribute to these outcomes is the more
significant concern.11

Part I: The Case for the Traditional Family
Concern over the statistical breakdown of intact biological nuclear families
grounded in heterosexual marriage is rooted in arguments that the structure of the
traditional family promotes children’s healthy development in ways other family forms
cannot.12 Due caution must be observed to refrain from assuming particular conceptions

11

This use of structure should not to be confused with psychological and sociological uses of
‘structuralism.’ Structuralism, in social scientific use, relates to theories that investigate human behavior in
correlation with the structures of the mind that dictate how humans integrate information and utilize
knowledge. Structuralism was promoted by the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss in the early and midtwentieth century but has since been criticized for its universalizing tendencies. Rodrigues and Harding, 62
– 65.
12

Cf. Pontifical Council for the Family, “Family, Marriage and ‘De Facto’ Unions,” Vatican,
(November 9, 2000)
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of children’s needs without attending to studies of actual children. This is particularly
important given the reality that significant changes have occurred in cultural conceptions
of children and childhood throughout Western history.13 The New Testament
commitment to criticizing prevailing structures of social control when these do not serve
the interests of those in need is therefore a critical guide in considering present realities.14
As important as critical attention to cultural ideology is, social scientific evidence
indicates that children who live in stable households with their married biological parents
fare better with regard to health, educational, and economic outcomes. As such, a critical
theological evaluation of parenthood must acknowledge that, on factors important to
child wellbeing, commitments to the biological nuclear family based on marriage are well
supported by social scientific research.15
Summarizing research on the impacts of family structure for children’s wellbeing,
Kristin Anderson Moore concludes that “a family headed by two biological parents in a
low‐conflict marriage” is most conducive to child wellbeing when compared to “children
in single‐parent families, children born to unmarried mothers, and children in
stepfamilies or cohabiting relationships.”16 In a study which intentionally targeted a wide

http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/family/documents/rc_pc_family
_doc_20001109_de-facto-unions_en.html, I.2.
13

Philipe Ariès, Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life, trans. Robert Baldick
(New York: Random House, 1962). and Hugh Cunningham, Children and Childhood in Western Society
Since 1500, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005).
14

Rosemary Radford Ruether, “Christianity and the Family: Ancient Challenge, Modern Crisis”
The Conrad Grebel Review (March 9, 2001), 95.
15
For a secular argument on the importance of traditional marriage related to childrearing, see,
Sherif Giris, Robert P. George, and Ryan T. Anderson, “What is Marriage,” Harvard Journal of Law and
Public Policy 34, no. 1 (winter, 2010): 245 – 287.
16

Kristin Anderson Moore, et al., “Marriage from a Child’s Perspective: How Does Family
Structure Affect Children, and What Can We Do About It?” Child Trends, (June 2002)
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variety of family forms, Patrick M. Krueger and colleagues observe, “All non-married
couple family structures are associated with some adverse outcomes among children, but
the degree of disadvantage varies across family structures.”17 The disadvantages cited are
based on measures of health and dental care, access to health care, and schools attendance
and performance. The study advises that research methods be adapted to more adequately
account for the increased diversity of family forms.18 For example, cohabitation is a
recent and rapidly growing phenomenon and research has been slow to account for the
changes it requires in the way studies must be conducted. Until recently, most assumed
married or single parent households.19 It is estimated that about one in seven children
reported to be in mother-only household are actually in a cohabitating household.20
Moreover, research on race and poverty has tended to overlook alternative familial or
childrearing arrangements beyond the nuclear family which may be employed at higher
rates among non-white communities.21
Research further indicates that children who live with biological married parents
show the greatest emotional, behavioral, and psychological wellbeing, as well as

http://www.childtrends.org/?publications=marriage-from-a-childs-perspective-how-does-family-structureaffect-children-and-what-can-we-do-about-it, 2. It is significant that this particular study does not consider
same-sex or adoptive parenting.
17
Patrick M Krueger, et al. “Family Structure and Multiple Domains of Child Well-being in the
United States: a Cross-Sectional Study,” Population Health Metrics 13, no. 6 (2015): 1.
18

Ibid.

19

Aulette, 128.

20

Ibid., 123.

21

Ibid., 127.
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educational and economic outcomes.22 One study comparing the effects of family
structure on educational attainment in the US and Sweden yielded fascinating results. In
both countries, children living in non-intact families do worse educationally such that
each additional year a child spends with a single mother or stepparent reduces that child’s
overall educational attainment by approximately one-half year.23
Although factors such as financial resources must be accounted for, marriage
itself appears to have a positive impact on children’s wellbeing.24 Stepfamilies, despite
greater average financial resources, have educational outcomes for children resembling
single-parent households more closely than biological married parent households.25 Even
as social problems among young people have declined in recent decades, such as criminal
activity, delinquency, and pregnancy, problems related to psychological health which are
strongly associated with family structure have increased dramatically over a period of
increased diversity in family structures.26
Despite changing social trends, most nuclear families still largely follow
traditional parental gender roles; with mothers contributing a much larger proportion of

22
Kristin Anderson Moore, et al. “Research Brief: What is ‘Healthy Marriage’? Defining the
Concept.” Child Trends, (September 2004), 3, http://acf.gov/healthymarriage/pdf/Child_Trends-2004.pdf.
Cf. footnote 19.
23

Center for Marriage and Families. “Family Structure and Children’s Educational Outcomes.”
Institute for American Values, (November 2005), 2, http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/
researchbrief1.pdf (accessed March 2012).
24

Center for Marriage and Families, 2. Studies comparing the effects of family structure on
educational attainment in the U.S. and Sweden yield fascinating results. In both countries, children living in
non-intact families do worse educationally, such that each additional year a Swedish or an American child
spends with a single mother or stepparent reduces that child’s overall educational attainment by
approximately one-half year.
25

Ibid., 5.

26

Popenoe, 3.
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their time to childcare and domestic labor than fathers. The type of time mothers and
fathers spend with children is also generally divided by gender; with fathers having a
greater share of weekend care, play, and leisure time and mothers a greater share of time
spent on weekdays and in personal care activities. Mealtime remains both the most
consistent and most commonly shared parental interaction with children.27 Over several
decades, David Blankenhorn has argued for the importance of father involvement for
children’s wellbeing, as well as the future of society. Blankenhorn contends that
fatherhood is an important cultural construct that binds men to their families, which
results in significant benefits to children’s wellbeing and assets as they move into
adulthood.28
Concerning the impact of the nuclear family on the spouses themselves, children
tend to stress marriages but have a positive influence on individual parental wellbeing.
Married parents receive the greatest overall benefits from having children.29 When
compared to their childless peers, married couples with children are “less happy and
satisfied… more worried, depressed and anxious.”30 But children also tend to have

27
Allison Sidle Fuligni and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, “Measuring Mother and Father Shared
Caregiving: An Analysis Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics – Child Development Supplement,”
in Conceptualizing and Measuring Father Involvement, eds. Randal D. Day and Michael Lamb (Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers, 2004), 355 – 356.
28

See, David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting our Most Urgent Social Problem
(New York: Basic Books, 1995), 2 – 3. Blankenhorn’s arguments for the value of fatherhood have been
published in the Wall Street Journal, Yew York Times and other media outlets. Having previously argued
for California’s Proposition 8, in 2012 Blankenhorn announced publicly that he had changed his opinion
and now favors legal recognition of same-sex marriage.
29

W. Bradford Wilcox, ed. “The State of Our Unions; Marriage in America 2011.” University of
Virginia National Marriage Project and Institute for American Values (December 2011)
http://stateofourunions.org/2011/SOOU2011.pdf, x.
30

Aulette, 356.
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positive effects on their parent’s individual wellbeing. Children show empathy to parents,
create responsibility and commitment, and allow greater emotional expression, especially
through the opportunity to experience child-like play with social approval.31 Commitment
to children also appears to be a significant factor in the long-term health of marriages.32
Studies indicate that large families tend to reap significant benefits; particularly in
the marital satisfaction of the spouses. However, these results appear largely due to
selection effects. That is, “particular types of couples end up having large numbers of
children, remain married to one another, and also enjoy cultural, social, and relational
strengths that more than offset the challenges of parenting a large family.”33 Selfselecting into large families may be driven by religious motivation. As such, religious
mothers of four or more children are significantly more likely to report being ‘very
happy’ with their marriage, non-religious mothers with large families show no significant
difference compared to non-religious mothers with fewer children.34
Consequently, selection effects should not be overlooked in assessing the benefits
of the traditional family because socialized expectations play an important role in who
marries, stays married, and how spouses structure their marriage. For example, spouses
who report satisfaction with traditionally divided spousal gender roles are likely
influenced by having brought those gender role expectations into their marriages.
External factors also complicate the data. For example, fatherhood is correlated to

31

Ibid., 359.

32

Kristin Anderson Moore, et al. “Healthy Marriage,” 1.

33

Ibid., 53.

34

Ibid., 55.
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increased income, but this is only true of married fathers. Married men appear to benefit
from the division of household labor as well as preferential treatment extended as a result
of social recognition.35 As such, whether it is being married itself, or some factor related
to marital status that is most responsible for certain benefits can be difficult to determine.

Beyond general agreement on assets for child wellbeing, magisterial teaching and
observations from the social sciences point to similar detrimental factors. Poverty, racial
discrimination (present and historical), gender discrimination, and divorce or singleparent families are interconnected realities which cumulatively have profound negative
consequences for children.36 The only risk factor consistently identified in modern
magisterial teaching that is not strongly supported by social scientific research on child
wellbeing is same-sex parenthood. This discrepancy is indicative of the general
relationship between magisterial teaching and social scientific research; broad agreement
exists in general areas while specific claims are often more contested. For example, while
magisterial support for the nuclear family is confirmed by research, the magisterium’s
suggestion of a causal effect from traditional marriage to stability is less certain.37 Do

35

Rebecca Glauber, “Race and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Premium,”
Gender and Society 22, no. 1 (Feb., 2008): 24.
36

Cf. John Paul II, Familiaris consortio, Vatican, (November 22, 1981)
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ john_paul_ii/apost_exhortations/ documents/hf_jp-ii_exh_19811122_
familiaris-consortio_en.html. John Paul II, Gratissimam sane (Letter to Families), Vatican, (February 2,
1994) http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/ letters/documents/hf_jp-ii_let_ 02021994_families_
en.html. NCCB, “Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S.
Economy” USCCB, (November, 1986) http://www.usccb.org/upload/ economic_justice_for_all.pdf. et al.
37

“A committed, permanent, faithful relationship of husband and wife is the root of a family. It
strengthens all the members, provides best for the needs of children, and causes the church of the home to
be an effective sign of Christ in the world.” USCCB, Follow the Way of Love (Washington D.C.: United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1994)
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children in nuclear families have better outcomes because a family based in marriage
itself supports healthy development, or because couples who get and stay married tend to
have greater resources, opportunities, social support, and parenting skills? Neither
explanation alone fully accounts for the data.38 Consequently, attention to social,
economic, educational, and other factors is warranted before such data can found
substantive moral pronouncements.

Stability
From a functional perspective, stability39 appears to be the single most important
factor for child wellbeing on which Catholic thought and contemporary social scientific
research agree. Marriage is a considerably more stable institution than cohabitation in
terms of the longevity of parental relationships and is associated with significant financial
advantages over both cohabitation and single parenthood.40 In part this is due to
cohabitating couples tending to be younger, less prepared for parenting, and in less stable
long-term partnerships than married couples.41 Still, willingness to marry itself is a
relatively weak predictor of long term relational stability when compared to more specific

38

Center for Marriage and Families, “Research Brief 1: Family Structure and Children’s
Educational Outcomes,” Institute for American Values, (November 2005)
http://www.americanvalues.org/catalog/pdfs/researchbrief1.pdf, 1-2.
39

Stability generally refers to low-conflict families without divorce, separation, or other
significant shifts that affect caregiving arrangements. When such disruptions occur, stability characterizes
family systems that adapt readily and diminish secondary effects.
40
See, Lisa Mincieli, et al. “The Relationship Context of Births Outside of Marriage: The Rise of
Cohabitation,” Child Trends, (May 2007) http://www.childtrends.org/?publications=the-relationshipcontext-of-births-outside-of-marriage-the-rise-of-cohabitation.
41

Patrick M Krueger, et al. “Family Structure and Multiple Domains of Child Well-being in the
United States: a Cross-Sectional Study,” Population Health Metrics 13, no. 6 (2015): 6.
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factors. Income, education, age at marriage, and birth of the first child at least seven
months after marriage are all considerably reduce the likelihood of divorce (30, 25, 24,
and 24 points respectively). Intact families of origin and religious affiliation follow after
these (14 points each).42 As such, a well-educated couple with incomes above the median
who marry after age twenty-five has a significantly smaller likelihood of divorce than a
less-educated younger couple with lower annual incomes. These more divorce-prone
couples share many characteristics with couples who are likely to choose to cohabitation.
These constitute significant selection factors that suggest that stability within a marriage
is deeply tied to advantages already evident before marriage and that couples who would
be prone to marital break-up tend to forgo marriage in favor of cohabitation at a higher
rate than their more advantaged peers.
Over recent decades, the percent of marriages that end in divorce has remained
relatively stable. But, the overall number of both divorces and marriages has dropped as
rates of cohabitation have risen significantly.43 Compared to marriage, cohabitation has a
much reduced likelihood of a stable long-term parental relationship for children. Among
all first marriages, the chance of spouses remaining married for ten years is around 66%,
whereas only 16% of cohabitations will remain together for five years. The longevity of
cohabitation is also connected to the probability of marriage. Couples who are engaged
before cohabitating show no negative correlation in marital longevity. Of cohabitating
couples, about 25% will marry within the first year and of those that last five years the

42

Wilcox, 73.

43

US Department of Health and Human Services, “Marriage and Cohabitation in the United
States: A Statistical Portrait Based on Cycle 6 (2002) of the National Survey of Family Growth,” Vital and
Health Statistics, Series 23, no. 28 (February 2010): 1 – 12.
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odds of marriage are about 65%.44 Yet, the fact of an association between instability and
cohabitation is of less interest than the functional relation. In this regard it appears that
couple’s expectations and understanding of the nature of their relationship has a decisive
impact for long-term stability. Couples who understand their relationship as having a
long-term future orientation have significantly greater prospects of relational longevity
than those who do not.

Part II: Biological Kinship
While recognizing that long-term stable families are associated with traditional
marriage, families formed by adoption also tend to have strong outcomes. In many
instances, the spousal relationship is not procreative in the biological sense, yet adoptive
parenting appears to function similarly with regard to healthy child outcomes. Care for
non-biological children has a long history in Christianity and families formed through
adoption are at times praised in modern magisterial teaching as true expressions of the
meaning of parenthood.45 However, emphasis on biological kinship and narrow
conceptions of procreation raise questions about the place of adoptive families in
contemporary Catholic thought on parenthood. While Catholic magisterial teaching
concerning the foundational importance of marriage-based families does not necessarily
exclude adoptive families, magisterial defenses of the procreative end of marriage creates
a bias towards biological parenthood. This is especially true after Humanae vitae. On the
basis of sociological research, there is good reason to believe that adoptive parents are

44
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often models of “the true meaning of parenthood”46 and therefore ought to play a more
significant role in our theological conceptions of parenthood and the family.
Outcomes among adopted children are similar to average outcomes for all
American children despite the selection effects that adoption often presupposes.47 As in
biological families, stability remains an important factor for adopted children and those in
foster care as a predictor of long-term wellbeing. Unfortunately, over a quarter of all
children in the foster system do not find stable placements. Those who do are “more
likely to be young, have normal baseline behavior, have no prior history with child
welfare, and have birth parents without mental health problems.” David Rubin and his
colleagues argue that instability alone accounted for a 63% rise in behavioral problems
among the foster children they studied.48
For children who are permanently adopted, the negative impacts of factors that
led to a their eligibility for adoption and/or time spent in foster care are largely
compensated for by the advantages adoptive parents tend to have in income, education,
and parenting skills.49 Adopted children have higher rates of conditions that impede
educational performance than their peers, with those adopted from foster care facing even
greater educational and emotional challenges. However, adopted children’s parental

46

Ibid.

47

Matthew D. Bramlett, “The National Survey of Adoptive Parents: Benchmark Estimates for
School Performance and Family Relationship Quality for Adopted Children,” U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, (June 2011), 6, http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/09/ NSAP/Brief1/rb.pdf.
48

David M. Rubin, Amanda L.R. O'Reilly, Xianqun Luan and A. Russell Localio, “The Impact of
Placement Stability on Behavioral Well-being for Children in Foster Care,” Pediatrics 119, no. 2 (2007):
336.
49

Ibid., 6.

247

advantages compensate for these factors when child wellbeing is considered
comprehensively. This helps explain why adopted children tend to form stronger
relationships with their parents compared to their peers, but also fair worse
educationally.50
Beyond the generally good outcomes of adoptive parenthood, the process through
which a child is adopted matters. On average, children adopted from foster care have
greater educational and relational difficulties than their adopted peers who were not in
foster care. Foster care children are also more likely to be adopted at older ages and to
have suffered neglect or abuse. Moreover, the advantages of their adoptive parents are
less significant as those who adopt from the foster care system are on average less
educated and have lower household incomes than those who adopt by other means.51 In
light of the expense of adopting through private agencies, this variance is not surprising.52
Still, the majority of parents who adopt from foster care, 90%, would repeat their
decision. Among these parents, almost three quarters believe their child was exposed to
abuse prior to adoption.53
Adoptive parents, particularly those who welcome challenging children, embody
many attributes deemed admirable by Catholic teaching. Moreover, adoptive parents

50

Bramlett, 8.

51

Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, 10.
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According to the US Department of Health and Human Services, more than half of adoptions
from foster care cost no money, and only about 15% cost more than $5000. The cost of private adoptions
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generally enjoy very good child outcomes. But further nuances within the data may also
be observed. Of parents who adopt from foster care, the most common factor motivating
the adoption is the desire to provide a permanent home to a child in need, though factors
such as infertility, family expansion, and providing a sibling to an existing child are also
common.54 One troubling reality is that the parents with the greatest income and
educational assets do not tend to adopt the children with the greatest needs.
Elizabeth Bartholet argues that present adoption practices are characterized by
advantaging those with financial resources rather than serving children’s needs.
Prospective parents with greater financial assets have greater opportunity to match
themselves with younger, healthier children with fewer initial disadvantages.55 Although
adoption functions because people desire to provide homes for children in need, adoption
also fulfills adult desires and this complicates any moral appraisal. While individual
motivations for adopting can be complex and diverse, the beneficial role adoption can
play as well as the general success of adoptive parents should be acknowledged.
Nonetheless, differences in parental motivations and real disparities within present
systems ought to raise concern about how systematic disadvantages shape adoption and
foster care.
Racial disparities in treatment and opportunity, economic pressures on families,
and systematic social disadvantages all are factors in the reality of American families.
These factors create real distinctions in abilities to form and maintain stable family units,
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in how the adoption and the foster care system operate among different groups, and in
available opportunities for family formation and resources of parental support. Attending
to these realities complicates simplistic causal connections between family structure and
child outcomes by calling more attention to the selection effects spurred on by social
differences and disparities that influence the formation and fragmentation of family units.

Race, Class, Economics, and the Traditional Family
Within the US, marital status, race, and age are correlated to poverty even as the
precise nature of the relationships among these factors is disputed.56 Among the poor,
children constitute the largest single group,57 while 40% of the homeless are families.58
The advantages of the powerful US economy do not often reach children raised in
poverty who have a significantly higher probability of living in poverty as adults than
their wealthier peers.59 In fact, the average American child is “poorer than the average
child in 12 of the 14 most developed nations.”60 Although family structure and income
are correlated, with families headed by married partners having the highest income on
average, attending to only the causal linkages between marriage and increased income
reduces a more complex reality.
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Family structure itself is dependent on far more than individual choice and instead
responds to economic pressures and social realities. That is, the family is much more than
a natural, religious, or ideological reality; the family is, and has always been, a social and
economic unit. This fact must not be forgotten when considering diversities in family
structures and advantages. The advantages related to marriage for child wellbeing may
largely be byproducts of socioeconomic factors which tend to accompany stable
marriages. One study finds that socioeconomic status tempers the links between family
structure and child wellbeing. “For every outcome examined, the relationship between
family structure and children’s well-being was weakened, sometimes fully explained, and
occasionally reversed once adjusting for family income, caregiver’s education and
employment, and home ownership.”61 This finding suggests that differences among
socioeconomic variables are at least as significant as family structure when viewing
families from a functional perspective in relation to child wellbeing.
Countering the ideological biases that idealize the traditional family and morally
condemn family units that do not live up to this standard, Patricia Hill Collins argues that
the ideology of the traditional family itself operates as tool of oppression within a
network of systemic injustice that disadvantages women, African Americans,
homosexuals, and other groups. Collins writes,
Situated in the center of the family values debates is an imagined traditional family ideal. Formed
through the combination of marital bonds and blood ties, ‘normal’ families should consist of
heterosexual, racially homogenous couples who produce their own biological children. Such
families should have a specific authority structure, namely, a father-head earning an adequate
family wage, a stay-at-home wife and mother, and children… Defined as a natural or biological
61
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arrangement based on heterosexual attraction, instead this monolithic family type is actually
supported by government policy. It is organized not around a biological core, but a statesanctioned, heterosexual marriage that confers legitimacy not only on the family structure itself
but on children born in this family. 62

Although criticism of simple hierarchies remains important, Collins’ work highlights the
complexity of systemic injustices, employing the term ‘matrix of domination’ to describe
a network of social oppression.63 Individuals of different circumstances and identities
may find themselves at different locations within this matrix and therefore may be subject
to differing social realities with different sets and proportions of social advantages and
disadvantages. Collins uses the term ‘intersecting oppressions’ to explain how differing
factors contribute to an individual’s relative disadvantage. She argues that the existence
of intersecting oppressions is rooted in “interdependent concepts of binary thinking,
oppositional difference, objectification, and social hierarchy.” Collins continues,
With domination based on difference forming an essential underpinning for this entire system of
thought, these concepts invariably imply relationships of superiority and inferiority, hierarchical
bonds that mesh with political economies of race, gender, and class oppression. 64

Because social conditions and economic pressures have been shown to influence
the function of family units so as to mitigate structural differences, it is important to
clarify how different aspects of racial, economic, gendered, classists and heterosexists
advantages create concrete challenges in the circumstances of families. To clarify the
impact of intersecting oppressions on family functions, intersections of particular social
disadvantages within the US will be briefly presented below with particular attention to
non-biological nuclear family forms.
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Income and Family Form
Race, education, and marital status all correlate to poverty. The percent of blacks
and Hispanics who live in poverty is roughly twice that among whites65 while individuals
with lower levels of income and education cohabitate at higher rates.66 Considering
marital status and poverty, only about 10.5% of children in two parent homes live in
poverty compared to over 50% in mother-only homes.67 The relationship between
cohabitation and income is also complex. While people with lower incomes are more
likely to cohabitate, the instability and lack of future orientation among non-engaged
cohabitating couples may also contribute to these lower household incomes.68 And
marriage is related to educational advantages. Among college educated women, more
than nine out of ten will be married before the birth of their first child compared to just
43% of those who have never attended college.69 In light of these realties, W. Bradford
Wilcox laments, “marriage is progressively becoming the preserve of the welleducated.”70
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Race is also a factor in the interconnected realities of marriage, income, and
education. Sixty years ago, the majority of children in poverty lived with two married
parents. By the turn of the century, “57% of poor children lived in female-headed
families...”71 When household income of single mother households is expanded to
include not only those below the poverty line, but also those categorized as “near poor”
(less than 150% of the poverty line), nearly 70% fit this category.72 Collins contends that
increased rates of African American single mother headed families in inner city
neighborhood are the consequence of decreases in urban male employment opportunities
and increasingly punitive social welfare policies that fail to adequately respond to these
economic realities.73 She argues that welfare policies became more punitive just as
African Americans won the right to be included in the formerly white system. Even at
present, many single Black mothers struggle “to gain welfare benefits long available to
white women.”74

Race and Family Form
Given these realities, divergence from the nuclear family form must be viewed
within the context of these interlocking forces. Moreover, family forms have historically
differed among different cultural groups. While Hispanic, Native American and other
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groups show their own unique differences, presently high rates of single motherhood
within the African American community may serve as an example.
Historically, extended kin networks within African American families often
shared responsibilities for child care and aspects of the social importance placed on these
networks still persist. A 1993 study showed that 85% of African Americans have
extended family living in the same city.75 Some have suggested that strong kin networks
may explain why African American children show lower maltreatment rates compared to
their white peers when adjusted for income, employment, and urbanization. These
networks could function to provide direct caregiving support or by holding standards of
treatment as communal expectations.76
However, the social and economic shifts of the late twentieth century have
yielded a social context which leaves many black families with fewer social supports than
in previous generations. Increased unemployment, more punitive welfare and criminal
justice policies, and increasingly fragmented communal and family networks have all
contributed to this reality.77 Throughout the last half-century, while some African
Americans moved up in economic status, once economically homogenous black
communities became more stratified. Moreover, the increasing privatization of the
American family, led by upper and middle class whites, has left most contemporary
American families more insular and less communally supported than in previous
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generations.78 Despite African Americans historically having recourse to extended kin
networks of support, Collins writes, “for far too many African-American children,
assuming that a grandmother or ‘fictive kin’ will care for them is no longer a reality.”79
Even as recent generations have witnessed a decline in communal and kin
supports, the traditional centrality of women within African American families has
nonetheless remained strong. Motherhood remains an important and respected position
within black communities and can define a young woman’s status as an adult.80 Collins
argues that the centrality of women is not about the absence of men within the family, but
historically finds its locus in “organized, resilient, women-centered networks of
bloodmothers and othermothers.” 81 Furthermore, single motherhood is less stigmatized in
black communities due to the recognized challenges of finding a stable partnership. Yet,
she warns, many women may be overemphasizing the traditional centrality of the motherchild bond in order to compensate for the absence of “steady, sexualized love
relationships in their lives.”82
In a 1997 article, Elaine Bell Kaplan argued that two common assumptions of
sociological literature on black teenage motherhood no longer consistently held true.
“First, that adult Black women are supportive of their daughter’s pregnancies and
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encourage them to keep and raise the babies; and second, that this attitude is linked to the
existence of an extended kin network.” 83 Instead, young black mothers commonly defied
their own mother’s demand to terminate the pregnancy. After birth, conflicts between
young mothers and grandmothers tended to escalate. 84 Many young women in Kaplan’s
study reported feeling that they could not turn to their own families for support while the
majority relied on their friends for support.85 Other research has shown that grandmothers
are both the most frequent coparent for single African American mothers and that they
tend to provide the greatest instrumental support in caregiving. But the tendency for high
levels of conflict was also confirmed.86 In Kaplan’s Study, grandmothers reported great
disappointment in their daughters. Those of lower income felt their daughters had failed
them in their effort to provide them with a better life. Those of middle income felt that
their daughters had thrown away the advantages they had worked hard to attain.87
More recent studies clarify some of the dynamics faced in such inter-generational
single mother households. Krueger and colleagues argue that the presence of a
grandparent in the home does not generally mitigate the negative impacts of single
parenthood or cohabitation on child outcomes. They surmise that this lack of impact may
be due to residential grandparent of advanced age or ill health drawing upon the primary
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caregiver’s resources to an extent that lessens the benefit of additional adults in the
home.88 In the case of younger mothers and grandmothers high conflict relationships
between mother and grandmother are a more likely culprit. Erin K. Shoulberg and
colleagues argue that the positive influence of coparents for children’s wellbeing depends
less upon the coparent’s relation to the child than it does upon the quality of their
relationship with the child’s mother.89

Race and Incarceration
Incarceration rates among blacks and Hispanics are a significant factor in family
fragmentation. Over recent decades, rates of incarceration in the US have increased
dramatically and are now roughly seven times higher than they were two generations
ago.90 This increase in the prison population has a racial dynamic, with the incarceration
rate of African Americans nearly eight times greater than that among whites.91 In
response to these trends, Angela Davis has described the modern criminal justice system
as an ‘out of control punishment industry.’92 Between 1991 and 2007 the number of
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American children with a parent in prison increased by 82%.93 With such significant
increases in incarceration, especially among minority communities, families are clearly
being impacted.
Although more research is needed on the influence of incarceration on family
health, it is clear that incarceration disrupts family life and makes finding employment
more difficult.94 Dorothy Roberts has argued that the effects of incarceration on the
family are particularly troubling given the fact that black women now account for the
most rapidly growing group among the incarcerated.95 Most imprisoned women are
mothers, a fact that has a particularly pernicious influence on the stability of their
families under present circumstances. Women who were formerly primary caretakers of
children are less likely to be visited by their family than incarcerated fathers. This
disparity is likely due to many children being removed from their former home after a
mother is imprisoned. Prisons are also often located in remote areas which makes
visitation with children particularly challenging. A 1995 study showed that, on average,
women in federal prison were 160 miles farther from family than male inmates.96
Although children and families may benefit from removing the negative influence
of criminal mothers, the injury to family stability and social networks appears under the
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present systems appear to outweigh the gains.97 High rates of imprisonment work to
reproduce social disadvantage across generations.98 Not only does imprisonment of
parents, particularly mothers, often result in foster care placement and ruptures in
communication with children, high rates of imprisonment with local communities can
significantly reduce capabilities for social support and organized response. Roberts
writes, “Unlike the black urban ghetto, which ‘enabled African Americans to fully
develop their own social and symbolic forms and thereby accumulate the group capacities
needed to escalate the fight against continued caste subordination,’ prisons break down
social networks and norms needed for political solidarity and activism.”99

Race and Foster Care
Comparison between the treatment of African American and Native American
families and white families by the foster care system reveals troubling racial disparities.
Tanya Asam Cooper argues that professionals within the foster care system “routinely
contend that Native American and African American children are the most at-risk for
child abuse and neglect” and apply this belief in their actions despite statistical evidence
to the contrary.100 She writes,
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Besides being reported, investigated, and removed from their homes more often for suspicions of
abuse and neglect, these children are less likely to receive the mental health services they need in
foster care; are more likely to have fewer visits with their parents and siblings; are less likely to
receive services designed to reunify them with their family; are less likely to have contact with
their foster care caseworkers; and are more likely to see their parents' rights to maintain a
relationship with them terminated.101

Cooper contends that whereas foster care functions as a means of last resort among white
families, intervention leading to family break-up is practiced more aggressively with
Native American and African American families.102
One culprit in this racially disparate treatment is revealed in a 2008 study.
Stephanie Rivaux and colleagues show that risk scores from family assessments are
actually lower than among African American families than among whites when adjusted
for circumstances. Given the evidence, they argue that, although the assessment of risk
itself does not appear to show a racial bias, case workers apply lower standards for
intervention when dealing with African American families.103
Cooper contends that the present foster care system financially incentivizes
keeping children in foster care while offering no financial reward for moving children out
of the system or preventing their entry altogether. Cooper concludes that, despite the
intentions claimed, the foster care system works primarily for self-perpetuation while
operating as a “billion-dollar, publicly-funded bureaucracy” that sustains and fosters
racial disparities.104 “Interestingly,” Cooper notes, “the family preservation strategies are
generally considered cheaper than traditional foster care because the services are
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provided to families at-risk without the additional costs of foster care—which can be up
to seven-hundred dollars per month per child of taxpayer dollars.” And yet, “incentives
exist to place children in government-subsidized foster care, instead of with these
children’s families and friends who would care for their children for free.”105

Sexuality, Income, and Adoption
Same-sex partnerships cut across racial and economic demographics and have
shown signs of transition as the US social climate has changed in recent decades,
specifically in increased rates of marriage and adoption.106 Homosexual individuals and
same-sex couples within the United States show some differences from heterosexual
individuals and different-sex couples in a number of categories but these are not always
consistent. For example, individuals in same-sex couples tend to be younger but with
more education than different-sex couples and have similar incomes when both partners
work but significantly lower incomes when one only partner works.107
Fewer same-sex couples are raising children than their heterosexual counterparts,
although this varies considerably by race and education. African-American, Hispanic,
and Native American couples are more likely to be raising children than are whites, but
the proportional difference among same-sex couples alone is much more dramatic.
Compared to whites, same-sex couples in these groups are between 2.4 (African
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American) and 1.5 (Native American) times more likely to be raising children.108 Samesex couples with lower education are also significantly more likely to be raising children
with those having less than a high school degree at roughly 43%, a proportion very near
their different-sex peers. Whereas childrearing remains relatively stable across
educational attainment for different-sex couples (between 41 – 48%), it drops
substantially for same sex-couples (10% for college educated). 109 Gary J. Gates writes,
“Given the connections between parenting and education, it is perhaps not surprising that
same-sex couples with children show evidence of economic disadvantage relative to their
different-sex counterparts.”110
Same-sex couples are also four times more likely to have adopted and six times
more likely to be involved in foster care than different-sex couples.111 The general pattern
of white well-educated couples having the highest rates of adoption is exacerbated among
same-sex couples, which may account for a slight rise in childrearing among the most
educated same-sex couples.112
In a much more overt way than those located at other intersections of social
disadvantage, homosexual individuals and same-sex couples find themselves faced with
challenges that often take on explicitly religious justifications. This reality is particularly
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poignant for same-sex couples with children or who seek to adopt children. Some
advocates of same-sex adoptive parenthood have argued from the perspective of
expanding the pool of potential adopters for children in need of stable homes.113 David
Brodzinski writes,
Long-term foster care is detrimental to children's emotional well-being and undermines their
future opportunities. To better serve these children, we must do everything possible to increase the
pool of available caring and capable adults who can make a lifelong family commitment to them
and ensure that their medical, psychological, social, spiritual and educational needs are met. 114

However, from the Catholic magisterium’s perspective, the present plight of stable, longterm marriage in Western society is linked to moral decay which is itself exemplified by
the public acceptance of same-sex relationships. The USCCB’s 2009 pastoral letter
“Marriage, Love and Life in the Divine Plan” acknowledges social factors as practical
challenges to marriage, but defines the fundamental issues as morally insufficient ideas
“directed at the very meaning and purposes of marriage,” including contraception, samesex unions, divorce, and cohabitation.115 These perspectives fundamentally disagree on
the social impact of social acceptance of same-sex relationships. Consequently, they
dispute whether same-sex adoptive parenthood might alleviate a social need, or would
further contribute to factors that exacerbate that need.
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Given the complexity and interconnections of the social and economic realities
presented above, analyzing the contemporary state of the family by individual moral
choice alone is inadequate. Factors that influence and give shape to present contexts for
childrearing, including institutional racism, systematic economic disadvantages, and
prejudice based on sexual orientation among others, must be addressed as contributing to
individual circumstances. This viewpoint expands the moral horizon to systemic social
issues while providing a more nuanced moral analysis of individuals who inhabit socially
marginalized realities. In so doing, the idealized moral superiority of the nuclear family
unit lessens as the economic, educational, and social factors that determine individual
opportunities increases. Non-nuclear familial contexts for childrearing require a more
careful appraisal based less upon idealizations of gender roles and sexual conduct, and
more upon how parents function to serve children’s wellbeing in the face of complex and
often challenging circumstances.

Making Kinship
Despite the emphasis on biological kinship within modern Catholic perspectives,
historical resources suggest that Christian conceptions of kinship are not inherently tied
to biological relatedness. Instead, Christians create kinship by recognizing some
underlying reality (biological relation, baptism, need, etc.) then creating specific
obligations based on that reality through theological interpretations of its significance.
Interpretations of kin obligations based on realities other than biological relatedness are
often described as ‘fictive kinship.’ This is an unfortunate and misleading term which
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suggests that non-biological kinship is merely imagined. All kinship is interpreted, and
therefore ‘fictive’ in a sense.
Interpretations of kinship carry profound social and religious implications. For
example, non-biological kinship plays an important role in Jesus’ explanation of his
mission and in the self-identity of early Christians.116 The theological challenge at present
lies in addressing the biases that have led to associating ‘real’ kinship with biological
relatedness and have thus centralized the biological nuclear family as the ideal and truest
form of the Christian family. A biological bias is historically disingenuous. It relegates
other forms of kinship to mere metaphor with no real social import when, in fact, nonbiological kinship is central to Christian commitments.
Kinship in the Christian tradition is based upon recognizing a fundamental mode
of human relationship founded upon belief in God as creator and redeemer. This makes
the facts of baptism and human existence itself foundational for interpretations of
kinship. As such, it is imperative to recognize that ‘fictive kinship,’ is no less real or
significant than biological kinship, but expresses deep Christian commitments. Christians
have often accepted kinship obligations based upon interpretations of the significance of
biological relatedness and, historically and cross-culturally, biological relatedness
prevails as a powerful and central source of kin obligations. However, Christianity differs
from a strict naturalism in its willingness to abrogate the kinship claims that are often
culturally attached to biological relatedness and to construct obligations for the sake of a
new kinship in Christ. Kinship in Christ is the fundamental mode of Christian kinship
construction that centers all kin obligations.
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Although Christian kinship is constructed it is neither fictional nor relativist, but
simply recognizes that the realities of shared humanity and shared baptism run deeper
than biological relatedness. From a theological perspective, God’s actions take
precedence over human response. Consequently, the manner in which humans cooperate
with God in biological procreation must be viewed from within the context of God’s
grace in both creating and redeeming humankind. Biblical assertions of God’s fidelity as
superior to biological ties, joined with commitment to the unity of all believers in Christ,
substantiate the theological conviction that all human relationships are fundamentally
based in communion with God and others.117 This underlying reality, not biological
reproduction, holds priority of place in Christian interpretations of kinship. The two
realities are not inherently conflictual even as they may at times come into conflict.
Within the social scientific perspectives, some sociobiologists who base their
research upon evolutionary theory have been prone to argue that care for biological kin is
an evolutionary adaptation that informs concrete behavior. Some, who focus on the
transmission of individual genes across generations, argue that protection of biological
children, or closely related kin, is an extension of self-interest as it is, in a sense, the
protection of one’s own genetic survival.118 Interestingly the argument parallels Aquinas’
argument for the rationality of paternal care for their offspring on the basis of Aristotle’s
theory of fetal development, which portrays children as quite literally the seed of their
fathers. This perspective raises a challenge for the view that kinship is predominantly a
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socially constructed obligation. But this perspective can be challenged from a number of
fronts beyond theological convictions alone. For example, the sociological perspective of
David Blankenhorn, proceeds from a contrary opinion that men are evolutionarily
adapted to produce the maximum number of offspring, which is contradictory to long
term care of particular children. Therefore, from Blankenhorn’s perspective, men must be
socially conditioned to attend to the long-term care of their own children.119 Moreover,
within sociobiology itself opinion differs as to whether individual’s genes or social
collectives are the more accurate center of interest in describing evolutionary adaptations.
When the long term survival of collectives is prioritized over that of individuals, the
evolutionary basis on altruistic extensions of kinship beyond near-biological kin alone
becomes more obvious.120
Differentiating conceptions of kinship from the fact of biological relatedness,
while admitting a general pattern of correlation on the one hand and significant historical
diversities on the other, constitutes an elusive but necessary challenge. Bernard Jussen, a
historian who has explored historical Christian constructions of kinship in response to
societal needs, writes,
Like the majority of anthropologists, historians too have uncoupled the scholarly notion of kinship
from biology and now restrict themselves to assuming that there is some kind of relationship
between biological reproduction and kinship. This kind of relationship is, however, hard to define.
The difficulty lies in the tightrope walk involved in retaining some connection between biology
and kinship while conceiving of kinship as a mental system use to structure social relations of all
kinds.121
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As a mental system, kinship is an interpretation of the obligations owed to a particular
relationship, and yet interpretations of kinship are not entirely unconstrained from the
facts of biological relatedness. Even scholars who admit the necessity of differentiating
biological relatedness from kinship nonetheless tend to allow cultural interpretations to
dominate. Jussen writes, “It is not difficult to show that these scholarly conceptions of
kinship are inconsistent. They are incompatible with the broadly accepted proposition
that kinship is an instrument of conceiving of social relations, and that it has no clear-cut
relationship to biological reproduction.”122
Differentiating ‘fictive kinship’ from ‘biological kinship’ creates a false
dichotomy because all kinship is a socially constructed interpretation of human
relationships and obligations. Consequently, the kinship of Christians, as siblings united
by baptism, is no more fictive than the biological kinship of siblings in the nuclear
family. Both forms of kinship unite and give rise to collectively interpreted norms of
relation. And yet, Christians have not been generally prone to explain the significance of
the obligations owed to biological siblings through baptism, even while consistently
conceiving of fellow baptized believers as sisters and brothers in Christ.
In terms of non-biologically related families, this recognition of the nature of
Christian kinship helps to explain why their kinship, though uniquely chosen, is as real
and significant as any other. The presumption that ‘real’ kinship, and thus ‘real families’
only arise through biological procreation not only unfairly dismisses the social scientific
evidence that adoptive families can function as well as biological families, but
misinterprets Christian commitments. This disparity between presumption and reality
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calls to attention how dangerous biological bias can be for more central Christian
commitments. No modern magisterial teaching actually makes the explicit claim that
biological kinship is central to ‘real’ Christian families, but the claim that the
reproductive pair is central to family formation is related and has functioned in Catholic
arguments.

Part III: Parenthood? Or Motherhood and Fatherhood?
Marriage has undergone significant transformation in recent decades and through
this the spousal relationship has assumed increased importance as the center of emotional
support, identity, fulfillment, and stability. Anthony Gittens writes,
Part of the reason for the perceived crisis in the institutions of marriage and family seems to be the
increased emphasis on the isolated individuation of the conjugal pair, and the privatization of
marriage itself. This has largely replaced more traditional emphases both on the integration and
socialization of the parties and on the social and moral sanctions intended to emphasize social
responsibility rather than individual rights and choices.123

This emphasis on the spousal pair is the not the result of ideology alone, but also
long-term historical realities. Low mortality rates in developed societies make this
emphasis possible. Historically the odds both parents would survive to see all their
children reach adulthood were relatively slim. Now married couples can expect to spend
a significant portion of their marriages together after their children have grown. In
addition, the social context now makes increased demands on spouses’ time and
attention; because of this, emphasis on the spousal relationship might be expected.
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Post-Vatican II magisterial teaching on sex and marriage focuses on the spousal
relationship and argues for the true nature of responsible parenthood in opposition to
contraception, marital indissolubility in opposition to divorce trends, and
complementarity against growing acceptance of same-sex relationships. These concerns
have worked to reduce the scope of concern to matters of the spousal relationship which
are further influenced by essentialist gender commitments. In this context,
complementarity has arisen in recent decades as a central theological idea for
considerations of parenthood.

Parental Complementarity
Since the mid-twentieth century, magisterial teaching has generally avoided
describing the spousal relationship in terms of the earlier hierarchy of male over female
while emphasis on the equality of spouses has grown.124 John Paul II was extremely
influential in guiding the interpretation of spousal equality after Vatican II through his
concept of complementarity and its insistence on the continuing importance of gender
differentiation.125 Consequently, the use of ‘complementarity’ in Catholic writing has
seen a meteoric rise in recent decades. Complementarity is now a key concept in the
magisterium’s articulation of the centrality of the male-female sexual relationship for
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founding marriage and family.126 Any criticism of the modern magisterial conception of
parenthood requires addressing this relatively new but remarkably influential concept. 127
Within magisterial documents, uses of the word ‘complementarity’ suggest
several related meanings. Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler argue that these
applications fall into two basic categories, which they label ‘biological’ and ‘personal’
complementarity. They further subdivide each category; biological complementarity
includes ‘heterogenital’ and ‘reproductive’ complementarity, while personal
complementarity includes ‘communion’, ‘affective’, and ‘parental’ complementarity.128
In their analysis, Salzman and Lawler detect a hierarchy among these conceptions and
argue that heterogenital complementarity is ultimately determinative over the rest. 129
Their argument helps demonstrate how closely tied modern Catholic conceptions of
parenthood are to sexual ethical norms and an essentialist theory of gender.
The fact that parental complementarity is identified among the explicit forms of
complementarity being employed is also significant. From a structural perspective,
parental complementarity explains why male-female partnerships are essential for
parenthood because it emphasizes the importance of male and female embodiedness. But
from a functional perspective, parental complementarity must be judged as the extent to
126
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which parents function together and utilize each other’s strengths and weaknesses to raise
children well. Both the structural and functional conceptions conceive of parenthood as a
cooperative act wherein each individual parent does not have to be capable of everything.
But they disagree whether gender difference is determinative or even predictive of
parental capabilities.
Christine Gudorf attributes the present prominence of gendered parental roles to
the rise of the ‘two-sex’ gender paradigm and its romanticized conceptions of the family
which associated women with domestic roles and motherhood with love, warmth, and
nurture.130 When the previously accepted understanding of male and female as the
superior and inferior forms of the human person respectively became unacceptable, the
distinction between male and female took on greater significance. In the earlier
hierarchical structuring of the genders the humanity of each gender was never in
question, only its relative degree of perfection. But in the present ‘two-sex’ paradigm,
male and female must be described as distinct but equal ways of being human. The
manner in which the distinction between the genders came to be understood was in no
small part shaped by sociologist Talcott Parsons’ suggestion that men and women have
essentially separate and inescapable functions to fulfill in childrearing. Christie Neuger
contends that throughout recent decades Catholic conceptions of the family have relied
upon Parson’s functionalist sociological model which was shaped by the 1950s American
context.
Women, by nature, have the expressive roles. The family is their emotional domain and they are
responsible for the nurturance and care of family members. Men, by nature, and the instrumental
roles and they provide the structural support for the family and bridge the gap between the
private/domestic world and the public world. According to Parsons, deviation from these natural
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roles creates dysfunction and instability for families. Thus, it is important for all of society to
support this role division for the sake of the greater good.131

Contemporary magisterial teaching insists upon the importance of parental gender
complementarity and posits at least some degree of essential functional difference in the
capabilities of mothers and fathers.132 Yet it remains remarkably nonspecific in clarifying
which capacities each gender offers that the other cannot. Fatherhood is often associated
with financial provision, education, oversight, and support while motherhood is
associated with nurture, care for young children, compassion, and love. None of these
traits are clearly defined as foreign to the other gender.
The claim that motherhood and fatherhood, each based essentially on gender, are
both necessary for promoting child wellbeing requires careful scrutiny because of the
patriarchal legacy such divisions can carry. Many feminist scholars regard the idea that
strong differentiation can accompany gender equality with skepticism.
The suspicion of historical and conceptual connections between insistence on
gender roles and a patriarchal legacy is only strengthened by the reality that in modern
history women’s role as mothers have elicited far greater moral and social concern than
men’s role as fathers.133 The disproportionate concern for motherhood is largely a
consequence of having centralized motherhood as the domestic role of nurture and
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caregiving such that any alteration appears to have an immediate impact on children’s
wellbeing. This centralization creates a restrictive and often idealistic definition of the
good mother while largely neglecting to consider what makes a good father in relation to
children.
Changing conceptions of human gender as well as changing social realities and
economic pressures challenge predetermined parental roles based on gender. In this
perspective, ‘motherhood’ and ‘fatherhood’ are not explicitly correlated to either function
or gender.134 This non-essentialist view tends to emphasize diversity and flexibility and is
based upon research that exposes the “instability of difference and sameness” in human
gender.135 Considering the implications of this view for lived reality, Susan Frank Parsons
writes,
[G]ender theory is questioning what has been taken to be a primary ground of ethics during
modernism. To believe ethics is founded in our biology that those biological realities form a given
human nature which expresses itself in differing social systems and makes itself powerfully
manifest in the perilous life of the individual person, is part of our modern intellectual inheritance
in the West.136

Lisa Sowle Cahill adds, “neither empirical evidence nor the scriptural accounts of
creation support the thesis that the exclusive role for which women, and women alone,
are suited is a domestic one... Most human roles (as distinct from traits or capacities) can
be fulfilled in a variety of styles.”137
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Perspectives that view parenthood as essentially a single reality, rather than dual
gender-based realities, tend also to promote negotiated parental roles that allow flexibility
in arrangements for earning income and care of children. Feminist philosopher Sara
Ruddick has been an influential advocate of non-gendered function-based conceptions of
parenthood. She argues that ‘mothering’ is defined by a distinctive mode of
thoughtfulness which gives rise to a unique discipline. That is, through the functional
practice of mothering itself, individual behavior builds a habit of responding to the needs
of others. It is this adaptive pattern of behavior that defines motherhood for Ruddick. As
such, she does not define the functional role of mothering with essential attributes of the
female gender. Instead she contends, “the work or practice of mothering is distinct from
the identity of the mother. Mothering may be performed by anyone who commits him- or
herself to the demands of maternal practice.”138 Bell hooks supports Ruddick’s vision of
equal parental roles across genders but believes her approach is flawed in romanticizing
the idea of the maternal. In response, she pushes for an expansion of the masculine
parental identity to the point of sameness with mothering. Bell hooks is less inclined to
believe that individuals will cross lines among gendered self-concepts and therefore
contends that men will not self-identify with the maternal because the concept in
inextricably linked to the feminine. She writes,
Telling a boy acting out the role of a caring parent with his dolls that he is being maternal will not
change the idea that women are better suited to parenting; it will reinforce it. Saying to a boy that
he is behaving like a good father… would teach him a vision of effective parenting, of fatherhood,
that is the same as motherhood.139
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Though egalitarian visions of shared parenting have been influential, social
acceptance has outpaced lived realties especially when measured by male involvement in
the home. As Herbert Anderson observes, a “significant gap” persists “between rhetoric
and reality.”140 Glenda Wall and Stephanie Arnold write,
American fatherhood appears to have undergone more changes in culture than in conduct. For this
reason, the general public may conceive of fathers as being more involved and nurturing than they
truly are. Subsequent research has certainly borne out the fact that although the conduct of fathers
has changed somewhat, it is still mothers who bear the vast majority of responsibility for young
children…141

In response, some argue that inequality is more enduring within the home because
legislation does not directly affect the domestic sphere; others draw attention to social
forces which inhibit mutuality in domestic work.”142
Sociologist Andrea Doucet claims that, in practice, men are not as welcomed into
non-traditional roles as social support appears to indicate. Rather, men are much more
inhibited and viewed with greater suspicion in communal settings including children or
when expressing interest in the children of others.143 Doucet finds that primary caregiver
fathers tend to tell narratives that stress the fact that their families work despite
nontraditional arrangements. She attributes this to the extraordinary efforts these fathers
must make “in social environments that often assume men’s incompetence in
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caregiving.”144 In a similar manner, Wall and Arnold reason that changes in fatherhood
have been “undermined by images and text that position fathers as part-time, secondary,
less competent parents with fewer parenting responsibilities and greater breadwinning
responsibilities than mothers…”145 They conclude that magazines and other sources of
parenting advice are so focused on mothers that they inhibit diversifying practice.146 Bell
hooks surmises that as long as the mother-child relationship remains socially held to a
unique and superior status childcare will be defined as women’s domain. She adds, “Even
the childless woman is considered more suited to raise children than the male parent
because she is seen as an inherently caring nurturer.”147
Despite these social disincentives, research indicates that equitable sharing of
domestic labor and childcare coincides with reduced behavioral distinctions between
motherhood and fatherhood. Sociologist Michael Lamb argues that, functionally,
maternal and paternal influences on children are more similar than distinctive.148
Summarizing a similar conclusion by sociologist Scott L. Coltrane, Julie Hanlon Rubio
writes,
Coltrane found that the more parents shared childcare, the less distinguishable Mom and Dad
became. Instead of mothering and fathering, he found parenting. Coltrane believes that as men and
women continue to share the work of family life, the roles will continue to converge. The new
father will truly emerge, and he will look an awful lot like the new mother, who will, in due
course, have adjusted her parenting to reflect her new lifestyle. 149
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Studies also show similarities between the dispositions of single fathers and employed
mothers.150 This suggests that the activity of parenting itself may shape personality
expression and help fathers become more nurturing and build intimacy with their child.151
Another study shows that the birth of a child triggers a drop in testosterone levels in
fathers; a physiological change in response to behavior that could assist fathers in child
care.152 Yet, Doucet’s extensive research on primary caregiver fathers reveals that these
men tend to emphasize their own masculinity and do so according to traditional
conceptions of gender. Despite fulfilling ‘mothering’ functions, the men appear
determined “to distinguish themselves as men, as heterosexual males, and as fathers, not
as mothers... they must actively work to dispel the idea that they might be gay, unmasculine, or not men.”153 Although studies challenge differentiated gendered parenting
roles social ideals about men and fatherhood clearly influence men’s behavior and selfunderstanding as fathers.
Women are similarly influenced by social perceptions in their parental
experiences. Potentially as a result of dissonance between their own experiences and

150
Research on single father families is inconsistent with some studies showing similar impacts on
children as single mother families while others show stronger child outcomes. Improved child outcomes
among children in single father families may be due to single fathers tending to be older and more likely to
have been previously married than single mothers. The lack of research on single fatherhood is in part due
to a tendency to focus on the impact of fathers in dual parent families as opposed to single mother families.
Patrick M Krueger, et al. “Family Structure and Multiple Domains of Child Well-being in the United
States: a Cross-Sectional Study,” Population Health Metrics 13, no. 6 (2015): 2, 6.
151

Aulette, 328.

152
See, Lee T. Gettler, et al., “Longitudinal Evidence that Fatherhood Decreases Testosterone in
Human Males,” Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences of the United States of America 108,
no. 39 (2011): 16194-16199.
153

Doucet, 88. A similar phenomenon has also been documented among men who work in
traditionally female occupations.

279

widespread social conceptions about motherhood, the majority of American mothers are
ambivalent about motherhood. Only one in four report their experience has been mostly
positive while one in five report that it has been mostly negative. Dissatisfied and
ambivalent mothers also often report limited involvement by their husbands as a factor.154
Although women retain the majority of domestic duties, roughly 71% of American
mothers work outside the home. Most report doing so out of financial need but most also
say they would continue their employment if money were not a factor.155 For women,
work outside the home is associated with increased marital power and equitable division
of household labor, which could enhance marital and parental satisfaction.156
The effects of women’s employment also vary according to race. African
American and Hispanic women have historically been employed fulltime at higher rates
than whites and therefore have social histories of balancing work and motherhood.157
Because of the types of employment traditionally available to women of color, African
Americans and Hispanics may see work less as a vocation and more as a necessity, which
in turn encourages more emotional investment in the home. That is, they may tend to
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balance the toil of menial or demeaning work against seeking greater fulfillment in
family interactions outside of working hours.158 These social realties appear to make a
difference in working mother’s relationships with their children. For white mothers
sensitivity tends to be reduced when early grade school children experience extensive
time in childcare, whereas the sensitivity of African American and Hispanic mothers
tends increase.159 For all mothers, both employed and not, greater time spent interacting
with children during non-work time had positive effects on sensitivity.160
Aside from present social pressures that influence parental behavior and selfunderstanding, individual upbringing can also be significant. Rigidity in parental
modeling of gender roles has been criticized for tending to limit the way children are
socialized into their own human capacities. The negative consequences of rigid gender
roles may have an especially profound impact on young boys and may result in
restrictions in the development of male psyches.161 David James argues that child rearing
practices which model narrow conceptions of masculinity “tend to foster a boy’s
alienation from himself and from others.”162 Christine Gudorf contends that this leads to
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limited male capacities in later life “for child nurturance or for the emotional selfdisclosure necessary for the close friendships and mutual, intimate marriages which
become more necessary in modern society as more traditional forms of community and
intimacy disintegrate under the influence of mobility and urban anonymity.”163 The
consequences of these modes of socialization are significant. Clinical psychologist and
Jesuit priest John Cicero writes,
As adults, those men and women who grow up with rigid senses of masculinity and femininity
according to established cultural norms are less likely to achieve a more adaptive sense of balance
in the Jungian sense of the animus and anima. They are more likely, instead, to denying the
opposite side of themselves, and in so doing to close themselves off to sexual maturity. Empirical
studies with dependency styles, men are far less likely than women to endorse the need for
emotional warmth, support, and nurturance on self-report measures; but on projective measures —
where they don’t realize what they are endorsing — they are just as dependent.164

Cicero further argues that men’s inability to recognize healthy dependency as a
consequence of highly gendered socialization may impair “healthy spiritual awareness
and practice.”165 As such, strong socialization for well-defined gender roles appears to
have limited value within a Catholic theological framework inasmuch as it may suppress
capacities for individuality, friendship, marital health, and religiosity. When parenthood
is linked too tightly to narrow conceptions of gender, several challenges are presented in
relation to achieving human flourishing.
In sum, parenthood can be conceptualized as either a singular or a dual reality.
From one perspective, motherhood and fatherhood appear distinct and complementary,
such that even a child with two mothers or two fathers still lacks a full and authentic
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experience of parenthood. From the other, parenthood is a foundational term that is
labeled either motherhood or fatherhood depending upon which gender is being
referenced. From the first perspective, the lack of a mother or a father constitutes an
absence of complementarity and thereby a deficiency in a child’s parental resources.
From the second, parental function is central, such that a child experiences deficiency in
parental resources when the available caregivers cannot or do not adequately respond to
the child’s needs. Both perspectives are, in reality, based on parental function. The
gendered perspective that differentiates motherhood from fatherhood posits parenthood
as a dual gendered reality in which particular parental functions are connected to either
motherhood or fatherhood. This gendered perspective is, however, hesitant to name these
gendered functions explicitly aside from vague references to the importance of malemasculine and female-feminine parental role models. And even this claim to functional
importance of role models is weak inasmuch as it depends upon on cultural assumptions
of what constitutes femininity and masculinity and implies that parents alone constitute
the only significant role models in a child’s life.
Many households continue to divide labor along gendered lines despite
increasingly egalitarian ideals of parental function. Does this reality imply that the
genders are naturally fit for specific roles or that cultural conditioning simply makes
assuming these traditional roles easier? Because behavior is influenced by both natural
propensities, internalized cultural ideals, and external pressures (such as economic
constraints) the answer to this question will always remain somewhat ambiguous. What is
clear, however, it that an absolute principle of exclusion in parental function (i.e. women
cannot fulfill certain tasks of fatherhood and vice versa), is not supported by available
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evidence. Without this, the division of function based on gender is at best a guide, not a
rule.

Gender and Parenthood
Appeals to complementarity, as an essential requirement of childrearing, surface
with regularity in arguments against same-sex parenthood. In magisterial teaching, the
need for parental complementarity is posited as a matter of basic justice.166 Echoing
several years of statements by the US Catholic Bishops, Pope Francis explains,
It is necessary to emphasize the right of children to grow up within a family, with a father and a
mother able to create a suitable environment for their development and emotional maturity.
Continuing to mature in the relationship, in the complementarity of the masculinity and femininity
of a father and a mother, and thus preparing the way for emotional maturity. 167

Several revisionist theologians disagree strongly with such arguments and are
quick to cite sociological and psychological evidence that children raised by same-sex
parents have comparable outcomes to children of heterosexual parents. For example, in
response to the CDF’s argument against same-sex parenthood in the 2003 document
“Considerations Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between
Homosexual Persons”, Patricia Beattie Jung writes,
[D]espite the Vatican’s assertion that claims to be based on experience, after more than twenty
years of scrutiny not a single research study suggests that children raised by same-sex parents fail
to flourish. As early as 1999, reviews of the relevant literature had given clear evidence to the
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contrary.” In fact ample evidence suggests that normal development among children may be
expected among same-sex parents at the same rate as their heterosexual peers. 168

In recent decades, several concerns have been raised in relation to the capabilities of
homosexual persons in childrearing. These include worry that children will develop
impaired sexual identities, abnormal conceptions of gender roles, or that they will
themselves become homosexual. Beyond this, some express concern for children’s
mental health, social adjustment, behavior, and ability to form social relationships while
others feared that children in gay and lesbian households will be at higher risk for sexual
abuse.169 After several decades of research, a consensus of evidence now contradicts the
validity of these anxieties, even as societal stigma remains a factor with which gay and
lesbian parents must contend. Social-scientific evidence shows that gay and lesbian
parents are as capable as their heterosexual peers are in raising healthy children.170
Moreover, children of gay and lesbian parents do not generally report that their parents’
sexuality has had any significant impact in their parenting capabilities. Findings do
indicate that social stigma is a recognized challenge in these children’s upbringing. 171
Lesbian mothers have been shown to experience greater psychological wellbeing when
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they can be open about their sexuality and are in stable partnerships.172 As in all families,
psychological health and happiness among parents has a positive impact on children.173
On the issue of parental complementarity, magisterial teaching is confronted with
three difficult realities. First, even as clear parental gender roles may have benefits for
some parents, they are not necessary for child wellbeing. Second, arguments for
complementarity do not clearly specify which parental functions are the irreplaceable
domain of one gender. This ambiguity makes empirical verification of the claim
problematic. Without clarity, the general social scientific evidence suggesting that
parental roles are adaptable even as they are influenced by societal expectation presents a
clear challenge to this line of argument. Third, the argument for parental complementarity
appears set upon a conception of the family as essentially private which and ignores the
influence other adults may have on children. This third challenge is particularly
intriguing because it suggests a privatized conception of the family which stands in
tension with the more communal and socially engaged vision of the family that informs
aspects of Catholic Social Teaching. At the same time, the private, nuclear conception of
the family from which this argument stems neglects functional theories of parenthood
that place much greater emphasis on the positive influence of non-parent adults in
children’s lives.174
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Bell hooks, cites Elizabeth Janeway who contends that “the idea of an individual
having sole responsibility for childrearing is the most unusual pattern of parenting in the
world, one that has proved to be unsuccessful because it isolates children and parents
from society.”175 Janeway continues,
Such isolation means that the role of the family as the agent for socializing children is
inadequately fulfilled at present whether or not mothers are at work outside the home. Children
grow up without the benefit of a variety of adult role models of both sexes and in ignorance of the
world of paid work. Returning women to a life centered in home and family would not solve the
fundamental loss of connection between family and community. 176

In response, hooks argues that childcare must be a shared responsibility both among the
parents as well as among the community.177

Community and Parenthood
Esther Goody’s functional framework of parenthood helps explain why focusing
singly on parental partners fails to capture all pertinent factors in child wellbeing. For
Goody, parenthood itself is the process of fulfilling the important tasks related to
childrearing. As such, there are numerous ‘parental’ roles which may be assumed by
various adults. Despite limitations in her framework, the premise is important: parents are
rarely the only ones engaged in parenting.178
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Goody’s conception challenges the notion that biological parents are the only
‘real’ parents whose particular form of kin relationship with their children is
differentiated in kind and superior to that of other adults. Her perspective also challenges
privatized conceptions of the nuclear family as inaccurate and unhealthy. Biological
parents may be central to the family, but their centrality is correlated to the functions they
assume. Consequently, the dichotomy between the ‘real’ parenthood of biological parents
and the participation of other caregivers is lessened, while the legitimate dependence of
families on extended social support networks is brought to light. Goody’s insight on the
importance of non-parent adults is supported by research showing children benefit from
relationships with caring adults. These caring adults may be their parents, but others can
fulfill the role. Children benefit most by having an additional caring adult outside their
own household.179
Many resources within Catholic thought can be used to support Goody’s
framework and counteract reductionist tendencies that center considerations of child
wellbeing on the parental pair alone. Yet Catholicism’s commitment to community and
social participation in considerations of the family is undermined internally by the sexual
ethical and gender essentialist concerns that drive contemporary thinking on parenthood
towards privatized conceptions of the nuclear family.180 While Catholic teaching
rightfully defends the importance of parental rights and responsibilities in caring for their
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children and directing family affairs, overemphasis biological reproduction and the role
of parent’s as their children’s only significant role models and caregivers undermines a
more expansive vision of the family’s legitimate Christian vocation in the world.
Some Catholic theologians note the historical contingency of the nuclear family.
Cahill argues, “the extended consanguineous family is more ancient and more universal
in social importance than the modern so-called nuclear family, consisting of spouses and
children and considered to have been formed through marriage.”181 Moreover, Jussen
argues that non-biological kinship within the Christian tradition served precisely to create
broad networks of support for the family. Since the early Middle Ages, both baptismal
and confirmation sponsors have been used to extend kin networks. Through these means,
early medieval Christian parents would often ally themselves with several sets of
godparents and a few confirmation sponsors (on account of child mortality). Jussen
concludes that through these kin-making practices, “a couple could easily acquire twenty
to thirty spiritual cofathers and comothers.”182
Importantly, magisterial and revisionist Catholic sources agree that the family
does not operate for itself, but is an outwardly directed social institution aimed at
benefiting the common good. Unfortunately, much of the traditional conceptual
foundation for these commitments has been relegated to a secondary, fictional status as
biological kinship has increasingly come to dominance as the normative mode of kinship
itself. The magisterium has consistently asserted that the family is not an isolated, private
181
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reality but should join in association with others for support and to promote the common
good.183 The family has a legitimate role to play in advancing the common good, but this
role is an underappreciated element of Catholic Social Teaching.184 The bias toward
gender and sexual ethical concerns has played a significant role in this oversight as it has
pulled conceptions of the family towards idealization of biological kinship and the private
nuclear family while simultaneously feeding into reductionist cultural suppositions about
the family’s sphere of concern. For families to recognize the legitimate social vocation
set out for them by Catholic Social Teaching, commitments and influences outside the
private nuclear family must be asserted more clearly. Yet emphasizing these
commitments and influences necessarily diminishes the centrality that can be placed upon
the parental pair alone. That is, one cannot uphold a vision of the family as a socially
engaged and supported entity while simultaneously making the claim that parents are the
only role models of masculinity and femininity with any meaningful impact on children.
Relationships beyond the nuclear family are either significant or they are not. The present
articulation of magisterial commitments is simply too selective in when and how such
relationships beyond the nuclear family matter to provide a realistic account of the
family’s essential structure and vocation.
At a pastoral level, this ambiguity in Catholic thought has influenced inconsistent
responses to the reality of same-sex parenting. In recent years, some homosexual
individuals have been refused communion and fired from Catholic parishes and
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schools.185 Some same-sex couples have also been denied baptism for their children and
refused admittance into Catholic schools.186 These incidents raise serious concerns, since
they constitute the refusal to offer communal support for these individuals, partners, and
children on the grounds that presumed sexual behavior cannot be tolerated by these
Catholic communities. If families are essentially privatized units that may influence, but
are not essentially bound to one another, then removing immoral aberrations from the
collective would be quite defensible. But the challenge is that this conception is not the
full Catholic vision of the family as it is presented within the body of Catholic Social
Teaching. If Catholic families are obligated to serve each other and the common good on
the basis of shared baptism and shared humanity, the practice of isolating families headed
by same-sex parents from the resources of the community becomes more challenging to
defend. This is especially true when children are involved, as in baptism, parish
membership, and enrollment in Catholic schools. If we admit that children’s relationships
with adults other than their parents really do make a difference in children’s lives, and
this is exactly what social scientific evidence suggests, then providing children of samesex couples with the opportunity to form significant and influential relationships with
faithful adults through Catholic schools and parish life seems defensible. When this
social scientific evidence is understood within the social vocation of the family as
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presented by Catholic Social Teaching, the pastoral responses to same-sex headed
families noted above appear all the more problematic.

Part IV: Parenthood from a Functional Perspective
As previous chapters showed, modern magisterial teaching, contemporary
revisionist theologians, and Western Christian history include precedents for functional
evaluations of parenthood. But these precedents are often paired with, and occasionally
eclipsed by, commitments to family structures. Particularly within modern magisterial
teaching, family structure has assumed a priority of place perhaps largely as a reaction to
changing social gender roles, the break-down of traditional marriage in the West, and
same-sex relationships. Two implications of this structural emphasis merit particular
concern. First, centralization of family structure is associated with commitments to
particular gender roles, sexual ethical norms, and biological reproduction. This has led
anxiety over changes in gendered-parental behavior as well as understandings of
biological kinship as ‘real’ kinship. Construing biological kinship as the normative form
of kinship restricts Catholic appreciation of the bonds shared by families who are not
biologically related. It also suggests that non-biological families are somehow unnatural,
less desirable, or less truly families. Moreover, the structural association with gender
roles prioritizes the male-female spousal pair as the locus of concern which allows
commitments to sexual ethical norms, conceptions of marriage, and essentialist theories
of gender to take the place of more concerted evaluations on parental capabilities. These
biases present themselves as assertions of restrictive gender roles and a willingness to
judge the full moral content of intimate relationships by the morality of the sexual acts
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they may contain. Finally, the emphasis on structure retains vestiges of patriarchal gender
hierarchies and physicalist sexual morality which remain problematic. For these reasons,
evaluations of parental function offer a stronger resource for understanding parenthood
apart for these assumptions and biases.
Emphasizing parental function encourages a new approach to defining what
constitutes a family. Anthony Gittins writes, “the US Catholic bishops offer that ‘a
committed, permanent, faithful relationship of husband and wife is the root of a family’:
but clearly it is not the root of every family, and increasingly, not even most.”187 Instead
of starting with the extensional definition ‘the family is…’,” Gittins argues, “we could
first specify common characteristics such as adequate structure; the support, protection,
dignity, and fulfillment of members; the intention of stability and endurance; and the
relation to the wider world.” By using an intensional approach, social arrangements
which fit the definition generated could be regarded as forms of family; even as some
may be judged preferable.188 The challenge, then, is to construct an adequate theological
intensional definition of the family that can account for diversity in structure among
domestic arrangements that function as families. Within this framework, the biological
family may still offer an important natural paradigm, since it is through experience of
functioning families that the common characteristics of families come to be known; and
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biological families have offered many examples of well-functioning families. However,
this approach does not allow structure alone to be determinative.
Gittins’ perspective fits well with Goody’s functional definition of parenthood
explained above. In fact, Goody’s articulation of parental tasks parallels the social duties
of parenthood articulated in modern Catholic teaching. Namely, parents are primarily
educators who have the task of preparing children for vocations as contributors to the
common good. This description offers a fair start to an intensional account of parenthood.
However, contemporary trends suggest that on the measure of socio-religious
reproduction, contemporary Western Catholic parents are failing at an alarming rate; only
one in three American children raised Catholic will remain Catholic into adulthood.189
Catholic adults are leaving the Church as well. If ex-Catholics were their own
denomination, they would be the third largest in America.190 The connection between
Catholic departure from the Church and the significant demographic shifts in marriage
we have explored remains somewhat unclear.
Although the nuclear family, with a father in the labor force and a mother in the
home with children, remains an influential ideal, it was only briefly the majority family
structure among American families. Throughout the early twentieth century this family
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type was on the rise until a peak in 1965 at about 55%. Since that time it has declined
rapidly. Today about 22% of American children live in such households while dualearner and single-parent families account for three-quarters of the remainder.191
Roughly half of all American children will experience divorce before age
eighteen. Rates of divorce peaked in the 1980s while the divorce rate per capita has
dropped significantly since. But this decline corresponds to dropping marriage rates, such
that the proportion of divorce to marriages has held mostly steady over the past three
decades. 192 The high divorce rate of the 1980s appears to have influenced a negative
perception of marriage among that decade’s children. When they entered adulthood, rates
of cohabitation increased dramatically, nearly doubling from 1990 to 2006.193
Despite the importance of stability for children’s wellbeing, cultural skepticism in
the possibility of permanent and healthy marriage did not prompt a significant reevaluation of parenthood. American’s are now inclined to believe that rewarding parental
experiences can exist beyond a stable parental partnership, even as research shows that
married parents have significant advantages in happiness and mental health.194 More
Americans desire to become parents than are confident in the possibility of a stable
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marriage while over 40% of cohabitating couples have children.195 Among unwed
mothers, 73% are in a romantic relationship with the biological father and about half are
cohabitating with him. On average, child wellbeing in households with cohabiting parents
resembles single-parent households more closely than married parent households.196 And
relationships among cohabitating parents tend to be significantly less stable than those of
married couples.197 Fully 95% of cohabitating couples with children consider marriage at
least a 50/50 prospect for their future. However, only 9% will marry in the first year after
a child is born while the great majority will end their relationship.198 About half of
children in married households will experience divorce while the number of children of
cohabitating parents who will experience the end of their parent’s relationship may be
over 90%.199
On the other hand, conditions have made single and non-married parenting easier
socially. Not only has social stigma declined, but numerous human needs traditionally
met by the family or extended family unit can now be fulfilled through the state or
market.200 The negative effects of divorce on children are consistent, but are not large
when compared to peers with married parents.201 Moreover, at least two-thirds of children
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who experience divorce adjust successfully, while divorce can occasionally benefit
children’s wellbeing.202 However, adult children of divorced parents do tend to have
weaker commitments to lifelong marriage, less marital satisfaction, and reduced
likelihood of being married.203 Fully one-fifth of children from divorced parents feel that
they are destined to repeat their parent’s problems.204
From a theological perspective, the purpose of raising children is aimed neither at
social reproduction nor at achieving some baseline measure of wellbeing. Instead,
Christian parenthood includes leading children towards human flourishing and which is
found most fully in communion with God. Nonetheless, social reproduction and fostering
child wellbeing are important functions of parenthood. The data on divorce and
cohabitation suggest that some measure of social reproduction may be important for child
well-being, yet the data do not speak to theological goods directly. As such, the
concluding section of this chapter briefly considers more value-oriented functions of
parenthood in order to consider how parenthood might be directed towards theological
goods. This is not to suggest that human flourishing is only about proper values; but it is
to acknowledge that a theological vision of the human telos goes beyond standard socialscientific measures of wellbeing.
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Same-sex parenting is the issue on which social-scientific research and Catholic
teaching diverge most significantly. Revisionist theologians often counter the
magisterium’s assertions that same-sex parenthood is harmful to children by pointing to
research which indicates the contrary. But this response does not go far enough as it often
fails to develop a theological account of parenthood as such that can properly support its
claim. Although the response has been insufficient, the Vatican’s argument sets itself up
for just such a reply. The CDF’s 2003 argument against same-sex parenthood states,
“As experience has shown, the absence of sexual complementarity in these unions creates
obstacles in the normal development of children who would be placed in the care of such persons.
They would be deprived of the experience of either fatherhood or motherhood. Allowing children
to be adopted by persons living in such unions would actually mean doing violence to these
children, in the sense that their condition of dependency would be used to place them in an
environment that is not conducive to their full human development.” 205

Two points of this argument are particularly worthy of note. First, experience is
used to support the claim that same-sex parenting is harmful to children. Second, the
argument construes parenthood as leading children towards ‘full human development’ in
other words, human flourishing. On the basis of social scientific data, the first claim,
considered in terms of child wellbeing, is now quite easy to refute and many revisionist
theologians have pointed this out.206 Yet, the second claim shows why social scientific
data alone cannot serve as an adequate rebuttal to the argument the CDF is making.
Measurements of child wellbeing are only part of the story. A full rebuttal requires a
positive theological explanation of same-sex parenthood that shows how it could lead
children towards human flourishing, theologically considered. This brings the disjunction
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between what the magisterium claims and what social scientific research can measure
into focus.
While evidence does not support the claim that same-sex parenthood categorically
harms children in terms of their physical, social, and emotional development, the
question remains whether such relationships can lead children towards a theological
vision of human flourishing. The CDF argues that, children must not be placed with
same-sex caregivers lest they encounter “erroneous ideas about sexuality and
marriage…”207 That is, if magisterial teaching on human sexuality, which since Vatican
II has followed a personalist moral framework, is based on an accurate account of the
human person, same-sex parenthood quite clearly contradicts that vision and would lead
children away from an accurate conception of their goal. That is, when a vision of human
flourishing is understood as bound to an accurate understanding of the moral teachings of
the Catholic Church, the nature of the CDF’s concern for same-sex parenting becomes
more evident. However, when the concern is understood in this way it becomes
contextualized within much larger social factors. That is, the reproduction of commitment
to Catholic moral teaching on human sexuality is failing at a much larger rate and over a
longer course of time than same-sex parenting alone can possibly account for.
Research indicates that the majority of American Catholics support same-sex
marriage and that support is increasing substantially among younger Catholics.208 In
addition, over half of self-identified American Catholics support capital punishment and
207
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just under half believe abortion should be legal in all or most cases.209 Finally, the vast
majority of American Catholics disregard the prohibition of contraception.210 If
magisterial disapproval of same-sex parenting is based specifically on the moral
formation of children, the challenge being faced far exceeds same-sex parenthood itself.
Given the generally good outcomes of children raised by same-sex couples, it
seems very unlikely that these same children would tend to embrace Catholic moral
teaching on homosexuality and same-sex parenthood. Studies show that children raised
by same-sex couples are not prone to identify sexual orientation as an influence in their
parents’ childrearing abilities.211 But, American Catholic children raised by heterosexual
parents are also far more likely than previous generations to disagree with the official
Catholic position on same-sex parenting.212 This suggests that arguments over the
wellbeing of children raised by same-sex couples are less important from the point of
view of moral formation than concern for Catholic children’s moral formation in general.
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Mention of these realities is not to distract attention from the magisterium legitimate
concern for the same-sex parenthood; it does suggest that any limitations perceived
within same-sex parenting should not be held out as morally determinative while similar
limitations among heterosexual parents are not given similar scrutiny. That is, if the
moral development of children is what is at stake in the moral assessment of same-sex
parenthood, then this should be evaluated in terms of the achievements of heterosexual
peers rather than singularly subjected to an ideal would challenge others as well.
The late 1990s witnessed a surge in interest in the moral development of children
that continues to the present.213 The results show that parents are clearly powerful
influences in their children’s moral development.214 But little research has been done on
the specifically religious aspects of parenting and the moral development of children;
even as research has suggested connections between parental religiosity and more general
measures of child wellbeing.215 The effects of parental religiosity seem to depend on
family structure to some extent, but the relationship and the causality between religious
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views and child behavior are less clear.216 Moreover, research on children’s moral
development is presently limited by an almost exclusive focus on maternal influences. 217
One study argues that moral formation is highly dependent upon the mode of
discipline utilized by parents and suggests that discipline which focuses on the
consequences of behavior on others best supports the growth of moral reasoning. Unlike
earlier research, which focused narrowly on religion’s relation to physical punishment,
this study found that parental religiosity may have a significant influence on children’s
moral development.218 It also found that the efficacy of disciplinary styles was dependent
upon consistent use by both parents. This suggests consistency of discipline by both
parents, which has been tied to religious beliefs, is a significant factor in children’s moral
formation.219
Despite the paucity of research, there are numerous reasons to believe that
parental religiosity can create conditions that benefit children’s moral formation. The
2011 State of Our Unions report shows that couples who identify God as the center of
their relationship tend to have happier and more stable marriages.220 And marital
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spirituality supports generosity between spouses.221 Moreover, religiosity can support
beliefs which predict marital success, such as valuing commitment.222 One report asserts,
“Spouses who score above average in terms of commitment are at least 45 percentage
points more likely to report being ‘very happy’ in their marriages, and 29 percentage
points less likely to be prone to divorce. In other words, above-average commitment
more than triples the odds of marital happiness for husbands and wives and reduces their
divorce proneness sixfold.”223 Though this does not offer direct evidence of parenting
abilities related the children’s moral formation, parents in happy, stable marriages seem
more likely to be up to the task of assisting their children in moral development.
Adding complexity to these findings, religious parents, like their secular
counterparts, may profess values that do not correspond with their actions. A recent
project through Harvard University shows that, while nearly all parents say they are
committed to raising caring, ethical children, a large majority of American youth value
personal achievement over concern for others. When asked to rank values, nearly 80% of
young people choose high achievement or happiness as most significant while only about
20% chose care for others. At the same time, roughly half of high school students
reported cheating on a test and three-quarters had copied a peer’s work. While parents
rank care for other’s high among the moral values they wish to impart to their children,
around 80% of young people surveyed reported that “achievement and happiness” were
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their parent’s top concerns. A similar trend was found for educators.224 The study adds
pointedly, “Americans tend to worry a great deal about the moral state of our country and
about selfish and disrespectful children,” but “it’s not clear who, if anyone, believes
they’re part of the problem.”225
Far from simply failing to replicate specific moral commitments of the
magisterium in young people, American parents are apparently failing to replicate their
own commitments. This appears doubly damaging for children. Not only are the values
that parents and educators want to prize not being communicated, but the emphasis on
achievement and happiness actually reduces the likelihood of both.226
Whereas the magisterium fears that the structural realities of same-sex parenthood
will reduce children’s ability to understand marriage authentically, these studies suggest
functional failures. As such, the magisterium’s concern may be misplaced even as the
values that are not being communicated, kindness and commitment to others, correlate to
characteristics of healthy, stable marriages.227
Rather than assigning blame for these realities to simple moral failure, a number
of scholars suggest larger social forces actively work against communicating these goods.
Considering the impact of economics on family systems, Herbert Anderson writes,
Perhaps the most disturbing observation about the tension between work time and family time has
come from German sociologist Ulrich Beck. He has observed that a free market economic model
224

Making Caring Common Project, “Executive Summary,” Harvard Graduate School of
Education (The Presidents and Fellows of Harvard College, 2014), 1.
225

Ibid., 5.

226
See, John M. Gottman and Janice L. Driver, “Dysfunctional Marital Conflict and Everyday
Marital Interaction,” Journal of Divorce & Remarriage 43, no. 3/4 (2005): 63 – 77.
227

Gottman and Levenson, 83 -97. Cf. Scott Stanley, The Heart of Commitment: Compelling
Research that Reveals the Secrets of a Lifelong, Intimate Marriage (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers,
1998).
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presupposes a society without families or marriages.… A society that rewards people for
selfishness should not be surprised that it faces a crisis in families. If both women and men are
equally devoted to the marketplace and its demands, children will obviously suffer. But so will the
marriage, even if there are no children. 228

The ideology behind this economic system is at odds with stable, two-parent households,
making the latter difficult to sustain.
When the magisterium raises concern for the full human development of young
people in the context of same-sex parenthood, it has identified a legitimate area of
concern given the realities of modern society. Yet this concern goes well beyond samesex parenting and implicates both the majority of American parents, as well as the
economic and social values of American Catholics as a whole. While Catholic teaching
on marriage and sexuality does appear to justify the magisterium’s concern, it is unclear
that same-sex parenting is the most significant and pressing aspect of this matter. These
concerns would be better grounded in a clearer account of the theological nature of
parenthood and stronger criticism of the cultural values beyond sexual ethics that actively
work against parental efforts to instill moral commitments.
In the absence of an adequate theological account of parenthood that can stand at
some distance from sexual ethical concerns, same-sex parenthood is singled out as the
instantiation of parenthood that most clearly departs from the sexual ethical and
essentialist gendered norms. Consequently, same-sex parenthood is forced to bear the
weight of much broader anxieties, while the more significant contributing factors receive
far less scrutiny. Cultural trends suggest that American Catholic parents are really faced
with significant challenges in their attempt to communicate values with their children. If
this is truly the magisterium’s central source of concern in considerations of same-sex
228

Herbert Anderson, 71.
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parenthood, a much stronger response to the economic and social pressures that challenge
heterosexual parents is also warranted. On this count, revisionist theologians who simply
point to studies of child-wellbeing as justification for same sex parenthood are of little
help when they to fail to consider implications for a theological account of parenthood
broadly considered.
Without a theologically based conception of Christian parenthood as a functional
reality related to child wellbeing and children’s progress towards human flourishing, the
real challenges Christian parenthood face in fulfilling their theological vocation will
likely continue to receive too little attention.

Conclusion
Catholicism’s emphasis on sexual ethics and gender related concerns limits its
ability to offer a theology of parenthood based on parental function defined by child
wellbeing. In the face of present research, extended arguments over the significance of
gender difference and sexual ethical norms simply do not appear as significant features in
capacities for parenthood based on children’s wellbeing. Moreover, idealization of the
biological nuclear family and attendant gender roles can lead to moral analysis of diverse
family forms without sufficient attention to the economic and social influences that
influence individual realities. In this regard, greater attention to parental function in
response to social pressures could lead to a more nuanced analysis on diverse family
forms.
Research is lacking on the moral development of children as related to specific
religious convictions of their parents. Existing research does not suggest that Catholic
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parents are on the whole successful at indoctrination nor that family structure and
parental gender is solely determinative in child wellbeing. Stability is clearly a significant
factor in child wellbeing. Yet, for all the benefits ‘traditional’ marriage offers, parental
modeling of rigid gender roles can be detrimental to children’s development.
A significant number of valuable principles within Catholic thought which are
supported by social scientific studies remain underappreciated. Prominent among these is
the concern for socially engaged families supported by expansive networks of relations.
However, emphasis on social engagement and communal relationships beyond the
nuclear family also raise challenges with the privatized vision of the family arguments for
the importance of parental complementarity tends to assume. Acknowledges wider
networks of adult influence in parenting limits the weight of concern parental partners
themselves can bear.
Judging from evidence from the social sciences, the goals which the Catholic
Church posits for the family appear to have a tighter correlation to dispositions and
commitments of parents than to specific family structure and gender roles. With regard to
parental responsibility for children’s moral development, present research suggests that
while Americans are raising educated, emotionally adjusted children, basic values like
kindness, community orientation, and even physical health often fail to be communicated.
Christian parents ought to strive for stability in family life while fostering social
commitment and moral development appears to be a commonly agreed upon aspect of
this research. Biological kinship, family structure, parental gender and other factors
appear to have some influence and may better support these objectives, but none of these
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factors are definitive from the perspective of parental function.229 On the other hand,
divorce and cohabitation, both associated with instability, are correlated to greater
challenges in child wellbeing.

229

In an interesting reversal of the usual outcome of emphasis on biological parenthood, “Gay
men more often reported they were specifically chosen by birthparents because of their sexual orientation
than did lesbians (34.6% vs. 5.8%) in the majority of these cases, the men indicated the birthmother
expressed a desire to be her child's ‘only mother.’” Brodzinski, 27.
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Introduction
Bonnie Miller McLemore writes that, while academic interest in children has
grown significantly in some academic fields, “research on children has not exactly
proliferated in either theology or women’s studies.”1 The lack of interest is likely
connected to the historical realities within feminist thought that have shaped
contemporary scholarly agendas. Bell hooks writes that the early women’s liberation
movement reflected the ambitions of its white, educated, middle class participants. This
included arguments that motherhood confined women to the home away from careers and
public pursuits.2 Considering feminist theologians, McLemore argues, with so many
other corrections to be made to traditional patriarchal perspectives, earlier feminists “may
simply not have realized the extent to which redefining our position and value as women
requires a redefinition of the lower status children.”3 In general, she writes, feminist
theologians have been less oppositional concerning the individual claims of constituents
within the family than their secular counterparts; a trend exemplified most clearly by
feminist theologians of color who have shown that “the value of motherhood extends
well beyond procreation to the survival and sustenance of the community. Biological and
social motherhood empower women precisely through the flourishing of children and the
extension of self through family.”4 This perspective also founds a more congenial view of

1

Bonnie J. Miller McLemore, “The Least and the Greatest: Children in the New Testament,” in
The Child in Christian Thought, ed. Marcia J. Bunge (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 446.
Motherhood has become a growing topic in feminist approaches as a consequence of shifts away from
liberal feminism and towards deeper engagement with women’s experiences. Ibid., 449.
2

bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984), 133.

3

Ibid., 451.

4

Ibid., 454.
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men’s role in the feminist project. That is, “while patriarchy presents severe challenges
for women and children, men, particularly husbands and fathers, remain extremely
significant partners in communal liberation and familial stability.”5
McLemore further observes a decisive trend to explore socially oriented
considerations of childrearing; what she calls “nonparent-parenting.”6 “This concern has
two components. Bearing and rearing children are not absolutely requisite for human
fulfillment of Christian service and the responsibility of parenting includes and depends
on wider circles of care that extend beyond the immediate biological parents.”7 In
response to this trend, McLemore explains the importance of considering childbearing as
a social practice and the need to renew traditional concepts of non-biological kinship;
including adoption and God-parenting.8 This extends beyond family life to the church
and the state, which each exercise influence on familial matters. From a theological
perspective, much work needs to be done in reassessing our “amazingly adult-centered”
theological conceptions. “Unfortunately,” she adds, “theological neglect coincides with
the broader societal negligence. Theology played little or no role in calling societies to
confront their attitudes and actions toward children.”9
It is to these social developments that this chapter now turns. While feminist
theology has had its limitations in conceiving parenthood in light of children’s own moral

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid., 467.

7

Ibid.

8

Ibid., 468.

9

Ibid., 472.
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standing, modern theology as a whole has likely been more limited. Meanwhile, a
number of social developments in thinking of children, families, and parenthood have
taken place within fields of philosophy and legal theory.
This chapter will argue that significant resources for theological reflection on
parenthood exist within the writings of feminist philosophical ethicists and legal scholars
as these relate to issues including children’s and parental rights, gender, kinship,
adoption, nontraditional households, and family law. Among these perspectives are
arguments that stand in strong contrast to Catholic approaches and rest upon assumptions
about the human person that are incomplete or problematic from a theological
perspective. McLemore notes that feminist theologians have often criticized both liberals
and conservatives for promoting special interests, individualism, and social ideology at
the expense of the real needs of families.10 Ideological concerns are certainly at work in
some of the sources this chapter will utilize, yet, they also advance a number of valuable
insights in relation to rights, needs, and capabilities that are helpful in considering a
theological anthropology of parenthood. Some within these fields have also been
attentive to adoption in a way that theological sources have not. Consequently they have
raised pertinent questions about the meaning and function of parents, kinship, and the
family.
This chapter’s argument will also be guided by a concern for child wellbeing as a
central factor in considerations of parenthood and family which is advanced by clarifying
the rights and obligations of children and adults. In consideration of parental obligations,

10

McLemore writes, “Children suffer from the same or related social cultural distortions of human
rights and public policies that women have encountered for decades.” Ibid., 460.
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it will draw upon a distinction between and ‘causal’ and a ‘voluntarist’ approach. The
causal approach bases parental obligations on the fact of having participated in bringing a
particular child into existence, whereas the voluntarist approach centers on the decision to
parent a particular child. A strong version of the causal approach, prevalent in magisterial
teaching and some legal perspectives, is found problematic, as are aspects of the
voluntarist alternative. Consequently, this chapter advocates a blended approach to
parental responsibilities that proceeds from a weak causal account but requires support
from the voluntarist perspective. In so doing, parental responsibilities are grounded in a
manner that protects important values associated with parenthood in the Christian
tradition, while also correcting the excesses of modern Catholic thought inasmuch as it
has relied upon sexual ethics to construct parenthood. This account of the foundations of
parental responsibilities is not intended to constitute a complete philosophical defense,
but only to suggest a resource for a broadened Catholic account of parenthood.
The chapter then applies this theory of parental responsibilities to contemporary
developments in children’s rights and the criticism of adoption law raised by Elizabeth
Bartholet. It argues that grounding parental responsibilities in a mixed causal and
voluntarist approach supports the uniqueness of parenthood apart from other relational
commitments while protecting adoption as a positive instrument of family formation and
testament to inclusive love. Finally, the chapter engages Martha Nussbaum’s
development of the ‘Capabilities Approach’ as a resource for further developing a
theological conception of parenthood. It argues that this approach offers distinct potential
for correlating parental obligations with the unique needs of children, while proceeding
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from and amending the human rights tradition which has found widespread support
within modern Catholicism.11

Part I: Parental Obligations
The questions of what exactly parents owe their children and from where these
obligations arise have been subjects of recent philosophical discourse. At present, there
are two dominant frameworks for the ground of parental obligations.12 The first is the
‘causal’ approach which connects specific parental obligations to voluntarily undertaking
actions which may foreseeably result in the creation of a new human life. David Archard
and Bernard G. Prusak have each recently defended this approach, which presently
remains the more influential of the two alternatives. The ‘voluntarist’ approach is
dominant among the alternatives to the causal account and contends that parental
obligations are based upon voluntary acceptance of parenthood. Elizabeth Brake is
among the voluntarist approach’s most formidable defenders. Prusak observes that while
much conventional legal understanding supports the casual approach (e.g. child support),
decisions regarding new reproductive technologies have begun to rely more heavily upon
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the voluntarist approach (e.g. anonymity for gamete donors) which also appears to be
gaining strength among moral and legal theorists.13
While both Prusak and Archard adopt a more moderate view, a strong version of
the causal account would argue that those who voluntarily undertake actions which may
result in the birth of a child have a de facto obligation to parent that child. This
perspective tends to hold biological, social, and legal parenthood closely together and to
rely upon appeals to the natural.14 Proponents of strong causal accounts tend to be found
among more traditional legal theorists while the view itself traces back at least to
Aristotle and was enshrined in Roman law via the patria potestas. Due to this lineage, the
causal approach has often been mixed with claims of rights of possession for parents over
their children. John Locke recognized this challenge and attempted to differentiate a
causal account of parental obligations from standard property rights, though his attempt
has been criticized.15 McGill University legal scholar and medical ethicist Margaret
Somerville is one contemporary proponent of the strong causal approach. She has argued
forcefully against artificial reproductive technologies and same-sex marriage on the
grounds that both create or encourage situations of parenthood that are severed from a
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naturally reproductive marriage between a man and woman.16 Moreover, she argues that
these amount to infringements upon children’s basic human rights on the basis that all
children have a right to know and, if at all possible, be parented by their genetic parents. 17
Somerville’s argument helps to demonstrate some of the limitations of this perspective.
She does not garner much evidence showing how this purported right serves child
wellbeing or on what grounds such a right could be abrogated. She aligns same-sex
marriage so closely with the ethical problems facing the use of artificial reproductive
technologies that she fails to acknowledge that the industry owes its foundations to
heterosexuals seeking genetic offspring, while use by married same-sex couples is a more
recent phenomenon. And, in her insistence that marriage is essentially linked to
biological and legal parenthood, Somerville neglects to explain how heterosexual
adopters or the knowingly infertile fit within her framework. Consequently, Somerville
rather thoroughly suggests present challenges in the strong causal account.18 Namely, it
tends to offer limited convincing explanations of why biological parents should
necessarily be considered the best while relying on ‘nature’ to defend the claim. This
avoids the question of how biological parenthood itself generally assures superior
capabilities for the task of parenting a particular child. In addition, it tends to hold such a
high regard for biological kinship that it can undermine voluntary non-biological
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parenthood and while avoiding recognition of how it feeds into the desire of would-be
parents to associate only biological children as truly ‘their own.’ Finally, it holds sexual
ethics and parental ethics so closely together that the conditions for a moral sexual
relationship are easily be conflated with capabilities to care for children.
In opposition to the strong causal approach is the strong voluntarist approach,
which is more characteristic of certain progressive strands within the liberal tradition.
This view also faces significant challenges as it assigns care for children based solely
upon an informed act of consent. Jacqueline Stevens has argued against “genetic
privilege” within family law on the basis that this tends to differentiate and adversely
affect adoptive families.19 Stevens objects to the causalist notion that genetic contribution
alone should yield specific custody rights over children and raises concern about the
increasing use of DNA testing in legal procedures, though the ‘best interests’ argument
still prevails.20 She further objects to cultural associations of genetic kinship with ‘real’
parenthood on the grounds that these are influenced by new technology, inadequately
represent the reality of parenthood in its various forms, and undermine the legitimacy of
adoptive families.21 Against these trends, Stevens asserts the strong voluntarist position
that all parenthood should be based on the choice to rear a child while genetic kinship
alone should have no standing.22 In practice, Stevens suggests mothers be given a time
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after birth to decide to care for a child or make arrangements for adoption to others.
Consequently, legal adoption would be required for all children, regardless of if they are
adopted by their biological parents or others.23 Stevens sees this approach as simply
formalizing the practice that already dominates but passes unacknowledged. She writes,
“Overtly or implicitly all families are adoptive, as all families depend on the legal
institutionalization of rules that put children in relation to parents that the children
themselves do not choose.”24
Stevens’ insights are thought provoking and raise valuable questions about latent
social assumptions imbedded in parenthood as characterized by the causal approach, yet
her argument raises concerns as well. First, Stevens is too quick to discredit genetic
kinship despite ample evidence that people tend to find meaning in these relationships
and that it remains important for a significant number of adopted individuals as well.
Second, Stevens appears to accept current diversities in childrearing, such as historically
high rates of divorce and cohabitation, without contest, even when evidence suggests
their adverse effects on children. Finally, her decentralization of genetic bonds comes off
as disparaging of the family itself even as stable families appear to be among the most
significant predictors of child wellbeing. Here again, Stevens arguments suggests some of
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the significant limitations of the voluntarist account more generally. Namely, it tends to
take an individualist focus on the free choices of adults without adequate regard for
children’s wellbeing, and it tends to disparage the lasting value of traditional social
institutions in its willingness to correct their excesses.
Having visited the strong forms of each view, the limitations as well as the
contributions of each approach to a Catholic theology of parenthood can now be more
clearly delineated. That is, the weaknesses of the strong voluntarist approach suggest that
the ideological fight against ‘nature’ and social conventions in the name of individual
freedom ought to have limits, especially when the interests of actual children are at stake.
Conversely, the weaknesses of the strong causal approach warn against allowing
convention and nature, or a specific interpretation of what is natural, to override evidence
of what is possible or insights that may lead to better realities. It seems appropriate,
therefore, to look for more solid philosophical footing among more moderate versions of
these theories. Between the strong versions of each approach lie the causal approaches of
Prusak and Archard and the voluntarist approach of Brake.
Brake argues for a voluntarist account of parental obligations on the grounds that
these obligations are expansive and fluid institutions, not static natural requirements.25
She argues that parental obligations must be grounded in informed acceptance of parental
duties by adults who are capable of fulfilling these for specific children who are eligible
to be parented by them.26 Unlike Stevens, no contract is necessary for Brake because
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simply acting as a parent implies acceptance of the parental role and therefore obligates a
person to continue acting in this role.27 Brake distinguishes between ‘procreative costs’
and ‘parental obligations.’28 Procreative costs are those duties which are owed to a child
by a person who voluntarily brought that child into existence. Parental obligations are
those duties to which someone is bound when he or she assumes responsibility for a
child. The general confusion of these two realities is a major reason behind her support of
the voluntarist approach. This confusion is detrimental to full appreciation of parental
obligations as well as their fluidity over time. Though procreators have a responsibility
towards the child they create, Brake writes, “Obligations issuing from moral
responsibility for causing a child’s neediness by bringing it into being are not equivalent
to parental obligations.”29 Brake allows that her conception of the voluntarist approach
could hold unwitting procreators accountable for procreative costs;30 yet this
accountability is temporary and pales in comparison to the obligations of parenthood.
Brake’s concept of procreative costs serves as a useful conceptual distinction between
procreation and parenthood. On the other hand, the voluntarist approach in general rests
on the idea that this distinction is more or less absolute; a position the causal account
challenges. To support this view, Brake appears to mistake plurality for meaninglessness
in historical and cultural understandings of parental obligations.31 Consequently, this
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leads her to assert procreative costs as compensatory obligations only, which suggests
that human life, or specifically the condition of infancy, is a negative reality of having
been harmed.
Prusak finds Brake’s account to be the most formidable among voluntarist
approaches. But his direct concern lies in the ways in which reproductive technologies
could discourage unconditional parent-child love by encouraging children to be viewed
as products. 32 From this angle, voluntarist parenthood starts to look similar to consumer
choice. Prusak counters Brake by arguing that obligations do not arise in relation to
parents, but out of the needs of the child.33 Among a child’s needs is that for an ongoing
relationship that will provide “emotional support in the face of life’s burdens: more fully,
the child’s needs to be fortified against, prepared for, and reconciled to life’s burdens and
travails.”34 Because of this, Prusak contends that procreators are causally bound to
parental obligations. Yet this is only a prima facie duty that can be overridden given other
considerations.35 As such, he views placing children for adoption as an unfortunate but
commendable choice when undertaken with due consideration for the capabilities of the
biological parent or parents to fulfill their parental obligations. Notwithstanding the fact
that adopted children are generally healthy and well adjusted, Prusak argues, because a
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significant number nonetheless seek out relationships with their biological parents, the
child’s need for emotional support is most adequately met in relationships with their
biological parents.36
Prusak’s argument binds procreators to a prima facie duty to assume parental
obligations which should only be abandoned for serious reasons. As such, Prusak leaves
room for non-biological kinship arrangements but concedes that these are less desirable.
Still, his approach appears to rank biological continuity rather high in relation to other
considerations of parental capabilities and resources. Prusak acknowledges this challenge
in his admittance that valuing the institution of the biological family necessarily creates
conflicts between liberty and equality. Therefore, if the biological family is worth
preserving, then society owes compensation to children in more challenging
circumstances. He writes, “if we decide that the value of having our own children… is
greater than the value of seeking to assure all children equal life chances, then we owe it
to children in need to take measures to assure that they have at least good life chances,
though there is no pretending that these will be the equal of children with better fortunes
in life.”37 Whereas Brake may be criticized for underestimating continuity in valuations
of biological kinship, Prusak may be criticized for his limited willingness to explore how
social conventions shape the meaning attached to biological kinship. This becomes all the
more problematic inasmuch as his causal approach centers on biological kinship having
inherent value.
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Archard avoids Prusak’s challenge by offering a more restrictive version of the
causal approach that is also more accommodating to Brake’s concerns. Archard argues
for an adapted causal approach that holds that procreators are responsible for assuring a
reasonably good upbringing, but need not themselves assume the parental duties
generated by their actions. Archard makes this claim by distinguishing ‘parental
responsibilities’ from ‘the parental obligation.’38 Parental responsibilities are those rights
and duties that one must have to be a parent for a particular child. The parental obligation
is the duty to ensure that a child one has caused to exist is provided for sufficiently;
usually by the capable acceptance of parental responsibilities or arranging for other
capable individuals to do so. As such, Archard’s parental obligation is very near Brake’s
procreative costs, while his causal account of parenthood is significantly more truncated
than Prusak’s. Unlike Brake’s, Archard’s approach remains grounded in specific actions.
His intention is to refute the idea of a ‘parental package,’ that is, the idea that a set of
rights and duties come as a package when a person stands in a particular relation to a
child.39
Against other causalists, Archard contends that obligations, rights, and
responsibilities can be separated or held partially or incompletely.40 And he counters the
voluntarist criticism that the causal account leads to an endless string of cause and effect
by asserting that this conflates a metaphysical with a practical question. That is,
determining who is most causally responsible for an event is a routine judgment in courts
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of law which need not lead into a philosophical abyss.41 Archard favors the causal
approach because it clearly assigns obligations to parties who undertook inherently risky
behavior regardless of their intent. In so doing, it better assures that a resulting child will
not be harmed.42 To summarize his view, he writes, “if I cause a child to exist then I am
under an obligation to ensure that this child is cared for but the obligation is discharged if
the care is provided by someone who is willing to care for the child.”43
To some extent, Archard’s labeling of his approach is misleading as it makes
more limited claims than other causalists, such as Prusak, while treading very near
Brake’s argument for procreative costs. In introducing the concept of ‘parental
responsibilities’ Archard provides means for explaining, from a causalist perspective,
how adoptive and biological parenthood can be equally valid forms of parenthood.
Archard’s contribution is in arguing that the fundamental parental obligation to assure a
child’s basic wellbeing can be come from a causal approach without requiring that the
fullness of parental responsibilities must be assumed as well. The tension this raises with
Prusak’s view concerns the relative importance of biological relatedness to parental
responsibilities. However, Archard fairs far worse than Prusak in garnering real-life
evidence to support his claims. Though the distinction he makes rests on the idea that
transfer of responsibility away from biological parents is not itself unjust, he fails to
show, or even consider, evidence from the experiences of actual children.
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Brake, Prusak, and Archard’s views offer a good deal of insight for a Catholic
theology of parenthood. The voluntarist approach as a whole works well to explain why
parents have special obligations for their children, because this is a freely chosen
commitment which gives rise to important obligations.44 As such, the voluntarist
approach takes the relational aspect of particular parents to particular children seriously
and does not presume to assert that biological kinship alone can generate such a
relationship. While Brake’s separation of procreation and parenthood may be concerning
in its apparent individualism and acceptance recent social trends, she makes the
distinction in order to emphasize the full breadth and import parental obligations. Yet
Brakes view and that of the voluntarist approach more generally, distinguishes more
sharply between parents and non-parents than may be countenanced from a theological
perspective. That is, the legalistic foundations of the voluntarist approach stand in some
tension to theological commitments to community belonging and altruistic concern
beyond kin obligations. Certainly the commitment to a long-term stable relationship with
a particular child is an important aspect of parenthood; however the legalism behind the
voluntarist approach can center parenthood on one or two individuals without protecting
or acknowledging the role of caring nonparent adults. The existence of coparents beyond
the immediate parent or parents of a particular child is an important resource for adding
stability and supporting healthy child wellbeing.
The causal approach is less helpful in addressing the chosen nature of Christian
kinship but rightly attempts to ground individual responsibility for others in the actions
they have themselves taken. As such, it more accurately captures the duties owed in light
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of unplanned, but not unforeseeable consequences. The causal approach also paints a
more realistic picture of individual freedom and autonomy in light of the obligations their
actions create. This is in part because it is more inclined to prescind from abstract
theories of justice to engage the lived realities of actual children. On this score, however,
the causal approach also exposes its own weakness in its presumption of the categorical
benefits of biological parenthood for children.
A weak causalist account of procreative costs and prima facie parental obligations
joined to a voluntarist account of parental responsibilities most clearly captures the
significant strands within the Catholic tradition by acknowledging both the obligations
that result from actions as well as the chosen nature of parenthood. This combined
approach is near to the argument offered by Archard, however it must place more
emphasis on the actual needs of children. Moreover it requires the introduction of
theological convictions that can both expand and interpret its framework. In sketching
such an approach, it would seem that biological parents who accept their parental
obligations ought to also bear a prima facie claim to parental responsibilities. But this
prima facie claim could be abrogated in view of an individual’s actual capacity to raise a
child well in light of their personal and communal resources. This is the case for three
reasons. First, a presumption of fitness to parent cannot be drawn from the fact of the
ability to procreate alone. Second, biological kinship cannot suggest ownership over a
child, who is a gift from God endowed with full human dignity. And third, considerations
of child rearing must be made primarily in light of children’s wellbeing. In instances
were biological parents are not able to assume parental responsibility, other individuals
may create bonds of kinship which and assume parental responsibilities which are no less
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real or significant than those based on biological relatedness. This is because it is
children’s fundamental identity as gifts from God and subject in their own right, not adult
actions of decisions, the fundamentally grounds a Christian vision of parenthood. As
such, Christian parenthood includes a variety of equally valid responses to children
themselves. In the following pages, this sketch of parental obligations will be tested
against and refined by contemporary arguments for children’s rights, adoption law, and
social justice.

Part II: Children’s Rights
The conviction that children are endowed with full human dignity naturally
supports the conclusion that children possess human rights. Within the Catholic tradition,
discussion of distinct parental obligations towards children began to emerge within
household and moral manuals of the sixteenth century.45 But it was not until the lateeighteenth century, when the rising ideology of childhood as a time of carefree growth
met the industrial revolution that the human rights of children began to be asserted in
force.46 By the end of the nineteenth century, mounting social pressures gave rise to
conceptions of rights specific to childhood. These assertions relied upon specific
conceptions of childhood such that they were often formulated in opposition to the
demands of adulthood and they tended to be directed against industrial employers, not
families or parents. Christine Gudorf attributes the public orientation of children’s rights
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to the influence of the patriarchal household within the Judeo-Christian. She contends
that this tradition encourages children’s obedience and assumes that all parents will
protect and seek the best interests of their children. As such, it has tended to obscure
recognition of children’s rights within the home.47 Yet, when children’s rights have been
asserted within domestic situations, they have frequently failed to serve the interests of
children. Many ‘child-saving’ efforts of previous times removed children from families
only to place them in institutionalized care or stigmatize them as damaged.48 Thus growth
in children’s rights has historically tended to advance state authority relative to family
autonomy, but has a more complex relationship to children’s wellbeing and family
stability.49
The extension of human rights specifically to children was advanced in the
twentieth century by a number of international agreements, most notably the United
Nations’ “Convention on the Rights of the Child” of 1989.50 The Vatican has been a firm
supporter of these developments51 and Christian scholars have worked to support,
develop, and advance this agenda. Lisa Sowle Cahill and the late Jean Bethke Elshtain
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are noteworthy among theologians who advocate for children’s rights out of the tradition
of social justice. Both conclude that stable families are an important aspect of children’s
needs, and therefore children’s rights, but they differ on the extent of familial diversity
that this conclusion can accommodate. Cahill reacts against excessive privatization of the
family and assumes a socially altruistic view of motherhood in which the aspiration to
raise children and the extension of care to all children, “belong together as companion
considerations.”52 She argues that childrearing requires institutionalization within stable
and child-benefiting family forms, but does not clarify a precise structure. Elshtain argues
that the adequate socialization of children requires “clear structures of external authority
and limited freedom different from that practiced more widely in a civil society of
democratic politics of equality among citizens.”53 She adds that children need specific
adults to act as moral superiors in order develop their capacities for social relations.
Elshtain is less willing to accommodate diversity in family forms and advocates for
procreative heterosexual unions as the preeminent context for child-rearing. Elshtain, like
Cahill, grounds children’s rights within the contexts of families and stands firmly against
excesses in individualist and capitalists trends that have fractured family life. However,
Elshtain has been criticized for her romanticism of pre-industrial family life and limited
attention to social pressures and equality between marriage partners.54
In contrast, Annelies van Heijst, has studied institutional care for children by
women religious and concludes that, in the context of childrearing, the “ethics of justice”
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should be replaced with the “ethics of care.” She explains, “The ethics of justice focuses
on (legal) rights and justice, which are rational and general principles; while the ethics of
care deals with relational and emotional commitment and situations that differ in the
uniqueness and particularity.”55 Consequently, Heist argues that the “facility to care itself
must be considered a kind of power” because it holds the capacity to shape the lives of
children “who have no other choice than to subject themselves to the care of others.”
Caring, is therefore, a power that influences the development and self-understanding of
the care receiver through encouragement as well as discipline. The language of justice
and rights cannot accommodate this power to influence the depths of another’s selfunderstanding without their full knowledge and rational consent in the way that care
does. Yet it is the vulnerability of the human condition itself that creates the need for
“asymmetrical relations of dependency and allows exercise of the power to care.” The
ethical exercise of the capacity to care creates power over another individual but is
nonetheless a benefit to the care receiver. But this capacity is not immune to misuse and
harm.56
Heijst points in the direction of an increasing body of research by scholars who
contend that paradigms of justice, specifically rights language, need to not only adapt to
the specific requirements of children’s upbringing, but must also account for the
uniqueness of children themselves. That is, children ought to be seen not simply as
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individuals who have specific forms of dependence on others, but as a unique form of
individuals themselves. Timothy Jackson, for example, argues that, while traditional
language of human rights can explain some of the essential human needs of children, it is
inadequate to capture how children uniquely express their personhood because the
language is formulated for adults. He writes, “[children] are not ‘persons’ in the technical
sense of autonomous agents, self-aware across time. In addition, most children cannot
form valid contracts and are not capable of achieved merit or demerit; thus they stand in
an ambiguous relation to traditional procedural, distributive, and retributive justice.”57
The Best Love of the Child, edited by Timothy Jackson, collects essays on a
variety of topics which argue from the premise that the ‘best interest of the child’
rationale, which has proven foundational in modern legal discussions of children’s rights,
requires compliment and correction by concern for children’s duties, needs, and stages of
development. The collection further contends that the most fundamental right of the child
is “the right to be loved and the right to learn to love others.”58 A preface by Stephen Post
explains that because “love begets love,” the “best love of the child is one that begets
love in the child over the course of a lifetime.”59 Jackson argues, “the first right of the
child is the right to be loved, even as the first duty of parents and the surrounding society
is to give such love wisely and effectively. Every child, to live a fulfilling life, needs
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loving care.”60 Jackson later clarifies that the essays are unified in the idea that “the right
of a child to be loved is best fulfilled by teaching him or her, in turn, how to love others.”
Rana Lehr-Lehnardt and T. Jeremy Gunn helpfully ground the context of the book itself
by arguing that, despite present criticisms and limitations, the development of ‘the best
interests of the child’ standard was clearly influenced by the concept of love.61
Consequently, they argue, on the basis of psychological and sociological research on
children’s need for love, that the role of love in the best interest standard ought to be
more clearly acknowledged especially in its legal application.62
Margaret F. Brinig and Steven L. Nock begin with the premise that children must
learn to love unconditionally, primarily through experience of others doing so, and argue
in favor of legal strategies that could help promote the development of this capacity.63
They propose that the most likely role models of unconditional love are the love of
parents for children, the love of spouses for each other, and the love of God for
humankind.64 Based on their psychological research, they argue that there is compelling
legal interest in promoting permanent and stabile homes for children’s upbringing. While
adults may adapt relatively easily to changing domestic situations, the impacts of such
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changes on children are far more pronounced. For this reason they oppose legal
recognition of cohabitation as equivalent to marriage.65 The authors argue that legal
support of stabile and permanent caregiving arrangements is warranted and can be
promoted by formal and recognized structures of kinship or guardianship.66
In a concluding chapter, the late Don S. Browning suggests that the ‘more
classical integrational model of love’ may be in a process of being lost in favor of “a
relatively one-dimensional psychological or affectional interpersonal and intersubjective
relationship.”67 He notes that ‘best love’, ‘best care’, and ‘best interests’ of the child are
all related concerns that inform social practices; yet the legal interpretations of these
concepts contain significant diversity and have been used to support divergent
applications. Browning favors the multi-dimensional approach that is encouraged by
these differing concepts, which he labels the ‘integrational view,’ but argues that its
application should communicate “through affect and deeds the respect for the emerging
personhood of the child” while also striving to meet “the child’s developmental needs
throughout the life cycle.”68 Browning clarifies that to love a child requires meeting his
or her needs as they emerge throughout the process of development. As such, meeting
earlier needs is foundational for continual nurturance while decisions of what needs are
most significant at a given stage must be guided by practical wisdom and cultural
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awareness.69 Because child development takes place within the context of specific
societies, the best love of the child should critically appropriate cultural resources in view
of their significance for a child’s “emerging capacity and identity.”70 Although parents
and guardians are significant in these matters, they are not the sole arbiters of a child’s
resources. Browning writes, “At best they are the key mediators of influences, logics,
symbols, and narrative traditions that also make massive contributions to the growth and
well-being of the child.”71 After further clarification and expansion, Browning offers a
summary of his position:
The best love of the child is a set of parental and institutional practices that (1) communicates
respect for the child’s emerging self while meeting needs and actualizing potentials, (2) guides the
child to grow and live by a principle that respects the self and meets the needs of others, (3)
enriches the child with a vision or narrative of life that both supports and justifies this ethics, and
(4) does this in ways that realistically confront the opportunities and limits of various social and
natural contexts.72

From this perspective, Browning argues that among influential scholarship, the work of
Margaret Brinig most adequately demonstrates how the law can encourage and protect
these goals.73 This is because Brinig uniquely balances concerns for family dissolution
with family formation and informs her legal theory with empirical research and
recognition of children’s changing needs overtime.74
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Another resource for understanding contemporary developments in children’s
right is the ‘childist’ method developed by Jon Wall in his work Ethics in Light of
Childhood. Here Wall contends that children must no longer be viewed as mere objects
of ethical reflection but ought to “fundamentally transform how morality is understood
and practiced.”75 As such, he seeks to construct a method of ethical discourse that
corrects for historical bias in a manner akin to feminism, womanism, and other critical
theories. Wall labels this approach ‘childism’ which he describes as an “ethical poetics”
that builds upon earlier models of childhood while seeking to critically challenge and
overcome their limitations.76 This second step is augmented with insights drawn from
phenomenology and childhood studies. Wall believes that childism can significantly alter
conceptions of philosophical anthropology, the goals of individuals and society, and
obligations owed one another. In the final part of his book, Wall demonstrates how
childism can broaden and enhance considerations of human rights, the family, and ethical
thinking. Wall’s work proves an insightful look at the challenges created when children
are taken seriously as unique moral agents. Yet two concerns arise from Wall’s argument.
First, he tends to prioritize quantity over quality in human relationship and as such may
undervalue the importance of specific loves.77 That is, his anthropological framework
may not be sufficiently attentive to contingency and limitations within human experience
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that give rise to the need prioritize certain specific relationships over others. Second, the
orientation Wall gives his childist approach is not far removed from a more conventional
developmental conception of childhood. This raises concern as to how a non-child could
speak on behalf of the perspective of children without appropriating a conceptual
framework of childhood that is, at least in some respects, inauthentic, incomplete, and
limiting. Unlike feminism, childism does not and will never have fully capable advocates
to speak on behalf of their own experience. But this limitation in Wall’s approach only
further affirms the challenges of applying rights language, a system created for adults, to
children as was observed by Jackson.

Summary
The summary formula of parental obligations asserted above holds that children’s
full human dignity as gifts from God needs to be recognized in conceptions of
parenthood. Catholic conceptions of parenthood generally acknowledge children’s rights
on the basis of respect for their humanity dignity. Moreover, understanding children as
gifts from God has been used to mitigate over-assertions of parental authority or even
ownership. This can take the form of acknowledging the family as a “‘holding
environment’ where that gift is nurtured and brought to maturity so that it may be given
over to others. The baptism of the child reminds parents that the child, entrusted for a
time to their care, must in God’s design be sent forth.”78 Nonetheless, it needs
acknowledged that advocacy for children’s rights necessarily requires some authoritative
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body to enforce rights claims. Consequently, children’s rights advocacy has been accused
of over exerting state control into the affairs of families. This challenge appears to require
some a prudent balance between the privacy required for a family to function well and
the legitimate concerns of the state to protect the rights of all citizens.
Some have used rights language to apply justice concerns to children, however
they have disagreed on what model of the family, and even what model of justice these
claims might yield. Moreover, the adequacy of rights language itself has been questioned
in the context of childhood. At the very least, it requires adaptation to more adequately
explain the unique needs of children, such as stability and love. But some have argued
that it must go further to accommodate a much fuller account of childhood, as in the
proposal offered by Don Browning. As such, the sketch of parental obligations offered
above does help to suggest the applicability of rights language for children by
acknowledging their dignity and asserting their identity as gifts from God. At the same
time, however, these considerations of the peculiarities of applying rights language to
children contribute to a more complete understanding of how the human dignity of
children must be respected through approaches to justice that are uniquely adapted to the
conditions of childhood.

Part III: Adoption
Hugh Cunningham observes that although all societies have had to establish some
system of transferring children to non-biological parent caregivers, the predominant basis
of such exchanges historically has been economic. In the West, adoption changed
significantly in the twentieth century as potential caregivers became increasingly willing
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to pay to adopt children who would not themselves directly compensate for this economic
loss.79 This transition was encouraged by an increasingly sentimental cultural conception
of children, but individual motivations remained complex. Some were motivated to save
children from harmful situations, but the preference for children with particular features
suggests that many adults were also invested in satisfying their own desires.80 The
secrecy, and even shame, that has been culturally associated with adoption has
significantly lessened throughout the past century. Yet differing motivations and
experiences persist as do significant inequalities in which sorts of children will be placed
with which caregivers. These differences have their roots in a number of factors,
including the history of the adoption system and conceptions of the family as well as
racial and financial disparities. As such, it is important to work through contemporary
arguments concerning various facets of adoption in order to come to a more adequate
understanding of how these shape and are shaped by conceptions of parenthood.
Moreover, inasmuch as the causal approach to parenthood tends to diminish appreciation
of adoption as a positive family form, it is important to consider how the mixed approach
to parental obligations suggested above might be augmented by present ethical
discussions on adoption.
A healthy scholarly discourse is presently underway on multiple topics related to
ethical and legal aspects of adoption.81 Harvard Law School professor Elizabeth Bartholet
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represents one perspective and is a leading advocate for reforming adoptive rights in
order to expedite placements. Her book, Family Bonds, is based on her own experience of
completing two international adoptions. It exposes many significant assumptions that
underlie the present adoption system. She notes that standard practices in adoption would
amount to discrimination in other areas of the legal system while financial resources play
a significant role in the ability to acquire “desirable” children.82 Despite her robust
criticisms of adoption processes, Bartholet sees adoption itself as an important good and
argues that the social stigmas attached to adoptive families need to be redressed. She
maintains that because society defines “personhood and parenthood in terms of
procreation” it fails to see adoption as a “positive alternative to the blood-based family
form.”83 Bartholet is highly suspicious of the role biological kinship plays in decisions
regarding children’s family context. She argues that children ought to be placed with the
parent or parents who can best assure their wellbeing and questions the extent of the
rights to privacy and autonomy traditionally associated with biological kinship.84 In an
insightful criticism that implicates the causal approach, she asks, “Why do we think of it
as extraordinary and not ordinary to love as ‘our own’ children born to others?”85
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While Bartholet concedes that the desire for biological children may be natural in
itself, she adds that social influences make any evaluation of this natural impulse
uncertain.86 Moreover, present cultural pressures often manipulate in socially harmful
ways whatever natural impulse does exist. ‘Biological bias,’ joined by free market
medical technology and financial incentives, encourages people to try infertility
treatments while adoption agencies remain under-promoted.87 And, because women’s
self-understanding is deeply influenced by their capacity to be biological mothers, the
ability to see adoption as a legitimate form of parenthood is limited while the trauma of
infertility is increased.88 At the same time, adoption procedures themselves are set-up to
mimic biological parenthood as closely as possible so that parents and children will look
like they could be biologically related.
In Bartholet’s estimation, the consequences of these realities are disastrous.
People are sold on infertility treatments despite relatively low chances of successful
pregnancy, given no clear exit from treatment, and offered little or no alternatives by the
doctors and counselors.89 Often it is only after these medical infertility treatments are
abandoned as unsuccessful that adoption is seriously considered, after many years and
tens of thousands of dollars. By this point, energy and resources have been sapped while
86
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many would-be parents have aged-out of strong candidacy for adoption placement.
Bartholet laments,
It makes no sense for a society that thinks of itself as sane and humane to be driving people in the
direction of child production rather than adoption. It makes no sense for the children out there –
those who have already been born and who will grow up without homes unless they are adopted.
A sane and humane society should encourage people to provide for these existing children rather
than bring more children into the world. 90

In addition, Bartholet criticizes the adoptions system’s parental screening
practices for failing to serve either the best interests of children or prospective parents.
Despite adoption ethics upholding the principle that children may not be treated as
commodities, Bartholet contends that the system functions to make children into property
and allows adults to assert ownership in various ways.91 Moreover, no comparable
screening is required for future parents in either prenatal care or fertility treatment.92 She
writes, “Those who procreate live in a world of near-absolute rights with respect to
parenting. Those who would adopt have not rights. They must beg for the privilege of
parenting…”93 This inequality, she claims, is based on a high valuation of the right to
procreate while the relational aspects of parenting are neglected. As such, the system is
based on procreative rights more than concern for children’s wellbeing.94
Engrained biases against adoption have colored the social scientific research
which tends to focus on the negative aspects of adoptive families and hide many positive
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aspects. Moreover, this research often lacks nuance or allows certain inevitable minority
populations of adopted children disproportionate representation.95 Nonetheless, studies
show that children in adoptive homes have better outcomes than those who are raised in
institutional care, foster care, those returned from foster care to birth families, or those
raised by birth mothers who once considered adoption but decided against it. Bartholet
states emphatically, “These studies fail to confirm the negative claims made in the great
body of adoption literature. They reveal no significant disadvantages of adoptive as
opposed to biologic parenting, and some significant advantages.”96 Bartholet concludes
that adoption is not the same as biological parenting, and that biological parenting may
hold certain advantages. Yet adoption must be recognized as another positive form of
family that can teach about the value of families themselves and their connections to
larger human communities.97 She writes, “there may be some inborn need to procreate,
but there are also inborn needs to nurture.”98 This nurturing instinct ought to be
encouraged as it is the means by which the needs of existing children can be met.
Bartholet’s perspective provides a thorough critique of the excesses of the causal
approach to parental responsibility when it attaches too much significance to the fact of
biological relatedness alone. In contrast, her insistence that adoption be understood as a
positive form of the family claims similar values to the strengths identified in the
voluntarist account. That is, it acknowledges the virtue of responding to the needs of
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particular children and the importance free choice in parental obligations. The book,
Adoption Matters, edited by Sally Haslanger and Charlotte Witt, advances and challenges
some of Bartholet’s arguments while providing further considerations for adoption’s role
in clarifying the nature of parental responsibilities.
In this collection, Drucilla Cornell criticizes the “language of war” that
characterizes discussions of adoption and functions to set birth mothers in opposition to
adoptive mothers.99 Like Bartholet, Cornell criticizes the priority adoption practices tend
to place on heterosexuality and traditional gender roles as opposed to nondiscrimination.
But Cornell is considerably more sympathetic towards birth mothers and adopted
children’s loss of genetic and cultural ties. As such, Cornell advocates for open or
cooperative forms of adoption. Cornell’s commitment to nondiscrimination is joined to
concern for the freedom to construct one’s own sexual identity. While Cornell’s
argument helpfully advances some of the heterosexist concerns which are raised, but not
centralized, in Bartholet’s argument, it is also highly individualistic and optimistic about
deconstructing family systems. As a consequence, Cornell’s attempt to disassociate
families from the sexual unit tends to lose sight of the stability that more expansive
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family units can support.100 Despite advancing a concern of Bartholet’s, Cornell’s
argument differs significantly in being centrally concerned with ensuring adult rights and
individual freedom to form partnerships without consistent concern for intermediary
family structures that may also support children’s wellbeing.
Anita L. Allen rejects the idea that adoptive children need to know their
genealogical and cultural roots for healthy personal development.101 Many biological
parents do not know or care much about these, and thereby place children in a similar
state without significant alarm.102 Allen contends that the “social continuity argument”
against many forms of adoption is “based on the pervasive but mistaken view that
children are born with a certain thickly constituted social identities that ought to be reinscribed by an upbringing among or in the ways of their social similars.”103 On these
grounds, she argues for the rights of adoptive parents to control how the relationship to a
child’s birth parents is structured and maintained.
Chapters by Janet Farrell Smith, Charlotte Witt, and Shelly Park each advance
Bartholet’s criticism of the role of biological kinship in conceptions of parenthood. Smith
takes aim at the influence of the natural property tradition in Western law that has made
claims to possession over children on the basis of biological parenthood. To avoid
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associating children with property (she admits some necessary similarities), Smith
proposes commitment and responsibility as the legal foundations for parenthood.104
Smith argues, “rather than postulate a moral exceptionalism for adoptive parenting, we
should… provide a uniform moral foundation for both biological and adoptive parent’s
moral responsibility to children.”105 Different avenues to parenthood should be treated
equally because the moral obligations parents owe to their children remain essentially the
same regardless of how the relationship was formed. Smith augments Bartholet’s concern
that the genetic aspects of parenthood are given greater standing than the relational.
However, Smith’s does quite little to explore motivations for becoming a parent or the
capabilities that the obligations of parenthood might require.
Witt criticizes ‘genetic essentialism’ which presumes that a person’s selfunderstanding is determined by biological factors and leads to the assumption that
adopted persons necessarily have a fractured identity.106 She writes that present adoption
literature is undergirded by two assumptions. First, “personal identity is determined in a
substantial way by one’s genes.” Second “one’s self-understanding requires a relationship
with the source of one’s genetic endowment, the birth family.”107 Witt counters that
family resemblances are primarily social behaviors based on biological myths. The idea
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that a child has a biological relation’s attributes (personality, eyes, etc.) has some genetic
basis but is more importantly a way of creating meaning within a family.108 This implies
that adopted children will have certain challenges in developing their self-understanding
within a family, but these are not insurmountable or necessarily detrimental.
Park argues that traditional conceptions of motherhood have assumed that genetic,
gestational, and social mothering, are indivisible and that motherhood is a stable
institution. And that this conception ignores the historical realities of genetic families
divided by poverty, war, and slavery. It is also challenged by families created by
adoption, divorce and remarriage while new reproductive technologies complicate the
matter further.109 Park argues that a new conception of family in general and motherhood
in particular that can account for such diversities is required. She concludes that children
will benefit from maintaining as many parental bonds with diverse adults as there are
adults willing to foster such relationships. That is, parental relationships should not be
“arbitrarily foreclosed” to match some constructed notion of parenthood.110 She writes,
“A real mother for a child is someone whose child has acquired the skills of loving
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perception and thus who can see her as real.”111 Thus, motherhood is an existential
process not an essential state.
In each of these essays concern for adoption develops the way parenthood is
understood and each consistently raises pointed criticisms related to the influence of
biological kinship in conceptions of parenthood. Considered collectively, these make a
strong case against many presumptions identified by Bartholet and carried by the causal
account of parental responsibilities, such as Prusak’s suggestion that the frequent desire
of adopted children to seek relationships with their biological parents suggests a natural
prominence of biological kinship.
However, these perspectives tend to represent only one side of a more complex
debate. Whereas Bartholet privileges the immediate needs of children and the right of
capable adults to parent children, Dorothy Roberts emphasizes the unjust social
circumstances that sustain adoption and the challenges race and poverty create for family
stability. Roberts is particularly concerned with the systemic injustices that underlie
social disparities and correspond to disparities within the foster care system. Roberts
takes particular aim at foster care and laments that the entire system appears built upon
the assumption that whites will only show concern for black children if these children
live in white homes as their own.112 She writes, “The continuing supply of adoptable
children for middle-class women depends on the persistence of deplorable social
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conditions and requires severing the ties among the most vulnerable mothers and
children.”113 She continues,
But the current campaign to increase adoptions makes devaluation of foster children’s families and
the rejection of family preservation efforts its central components. Adoption is no longer presented
as a remedy for a minority of unsalvageable families but as a viable option – indeed, the preferred
option – for all children in foster care. Black mother’s bonds with their children, in particular, are
portrayed as a barrier to adoption, and extinguishing them seen as a critical first step in the
adoption process… Terminating parental rights faster and abolishing race-matching policies were
linked as a strategy for increasing adoptions of Black children by white families. Supporting this
strategy is a myth that the foster care problem can be solved by moving more Black children from
their families into white adoptive homes.114

In a separate essay Roberts argues that Bartholet’s campaign to increase adoptions
centers on the devaluation of relationships within black families. Rather than respecting
the relationship between black mothers and their children, these are characterized as the
first barrier to a more efficient adoption system. Roberts adds, “Supporting this strategy
is the myth that moving more black children from their families into white adoptive
homes can solve the foster care problem.”115
Roberts calls attention to the increasingly aggressive fashion with which state
agencies have tended to treat cases of maltreatment in black homes and contends that the
barriers women face in keeping their children, especially when they are poor, ought to be
given greater attention. Rather than increasing the speed with which children move from
foster care to adoption, Roberts argues for increased support for struggling families to
keep children out of foster care and avoid family break-up.116 However, she laments,

113

Ibid., 245.

114

Ibid., 241.

115

Dorothy E. Roberts, “Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers,”
UCLA Law Review 59 (2012): 1488.
116

This criticism of Bartholet relates not only to specific concerns for structural justice but also to
the challenge of ‘third generation’ rights which have proven problematic more generally in human rights

357

policy decisions in recent decades have worked in the opposite direction by simplifying
the termination of parental rights.117
Tanya Asim Cooper’s essay on disparities between the treatment of whites and
that of African and Native Americans in the foster care system asserts on the basis of
history that “Unconscious racism is embedded in our civic institutions; and the foster care
system is vulnerable as one such institution controlled and influenced by those in
power.”118 Cooper argues that this embedded racial bias shapes the operation of the foster
care system, which in turn mimics other racially disparate social realities. “Known as the
racial geography of foster care, those neighborhoods with poor African American and
Native American families and the greatest involvement and concentration of foster care
system surveillance are a perfect match.”119 Cooper acknowledges that most people agree
the foster care system is flawed, but disagree on whether it helps, or takes advantage of,
the most marginalized. She adds,
“What researchers do know, definitively, is that although designed in theory to protect children,
the foster care system actually harms many children… Although intended to provide temporary
care to children and their families, in fact many children stay in foster care for years. Once in
foster care, the system often moves these children from placement to placement, with many
experiencing three or more moves. 120

In a similar manner, Roberts argues that similarities between the demographics of the US
prison system and the foster care system, two of the most racially segregated institutions
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in the nation, are too significant to ignore and reveal systemic cooperation in punishing
black mothers and sustaining racial, gendered, and classist social divides. 121 Roberts
furthers the connections she draws to the prison system by calling attention to the
secondary harms that foster care brings about. She writes, “Many have warned that foster
care leads to prison, and more recently, a literature has developed on the risk that children
with incarcerated parents will end up in foster care.”122 The correlation between foster
care and prison is only one connection that may be drawn. Roberts laments that the full
harm being caused by aggressive child welfare policies within black communities may
yet be unimagined.123

Roberts raises important challenges to Bartholet’s argument by questioning her
presumptions and scope of concern. Bartholet does provide a strong argument against
race-based adoption management, which she characterizes as an unfair assertion of
ownership over children that disrespects their wellbeing by prolonging stays in foster care
and thereby lowering their chances at placement.124 Bartholet’s further contends that
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transracial adoption may produce children who are more sensitive to racism and capable
of operating within two distinct worlds. She allows a weak racial preference as
potentially legitimate but sees stress factors related to race as insignificant when
compared to prolonged stays in foster care or other unfavorable living conditions.125 Yet,
Bartholet’s arguments are much weaker in accounting for systematic biases that produce
disparities within the adoption system. Bell hooks points to the danger in arguments for
motherhood advanced by “white bourgeois women with successful careers who are now
choosing to bear children. They seem to be saying to masses of women that careers or
work can never be as important, as satisfying, as bearing children.”126 This reveals a
tension in Bartholet’s argument. If motherhood is about responding to the immediate
needs of children, not a lifestyle choice for adults seeking fulfillment, then why would the
immediate response to children in challenging family circumstances not be to support and
sustain children’s families of birth, rather than rapidly processing children through the
child welfare system? Indeed, some families of origin may be beyond recovery and some
children may be placed for adoption by individuals who sincerely do not desire or are
incapable of raising them. However, Roberts brings to light systematic prejudices in the
present function of the foster care system which Bartholet does not adequately address.
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Roberts’ arguments also reveal particular weaknesses in the voluntarist approach
more generally. In her concern to forefront the needs of children and criticize the way
adult concerns interfere in having these met Bartholet is quite inattentive to structural
injustices. The biological bias and the will to own that Bartholet criticizes do not fully
account for the complexity of family separation within a system that functions differently
among different racial groups. This also implies that a voluntary decision to parent a
child may be done in response to a child’s needs, but also carries implications of
particular adult desires which may influence one’s perspective.
Roberts’ argument also has its limitations. Roberts is much more concerned with
the foster care system itself apart from other forms of adoption, and while she utilizes
social scientific data to show disparities in racial treatment, she hardly acknowledges the
generally good outcomes adopted children tend to have or the outcomes of children
returned to families after time in the foster care system. In many cases Roberts appears to
presume an adversarial relationship between biological families and the child welfare
system, even as the system as a whole has shifted more recently towards kin placements
which provide less disruption in children’s connections to their communities and
extended family.127

Summary
The influence of the causal approach to parenthood provides one reason why
perspectives on adoption vary. The causal approach tends to emphasize the importance of
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biological kinship and thereby diminishes the positive aspects of adoption. This can lead
to the ‘language of war’ noted by Cornell, or more subtle suspicions of adoptive
parenthood. Because the approach to parental responsibilities arrived at above attempts to
retain and balance both the causal and voluntarist approach, it is important to examine
how well this mixed approach can account for adoption as a positive family form. Several
tensions that arise among legitimate concerns are worth noting.
Perhaps the most obvious tension is between focusing on children’s immediate
wellbeing and focusing on structural injustices which cause conditions within families of
origin that are detrimental to children’s wellbeing; represented by Bartholet and Roberts
respectively. Bartholet’s concern for biological bias needs to more adequately account for
the significant ways in which race, social, and economic power have shaped and continue
to influence practices within the adoption and foster care systems. Within the US unequal
racial treatment has a long legacy and such historical influence is not easily broken.
Roberts rightly points to injustices in intervention policies that correlate to race and
poverty, support unequal treatment, and devalue the integrity of black family’s relational
bonds. However, opposition to transracial adoption as such appears to go too far and
needs balanced by Bartholet’s concern for how implementation of these policies has
worked against children’s wellbeing.
The causal account of parenthood needs to be restricted by children’s wellbeing,
such that biological kinship alone does not stand as a reasonable defense for keeping
children in harmful situations. At the same time, the voluntarist approach must be
balanced by recognition that race and socioeconomic status are influential factors in how
social structures operate among different groups. Conditions that effectively force family
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break-up must be addressed and corrected as well as conditions that feed unequal
treatment among different families. Supporting and facilitating just social systems is
equally a means of caring for children’s wellbeing.
Matters are also complicated by the deep personal investments people have in
relation to parenthood as it relates to individual self-understanding. Some of the cultural
resources for this self-understanding are socially constructed and affected by
interpretations of fertility, biological kinship, and parenthood. Here the voluntarist
approach’s strength is most pronounced as it shows how legitimate parents can be made,
and are in fact always made, by the decision to form a parent-child relationship. This is a
helpful correction within a culture that appears willing to drive people into new
technologies that promise biological offspring, while existing children remain in need.
On the other hand, a legitimate right to procreate is worth defending and the voluntarist
perspective may be prone to underestimate the self-serving needs and desires of potential
parents. As such, the will to parent alone is not a viable foundation for parenthood but
needs to be balanced against actual capabilities to fulfill parental functions.
Attention to communal networks of support sheds light on how many of the
arguments advanced above narrowly define parenthood as related exclusively to certain
domestic arrangements involving specific adults rather than parental functioning. Here
Parks’ concern that parenthood not be artificially restricted is important, as is her
explanation of how parents are created by the children they nurture. Throughout history
many children have been ‘parented’ by grandparents, siblings, relatives, and other caring
individuals who stepped in to meet their needs and formed a particular relationship. To
deny that these relationships are legitimate expressions of parenthood is to deny validity
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to the experiences of such children. On the other hand, parenthood cannot be ascribed to
any adult who shows concern for a particular child, certain limited adults must
necessarily retain legal responsibility for children, and familial privacy has its value. As
such, there is a legitimate tension between communal support and family autonomy
which at either extreme leads to dismissing the family as a valid institution or
encouraging families that are closed in upon themselves.128 As such a prudent balance
needs struck between these concerns that can recognize both the family as well as more
expansive conceptions of parenthood.
Here an additional trend in the arguments above also needs mentioned. Several
authors tend to presume that only individual and state-level concerns are pertinent. This
appears to operate off an underdeveloped anthropology that underestimates the
importance of relational realities. Intermediary groups including the family,
neighborhoods, and ethnic communities require attention as well. These should not be
allowed to exert excessive control or operate with presumption of ‘genetic essentialism’
which tie individual destiny too closely to genes, but they do have legitimate standing in
light of children’s needs for structural stability and extra-familial support.
To conclude, consideration of how discussions on adoption challenge different
conceptions of parenthood reveals a number of important tensions that help balance an
approach to parenthood. Neither the causal nor the voluntarist approach alones appears
sufficient to account for these various challenges. Instead a mixed approach that remains
centered on children’s needs without an absolute presumption in favor of adoption or
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biological kinship seems best able to account for these tensions. But parenthood itself
also requires conceptual expansion in light of children’s needs rather than adult claims.
This allows for a greater appreciation of diversity in children’s own experiences of
parenthood.

Part IV: Parenthood and Capabilities Approach
Having considered children’s rights and adoption in regard to their connection to
parental responsibilities, a final consideration of the relationship between parental
responsibilities and social justice is in order. Each of the sections above concluded that an
adequate conception of parental responsibilities needs to take a moderated approach if it
is to avoid the excesses of certain perspectives. Here, it seems political philosopher
Martha Nussbaum’s work in developing the ‘Capabilities Approach’ to social justice
provides a valuable resource for articulating just how these balanced judgments may be
made. Nussbaum categorizes her development of the Capabilities Approach as a species
of human rights, though it attempts to be a corrective to some human rights theories and
more comprehensive than most. She explains “The common ground between the
Capabilities Approach and human rights approaches lies in the idea that all people have
some core entitlements just by virtue of their humanity, and that it is a basic duty of
society to respect and support these entitlements.”129 Because the Vatican has been a
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strong supporter of the international human rights movement, seeing in it a resource to
protect human dignity, there is good reason to believe that Nussbaum’s philosophical
approach may hold useful insights for a theological conception of parenthood, based on
human capabilities, that aligns with Catholic commitments. It may be noted, however,
that while Catholic teaching on social ethics and sexual ethics are rooted in natural law
arguments, they assume different points of emphasis. Catholic Social Teaching often
speaks in terms of principles which must be upheld while leaving room for discretion in
particular applications, whereas Catholic moral teaching proposes numerous absolute
negative moral norms related to human sexuality that are always binding regardless of
circumstance or intention. To employ Nussbaum’s argument within a consideration of
parenthood does in some ways transverse these distinctive approaches in a way that
official Catholic teaching has been hesitant to embrace.
Utilizing Amartya Sen, the pioneer and partner with Nussbaum in developing
Capabilities Theory, Nussbaum explains that capabilities as those things which a person
is able to do and to be. “‘Capability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to
achieve alternative functioning combinations.’ In other words, they are not just abilities
residing inside a person but also freedoms or opportunities created by a combination of
personal abilities and political, social, and economic environment.”130 These capabilities
come in two forms; ‘internal’ and ‘combined.’ Internal capabilities are those traits and
abilities which are developed through the interaction of innate human potential with the
external environment. As such they are not static attributes of the human person but are
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dynamic realities that arise through engagement with the opportunities in one’s life. 131
Education is perhaps the simplest, albeit very general, example of an internal capability;
it combines the human ability to learn with an external resource for learning (e.g. a book,
teacher, or educational system). Combined capabilities denote the means of expressing
internal capabilities made possible by a social context. Combined capabilities help clarify
the tasks of a just society as not just providing space for people to develop internal
capabilities, but also to protect the expression of those capabilities. In the example
provided by Nussbaum, a society may help people develop the internal capability of
critical thought on political matters, but also has the obligation to protect the combined
capability of expressing that thought through the protection of free speech.132 Thus,
internal capabilities are primary and relate more closely to innate human potential, while
combined capabilities are secondary and relate to the real-world application of developed
potentials. Conversely, assaults to human dignity are essentially directed at limiting or
damaging capabilities. Limitations of combined capabilities, such as imprisonment or
restrictions on the freedom of speech, are conceivably justified in a just society.
Limitations of internal capabilities are much more serious as this infringes upon human
dignity itself. In all cases, Nussbaum argues, human dignity and fundamental equality are
essentially retained, yet some infringements are more damaging than others.133
Nussbaum sees her approach as drawn from a variety of sources, but grounded
most clearly in particular strands of the Western philosophical tradition which emphasize
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human flourishing or self-realization. As such, the approach tends to focus on how
human potential is shaped and expressed. It does, however, take into account inborn traits
that make such development possible. Nussbaum labels these propensities ‘basic
capabilities.’ She explains, “Basic capabilities are the innate faculties of the person that
make later development and training possible.”134 When basic capabilities are realized
they become internal capabilities which can be expressed as combined capabilities; when
this happens, a person experiences ‘functioning.’ Functioning is related to the concept of
human flourishing and simply denotes the enjoyment or enrichment experienced when
one’s capabilities are adequately developed and expressed. Functioning incorporates a
wide range of human experiences, from a musician’s mastery of an instrument to simply
enjoying good health.135 Not all capabilities must lead to functionings and individuals
should be permitted the freedom to select which capabilities to develop in order to reach
their desired functionings.136 This ability to select is itself a capability and must remain
open to fluidity in order to account for ‘adaptive preferences.’137 That is, desires are
shaped by experiences and possibilities such that new experiences and possibilities will
likely result in changing desires.138 In her explanation of ‘functionings’, Nussbaum
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upholds the principle that all individuals are free to select their own vision of the good
life, but she concedes that this freedom is not universal. Nussbaum excludes children who
may be required to pursue “certain sorts of functioning… (as in compulsory education)…
as a necessary prelude to adult capability.”139
Nussbaum is clear that the Capabilities Approach is not an attempt to define
human nature nor does it extract ethical norms uncritically from an idea of human
nature.140
Instead, it is evaluative and ethical from the start: it asks, among the many things that human
beings might develop the capacity to do, which ones are the really valuable ones, which are the
ones that a minimally just society will endeavor to nurture and support? An account of human
nature tells us what resources and possibilities we have and what our difficulties may be. It does
not tell us what to value.141

Maintaining a foundation in moral pluralism is important for the Capabilities Approach,
however, it does rest upon assertions of fundamental and universal human dignity,
freedom in respect to that dignity, and a claim that humans inherently strive to develop
certain faculties.142 Moreover, Nussbaum adopts Kant’s dictum to ‘treat all people as an
end’ as a basic guideline143 and argues that some freedoms promote human dignity while
others do not.144 As such, her philosophy, though denying it is an account of human
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nature, rests quite clearly on a very basic anthropological conception. This basic
anthropology is drawn most clearly from Aristotle and the Stoics. Aristotle offers a vision
of the human person that includes both a teleological orientation towards flourishing and
a deep understanding of human limitation. The Stoics offer a commitment to human
equality as well as natural law.145 Furthermore, Adam Smith’s insistence that the failure
to develop certain human abilities amounts to an infringement upon human dignity
provides an important foundation for the Capabilities Approach.146
Relying upon these foundational commitments, Nussbaum asserts ten ‘central
capabilities’ that arise as the most significant among the numerous possibilities a person
may pursue. These are (1) life, (2) bodily health, (3) bodily integrity, (4) senses,
imagination, and thought, (5) emotions, (6) practical reason, (7) affiliation (in two forms),
(8) other species, (9) play, and (10) control over one’s environment. Nussbaum
distinguishes ‘affiliation’ and ‘practical reason’ as the two most prominent capabilities as
they tend to influence and ground the others.147

Nussbaum and Theology of Parenthood.
Several aspects of Nussbaum’s development of the Capabilities Approach suggest
that it may serve as a useful resource for a broader theological conception of parenthood.
There are a numerous basic similarities in commitments and methods. First, Nussbaum,
like the Catholic tradition, upholds human dignity and human flourishing as central
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commitments. Second, both draw widely upon the resources of the Western philosophical
tradition. Third, both rely to varying degrees on a fundamental conception of the human
person. And fourth, both tend towards a basically teleological or developmental
orientation.
Concerning human flourishing, both the Catholic tradition and the Capabilities
Approach champion education as a powerful resource for advancing the human good.
Nussbaum defines education broadly and writes that it, “forms people’s existing
capacities and develops internal capabilities of many kinds.”148 As such, education holds
intrinsic value and contributes to lasting personal satisfaction. Education is also an area in
which freedom of choice is limited due to its close association with children. Because
education contributes to growth in capabilities, “making it compulsory in childhood is
justified by the dramatic expansion of capabilities in later life.”149 Nussbaum’s
commitment to moral pluralism raises some tensions as it contrasts with Catholic
theology’s claim that humanity’s ultimate good is found in God. Yet, Catholic theology is
itself a vision of ultimate meaning, not a political philosophy for pluralistic societies, and
the limited assertions Nussbaum does make do not appear contradictory to Catholic
thought.150 Nussbaum’s political philosophy attempts to limit its scope in ways that the
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Catholic moral vision does not because of the fundamental difference in their willingness
to define the good. Whereas the Catholic tradition is fundamentally based in the divinehuman relationship; commentary on the existence of God is beyond the intent of
Nussbaum’s system, let alone drawing upon implications from this belief to shape
practice.
Both the Capabilities Approach and the Catholic tradition draw from several
major branches of ethical reasoning and attempt to balance how these are utilized. The
Capabilities Approach rests upon a few basic deontological convictions, especially in
relation to human dignity, but also permits consequentialist, though not utilitarian, moral
judgment based on outcomes as it seeks to protect functionings.151 In Nussbaum’s
formulation, the Capabilities Approach also requires altruistic behavior and, therefore,
must encourage its development.152 Consequently, Nussbaum may be viewed as
borrowing from virtue ethics in her argument for creating structures that motivate
individuals to develop socially beneficial behavior.153 Though there are significant points
of disagreement, this attempt to blend ethical methods into a consistent theory is also
characteristic of Catholic thought and has been exemplified in recent times most notably
by John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis splendor.154
151
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Both approaches also operate on the basis of a fundamental anthropological
conception. Nussbaum’s account is much more restricted and amounts to little more than
a few assertions that must be accepted as reasonable for the system to work. But the more
significant tension is in the essentially individualistic nature of Nussbaum’s approach155
which is developed in part as a consequence of rejecting certain Utilitarian tendencies.156
This squares quite well with human rights theory but raises certain challenges from a
Catholic theological standpoint. Communally oriented conceptions of the human person
are a mark of the Catholic tradition and Catholic leaders have frequently criticized the
growth of individualism in recent times.157 Still, Nussbaum’s intent in centering
commitment on the individual is to provide a means for protecting each and every
individual’s dignity regardless of communal claims. This intent in itself fits well with the
Catholic commitments to safeguard human dignity.
Perhaps the most important point of continuity lies in Capabilities Approach’s
fundamental orientation towards expanding concern beyond negative freedoms (i.e.
noninterference or restriction on rights of others) as is common in constraint views of
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human rights.158 That is, without articulating the good that is to be pursued, Nussbaum
attempts to protect the positive freedoms involved in pursuing goods. This gives the
approach something of a teleological orientation; even as it allows individuals to define
their own telos. Moreover, she sets some limits on what might reasonably be considered
goods and what desires are harmful in themselves. Here again, Nussbaum’s approach
articulates only basic commitments and these do not appear to seriously conflict with the
intents of Catholic theology. For this reason, Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities
seems a useful starting point from which to build a more comprehensive theological
reflection on the nature and function of parenthood.
Of the central capabilities, affiliation is most clearly related to parenthood, though
others may account for experiences within parenthood as well. Nussbaum gives
affiliation two definitions. The first is the ability “to live with and toward others, to
recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social
interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another.” The second is “having the
social basis of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified
being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of nondiscrimination
on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.”159
Nussbaum’s concern for nondiscrimination extends to the social continuation of
gender roles as this serves to disadvantage women, particularly in educational
opportunities. She argues that society ought to strive for greater reciprocity in male-
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female relationships and adds, “society needs new conceptions of masculinity that do not
deem unmanly such acts as washing the body of an aged mother or father.”160 While
these concerns relate to those of Catholic Social Teaching, Nussbaum’s application goes
further in challenging conventional gender roles. Moreover, Nussbaum does not believe
that heterosexual marriage is the normative foundation of the family. Instead, she argues
that the same principles of equality and nondiscrimination apply to considerations of the
family as a consideration of basic justice. Nussbaum expresses particular concern for the
ways in which, “discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation expresses stigma and
reinforces a view that some people are not fully equal.”161 She argues that restrictions on
same-sex marriage are similar to laws against miscegenation and the creation of civil
unions rather than access to marriage amounts to a continuation of the stigma of
inferiority for same-sex couples.162

Summary
Nussbaum’s version of Capabilities Theory helps to advance considerations of
parenthood particularly through naming and defining ‘affiliation’ as a central capability.
Affiliation calls attention to the capacity to build intimate relationships and locate oneself
meaningfully within the social world. Affiliation goes beyond simply forming
relationships to include the development of personal and interpersonal attributes that
make meaningful relationships possible; such as care and empathy. Affiliation also
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concerns a person’s relationship to society and thereby requires societies to respect
individuals’ capabilities and to work against various forms of discrimination. Because it
is an internal capability, failure to protect affiliation amounts to an infringement upon
human dignity.
From this perspective, affiliation is the internal capability out of which the
combined capability of parenthood stems. Parenthood is just one particular form
affiliation might take and is a combined, not internal, capability because it relies upon an
external factor; i.e. the existence of a child who can be parented. Part of the Capabilities
Approach’s value for considering parenthood is its recognition that capabilities are
dynamic. This helps account for parenthood as reality that changes over time as the
parent-child relationship develops and parent’s desires for their relationships shift. As
such, the Capabilities Approach helps differentiate parenthood as a lived reality from the
basic human potentials it may require as a foundation. When a potentially capable person
willingly accepts the responsibilities of parenthood, they are simultaneously accepting the
task of developing their own capacity for affiliation in particular ways; ways which could
not be developed apart from this particular relationship.
In addition, Nussbaum’s description of affiliation helps to explain parenthood as
an inter-personal as well as a social reality.163 Social constructions of kinship and the
family are significant factors in how individuals come to understand parenthood and even
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their own individual worth.164 Concerns of ‘pronatalist’, ‘biologic’, and ‘genetic
essentialist’ presumptions within contemporary society point to influences that stigmatize
certain forms of affiliation, such as childless marriage or adoptive parenthood. But these
ought to be valued as specific functionings.165 Moreover, a society fixated on biological
procreation is less likely to recognize that people may realize parental functionings in
specific ways even when they do not have biological children. Nor will it foster
appreciation of adoptive parenthood as a pathway towards positive functionings related to
parenthood. For those who are incapable of the particular demands of parenting, perhaps
due to limited resources or capacities, exercising the capability of affiliation nonetheless
remains important for their dignity. Not being able to realize functionings specific to
parenthood does not infringe upon a person’s dignity but may be a reality caused by the
conditions of a person’s existence. This explanation provides a valuable conceptual
framework for considering parenthood from functional perspective while attending to
both biological and non-biological modes of kinship.
Nussbaum’s approach prizes equality and avoids absolute distinctions based on
gender. Consequently, she does not suggest that human relationships are conditioned in
any essential way by human gender. This is not to say that gender will not influence how
the basic capability of affiliation will come to be realized as a combined capability. 166
Gender often will influence the specific forms relationships might take, but it is not
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essential to forming a relationship as such. Instead, relationality is a basic human
potential that comes to be developed according to individual abilities and external
realities. Therefore, limiting the formation of particular types of human relationships
without clear reason acts unjustly against an individual’s freedom to develop their
internal capabilities and may be an affront to their human dignity. However, combined
capabilities, which include specific forms of relationships, may be limited justly if they
are reasonably seen to be detrimental to the human good. That is, Nussbaum’s conviction
that individuals are free to construct their own vision of the good, does not lead her to
conclude that societies are obligated to accept as good all the possible forms this pursuit
may take.
Here the tension with the Catholic magisterium’s opposition to same-sex
parenthood becomes clear. Whereas Nussbaum sees her approach as defending same-sex
marriage, and presumably same-sex parenthood for similar reasons, the magisterium has
argued against these and done so largely within the conditions set by Nussbaum. For
example, the magisterium does not teach that homosexual persons lack dignity or cannot
form loving relationships; it has defended both of these.167 However, the magisterium
does limit the socially allowable types of relationships, including marriage and
parenthood, which same-sex persons may pursue.168 Thus, these teachings amount to
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restrictions of combined capabilities which may be justly permitted for good reason. In
Nussbaum’s view, these concerns evidently do not legitimate such a limitation, and in
fact are tied to conditions that impact the individual’s social recognition. As such, these
restrictions flow from discrimination, limit the basic capability of affiliations, and amount
to an affront to human dignity. Conversely, the Magisterium argues that certain same-sex
relationships do not serve the common good or individual wellbeing. Nor can they serve
as a foundation for the family or promote children’s wellbeing. As such, the magisterial
argument operates within Nussbaum’s framework in articulating certain forms of samesex relationships as the type of pursuits that simply should not be recognized as good. But
Nussbaum’s framework raises two particular challenges to this argument. First, the
argument for limitation would need to carry the burden of proof in showing that it really
is based upon reasonable and serious potential for individual and social harm, not simply
discrimination. Second, the argument would also have to show how this limitation avoids
restricting individual standing within the community to such an extent that it acts against
the basic capability of affiliation.
The Capabilities Approach also helps to show how the subject of adoption is
complicated by the fact that children have limitations on their freedom to select which
functionings to pursue and thereby rely on adults to make these decisions for them. In
biological families, parents assume this responsibility for overseeing their children’s
developing capacities from birth. But in situations where children do not have capable
parents, the question of which functionings to pursue must be turned towards potential

http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homose
xual-unions_en.html.
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parents as well. Some have offered arguments that suggest children are harmed when
specific functionings related to their genetic, racial, and cultural identity are removed as
viable options. For example, the specific good of coming to understand one’s self within
the context of one’s own racial community may be removed as a potential functioning in
instances of transracial adoption. But Capabilities Approach also shows how adoptive
families themselves offer distinctive potential functionings. For example, the distinctive
good of developing a bi-racial or bi-cultural identity could not be had in a more
homogenous home environment. As such, the Capabilities Approach helps to explain the
positive specific content of adoptive families while limiting over-assertions of racial,
cultural, or biological identity. Restricting a specific combined capability is not the same
as restricting an internal capability and does not challenge human dignity when done with
good reason. When adoption is necessary for a child’s wellbeing the new family that
results from that adoption ought to be understood as a positive reality.
This also raises the question of if any collective can really be said to love. If
collectives cannot fulfill this need of children, how can they have a right to dictate
children’s future? If children were considered objects of ownership, collectives could
claim rights over them. But because they obligate human relationships that only
individuals can provide, the claims of the collective are weakened substantially. Thus a
group could not claim to retain responsibility over a child if individuals within that group
cannot also provide for the care obligated. On the other hand, it remains important to
recognize that existing relationships and identities should not be fractured without
compelling reasons. Adoption may allow a child to pursue unique functionings but
existing potentials must also be taken into account. As such, the age of the child seems to
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be an important factor. Conversely, instability in domestic arrangements works against
the internal capability of affiliation and ought to be a very serious concern. That is, if
human dignity itself calls for developing capabilities and desired functionings change
with personal and social conditions, it is then very important to ensure stable home
environments for children so that they can aim for and achieve functionings throughout
their development with some sense of security. Transient child-care arrangements, such
as foster care, may be necessary in certain situations, but moving children into stable
homes as quickly as possible is not simply about fulfilling the desires of adult adopters,
but is a concern raised by the child’s own dignity.

Conclusion
This chapter began by pointing to the limited attention feminist theology has often
afforded children and suggested that theology as a whole has not fared better. It then
proposed that present discussions in philosophy and legal theory may prove insightful for
advancing the theological discourse. Throughout, the chapter has called attention to
aspects of arguments that may prove useful for a Catholic theological approach to
parenthood. But it has also attended to tensions or limitations where these exist. On the
whole, these sources have added important perspectives that ought to be considered
seriously. These include reflections on how parental responsibilities arise, the strengths,
challenges, and limitations of children rights, complex issues in adoption, and
considerations of parental relationships from a social justice perspective. Below, these
contributions will be reviewed and utilized to further progress towards foundations for a
theological conception of parenthood.
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Present Catholic teaching on parenthood appears to rely heavily upon the strong
causal approach and also shares its limitations. Namely, Catholic perspectives tend to
attach great significance to biological kinship without recognizing how kinship itself is an
interpreted reality. This gives rise to a tendency to destabilize the value of adoption and
other chosen forms of kinship or characterize these as abnormal or undesirable. Overtly
the magisterium has praised adoption, but the operative theory of parenthood appears to
undermine these assertions. Lastly, this approach is prone to speaking for children’s
natural need to be reared by their biological parents without thorough consideration of the
contextual complexities that can make this undesirable or impossible for certain children.
As such, it can cast suspicion on non-biological family forms without thorough analysis
of where these fit in meeting children’s needs given the realities of their contexts. For
example, the assertion that all children have a right to be raised by their biological parents
carries very little value within discussions of care for foster children as this option is
already void in most instances. Nonetheless it has been employed in this context in
arguments against same-sex parenthood.169
The voluntarist approach calls more attention to the uniqueness and value of
specific relationships and better appreciates the constructed nature of kinship which has a
legitimate place in the Christian tradition. However the voluntarist account can place too
much emphasis on chosen relations and tend to undermine unchosen relationships,
communal identity, and traditional family forms. On this score, the causal account
appears to be more realistic about the complexity and limitations of human relationships.
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Because of these factors, the first section concluded by suggesting that a mixed
approach that blends a presumption for a weak causal account with a recognition of the
voluntary acceptance of parental responsibilities best accounts for Christian claims.
Moreover, this approach needs conditioned by adult capabilities and children’s needs.
This was not to suggest that all historical Christian perspectives on parenthood are so
easily reconcilable, but simply to provide a modest working definition of the origins of
parental responsibilities that can help build a foundation for a theological account of
parenthood.
The following section considered this theory of parental obligations in light of
contemporary developments in children’s rights and introduced the need for the human
dignity of children to be central to a conception of parenthood. It also suggested that
respecting the human dignity of children entails different considerations than adults
which limits the applicability of rights language. Some have argued that rights language
cannot simply be modified to account for the unique needs of children, but needs
fundamental revision to account for its basis in adult experience. These approaches help
to explain why procreative costs and parental obligations are owed by those who brought
children into existence to these children on account of their own needs and dignity.
The third section presented Bartholet’s claim that families formed by adoption
must be seen as a positive form of the family and adoption practices need to be more
adequately guided by children’s wellbeing. Both expansions on Bartholet’s argument and
some serious limitations were considered. Repeatedly, the influence of differing
commitments to the causal or voluntarist theory of parenthood emerged. This section also
raised very serious concerns about the role of race and socioeconomic status in adoption

383

practices. These concerns for structural injustice bring to light the complexity of
discussions of adoption and mark out some legitimate boundaries of voluntarist accounts
of parenthood. Social injustice works against children’s wellbeing while simply
proposing adoption as the solution ignores the structural problems. Claims to rightfully
possess children are problematic whether asserted by communities of birth or zealous
prospective parents. Although many individuals may desire to be parents to particular
children, the decision of who should parent needs to be made on the basis of children’s
own wellbeing. On this count, racial and cultural identity may provide some claim but not
one that particularly strong in light of other possible concerns. This raises the concern
that neither the causal approach be allowed to justify keeping children in harmful
situations nor the voluntarist approach be used to justify ‘rescuing’ children from harm
without attending to the factors that contribute to the situation. As such, this section
brought to light the importance of parenthood being grounded in right intentions and
sufficient capabilities. Moreover the term parenthood itself needs sufficient expansion to
account for communal investments in childrearing as well as non-parent adults who
function in parental ways within the lives of specific children.170
The final section took a somewhat different approach in considering how
Nussbaum’s development of the ‘Capabilities Approach’ might be employed as a
resource for a more comprehensive theological conception of parenthood. The basic
capability of affiliation became most pertinent in this investigation as it helped to show
170
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how capabilities relate to specific human relationships in various ways. This gave a name
to the deeper human reality in which parenthood is grounded while also conceptualizing
the capability of parenthood in a dynamic way that helps account for both child
development and the changing nature of parenthood through the course of a lifetime.
Moreover, parenthood is a somewhat unique human relationship that encompasses both
the inter-personal and social dimensions of the central capability of affiliation. This had
two notable implications for considering a Catholic theological account of parenthood.
First it accepted the objective validity of particular lines of argument against same-sex
parenthood, but also brought this opposition into suspicion as potentially unfounded by
evidence and acting against the dignity of potential same-sex parents. Second, it
articulated more clearly why adoption might be considered a positive form of family
while casting doubt on some arguments opposing transracial and international adoption.
Throughout these arguments, certain themes have also emerged consistently.
Among these are the concern to identify parenthood in light of children’s wellbeing, the
recognition that ‘parenthood’ is itself a complex term which encompasses a variety of
meanings, and the persistence of tensions between individual and communal
commitments. Perhaps the two most significant insights this chapter yields for a
theological conception of parenthood is that parenthood is both a largely voluntary and a
dynamic reality. That is, parenthood must be recognized as a capability that a parent
determines to develop in initiating a relationship with a particular child. As such,
parenthood itself is a process of developing certain potentials, or even virtues, which
themselves direct a person towards human flourishing.171 This development is ongoing as
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the parental relationship grows and changes over the course of time. As such, parenthood
is less of a static reality than an ongoing vocation. Nonetheless, parenthood requires
certain internal capacities and external factors. It is not required for human flourishing,
but it is probably undertaken in more diverse forms than we are presently prone to
recognize.
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Introduction
This concluding chapter reviews the arguments made in previous chapters and
initiates a constructive theological account of parenthood. It then returns to the case study
shared in the Introduction and considers how this account of parenthood being developed
parenthood might help address present dilemmas regarding Catholic participation in
adoption services under laws that prohibit discrimination between marriage and legally
recognized same-sex partnerships. This chapter argues that rigorous concern for the best
interests of children in need of stable, permanent families is essential and that the
importance of the Catholic Church’s involvement in adoption services for its own identity
should not be ignored. Catholic responses to non-discrimination legislation for same-sex
adopters are evaluated in terms of this account of parenthood which attempts to be both
mindful of children’s rights and needs, as well as the magisterium’s present objections
and concerns. This evaluation is based upon considering the caregiving potential of samesex partnerships in distinction from moral judgments of homogenital sexual acts. The
final section of this chapter outlines potential trajectories for future research that would
continue this project’s line of inquiry. The chapter calls for moral reflection on the
relationship between conceptions of parenthood and gender, the relationship between
sacramental marriage and other intimate human partnerships, and the development of
moral theologies that take children seriously.

Part I: Review of Arguments
Before considering how the observations and arguments presented in this research
might inform a theological account of parenthood, the arguments of the preceding
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chapters will each be briefly reviewed in turn. The Introduction addressed differing social
and religious conceptions of parenthood that American Catholic adoption agencies face
in light of the reality of same-sex parenting. These tensions are caused by both shifting
social understandings as well as developments within Catholic teaching. It maintained
that further investigation into the theological nature of the conflict was warranted because
orphan care is a central Christian practice that should not be easily abandoned. Decisions
to end adoption services in response to non-discrimination legislation for same-sex
adopters reflect a limited theological account of parenthood. This conception of
parenthood is indebted to an essentialist theory of gender and related system of sexual
ethical reasoning. It offers a clear vision of gendered parental roles but very little
reflection on the human capabilities that may be required to parent well. Furthermore,
this conception of parenthood relies heavily upon a post-Victorian social context and
privileges the biological nuclear family to such a degree that it effectively undermines
Catholic participation in, and theological reflection on, adoption more generally. As such,
the Introduction asserted that the operative perspective on parenthood within official
Catholic teaching insufficiently engages a long and diverse history of orphan care and
does little to integrate contemporary studies of child wellbeing.

Chapter 1 identified particular biases within modern magisterial teaching. The
biases concern the role of normative sexual ethical judgments, especially as these are tied
to an essentialist theory of gender, bear on conceptions of parenthood. By construing
sexual ethics almost exclusively as an ethics of marriage magisterial teaching narrowly
construes parenthood as centered on sexual reproduction and biological kinship, a trend
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that only increased following the publication of Humanae vitae. Contemporary
magisterial teaching retains the conviction that spiritual education expresses Christian
parenthood in its fullness yet undermines this very conviction through its repeated
emphasis on biological procreation. This emphasis on biological procreation has diverted
considerations of parenthood towards defenses of the moral condemnation of
contraception and assertions of gendered parental roles. To explore these shifting
concerns more closely, the first chapter focused on developments within certain key
themes: gender, sexual ethics, family structure, and family function.
An essentialist theory of gender, which conceives of male and female as discrete
and differentiated categories, characterizes magisterial teaching from the papacy of Leo
XIII through Benedict XVI. Magisterial perspectives pay little attention to social or
individual constructions of gender identities and ideologies when these agree with. Yet,
the magisterium does express concern over gender theories that view the relationship
between embodiment and gender identity as more fluid. Modern magisterial documents
also consistently conceptually separate the male-public and female-domestic spheres
even as they express commitment to women’s dignity and their right to equitable social
participation. In the writings of John Paul II, the concept of complementarity largely
captures these commitments. Complementarity allows for universal claims about the
normative dispositions of the sexes while avoiding complex considerations of the
formation of gender identity and cultural ideology.
Two major concerns were raised in response to these developments. First, gender
essentialism can obscure individual diversity, human adaptability, and cultural capacities
for change. Second, the complexity of human sexuality as understood today is simply too
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great to fit neatly within dichotomous categories. Although Catholic teaching
acknowledges physical, psychological, social, and spiritual aspects of human sexuality, it
does little to address potential conflicts that may arise among these various dimensions.
Moreover, it retains a tendency to make normative claims on the basis of generalist
categories, as well as utilizing language suggestive of female subordination to male
prerogative.
Humanae vitae is also significance as the first post-conciliar document to operate
on the basis of a personalist moral framework. Some saw its approach as rightfully
linking the physical and metaphysical realities of the human person while bringing these
to bear in its moral teaching. Others saw an importation of outdated physicalist
methodology under the cloak of personalist language, with moral conclusions ultimately
based on the physical structure of the act. With John Paul II, the debate over Humanae
vitae grew in complexity and importance as his central concern for truth, particularly “the
truth about man”, provided human sexual differentiation with metaphysical significance.
John Paul II clarified that both marriage and parenthood were essentially misunderstood
by those who enacted the lie of contraception which speaks at a fundamental level against
the dignity of love, marriage, and the sexual act. The most significant concern in these
developments is the extent to which the defense of Humanae vitae displaced earlier
prioritizations of spiritual education as the primary task of Christian parenthood. This
commitment was not lost, but became overshadowed by concerns related to the morality
of marital sexual expression.
Concerning family structure, commitments to gender essentialism and sexual
ethical norms contributed to an idealization of the biological nuclear family. Until the
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mid-twentieth century, the ideal family structure also explicitly included male headship,
but a more egalitarian vision arose with Vatican II. Adoption is rarely mentioned since
Vatican II and is generally offered as an alternative to abortion or as an option for
infertile spouses in preference to artificial reproductive technologies. However, under
John Paul II, the family was consistently encouraged to open itself outwardly in support
of social needs and to cooperate and find support in other families and organizations.
Although many aspects of this vision of the family are indebted to certain cultural ideals,
its basic resonance with broad historical patterns is also significant. Stable heterosexual
partnerships, biological procreation, and the social structures that support childrearing are
common human experiences which have import within natural law moral systems.
However, Catholic natural law moral theology is not solely based on nature alone, but
interprets this through a vision of supernatural realities.172 Although the Catholic tradition
posits the natural and supernatural as complementary rather than conflictual the potential
to prioritize one disproportionately in moral reasoning remains. The present approach to
parenthood through the natural order biological procreation has detracted attention from
adoption which is traditionally defended on the basis of spiritual goods. In light of this,
the relationship between adoptive parenthood and the procreative end of sex and marriage
raises a particularly challenging concern. If adoption is an alternative way to realize this
end, families formed by adoption are based in marriage and complementarity like those
formed through biological procreation. Yet acknowledging adoption as a kind of
procreation could lend support to arguments that question the judgment of Humanae vitae
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or support diverse family forms. Without a close connection between the end of
procreation and biological reproduction the tightly knit concepts of complementarity,
reproduction, and parenthood would admit to greater exceptions than present teaching
allows.
Finally, conceptions of family function are fruitful resources in contemporary
magisterial teaching for both internal critique and as foundations for a theology of
parenthood. Contemporary magisterial teaching reclaims the idea of the family as the
“domestic church,” such that within the family all members exercise their baptismal
priesthood in a special way.173 Parents have a special task of evangelizing and leading
their children to maturity, salvation, and holiness. As such, the family is described as a
learning and evangelizing community, a “school of virtue” and a “school of deeper
humanity.”174 These functional descriptions suggest possibilities for challenging accounts
of the family based primarily upon structure. Magisterial focus on family structure has
much to do with the particular form of personalism adapted by Paul VI and developed by
John Paul II. In John Paul II’s moral theology, physical and meta-physical are closely
connected. While utilizing personalist arguments John Paul II also tended to route
supernatural goods through the natural order in way that downplayed potential conflicts
or exceptions and occasioned accusations of physicalism. Closer attention to the role of
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cultural assumptions in presumed natural constructions of gender may have inspired more
careful scrutiny of this relationship.
Such an approach also elevates the significance of functional assessments of the
family over family structure. That is, if a community functions like a family and appears
to enjoy the spiritual benefits of a family, theological resources ought to exist for
claiming it as a family or acknowledging similarities. This perspective finds support in
repeated magisterial affirmations that the true meaning of parenthood goes well beyond
biological procreation to spiritual education and service to the common good. Moreover,
when the family is normatively envisioned as a learning and evangelizing community
then moral evaluations of the family rightly consider function because structural
assessments alone are inadequate for evaluating any particular community’ ability to
learn and evangelize.

Chapter 2 argues that revisionist Catholic theologians, who generally disagree
with the magisterium on a number of sexual ethical judgments, also consistently access
concepts of parenthood through prior accounts of sexual ethics and thereby replicate, to
an extent, the biological bias of magisterial thought. That is, revisionist moral theologians
also commonly assume a linear progression from human sexuality, to sexual ethics, to
theology of marriage, to theology of parenthood. This approach similarly results in a
tendency to treat adoption as a peripheral, rather than integral, consideration of the
meaning of Christian parenthood.175 The revisionist authors engaged express general
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concern that magisterial teaching on the family is too tightly linked to the nuclear family
and gendered parental roles, and that it is too idealistic to address adequately the
complexities of lived realities. But, their responses to these concerns are limited by the
tendency to replicate certain lines of thought in the writings they criticize. For example,
the authors surveyed agree that openness to adoption is a positive expression of Christian
parenthood, yet theological explanations of why this is so and how adoptive parenthood
relates to biological parenthood and marriage are consistently under-developed.
Additionally, several revisionist authors defend same-sex parenthood on the basis of
sociological evidence, but offer limited theological support based on the nature of
parenthood itself.
Still, revisionist theologians make valuable contributions to theological reflection
on parenthood given their commitments to experience as a moral guide, to a historically
conscious worldview, and to broadened anthropological frameworks with nuanced
conceptions of human gender. Moreover, revisionists also provide expanded definitions
of ‘procreation’, commitment to justice as a norm for human relationships, and gestures
towards the significance of human capacities are also significant. Lisa Sowle Cahill and
Julie Hanlon Rubio explicitly clarify that the Christian family’s call to discipleship is
rooted in the vocation of the family, not a family’s structure. Both also advocate for more
socially supported and socially engaged families.176 Richard Gaillardetz offers the
Eastern Christian notion of ‘generativity’ as a more promising concept than the dutymay be related to broader cultural shifts. See, Stephen G. Post, “Adoption Theologically Considered,”
Journal of Religious Ethics 25, no. 1 (1997): 149 – 168.
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laden term ‘procreation’ because the former can connect reproduction and social
commitment via a theological conception of the nature of human love.177 The second
chapter concludes that disagreements between magisterial and revisionist conceptions of
parenthood and the family are primarily methodological. They are most pronounced in
matters of sexual ethics but diminish as considerations move toward family function;
specifically the Christian family’s role in society. As such, a more firm and
comprehensive vision of parenthood, that is allowed a degree of distinction from sexual
ethics, has the potential to unite insights from these often disparate Catholic sources
while also coherently addressing present realities.

Chapter 3 argues that Western Christian history witnesses to myriad ways of
providing care for children while conceptions of children and childhood have continually
shifted. Caregiving practices have included forms of kin guardianship, non-maternally
centered domestic caregiving, spiritual interpretations of ‘true’ motherhood, and diverse
adoption practices. Modern conceptions of the family are largely indebted to cultural
conceptions of childhood which encouraged emphasis on gendered parental roles and
associate caregiving capabilities with the nature of womanhood.178
Throughout Christian history, biological kinship if often central but faith-based
interpretations of kinship serve as a powerful resources for supporting non-biological
caregiving. Whether biological kinship or the willingness to construct kinship based on
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other’s needs is the more fundamental Christian ideal remains an open question. The
priority of biological kinship is often suggested throughout Western Christian history
however biology relatedness alone has never been singly determinative of kinship.
Christian kinship is also a theologically interpreted reality. At times, basic Christian
commitments to responding to the needs of others provided bases for constructing kinship
and explaining caregiving practices.

Chapter 4 began an exploration of non-theological contemporary resources by
engaging sociological and psychological studies of family function and child wellbeing.
A major challenge of assessing this research involves acknowledging both the
measureable benefits of ‘traditional’ families for children while carefully parsing the
complexities of familial diversity. Available social scientific evidence strongly indicates
that stable nuclear families based in marriage promote child wellbeing. However,
drawing broad and exclusionary conclusions from this data masks important
complexities. For example, the emphasis placed on parental gender complementarity
within Catholic teaching is an aspect of the traditional family yet this does not
significantly impact measures of children’s wellbeing in comparisons of children raised
by homosexual and heterosexual partners. Of course, social-science research concerns
basic measures of health while the magisterial view of the family emphasizes children’s
moral and spiritual growth.
The most significant point of common ground between the two perspectives is the
importance of stability for child wellbeing. The general agreement between revisionist
and magisterial sources on commitment to open and socially engaged families with
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extended networks of support appears to be one viable means to encourage this stability.
Moreover, present social emphases on achievement and personal happiness have a
negative effect on actually attaining both, while the Catholic vision of the purposes and
function of the family may provide a valuable corrective. Yet such suggestions need to be
expressed against the reality of social conditions, including, for example, economic
systems that are often at odds with the creation of stable and socially engaged families.

Chapter 5 acknowledged the limited attention children receive as subjects of
theological discourse in their own right then explored philosophical and legal resources
that may aid in correcting this limitation. The chapter presented philosophical
disagreements on the basis of parental responsibilities. The causal approach is dominant
in contemporary Catholic teaching and shares similar limitations but the voluntarist
approach can be individualistic and lacks appreciation of the importance of communal
relationships. Therefore, a mixed approach provides a more adequate representation of
traditional Christian commitments.
In light of contemporary developments in children’s rights a need exists for
making the human dignity of children a central aspect of any conception of parenthood.
This requires, at least, significant revisions to aspects of rights language which is
indebted to adult experience. However, the human rights tradition does help to explain
why parental responsibility is not merely a matter of choice, but is owed to children on
account of their needs and dignity.
The mixed approach to parental responsibilities is further clarified by insisting
that adoptive families are a ‘positive’ form of family. First, although many individuals
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may desire to be parents to particular children, the decision of who should parent needs to
be made on the basis of children’s own wellbeing. Second, research on adoptive families
calls attention to the importance of grounding parenthood in right intentions and
sufficient capabilities. Third, the term ‘parenthood’ itself needs sufficient expansion to
account for communal investments in childrearing as well as non-parent adults who
function in parental ways within the lives of specific children.
Chapter 5 also considered the ‘Capabilities Approach’ developed by Martha
Nussbaum as a resource for a more comprehensive theological conception of parenthood.
The ‘basic capability’ of ‘affiliation’ is most pertinent as it most directly concerns
interpersonal relationships. Affiliation names the basic human reality that grounds
parenthood and assists in conceiving of parenthood as a dynamic capability. The
capability of affiliation can account for both child development and the changing nature
of parenthood through the course of a lifetime. Where Catholic teaching has been
criticized for emphasizing procreation over the actual rearing of children, affiliation
offers a more developmental foundation for conceiving of parenthood as an ongoing
personal relationship. Parenthood is both largely voluntary and dynamic. As such,
parenthood itself is a process of developing certain human potentials. This development
is ongoing as the parental relationship grows and changes with time. Nonetheless,
parenthood requires certain internal capacities and external factors.
Utilizing Nussbaum’s approach has two notable implications for a Catholic
theological account of parenthood. First, it can accept the objective validity of particular
lines of argument against same-sex parenthood, but would also evaluate such claims
against evidence and with concern for the dignity of potential same-sex parents. Second,
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Capabilities Approach aids in articulating why adoption is considered a positive form of
family while also casting doubt on arguments opposing transracial and international
adoption.

Part II: Basis for a Child-Centered and Functional Account of Parenthood
This project criticized contemporary modes of Catholic discourse on parenthood
and explored resources that help substantiate a more adequate contemporary theological
approach. Throughout, it consistently claimed that any such contemporary theology of
parenthood should be based on considerations of children’s wellbeing as well as the
capabilities of adult caregivers. It draws from natural law tradition and modern
personalist moral theology the belief than any moral prohibition must be based on what is
truly contrary to the human person. Consequently, the dissertation draws insights from
history, the social sciences, and the humanities to give depth to this preliminary reflection
on the moral-theological foundations of parenthood. A number of observations about the
nature of parenthood followed.
Throughout the modern era and particularly after Humanae vitae, sexual ethics
has played an increasingly important role in Catholic conceptions of parenthood. Since
this encyclical, magisterial teaching has repeated asserted sexual ethical norms,
particularly the prohibition of contraception, while parenthood has been largely defined
by biological procreation. Although this is a distinctive trend, it is based in tendencies
rather than an explicit theological turn. Aspects of the tradition contrary to this trend were
retained, asserted, and even recovered during this period. Examples include the
convictions that adoptive parenthood is a paradigmatic expression of the nature of
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Christian parenthood, that the most important function of the Christian parent is the
spiritual education of children, that families are versatile and open social units which
function over time, and that all people have nurturing and caregiving capacities. Yet these
are not the dominant themes of contemporary magisterial discourse on parenthood. While
biological kinship, marriage-based family structure, and moral means of procreation
remain important to Catholic reflections on parenthood, their recent dominance has
overshadowed other significant ideals.
An account of Christian parenthood centered in child wellbeing and adult
capabilities should rest most centrally on a commitment to care for the spiritual
development of particular children to the best of one’s abilities. This conception implies
care for the physical, emotional, and educational needs of children when it is guided by
the moral pursuit of authentic human flourishing and understands children fundamentally
as gifts from God.179 Christian parents, most importantly, help their children find
friendship with God and therefore Christian parenthood is a form of evangelization.180
Promoting the spiritual development of children is the central task of Christian
parenthood from the simple fact the Christianity proposes relationship with God as the
highest good and ultimate goal of all people. However, spiritual development is reliant
upon physical care, emotional development, and educational advancement to reach its
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fullest human extent.181 This teleological perspective on human life also may be why the
developmental model of childhood has remained persuasive throughout the Christian
tradition.182
Consideration of the theological nature of Christian parenthood presumes that
Christian parenthood is to some extent unique from ‘natural’ parenthood or from other
cultural and religious conceptions. Early Christian testimonies show that Christians
within the Roman empire were, in fact, differentiated from the broader culture by the
fluidity with which they constructed (and at times deconstructed) kin obligations.183
Christians both disavowed families of birth and named fellow Christians their sisters and
brothers. Early Christians also valued the dignity of each individual human life and felt
called to care for orphans. Upon gaining political power, Christian emperors created new
sanctions against infanticide184 although the practice of exposure continued for some
time.185 Reproductive morality was also clearly a factor in early Christian perspectives on
parenthood, though this was bound with body-rejecting dispositions acquired largely
from mixing strands of Greek philosophy with eschatological religious expectations.
Belief in the distinctiveness of Christian parenthood is confirmed by this historical
evidence. It is quite clear that early Christian conceptions of parenthood were formed in a
181
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dialogue with the surrounding culture, sometimes accepting and sometimes rejecting its
ideals. But Christians also firmly asserted their commitment to the fundamental dignity of
the child, care for those in need, willfully constructing of kinship, and moral regulation of
sexuality and reproduction.
In light of this history, it is important to add to the foundation of Christian
parenthood the observation that all kinship is interpreted kinship, and that different times
and places have tended to make different interpretations of the same underlying realities.
Biological maternity and paternity have generally formed the basis of conceptions of the
family and parenthood. But this general consistency in interpretation does not prove
inherent meaning, which is particularly important to acknowledge when identifying the
distinctiveness of Christian kinship in its willingness to interpret kinship “against
nature.”186
Christian willingness to make kinship beyond biological relatedness is distinctive
for going beyond what is ‘natural.’ This idea of acting in excess of nature is itself based
on the Pauline conception of God’s work of salvation for the Gentiles. Paul writes, “For
if [the Gentiles] were cut from what is by nature a wild olive tree, and grafted, contrary
to nature, into a cultivated one, how much more will [the Jews] who belong to it by
nature be grafted back into their own olive tree.”187 To lose sight of the excess of God’s
plan of salvation beyond what is ‘natural’ is to lose sight of the eschatological edge of the
Christian tradition that proclaims God’s grace in a yet-unfinished world. For this reason,
186
As Eugene Rogers points out, Paul at times uses the term ‘against nature’ to call attention to
significant religious goods that are go beyond nature. Paul points to circumcision as a command of God
that goes ‘against nature’ (Romans, 2:27), as well as his Christian outreach to the Gentiles, which
unnaturally grafts them as branches onto the pure tree of Israel (Romans, 11:24). Rogers, 64 – 65.
187

Romans, 11:24, NASBRE.

406

a Christian conception of parenthood must be able to accept a certain natural ordering of
kinship and the family, while also remaining willing to transcend biological kinship. This
transcendence is a hallmark of early Christian attitudes towards kinship, in contrast to the
surrounding Jewish culture.
For this reason, the voluntarist account of parenthood, which asserts that
parenthood is based upon a decision to parent, has a certain fitness for the Christian
perspective on parenthood. On the other hand, the Catholic tradition’s belief in the
essential cooperation of the natural and supernatural orders (nature and grace) should not
be discounted as this relates to human kinship. This complimentary relationship
theologically warrants a positive evaluation of biological kinship. What is naturally the
case (e.g. that biological kinship tends to form the foundation for interpretations of kin
obligation) should not be disparaged even as it may be legitimately critiqued and
expanded in light of Christian convictions.
Consequently, Christian parenthood is best represented by a mix of the voluntarist
and causal approaches. The strength of the causal approach is the centrality it gives to
children’s needs and the respect it affords the human dignity of the child. Yet, the causal
account can presume too much about parental fitness based on the mere fact or biological
procreation and can lose sight of the importance of decisive commitments made in
response to the needs of a particular child. A blended approach admits that non-biological
kin may embody Christian parenthood in its fullness, even as biological procreation is
generally the basis for Christian parenthood. In either instance, a decision to parent is
made in response to a particular child’s needs.
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This approach to Christian parenthood stands in basic agreement with that of
Stephen Post, who is likewise concerned to argue for the theological good of adoptive
parenthood. Post writes,
Adoption does not exist side by side with the requirement that biological parents rear their
offspring, as though birth parents might select one option of the other under ordinary
circumstances. There are, however, limited ranges of circumstances under which prima facie
duties may be set aside… While adoption is, then, a secondary option, Christianity nevertheless
solemnizes it and ensconces it theologically as the right response to the child in need. 188

The decision to parent a child is itself a decision to care for that child. This does not make
all caregivers parents, but does imply that all who nurture children participate to some
extent in the reality of parenthood. In the Christian context, this is particularly true of all
who voluntarily commit to nurturing a child’s spiritual growth. That is, many who
‘parent’ are not ‘a parent’ to a specific child.
That Christian parenthood is in fact a reality in which people participate in
different forms is suggested in a number of ways. First, Christian tradition and Western
culture include naming variations of parenthood, most notably ‘grandparent’ and
‘godparent,’ which suggest that these forms of kinship somehow participate in the reality
of parenthood itself. Second, while the Catholic tradition has long valued education and
associated it with the primary duty of parenthood, it has also established schools which
move this responsibility beyond immediate parental supervision. Consequently, while the
duty to educate well remains vested in parenthood, others may participate in its
accomplishment.189 And third, Catholicism’s long association with orphan care
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demonstrates that fitness to provide ‘parental’ care for children has not historically been
associated with biological relatedness alone or with adult marital status. At times,
prospective women religious have even been recruited with the promise of making use of
their ‘motherly’ instincts in the operation of orphan asylums.190 Frequently, orphan care
has been provided not because no living relative existed, but because the ones who did
were considered, by themselves or others, unfit for the care of small children. As such,
the daily obligations for care that parenthood involves have often been transferred to
those with a greater ability to provide adequate care for a child. Therefore, the Christian
tradition itself relativizes kinship obligations based on biological relatedness by
acknowledging the parental nature of some non-parent adults, not compelling parents to
meet all their children’s needs personally, and by creating institutions of care giving not
based on biological kinship.
Conceiving of parenthood as a reality that can be participated in by degrees rather
than an all-or-nothing institution helps to explain why Christian parenthood finds its basis
in children’s needs and adult capabilities. Following Kant’s moral dictum “ought implies
can,” a person cannot morally assent to an obligation which they cannot fulfill; either
because they are incapable or do not reasonably have the means of becoming capable.191
That is, one cannot assume the capability of a particular biological nuclear family to

in The Best Love of the Child: Being Loved and Being Taught to Love as the First Human Right, ed.,
Timothy P Jackson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 179 – 196.
190
Annelies van Heijst, Models of Charitable Care: Catholic Nuns and Children in their Care in
Amsterdam, 1852-2002 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008), 55. It is notable that the advertisement what set in
the context of offering a possibility for the young woman to use the motherly skills with which they are
naturally endowed “and yet keep her entire heart free for God.”
191

Cf. Post, 154.

409

parent a child any more than a particular single mother without knowledge of the family
unit’s particular circumstances and resources. The need for capability is particularly
important when considering parenthood; an obligation of supervision for the spiritual
development of a gift from God, and all that this entails. Although biological parents hold
a prima facia duty to parent, this can be set aside for serious reasons. On the other hand,
the human capacity for growth and adaptation in capabilities must also be taken seriously.
Parents frequently feel overwhelmed at the challenges of the task that faces them.
A functional account of parenthood could exacerbate these anxieties. But parents also
develop skills adapted to the specific challenges they encounter, skills they likely would
not have developed without their experience of parenting particular children. In addition,
circumstances can change significantly over the course of a child’s development;
therefore assessment of parental capability must attend to reasonably foreseeable
developments and adaptations in parental abilities.192 On the other hand, the dignity and
wellbeing of the child is also a central factor for considerations of parenthood. That is,
parenthood exists because children need adult relationships which will provide them care
and protect their best interests. The Vatican has rightly asserted that the adult desire to
parent can never itself be claimed as a positive right.193 Conversely, care for children in
need may well be asserted as a duty for anyone who is able.
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Not to be overlooked in this consideration of capabilities and obligations to care
are those who reasonably and in light of circumstance surrender parental duties out of
concern for a child’s best interest. Tragic circumstances may lead to this decision, but
such a parent fulfills the obligations of parenthood in their choice. In fact, in recognizing
that biological kinship does not itself bind parenthood, biological parents who place their
children in the care of others, in light of the child’s needs and their capabilities, truly
respond to the Christian vision of parenthood.194 Thus, an authentic understanding of
Christian parenthood may lead to family dissolution as well as family formation; even as
the circumstances for the former may be more tragic than joyous.
The central role of marriage and the biological family in providing the context for
Christian parenthood throughout history must also be noted. However absolutism about
the biological nuclear family as the normative context for parenthood is limited by two
important realities. First, the family has not been immune to change throughout history,
but in fact has consistently adapted to social, economic and other pressures. Second,
Christians have freely and consistently chosen to care for children without the ties of
biological kinship and beyond the bounds of the nuclear family. As such, while this
conception of parenthood is related to it cannot be subsumed by conceptions of the
family.
The shared nature of parental obligations within the nuclear family is also
important to acknowledge. Present arguments that gender complementarity is an essential
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aspect of the family consider this particular mode of sharing parenthood normative.195
However, the veracity of this claim can be questioned in light of both social scientific
evidence and historical realities. Historically, the functions of parenthood have rarely
belonged to one or two individuals alone. Grandparents, godparents, relatives, neighbors,
and siblings have all fulfilled parental duties to various extents for countless children
throughout history. Moreover, only recently has Catholicism come to understand
parenthood as a partnership of equals. Western history has tended to associate the
executive functions of parenthood singly with fathers, who in Catholic theology were
held to be the divinely appointed head of the household.196 Because of this, mothers have
not had equal share in determining how parental obligations are fulfilled. The Romantic
Movement influenced a decisive shift towards viewing women as the centers of true
parenthood, defined in terms of nurture, but simultaneously questioned the long held
presumption of women’s fitness to educate.197 Due to these realities, to take for granted
equitable sharing of parental obligations is far too simplistic given the influence of these
historical patterns. Therefore, in contrast to the complementarian ideal, it is evident that
parental functions have not generally rested on spouses alone, while cultural theories of
gender influence how parental labor is divided between the spouses.
Even as parenting exceeds domestic life alone, because it is primarily a social
function, individual family units remain the central context for Christian parenthood. All
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Christians have an obligation to participate in parenting in accordance with their
capabilities and the needs of children, but not all must be parents of particular children, in
the sense of heading a family unit. At the same time, structural definitions of the family
ought to remain elusive if they are to include all the variations in which the functioning of
parenting might take place. Minimally, family, conceived as a basic social unit in which
Christian parenting exists, i.e. the domestic church, must include intimate caregiving
relationships and a shared striving to towards friendship with God. As caregiving
relationships some individuals fulfill a parenting function in light of the needs of others.
However, greater reciprocity between caregivers and care receivers may be
acknowledged in facilitating friendship with God. Thought this is a very loose definition
of the family, it seems the only structural definition that does not unnecessarily exclude
functional families. Parenthood can be exercised well beyond traditional family structures
and domestic arrangements. Because of this families in the sense of domestic churches
are created whenever and wherever the tasks of Christian parenthood are embraced
within an intimate context in light of the needs of children. Beyond this, authentic
parental functions exist for similar reasons beyond the domestic sphere and stand in an
intimate relationship with these domestic churches. At times, the circumstances for
particular arrangements may be lamentable, but the acceptance of parental obligations for
particular children in need remains an authentically Christian task.

Part III: Prudential Suggestions
How do these commitments to a Christian theological account of parenthood bear
on the case study shared in the Introduction? This section does not make definitive
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recommendations for the US Bishops and Catholic adoption agencies to pursue. Rather, it
attempts to articulate goods that are at stake in these arguments which require more
considered attention.
To review briefly, in recent years Catholic adoption agencies in several US
localities have encountered new legislation that no longer permits discriminating between
married applicants and those in legally recognized same-sex unions or marriages. In
Illinois, this legislation was passed with assurances of an exception for private-religious
organizations that were not honored later. Previously, Catholic agencies had willingly
placed children with same-sex couples, but this was done only after other placement
options had been exhausted. In 2008, Cardinal Levada, Prefect of the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith, clarified that any placements by Catholic adoption agencies
with same-sex couples are morally prohibited by Catholic teaching. The antidiscrimination laws forced the question whether Catholic affiliated private adoption
agencies could continue their partnerships with the public sector given the newly clarified
teaching that these placements were no longer acceptable under any circumstance. In the
ensuing discourse surrounding the legal dispute, Catholic leaders consistently pointed to
religious freedom and the right of every child to a family founded on heterosexual
marriage.198 Little was said about the actual human capacities needed to raise children
well. This project has investigated the presumptions of this discourse, particularly its
emphasis on gender and sexual ethical norms, and has upheld two basic commitments.
First, like all moral evaluations of parenthood, consideration of adoption placement must
center on the best interests of the child and children’s need for stable, permanent families.
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Second, the Catholic Church’s involvement in adoption services is more than a public
and humanitarian service, but functions as a testimony to Church’s own identity.
An initial suggestion is that representatives of the Catholic Church make public
pronouncements regarding same-sex parenthood or other changes in family life with due
care in light of practical considerations as well as persistent biases. Catholic responses to
changes in legislation are based in deep concern for changing patterns of American
family life and social standards, some of which have significant negative repercussions
on child wellbeing.199 Family formation by same-sex adopters clearly departs from
conceptions of the family found in magisterial teaching, yet until very recently, adoptions
by same sex couples were permitted by Catholic agencies, albeit only when particularly
difficult circumstances were thought to warrant such placements. Moreover, the influence
of same-sex adoption on society as a whole is limited due to the relatively small number
of families it affects.200 The loud and public response given to this phenomenon, which
directly impacts only a small percentage of the already small percentage of children who
are in public adoption programs, suggests the issue is driven by more than concern for
children’s wellbeing. The argument that public recognition of same-sex relationships and
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families headed by same-sex partners contributes to a breakdown in cultural
understanding of the reality of marriage has often been raised, but meets certain
challenges. First, it can suggest the cultural conceptions of marriage and family take
precedence over actual children’s need to find stable loving parents. Second, the actual
negative implications of same-sex parenting on either children or society are difficult to
justify given present social scientific research. Third, this argument can feed cultural
perceptions that the Catholic Church’s leadership is primarily a vanguard of outdated
social sexual conventions. Concerns about sexual ethics and gender do over-determine
Catholic responses to same-sex parenthood and this weakens the likelihood that Catholic
commitments to the nature of parenthood apart from these factors will be taken seriously.
Attending too closely to sexual ethical matters in objections to same-sex
parenthood risks suggesting that the Catholic Church’s real motive in the argument is not
children’s wellbeing but the assertion of standards of sexual ethical behavior for society
at large.201 Catholic public responses to the phenomenon of same-sex parenting, should
speak first and foremost to this reality as parenting rather than as a disordered sexual
relationships that claims more social rights than they deserve. The tendency to speak
more directly to sexual ethical concerns than to actual parental capabilities significantly
weakens possibility of effectively communicating concerns for child wellbeing. As
Bonnie Miller-McLemore observes, religions are often prone to equate the survival of
particular gender-roles and familial hierarchies with the survival of the faith community
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itself.202 This way of thinking was clearly a factor in the Catholic Church’s negative
response to the changing public roles of women throughout the early twentieth century.
Papal arguments purportedly concerned with defending the dignity of women were
revised significantly by subsequent pontiffs in response to new perceptions of cultural
realities.203 Avoid the perception that the Church is once again standing on the wrong
side of history in order to defend an outdated gender ideology requires an argument with
more careful distinctions and a more nuanced engagement of social scientific data.
Moreover, evaluating parental fitness on the basis of presumed sexual acts within
a relationship suggests an unfair double standard. While Catholic leaders have had much
to say about the moral problems of contraception, the objective moral evaluation of
contraceptive heterosexual sexual acts has never been used to implicate the couples who
practice contraception as categorically unfit for parenthood. Rejecting same-sex
parenthood on the basis of presumed sexual activity easily suggests simplistic moral
dichotomies that fail to recognize the complex aspects of the situation. This is especially
true when considering relatively stable, committed, and monogamous same-sex
relationships which appear to share more in common with their heterosexual married
peers than Catholic leaders have been prone to recognize, especially when considered
from a relational perspective.204 In other words, the greatest challenge to the
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magisterium’s argument against social acceptance of same-sex couples is not an ideology
of sexual freedom, but the apparent existence of happy and socially responsible same-sex
couples. Straw man arguments that fail to engage actual experience are unlikely to
prevail. Moreover, the line of argument suggests a flawed conception of the complexity
of human relationships. While immoral sexual practices may at be significant enough
outweigh the moral goods of a particular relationship, admitting this is different than
declaring that nothing good exists in these relationships on account of the sexual
immorality.205 This follows from the Catholic understanding that sexuality is more than a
drive towards sexual activity itself, but is a factor in the human drive towards
relationships as such.206 If sexuality drives towards a greater relationship, sexual
immorality alone cannot determine the entire moral content of a relationship.
In addition to acknowledging the complexity of same-sex relationships, it is also
important to acknowledge the complex relationships some same-sex couples have with
regard to Christian faith and the Catholic Church. Statements that suggest that such
couples act only out of a desire to possess children, are active participants of an
international ideological agenda, or that they are somehow stealing children away from
heterosexual homes must be dropped. Because parenthood is rooted in basic human
capacities and because the Christian tradition views responding to the needs of children
as praiseworthy, hostility towards same-sex couples who seek to offer homes to children
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in need should be replaced with a more generous attitude. Recent magisterial teaching
clearly opposes same-sex parenthood but does not argue that same-sex couples are
categorically incapable of raising Christian children. Present realities witness to many
same-sex couples who do, in fact, desire to raise their children within the Catholic
Church.
Suggestions that same-sex partners are categorically morally corrupt and that their
children are exposed to this corruption must also be avoided more carefully. Inasmuch as
couples tend to keep their sexual lives private from their children, this moral objection is
overly presumptive. The full lives of parents are not known to their children, while it is
evidentially possible for individuals behave immorally in certain areas of their lives while
managing others more appropriately. Social recognitions of partners as parents, in
marriage or same-sex unions, does constitute a presumption of the sexual nature of this
relationship, but children are not generally aware of how that is enacted in particular
sexual acts. For Catholic teaching, the gender and marital status of partners is enough to
categorically judge the sexual acts of unmarried or same-sex partners. Numerous Catholic
theologians have taken issues with this method and conclusions. For example, Margaret
Farley judges that same-sex relationships can meet basic requirements of justice
considered holistically and not on sexual ethical matters alone.207 Considering the mode
of relationship parents tend to have with their children, the basic justice exemplified
within the spousal relationship of same-sex partners seems important even if the sexual
aspect of the relationship is judged morally unacceptable.
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In addition to these concerns, if arguments against same-sex parenthood on the
basis of gender complementarity are to be taken seriously as arguments about parenthood
in its own right, they require greater conceptual distancing from sexual ethical arguments.
Shifting arguments for parental complementarity aware from sexual ethical judgements
necessitates nuancing these arguments more carefully to account for other situations of
caregiving which are morally permitted yet lack married, heterosexual parents. Children
in some forms of institutional care or in the care of single parents do not experience
parental gender complementarity. Moreover, children in the foster care system also lack
the stability that a permanent placement might offer. Without recourse to the specifically
sexual nature of a same-sex adopting couple’s relationship, it is challenging to explain
why placement with a same-sex couple necessarily worsens a child’s situation. Nondiscrimination legislation does place same-sex adopters on equal footing with their
heterosexual married peers. If reliable evidence could show categorically better wellbeing
among children of heterosexual adopters, the argument based on parental
complementarity would be strengthened significantly. For example, if legally recognized
same-sex relationships can be shown to replicate the behavior of their cohabitating rather
than married heterosexual peers, and argument in favor of the general stability of
heterosexual marriage over same-sex unions could be upheld more forcefully.
The argument for parental complementarity is also challenged by the fact that
Catholic teaching has not substantively accounted for present changes in parental gender
roles. There is very little suggestion that men can nurture children directly, despite the
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existence of primary caregiver fathers as a small but historically significant reality. 208
Considering John Paul II’s letter to families Cahill observes “strikingly… the fatherhood
of men is interpreted precisely in relation to by virtue of the maternal role of women.”209
Male success in fatherhood is counted as involvement “in the motherhood of his wife.”210
As many men now partake in more egalitarian parental experiences, such gendered
characterizations unfortunately dismiss human adaptability as well as the developmental
nature of parenthood itself. Interestingly, John Paul II contends that motherly nurture
grows out of women’s experience of bearing children and thereby suggests that parental
traits are to some extent learned through experience. On this basis, it seems greater
attention to human adaptability in fulfilling parental roles is warranted and could
facilitate more nuanced responses to cultural developments.
To conclude, Catholic reactions to non-discrimination legislation on adoption
have appropriately raised concerns that parenthood is not a positive right, that moral
regulation of sexual activity is a traditional aspect of Christian thought on parenthood,
and that the family based in marriage and gender complementarity carries weight in
considerations of parenthood. However, the manner of expressing these convictions
becomes problematic if they are not carefully nuanced and balanced by other legitimate

208
A conception of direct male-nurture cannot be entirely ruled out because it could be implied in
the relatively brief considerations of single-parenthood and is present in statements by the US Catholic
Bishops.
209

Cahill, Family, 94.

210

John Paul II, Letter to Families, #16.

421

concerns.211 Moreover, practical concerns about perceptions of certain lines of argument
warrant greater caution.

Part IV: Looking Forward
This project does not construct a full theological account of parenthood; instead, it
raises particular concerns in response to prevailing Catholic conceptions of parenthood
and explores resources for their reconsideration. In particular, it calls attention to the
dominance of sexual ethics and conceptions of gender which restrict present discourse
concerning the nature of parenthood, particularly as articulated in responses to same-sex
adoption. It also identifies a variety of sources that can fruitfully inform Catholic
conceptions of parenthood. I have argued that renewed contemporary Catholic
conceptions of parenthood could overcome present biases by critically correlating
traditional insights, aspects of contemporary Catholic teaching and theological
scholarship, observations of the social sciences, and arguments from the humanities. The
preceding project endeavored to lay the groundwork for this reconsideration, yet a full
contemporary theological account of parenthood in this manner will require additional
efforts.
First, the research presented here requires testing against diverse opinions both
within and beyond Catholic theology. Second, relationships among the observations and
arguments here presented may well require greater clarification and support. Third,
several topics related to the ideas here presented require further scholarly development.
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These include: first, how the anthropological foundations of parenthood relate to specific
human capabilities and the correlation of these capabilities to human gender; second, how
the Catholic understanding of sacramental marriage relates to other forms of intimate
human relationships from friendship and fraternity, to cohabitation and same-sex
partnerships; and third, how children might be considered moral agents and subjects of
moral analysis in their own right. There are certainly additional research questions
implied in my line of inquiry, but by way of conclusion I will briefly address several
tensions concerning these three questions just enumerated.

Parenthood and the Problematic of Gender
One significant tension throughout this project concerns the relationship between
the human person and the human capability for caregiving, as well as the implications of
human gender for how that capability is developed and expressed. By employing Martha
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and observing historical Christian practices of
caregiving, this project suggested that a basic human capability grounds the capacities
necessary for parenthood. This basic capacity for caregiving is shared, at least in its
essence, by all well-functioning individuals. Nussbaum’s internal capability of
“affiliation” has been identified specifically as an attempt to name and describe this
human potential for parenthood. This is because parenthood requires certain specific
skills, such as responsibility, nurture, empathy, altruism, et al. that appear to stem from
this internal capability.212 Because the capacity to parent springs from a basic capability

212

See, Nussbaum, 33 – 34.

423

for forming relationships it is fitting to name parenthood both as an obligation owed to
children in need as well as a function in which multiple non-parents participate.
However, significant disagreement exists on the extent to which specific parental
skills, dispositions, and attributes are grounded in and reliably shaped by human gender.
Reductionist assertions about the relationship of human gender to the human person
operate at each pole of this discourse.213 The view that parental capabilities and specific
duties of parenthood are essentially governed by gender and the view that parental
capabilities and proclivity for parental behaviors are unshaped by gender both
shortchange the complexities of reality. An adequate approach must attend to the fact that
human gender really does shape dispositions and propensities while maintaining that
fundamental human capabilities are essentially shared by all. Adequate moral
consideration of parenthood should be informed by inherent human capacities and
propensities as well as the malleability of human abilities and the general adaptability of
human persons.
Staking out this middle ground requires attending to certain guidelines. From the
perspective of theological anthropology it must be maintained that certain capabilities are
simply too important to the human person to be the sole domain of a single gender.
Failure to recognize this constitutes a failure to recognize the essential unity of the human
experience and raises significant soteriological concerns.214 Therefore, when a capability
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appears to constitute an essential aspect of personhood, as do Nussbaum’s central
capabilities of practical reason and affiliation, the theological conversation must shift to
how gender shapes its expression, not its existence. From the teleological perspective, the
value of the human capacity for adaptation and development must also be respected. This
attention to change and growth is based in both the observable natural capacity of human
persons to learn and develop in their skills as well as a theological commitment that
understands the Christian life in terms of the process of sanctification or theosis.215 John
Paul II’s suggestions that women develop certain parental capacities associated with
motherhood out of their experience of gestation and infant care and that men too learn to
parent by observing maternal nurture and participating in caregiving provides a
magisterial resource for this line of argument.216 Attention to development and adaptation
is also found among theologians. Commenting on Bonnie Miller-McLemore, Cahill
writes “the fact that women get pregnant and the fact that women nurse babies matter.
These experiences teach women something about self-giving the father simply do not
know naturally.” But Cahill adds, caregiving is not inaccessible to those who do not have
these experiences; it is not “privileged knowledge” but knowledge meant to be shared.217
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Framing parenthood within commitments to the unity of the human experience
and the human potential for development does not settle the problematic of gender but
does mark out important parameters. If the ability of parental functioning relies on both
common human capabilities and the development of these through experience, it is
difficult to imagine motherhood and fatherhood as essentially dichotomous realities
without excluding non-biological mothers from authentic motherhood. Moreover,
because single parenthood, adoptive parenthood, and care for children by vowed religious
have all been accepted without protest on the grounds of parental capabilities, the human
capacity for caregiving does not appear to be essentially related to gender
complementarity among caregivers. But parenthood is also an embodied activity and
therefore gender differentiation cannot be entirely ignored. Cahill notes that embodied
human gender difference is a relatively stable component of the human experience and
consequently shapes numerous social institutions. As such, she suggests a dual approach
that takes “a critical and normative stance” toward human embodiedness. Cahill argues
that gendered difference is a “moral project” that represents “more opportunity than
limit.”218 For these reasons, contemporary discussions of parenthood rest on an
anthropological tension between the observable realities of human embodiedness and
human potential. Each of these requires sustained attention.

The Relationship between Marriage and other Human Relationships
Contemporary Catholic teaching views legal recognition of same-sex unions as a
direct threat to healthy families because it constitutes public recognition of these unions
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as equal, or at least similar, to marriage when they cannot “even in an analogous or
remote sense” fulfill the meaning of marriage.219 This line of argument raises two specific
concerns. First, the argument does not rule out the possibility that same-sex relationships
can possess and exhibit various goods. Instead the argument construes same-sex
relationships as morally distinct, in a total sense, from marriage. Perhaps by attending to
the values same-sex partners identify in their own relationships, and avoiding sweeping
condemnations, the Catholic magisterium could place itself in a stronger position to
explain the virtues of sacramental marriage. Shifting attention away from the immorality
of same-sex relationships and towards comparing perceived goods in light of the good of
marriage could also help overcome the challenge of speaking to experiential observations
of apparent virtues within same-sex partnerships, such as love, commitment, stability,
and mutual support. However, this shift in perspective would necessitate returning to the
recognition of potential interpersonal benefits of same-sex partnerships tacitly admitted in
Persona humana. It would also require a more nuanced analysis of potential relational
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goods in relation to the moral judgment about the sexual nature of these relationships.220
Second, a blanket assertion regarding the absence of analogy between heterosexual and
same sex relationships raises serious questions about marriage’s relation to other forms of
human relationships, specifically in its sacramental quality. Michael Himes argues that
the Catholic sacramental tradition is based upon specific recognition and celebration of
the universal and ever-present reality of grace.221 In certain times and places humans
recognize this presence of grace acutely. The seven sacraments represent a communal
naming of particular events as representative of God’s way of acting in relation to
creation. In light of this perspective, Himes describes the marriage’s sacramental nature
by marriage’s paradigmatic expression of the universal mode of loving human
relationships.222 Sacramental marriage is not unique because it is unlike other forms of
relationship but is sacramental precisely in its relationship to other human relationships as
a recognizable expression of a universal reality. From this perspective, it is seemingly
incomprehensible to assert that any relationship that fosters love, commitment, selfsacrifice, or other goods associated with marriage is not be in some way analogous to
marriage.
Yet, from the moral perspective, some contend that no true virtues are found
without conformity in intention to objective moral truth. Just as brave actions in criminal
activity are not true bravery, love and commitment within disordered sexual partnerships
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are not true love and commitment.223 As such there appears to be a basic tension between
the sacramental understanding of marriage in relation to other human relationships and
the moral understanding of marriage in relation to other human relationships. From the
moral perspective, objections to comparisons between same-sex relationships and
marriage often have recourse to the assertion that same-sex couples lack sexual
complementarity which is requisite for truly human sexual expression and marital love.224
This perspective is then dependent on an assertion of objective truth about the nature of
human sexual difference to which all virtuous sexual acts must conform. Sacramentally
considered, however, marriage is intrinsically connected to the human capacity for loving
relationships, and is sacramental specifically by that fact. From this perspective, it
appears that all human relationships are at least in some measure analogies to marriage.
Further exploration of this tension in the context of a more nuanced approach to the full
relational realities of same-sex partnerships appears to be an important task.
The less privatized vision of the family advocated by Cahill and Rubio among
others on the basis of Catholic Social Teaching only increases the challenge of explaining
marriage in light of other human relationships.225 Centering concern on the family’s
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social vocation decentralizes procreation as the essential task of Christian families and
suggests greater comparison between socially engaged Christian families and other
human communities that work to advance the common good.226 Accepting the notion of
non-parent parenting further relativizes the absolute necessity of parental gender
complementarity as it points to the reality that multiple adults should rightfully influence
children’s lives.227 As such, the complementarian logic that excludes consideration of
same-sex partnerships as a basis for parenthood requires more thoughtful examination in
relation to its reliance upon a privatized conception of the family that stands in some
tension with the Catholic Social Teaching and the broader tradition.

A Catholic Ethics of Childhood
Christian tradition includes a significant amount of theological reflection on
children and the nature of childhood that requires greater attention and is only recently
being rediscovered. This relative lack of theological and moral attention to children as
legitimate subjects of concern in their own right shows itself in variety ways. Examples
of this lacuna range from theological writings based in male experience which largely
ignore the topics of children and childcare as well feminist theological writings that
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presume children to be wrapped up in the concerns of women. Thankfully, many scholars
now recognize these limitations and are working towards their redress. In magisterial
writings, similar biases have influenced three distinct trends in addressing children. The
first, as in much modern theology, simply places the topic of children under the concerns
of the family. Care for the child is often divided among gendered lines with nurture,
especially centered on young children, coming from the mother and provision and
education coming from the father. This approach consistently suggests that we simply
know what children are without actually offering a conception of children or
childhood.228 Such an approach is liable to assume cultural ideals in the place of
thoughtful theological commitments.
The second trend is evident in the strong ‘natalist’ bent of modern teaching. Todd
David Whitmore writes, that this natalism “tends to focus on the gift of creation
expressed in procreation at the expense of how it manifests itself at other stages of
life.”229 As evidence of this point, moral concerns over procreation, reproductive
technologies, and protection of the unborn dominate contemporary Catholic teaching
related to childhood. An adequate contemporary account of parenthood demands a more
significant and sustained attention to theological reflection on the nature of childhood and
children throughout their development. Within the American context, the lack of direct
attention to childhood is further exacerbated by biases within the reception of magisterial
teaching. Rubio argues that none of the dominant American patterns of interpreting
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Catholic Social Teaching pay due attention to the place of the family within the corpus of
these teachings.230 She advocates for a social ethics “of everyday life” that can move
beyond social analysis to engage the realities; presumably including the realities of caring
for children throughout their developmental process.231
The final trend has been a tendency to translate concern for children’s wellbeing
quickly into rights claims. There are significant reasons to question the application of
rights language to children in as much as rational free adults are the original subjects of
this perspective. Additionally, rights language has been widely criticized as a rather
sparse tool for asserting ethical claims which respect the full dignity and complexity of
the human person. Without more sustained attention to theological reflections on children
and childhood, rights claims remain one of the few available tools for expressing
legitimate concern for children even as it does so imperfectly.
Among the various concerns raised by this project, ongoing pursuit of this line of
research points towards the needs to advance the scholarly conversations on the
relationship of gender and parenthood, the relationship of marriage to other human
relationships, and children as legitimate subjects of moral reflection.
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